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I.

What is Cyberspace? Who Regulates It?

American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
Per curiam
[Editor’s note: per Congress’ request, litigation against the Communications Decency Act
proceeded to a three judge district court panel. This excerpt is Section II of that court’s
decision, the Findings of Fact. The litigants stipulated to the first 48 paragraphs of these
factual findings, and the remainder was issued per curiam.]
…The Nature of Cyberspace
The Creation of the Internet and the Development of Cyberspace
1. The Internet is not a physical or tangible entity, but rather a giant network which
interconnects innumerable smaller groups of linked computer networks. It is thus a
network of networks. This is best understood if one considers what a linked group of
computers—referred to here as a “network”—is, and what it does. Small networks are now
ubiquitous (and are often called “local area networks”). For example, in many United States
Courthouses, computers are linked to each other for the purpose of exchanging files and
messages (and to share equipment such as printers). These are networks.
2. Some networks are “closed” networks, not linked to other computers or networks. Many
networks, however, are connected to other networks, which are in turn connected to other
networks in a manner which permits each computer in any network to communicate with
computers on any other network in the system. This global Web of linked networks and
computers is referred to as the Internet.
3. The nature of the Internet is such that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to determine
its size at a given moment. It is indisputable, however, that the Internet has experienced
extraordinary growth in recent years. In 1981, fewer than 300 computers were linked to the
Internet, and by 1989, the number stood at fewer than 90,000 computers. By 1993, over
1,000,000 computers were linked. Today, over 9,400,000 host computers worldwide, of
which approximately 60 percent located within the United States, are estimated to be
linked to the Internet. This count does not include the personal computers people use to
access the Internet using modems. In all, reasonable estimates are that as many as 40
million people around the world can and do access the enormously flexible communication
Internet medium. That figure is expected to grow to 200 million Internet users by the year
1999.
4. Some of the computers and computer networks that make up the Internet are owned by
governmental and public institutions, some are owned by non-profit organizations, and
some are privately owned. The resulting whole is a decentralized, global medium of
communications—or “cyberspace”—that links people, institutions, corporations, and
governments around the world. The Internet is an international system. This
communications medium allows any of the literally tens of millions of people with access to
the Internet to exchange information. These communications can occur almost
instantaneously, and can be directed either to specific individuals, to a broader group of
people interested in a particular subject, or to the world as a whole.
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5. The Internet had its origins in 1969 as an experimental project of the Advanced Research
Project Agency (“ARPA”), and was called ARPANET. This network linked computers and
computer networks owned by the military, defense contractors, and university laboratories
conducting defense-related research. The network later allowed researchers across the
country to access directly and to use extremely powerful supercomputers located at a few
key universities and laboratories. As it evolved far beyond its research origins in the United
States to encompass universities, corporations, and people around the world, the
ARPANET came to be called the “DARPA Internet,” and finally just the “Internet.”
6. From its inception, the network was designed to be a decentralized, self-maintaining
series of redundant links between computers and computer networks, capable of rapidly
transmitting communications without direct human involvement or control, and with the
automatic ability to re-route communications if one or more individual links were damaged
or otherwise unavailable. Among other goals, this redundant system of linked computers
was designed to allow vital research and communications to continue even if portions of the
network were damaged, say, in a war.
7. To achieve this resilient nationwide (and ultimately global) communications medium, the
ARPANET encouraged the creation of multiple links to and from each computer (or
computer network) on the network. Thus, a computer located in Washington, D.C., might be
linked (usually using dedicated telephone lines) to other computers in neighboring states or
on the Eastern seaboard. Each of those computers could in turn be linked to other
computers, which themselves would be linked to other computers.
8. A communication sent over this redundant series of linked computers could travel any of
a number of routes to its destination. Thus, a message sent from a computer in Washington,
D.C., to a computer in Palo Alto, California, might first be sent to a computer in
Philadelphia, and then be forwarded to a computer in Pittsburgh, and then to Chicago,
Denver, and Salt Lake City, before finally reaching Palo Alto. If the message could not
travel along that path (because of military attack, simple technical malfunction, or other
reason), the message would automatically (without human intervention or even knowledge)
be re-routed, perhaps, from Washington, D.C. to Richmond, and then to Atlanta, New
Orleans, Dallas, Albuquerque, Los Angeles, and finally to Palo Alto. This type of
transmission, and re-routing, would likely occur in a matter of seconds.
9. Messages between computers on the Internet do not necessarily travel entirely along the
same path. The Internet uses “packet switching” communication protocols that allow
individual messages to be subdivided into smaller “packets” that are then sent
independently to the destination, and are then automatically reassembled by the receiving
computer. While all packets of a given message often travel along the same path to the
destination, if computers along the route become overloaded, then packets can be re-routed
to less loaded computers.
10. At the same time that ARPANET was maturing (it subsequently ceased to exist),
similar networks developed to link universities, research facilities, businesses, and
individuals around the world. These other formal or loose networks included BITNET,
CSNET, FIDONET, and USENET. Eventually, each of these networks (many of which
overlapped) were themselves linked together, allowing users of any computers linked to any
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one of the networks to transmit communications to users of computers on other networks. It
is this series of linked networks (themselves linking computers and computer networks)
that is today commonly known as the Internet.
11. No single entity—academic, corporate, governmental, or non-profit—administers the
Internet. It exists and functions as a result of the fact that hundreds of thousands of
separate operators of computers and computer networks independently decided to use
common data transfer protocols to exchange communications and information with other
computers (which in turn exchange communications and information with still other
computers). There is no centralized storage location, control point, or communications
channel for the Internet, and it would not be technically feasible for a single entity to
control all of the information conveyed on the Internet.
How Individuals Access the Internet
12. Individuals have a wide variety of avenues to access cyberspace in general, and the
Internet in particular. In terms of physical access, there are two common methods to
establish an actual link to the Internet. First, one can use a computer or computer terminal
that is directly (and usually permanently) connected to a computer network that is itself
directly or indirectly connected to the Internet. Second, one can use a “personal computer”
with a “modem” to connect over a telephone line to a larger computer or computer network
that is itself directly or indirectly connected to the Internet. As detailed below, both direct
and modem connections are made available to people by a wide variety of academic,
governmental, or commercial entities.
13. Students, faculty, researchers, and others affiliated with the vast majority of colleges
and universities in the United States can access the Internet through their educational
institutions. Such access is often via direct connection using computers located in campus
libraries, offices, or computer centers, or may be through telephone access using a modem
from a student’s or professor’s campus or off-campus location. Some colleges and
universities install “ports” or outlets for direct network connections in each dormitory room
or provide access via computers located in common areas in dormitories. Such access
enables students and professors to use information and content provided by the college or
university itself, and to use the vast amount of research resources and other information
available on the Internet worldwide.
14. Similarly, Internet resources and access are sufficiently important to many corporations
and other employers that those employers link their office computer networks to the
Internet and provide employees with direct or modem access to the office network (and thus
to the Internet). Such access might be used by, for example, a corporation involved in
scientific or medical research or manufacturing to enable corporate employees to exchange
information and ideas with academic researchers in their fields.
15. Those who lack access to the Internet through their schools or employers still have a
variety of ways they can access the Internet. Many communities across the country have
established “free-nets” or community networks to provide their citizens with a local link to
the Internet (and to provide local-oriented content and discussion groups). The first such
community network, the Cleveland Free-Net Community Computer System, was
established in 1986, and free-nets now exist in scores of communities as diverse as
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Richmond, Virginia, Tallahassee, Florida, Seattle, Washington, and San Diego, California.
Individuals typically can access free-nets at little or no cost via modem connection or by
using computers available in community buildings. Free-nets are often operated by a local
library, educational institution, or non-profit community group.
16. Individuals can also access the Internet through many local libraries. Libraries often
offer patrons use of computers that are linked to the Internet. In addition, some libraries
offer telephone modem access to the libraries’ computers, which are themselves connected
to the Internet. Increasingly, patrons now use library services and resources without ever
physically entering the library itself. Libraries typically provide such direct or modem
access at no cost to the individual user.
17. Individuals can also access the Internet by patronizing an increasing number of
storefront “computer coffee shops,” where customers—while they drink their coffee—can
use computers provided by the shop to access the Internet. Such Internet access is typically
provided by the shop for a small hourly fee.
18. Individuals can also access the Internet through commercial and non-commercial
“Internet service providers” that typically offer modem telephone access to a computer or
computer network linked to the Internet. Many such providers—including the members of
plaintiff Commercial Internet Exchange Association—are commercial entities offering
Internet access for a monthly or hourly fee. Some Internet service providers, however, are
non-profit organizations that offer free or very low cost access to the Internet. For example,
the International Internet Association offers free modem access to the Internet upon
request. Also, a number of trade or other non-profit associations offer Internet access as a
service to members.
19. Another common way for individuals to access the Internet is through one of the major
national commercial “online services” such as America Online, CompuServe, the Microsoft
Network, or Prodigy. These online services offer nationwide computer networks (so that
subscribers can dial-in to a local telephone number), and the services provide extensive and
well organized content within their own proprietary computer networks. In addition to
allowing access to the extensive content available within each online service, the services
also allow subscribers to link to the much larger resources of the Internet. Full access to the
online service (including access to the Internet) can be obtained for modest monthly or
hourly fees. The major commercial online services have almost twelve million individual
subscribers across the United States.
20. In addition to using the national commercial online services, individuals can also access
the Internet using some (but not all) of the thousands of local dial-in computer services,
often called “bulletin board systems” or “BBSs.” With an investment of as little as $2,000.00
and the cost of a telephone line, individuals, non-profit organizations, advocacy groups, and
businesses can offer their own dial-in computer “bulletin board” service where friends,
members, subscribers, or customers can exchange ideas and information. BBSs range from
single computers with only one telephone line into the computer (allowing only one user at
a time), to single computers with many telephone lines into the computer (allowing multiple
simultaneous users), to multiple linked computers each servicing multiple dial-in telephone
lines (allowing multiple simultaneous users). Some (but not all) of these BBS systems offer
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direct or indirect links to the Internet. Some BBS systems charge users a nominal fee for
access, while many others are free to the individual users.
21. Although commercial access to the Internet is growing rapidly, many users of the
Internet—such as college students and staff—do not individually pay for access (except to
the extent, for example, that the cost of computer services is a component of college tuition).
These and other Internet users can access the Internet without paying for such access with
a credit card or other form of payment.
Methods to Communicate Over the Internet
22. Once one has access to the Internet, there are a wide variety of different methods of
communication and information exchange over the network. These many methods of
communication and information retrieval are constantly evolving and are therefore difficult
to categorize concisely. The most common methods of communications on the Internet (as
well as within the major online services) can be roughly grouped into six categories:
(1) one-to-one messaging (such as “e-mail”),
(2) one-to-many messaging (such as “listserv”),
(3) distributed message databases (such as “USENET newsgroups”),
(4) real time communication (such as “Internet Relay Chat”),
(5) real time remote computer utilization (such as “telnet”), and
(6) remote information retrieval (such as “ftp,” “gopher,” and the “World Wide Web”).
Most of these methods of communication can be used to transmit text, data, computer
programs, sound, visual images ( i.e., pictures), and moving video images.
23. One-to-one messaging. One method of communication on the Internet is via electronic
mail, or “e-mail,” comparable in principle to sending a first class letter. One can address
and transmit a message to one or more other people. E-mail on the Internet is not routed
through a central control point, and can take many and varying paths to the recipients.
Unlike postal mail, simple e-mail generally is not “sealed” or secure, and can be accessed or
viewed on intermediate computers between the sender and recipient (unless the message is
encrypted).
24. One-to-many messaging. The Internet also contains automatic mailing list services
(such as “listservs”), [also referred to by witnesses as “mail exploders”] that allow
communications about particular subjects of interest to a group of people. For example,
people can subscribe to a “listserv” mailing list on a particular topic of interest to them. The
subscriber can submit messages on the topic to the listserv that are forwarded (via e-mail),
either automatically or through a human moderator overseeing the listserv, to anyone who
has subscribed to the mailing list. A recipient of such a message can reply to the message
and have the reply also distributed to everyone on the mailing list. This service provides the
capability to keep abreast of developments or events in a particular subject area. Most
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listserv-type mailing lists automatically forward all incoming messages to all mailing list
subscribers. There are thousands of such mailing list services on the Internet, collectively
with hundreds of thousands of subscribers. Users of “open” listservs typically can add or
remove their names from the mailing list automatically, with no direct human involvement.
Listservs may also be “closed,” i.e., only allowing for one’s acceptance into the listserv by a
human moderator.
25. Distributed message databases. Similar in function to listservs—but quite different in
how communications are transmitted—are distributed message databases such as
“USENET newsgroups.” User-sponsored newsgroups are among the most popular and
widespread applications of Internet services, and cover all imaginable topics of interest to
users. Like listservs, newsgroups are open discussions and exchanges on particular topics.
Users, however, need not subscribe to the discussion mailing list in advance, but can
instead access the database at any time. Some USENET newsgroups are “moderated” but
most are open access. For the moderated newsgroups, all messages to the newsgroup are
forwarded to one person who can screen them for relevance to the topics under discussion.
USENET newsgroups are disseminated using ad hoc, peer to peer connections between
approximately 200,000 computers (called USENET “servers”) around the world. For
unmoderated newsgroups, when an individual user with access to a USENET server posts a
message to a newsgroup, the message is automatically forwarded to all adjacent USENET
servers that furnish access to the newsgroup, and it is then propagated to the servers
adjacent to those servers, etc. The messages are temporarily stored on each receiving
server, where they are available for review and response by individual users. The messages
are automatically and periodically purged from each system after a time to make room for
new messages. Responses to messages, like the original messages, are automatically
distributed to all other computers receiving the newsgroup or forwarded to a moderator in
the case of a moderated newsgroup. The dissemination of messages to USENET servers
around the world is an automated process that does not require direct human intervention
or review.
26. There are newsgroups on more than fifteen thousand different subjects. In 1994,
approximately 70,000 messages were posted to newsgroups each day, and those messages
were distributed to the approximately 190,000 computers or computer networks that
participate in the USENET newsgroup system. Once the messages reach the approximately
190,000 receiving computers or computer networks, they are available to individual users of
those computers or computer networks. Collectively, almost 100,000 new messages (or
“articles”) are posted to newsgroups each day.
27. Real time communication. In addition to transmitting messages that can be later read
or accessed, individuals on the Internet can engage in an immediate dialog, in “real time”,
with other people on the Internet. In its simplest forms, “talk” allows one-to-one
communications and “Internet Relay Chat” (or IRC) allows two or more to type messages to
each other that almost immediately appear on the others’ computer screens. IRC is
analogous to a telephone party line, using a computer and keyboard rather than a
telephone. With IRC, however, at any one time there are thousands of different party lines
available, in which collectively tens of thousands of users are engaging in conversations on
a huge range of subjects. Moreover, one can create a new party line to discuss a different
topic at any time. Some IRC conversations are “moderated” or include “channel operators.”
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28. In addition, commercial online services such as America Online, CompuServe, the
Microsoft Network, and Prodigy have their own “chat” systems allowing their members to
converse.
29. Real time remote computer utilization. Another method to use information on the
Internet is to access and control remote computers in “real time” using “telnet.” For
example, using telnet, a researcher at a university would be able to use the computing
power of a supercomputer located at a different university. A student can use telnet to
connect to a remote library to access the library’s online card catalog program.
30. Remote information retrieval. The final major category of communication may be the
most well known use of the Internet-the search for and retrieval of information located on
remote computers. There are three primary methods to locate and retrieve information on
the Internet.
31. A simple method uses “ftp” (or file transfer protocol) to list the names of computer files
available on a remote computer, and to transfer one or more of those files to an individual’s
local computer.
32. Another approach uses a program and format named “gopher” to guide an individual’s
search through the resources available on a remote computer.
The World Wide Web
33. A third approach, and fast becoming the most well-known on the Internet, is the “World
Wide Web.” The Web utilizes a “hypertext” formatting language called hypertext markup
language (HTML), and programs that “browse” the Web can display HTML documents
containing text, images, sound, animation and moving video. Any HTML document can
include links to other types of information or resources, so that while viewing an HTML
document that, for example, describes resources available on the Internet, one can “click”
using a computer mouse on the description of the resource and be immediately connected to
the resource itself. Such “hyperlinks” allow information to be accessed and organized in
very flexible ways, and allow people to locate and efficiently view related information even
if the information is stored on numerous computers all around the world.
34. Purpose. The World Wide Web (W3C) was created to serve as the platform for a global,
online store of knowledge, containing information from a diversity of sources and accessible
to Internet users around the world. Though information on the Web is contained in
individual computers, the fact that each of these computers is connected to the Internet
through W3C protocols allows all of the information to become part of a single body of
knowledge. It is currently the most advanced information system developed on the Internet,
and embraces within its data model most information in previous networked information
systems such as ftp, gopher, wais, and Usenet.
35. History. W3C was originally developed at CERN, the European Particle Physics
Laboratory, and was initially used to allow information sharing within internationally
dispersed teams of researchers and engineers. Originally aimed at the High Energy Physics
community, it has spread to other areas and attracted much interest in user support,
resource recovery, and many other areas which depend on collaborative and information
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sharing. The Web has extended beyond the scientific and academic community to include
communications by individuals, non-profit organizations, and businesses.
36. Basic Operation. The World Wide Web is a series of documents stored in different
computers all over the Internet. Documents contain information stored in a variety of
formats, including text, still images, sounds, and video. An essential element of the Web is
that any document has an address (rather like a telephone number). Most Web documents
contain “links.” These are short sections of text or image which refer to another document.
Typically the linked text is blue or underlined when displayed, and when selected by the
user, the referenced document is automatically displayed, wherever in the world it actually
is stored. Links for example are used to lead from overview documents to more detailed
documents, from tables of contents to particular pages, but also as cross-references,
footnotes, and new forms of information structure.
37. Many organizations now have “home pages” on the Web. These are documents which
provide a set of links designed to represent the organization, and through links from the
home page, guide the user directly or indirectly to information about or relevant to that
organization.
38. As an example of the use of links, if these Findings were to be put on a World Wide Web
site, its home page might contain links such as those:
* THE NATURE OF CYBERSPACE
* CREATION OF THE INTERNET AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CYBERSPACE
* HOW PEOPLE ACCESS THE INTERNET
* METHODS TO COMMUNICATE OVER THE INTERNET
39. Each of these links takes the user of the site from the beginning of the Findings to the
appropriate section within this Adjudication. Links may also take the user from the original
Web site to another Web site on another computer connected to the Internet. These links
from one computer to another, from one document to another across the Internet, are what
unify the Web into a single body of knowledge, and what makes the Web unique. The Web
was designed with a maximum target time to follow a link of one tenth of a second.
40. Publishing. The World Wide Web exists fundamentally as a platform through which
people and organizations can communicate through shared information. When information
is made available, it is said to be “published” on the Web. Publishing on the Web simply
requires that the “publisher” has a computer connected to the Internet and that the
computer is running W3C server software. The computer can be as simple as a small
personal computer costing less than $1500 dollars or as complex as a multi-million dollar
mainframe computer. Many Web publishers choose instead to lease disk storage space from
someone else who has the necessary computer facilities, eliminating the need for actually
owning any equipment oneself.
41. The Web, as a universe of network accessible information, contains a variety of
documents prepared with quite varying degrees of care, from the hastily typed idea, to the
professionally executed corporate profile. The power of the Web stems from the ability of a
link to point to any document, regardless of its status or physical location.
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42. Information to be published on the Web must also be formatted according to the rules of
the Web standards. These standardized formats assure that all Web users who want to
read the material will be able to view it. Web standards are sophisticated and flexible
enough that they have grown to meet the publishing needs of many large corporations,
banks, brokerage houses, newspapers and magazines which now publish “online” editions of
their material, as well as government agencies, and even courts, which use the Web to
disseminate information to the public. At the same time, Web publishing is simple enough
that thousands of individual users and small community organizations are using the Web
to publish their own personal “home pages,” the equivalent of individualized newsletters
about that person or organization, which are available to everyone on the Web.
43. Web publishers have a choice to make their Web sites open to the general pool of all
Internet users, or close them, thus making the information accessible only to those with
advance authorization. Many publishers choose to keep their sites open to all in order to
give their information the widest potential audience. In the event that the publishers
choose to maintain restrictions on access, this may be accomplished by assigning specific
user names and passwords as a prerequisite to access to the site. Or, in the case of Web
sites maintained for internal use of one organization, access will only be allowed from other
computers within that organization’s local network.
44. Searching the Web. A variety of systems have developed that allow users of the Web to
search particular information among all of the public sites that are part of the Web.
Services such as Yahoo, Magellan, Altavista, Webcrawler, and Lycos are all services known
as “search engines” which allow users to search for Web sites that contain certain
categories of information, or to search for key words. For example, a Web user looking for
the text of Supreme Court opinions would type the words “Supreme Court” into a search
engine, and then be presented with a list of World Wide Web sites that contain Supreme
Court information. This list would actually be a series of links to those sites. Having
searched out a number of sites that might contain the desired information, the user would
then follow individual links, browsing through the information on each site, until the
desired material is found. For many content providers on the Web, the ability to be found by
these search engines is very important.
45. Common standards. The Web links together disparate information on an ever-growing
number of Internet-linked computers by setting common information storage formats
(HTML) and a common language for the exchange of Web documents (HTTP). Although the
information itself may be in many different formats, and stored on computers which are not
otherwise compatible, the basic Web standards provide a basic set of standards which allow
communication and exchange of information. Despite the fact that many types of computers
are used on the Web, and the fact that many of these machines are otherwise incompatible,
those who “publish” information on the Web are able to communicate with those who seek
to access information with little difficulty because of these basic technical standards.
46. A distributed system with no centralized control. Running on tens of thousands of
individual computers on the Internet, the Web is what is known as a distributed system.
The Web was designed so that organizations with computers containing information can
become part of the Web simply by attaching their computers to the Internet and running
appropriate World Wide Web software. No single organization controls any membership in
the Web, nor is there any single centralized point from which individual Web sites or
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services can be blocked from the Web. From a user’s perspective, it may appear to be a
single, integrated system, but in reality it has no centralized control point.
47. Contrast to closed databases. The Web’s open, distributed, decentralized nature stands
in sharp contrast to most information systems that have come before it. Private information
services such as Westlaw, Lexis/Nexis, and Dialog, have contained large storehouses of
knowledge, and can be accessed from the Internet with the appropriate passwords and
access software. However, these databases are not linked together into a single whole, as is
the World Wide Web.
48. Success of the Web in research, education, and political activities. The World Wide Web
has become so popular because of its open, distributed, and easy-to-use nature. Rather than
requiring those who seek information to purchase new software or hardware, and to learn a
new kind of system for each new database of information they seek to access, the Web
environment makes it easy for users to jump from one set of information to another. By the
same token, the open nature of the Web makes it easy for publishers to reach their
intended audiences without having to know in advance what kind of computer each
potential reader has, and what kind of software they will be using….
72. Although parental control software currently can screen for certain suggestive words or
for known sexually explicit sites, it cannot now screen for sexually explicit images
unaccompanied by suggestive text unless those who configure the software are aware of the
particular site.
73. Despite its limitations, currently available user-based software suggests that a
reasonably effective method by which parents can prevent their children from accessing
sexually explicit and other material which parents may believe is inappropriate for their
children will soon be widely available.
Content on the Internet
74. The types of content now on the Internet defy easy classification. The entire card
catalogue of the Carnegie Library is on-line, together with journals, journal abstracts,
popular magazines, and titles of compact discs. The director of the Carnegie Library, Robert
Croneberger, testified that on-line services are the emerging trend in libraries generally.
Plaintiff Hotwired Ventures LLC organizes its Web site into information regarding travel,
news and commentary, arts and entertainment, politics, and types of drinks. Plaintiff
America Online, Inc., not only creates chat rooms for a broad variety of topics, but also
allows members to create their own chat rooms to suit their own tastes. The ACLU uses an
America Online chat room as an unmoderated forum for people to debate civil liberties
issues. Plaintiffs’ expert, Scott Bradner, estimated that 15,000 newsgroups exist today, and
he described his own interest in a newsgroup devoted solely to Formula 1 racing cars.
America Online makes 15,000 bulletin boards available to its subscribers, who post
between 200,000 and 250,000 messages each day. Another plaintiffs’ expert, Howard
Rheingold, participates in “virtual communities” that simulate social interaction. It is no
exaggeration to conclude that the content on the Internet is as diverse as human thought.
75. The Internet is not exclusively, or even primarily, a means of commercial
communication. Many commercial entities maintain Web sites to inform potential
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consumers about their goods and services, or to solicit purchases, but many other Web sites
exist solely for the dissemination of non-commercial information. The other forms of
Internet communication—e-mail, bulletin boards, newsgroups, and chat rooms—frequently
have non-commercial goals. For the economic and technical reasons set forth in the
following paragraphs, the Internet is an especially attractive means for not-for-profit
entities or public interest groups to reach their desired audiences. There are examples in
the parties’ stipulation of some of the non-commercial uses that the Internet serves.
Plaintiff Human Rights Watch, Inc., offers information on its Internet site regarding
reported human rights abuses around the world. Plaintiff National Writers Union provides
a forum for writers on issues of concern to them. Plaintiff Stop Prisoner Rape, Inc., posts
text, graphics, and statistics regarding the incidence and prevention of rape in prisons.
Plaintiff Critical Path AIDS Project, Inc., offers information on safer sex, the transmission
of HIV, and the treatment of AIDS.
76. Such diversity of content on the Internet is possible because the Internet provides an
easy and inexpensive way for a speaker to reach a large audience, potentially of millions.
The start-up and operating costs entailed by communication on the Internet are
significantly lower than those associated with use of other forms of mass communication,
such as television, radio, newspapers, and magazines. This enables operation of their own
Web sites not only by large companies, such as Microsoft and Time Warner, but also by
small, not-for-profit groups, such as Stop Prisoner Rape and Critical Path AIDS Project.
The Government’s expert, Dr. Dan R. Olsen, agreed that creation of a Web site would cost
between $1,000 and $15,000, with monthly operating costs depending on one’s goals and
the Web site’s traffic. Commercial online services such as America Online allow subscribers
to create Web pages free of charge. Any Internet user can communicate by posting a
message to one of the thousands of newsgroups and bulletin boards or by engaging in an online “chat”, and thereby reach an audience worldwide that shares an interest in a particular
topic.
77. The ease of communication through the Internet is facilitated by the use of hypertext
markup language (HTML), which allows for the creation of “hyperlinks” or “links”. HTML
enables a user to jump from one source to other related sources by clicking on the link. A
link might take the user from Web site to Web site, or to other files within a particular Web
site. Similarly, by typing a request into a search engine, a user can retrieve many different
sources of content related to the search that the creators of the engine have collected.
78. Because of the technology underlying the Internet, the statutory term “content
provider,” which is equivalent to the traditional “speaker,” may actually be a hybrid of
speakers. Through the use of HTML, for example, Critical Path and Stop Prisoner Rape
link their Web sites to several related databases, and a user can immediately jump from the
home pages of these organizations to the related databases simply by clicking on a link.
America Online creates chat rooms for particular discussions but also allows subscribers to
create their own chat rooms. Similarly, a newsgroup gathers postings on a particular topic
and distributes them to the newsgroup’s subscribers. Users of the Carnegie Library can
read on-line versions of Vanity Fair and Playboy, and America Online’s subscribers can
peruse the New York Times, Boating, and other periodicals. Critical Path, Stop Prisoner
Rape, America Online and the Carnegie Library all make available content of other
speakers over whom they have little or no editorial control.
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79. Because of the different forms of Internet communication, a user of the Internet may
speak or listen interchangeably, blurring the distinction between “speakers” and “listeners”
on the Internet. Chat rooms, e-mail, and newsgroups are interactive forms of
communication, providing the user with the opportunity both to speak and to listen.
80. It follows that unlike traditional media, the barriers to entry as a speaker on the
Internet do not differ significantly from the barriers to entry as a listener. Once one has
entered cyberspace, one may engage in the dialogue that occurs there. In the argot of the
medium, the receiver can and does become the content provider, and vice-versa.
81. The Internet is therefore a unique and wholly new medium of worldwide human
communication.
Sexually Explicit Material On the Internet
82. The parties agree that sexually explicit material exists on the Internet. Such material
includes text, pictures, and chat, and includes bulletin boards, newsgroups, and the other
forms of Internet communication, and extends from the modestly titillating to the hardestcore.
83. There is no evidence that sexually-oriented material is the primary type of content on
this new medium. Purveyors of such material take advantage of the same ease of access
available to all users of the Internet, including establishment of a Web site.
84. Sexually explicit material is created, named, and posted in the same manner as
material that is not sexually explicit. It is possible that a search engine can accidentally
retrieve material of a sexual nature through an imprecise search, as demonstrated at the
hearing. Imprecise searches may also retrieve irrelevant material that is not of a sexual
nature. The accidental retrieval of sexually explicit material is one manifestation of the
larger phenomenon of irrelevant search results.
85. Once a provider posts content on the Internet, it is available to all other Internet users
worldwide. Similarly, once a user posts a message to a newsgroup or bulletin board, that
message becomes available to all subscribers to that newsgroup or bulletin board. For
example, when the UCR/California Museum of Photography posts to its Web site nudes by
Edward Weston and Robert Mapplethorpe to announce that its new exhibit will travel to
Baltimore and New York City, those images are available not only in Los Angeles,
Baltimore, and New York City, but also in Cincinnati, Mobile, or Beijing—wherever
Internet users live. Similarly, the safer sex instructions that Critical Path posts to its Web
site, written in street language so that the teenage receiver can understand them, are
available not just in Philadelphia, but also in Provo and Prague. A chat room organized by
the ACLU to discuss the United States Supreme Court’s decision in FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation would transmit George Carlin’s seven dirty words to anyone who enters.
Messages posted to a newsgroup dedicated to the Oklahoma City bombing travel to all
subscribers to that newsgroup.
86. Once a provider posts its content on the Internet, it cannot prevent that content from
entering any community. Unlike the newspaper, broadcast station, or cable system,
Internet technology necessarily gives a speaker a potential worldwide audience. Because
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the Internet is a network of networks (as described above in Findings 1 through 4), any
network connected to the Internet has the capacity to send and receive information to any
other network. Hotwired Ventures, for example, cannot prevent its materials on mixology
from entering communities that have no interest in that topic.
87. Demonstrations at the preliminary injunction hearings showed that it takes several
steps to enter cyberspace. At the most fundamental level, a user must have access to a
computer with the ability to reach the Internet (typically by way of a modem). A user must
then direct the computer to connect with the access provider, enter a password, and enter
the appropriate commands to find particular data. On the World Wide Web, a user must
normally use a search engine or enter an appropriate address. Similarly, accessing
newsgroups, bulletin boards, and chat rooms requires several steps.
88. Communications over the Internet do not “invade” an individual’s home or appear on
one’s computer screen unbidden. Users seldom encounter content “by accident.” A
document’s title or a description of the document will usually appear before the document
itself takes the step needed to view it, and in many cases the user will receive detailed
information about a site’s content before he or she need take the step to access the
document. Almost all sexually explicit images are preceded by warnings as to the content.
Even the Government’s witness, Agent Howard Schmidt, Director of the Air Force Office of
Special Investigation, testified that the “odds are slim” that a user would come across a
sexually explicit site by accident.
89. Evidence adduced at the hearing showed significant differences between Internet
communications and communications received by radio or television. Although content on
the Internet is just a few clicks of a mouse away from the user, the receipt of information on
the Internet requires a series of affirmative steps more deliberate and directed than merely
turning a dial. A child requires some sophistication and some ability to read to retrieve
material and thereby to use the Internet unattended.
Obstacles to Age Verification on the Internet
90. There is no effective way to determine the identity or the age of a user who is accessing
material through e-mail, mail exploders, newsgroups or chat rooms. An e-mail address
provides no authoritative information about the addressee, who may use an e-mail “alias”
or an anonymous remailer. There is also no universal or reliable listing of e-mail addresses
and corresponding names or telephone numbers, and any such listing would be or rapidly
become incomplete. For these reasons, there is no reliable way in many instances for a
sender to know if the e-mail recipient is an adult or a minor. The difficulty of e-mail age
verification is compounded for mail exploders such as listservs, which automatically send
information to all e-mail addresses on a sender’s list. Government expert Dr. Olsen agreed
that no current technology could give a speaker assurance that only adults were listed in a
particular mail exploder’s mailing list.
91. Because of similar technological difficulties, individuals posting a message to a
newsgroup or engaging in chat room discussions cannot ensure that all readers are adults,
and Dr. Olsen agreed. Although some newsgroups are moderated, the moderator’s control is
limited to what is posted and the moderator cannot control who receives the messages.
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92. The Government offered no evidence that there is a reliable way to ensure that
recipients and participants in such fora can be screened for age. The Government presented
no evidence demonstrating the feasibility of its suggestion that chat rooms, newsgroups and
other fora that contain material deemed indecent could be effectively segregated to “adult”
or “moderated” areas of cyberspace.
93. Even if it were technologically feasible to block minors’ access to newsgroups and
similar fora, there is no method by which the creators of newsgroups which contain
discussions of art, politics or any other subject that could potentially elicit “indecent”
contributions could limit the blocking of access by minors to such “indecent” material and
still allow them access to the remaining content, even if the overwhelming majority of that
content was not indecent.
94. Likewise, participants in MUDs (Multi-User Dungeons) and MUSEs (Multi-User
Simulation Environments) do not know whether the other participants are adults or
minors. Although MUDs and MUSEs require a password for permanent participants, they
need not give their real name nor verify their age, and there is no current technology to
enable the administrator of these fantasy worlds to know if the participant is an adult or a
minor.
95. Unlike other forms of communication on the Internet, there is technology by which an
operator of a World Wide Web server may interrogate a user of a Web site. An HTML
document can include a fill-in-the-blank “form” to request information from a visitor to a
Web site, and this information can be transmitted back to the Web server and be processed
by a computer program, usually a Common Gateway Interface (cgi) script. The Web server
could then grant or deny access to the information sought. The cgi script is the means by
which a Web site can process a fill-in form and thereby screen visitors by requesting a
credit card number or adult password.
96. Content providers who publish on the World Wide Web via one of the large commercial
online services, such as America Online or CompuServe, could not use an online age
verification system that requires cgi script because the server software of these online
services available to subscribers cannot process cgi scripts. There is no method currently
available for Web page publishers who lack access to cgi scripts to screen recipients online
for age.
The Practicalities of the Proffered Defenses
Note: The Government contends the CDA makes available three potential defenses to all
content providers on the Internet: credit card verification, adult verification by password or
adult identification number, and “tagging”.
Credit Card Verification
97. Verification of a credit card number over the Internet is not now technically possible.
Witnesses testified that neither Visa nor Mastercard considers the Internet to be
sufficiently secure under the current technology to process transactions in that manner.
Although users can and do purchase products over the Internet by transmitting their credit
card number, the seller must then process the transaction with Visa or Mastercard off-line
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using phone lines in the traditional way. There was testimony by several witnesses that
Visa and Mastercard are in the process of developing means of credit card verification over
the Internet.
98. Verification by credit card, if and when operational, will remain economically and
practically unavailable for many of the non-commercial plaintiffs in these actions. The
Government’s expert “suspect[ed]” that verification agencies would decline to process a card
unless it accompanied a commercial transaction. There was no evidence to the contrary.
99. There was evidence that the fee charged by verification agencies to process a card,
whether for a purchase or not, will preclude use of the credit-card verification defense by
many non-profit, non-commercial Web sites, and there was no evidence to the contrary.
Plaintiffs’ witness Patricia Nell Warren, an author whose free Web site allows users to
purchase gay and lesbian literature, testified that she must pay $1 per verification to a
verification agency. Her Web site can absorb this cost because it arises in connection with
the sale of books available there.
100. Using credit card possession as a surrogate for age, and requiring use of a credit card
to enter a site, would impose a significant economic cost on non-commercial entities.
Critical Path, for example, received 3,300 hits daily from February 4 through March 4,
1996. If Critical Path must pay a fee every time a user initially enters its site, then, to
provide free access to its non-commercial site, it would incur a monthly cost far beyond its
modest resources. The ACLU’s Barry Steinhardt testified that maintenance of a credit card
verification system for all visitors to the ACLU’s Web site would require it to shut down its
Web site because the projected cost would exceed its budget.
101. Credit card verification would significantly delay the retrieval of information on the
Internet. Dr. Olsen, the expert testifying for the Government, agreed that even “a minute is
[an] absolutely unreasonable [delay] ... [P]eople will not put up with a minute.” Plaintiffs’
expert Donna Hoffman similarly testified that excessive delay disrupts the “flow” on the
Internet and stifles both “hedonistic” and “goal-directed” browsing.
102. Imposition of a credit card requirement would completely bar adults who do not have a
credit card and lack the resources to obtain one from accessing any blocked material. At
this time, credit card verification is effectively unavailable to a substantial number of
Internet content providers as a potential defense to the CDA.
Adult Verification by Password
103. The Government offered very limited evidence regarding the operation of existing age
verification systems, and the evidence offered was not based on personal knowledge.
AdultCheck and Verify, existing systems which appear to be used for accessing commercial
pornographic sites, charge users for their services. Dr. Olsen admitted that his knowledge
of these services was derived primarily from reading the advertisements on their Web
pages. He had not interviewed any employees of these entities, had not personally used
these systems, had no idea how many people are registered with them, and could not testify
to the reliability of their attempt at age verification.
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104. At least some, if not almost all, non-commercial organizations, such as the ACLU, Stop
Prisoner Rape or Critical Path AIDS Project, regard charging listeners to access their
speech as contrary to their goals of making their materials available to a wide audience free
of charge.
105. It would not be feasible for many non-commercial organizations to design their own
adult access code screening systems because the administrative burden of creating and
maintaining a screening system and the ongoing costs involved is beyond their reach. There
was testimony that the costs would be prohibitive even for a commercial entity such as
HotWired, the online version of Wired magazine.
106. There is evidence suggesting that adult users, particularly casual Web browsers,
would be discouraged from retrieving information that required use of a credit card or
password. Andrew Anker testified that HotWired has received many complaints from its
members about HotWired’s registration system, which requires only that a member supply
a name, e-mail address and self-created password. There is concern by commercial content
providers that age verification requirements would decrease advertising and revenue
because advertisers depend on a demonstration that the sites are widely available and
frequently visited.
107. Even if credit card verification or adult password verification were implemented, the
Government presented no testimony as to how such systems could ensure that the user of
the password or credit card is in fact over 18. The burdens imposed by credit card
verification and adult password verification systems make them effectively unavailable to a
substantial number of Internet content providers.
The Government’s “Tagging” Proposal
108. The feasibility and effectiveness of “tagging” to restrict children from accessing
“indecent” speech, as proposed by the Government has not been established. “Tagging”
would require content providers to label all of their “indecent” or “patently offensive”
material by imbedding a string of characters, such as “XXX,” in either the URL or HTML. If
a user could install software on his or her computer to recognize the “XXX” tag, the user
could screen out any content with that tag. Dr. Olsen proposed a “-L18” tag, an idea he
developed for this hearing in response to Mr. Bradner’s earlier testimony that certain
tagging would not be feasible.
109. The parties appear to agree that it is technologically feasible—”trivial”, in the words of
plaintiffs’ expert—to imbed tags in URLs and HTML, and the technology of tagging
underlies both plaintiffs’ PICS proposal and the Government’s “-L18” proposal.
110. The Government’s tagging proposal would require all content providers that post
arguably “indecent” material to review all of their online content, a task that would be
extremely burdensome for organizations that provide large amounts of material online
which cannot afford to pay a large staff to review all of that material. The Carnegie Library
would be required to hire numerous additional employees to review its online files at an
extremely high cost to its limited budget. The cost and effort would be substantial for the
Library and frequently prohibitive for others. Witness Kiroshi Kuromiya testified that it
would be impossible for his organization, Critical Path, to review all of its material because
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it has only one full and one part-time employee.
111. The task of screening and tagging cannot be done simply by using software which
screens for certain words, as Dr. Olsen acknowledged, and we find that determinations as
to what is indecent require human judgment.
112. In lieu of reviewing each file individually, a content provider could tag its entire site
but this would prevent minors from accessing much material that is not “indecent” under
the CDA.
113. To be effective, a scheme such as the -L18 proposal would require a worldwide
consensus among speakers to use the same tag to label “indecent” material. There is
currently no such consensus, and no Internet speaker currently labels its speech with the L18 code or with any other widely-recognized label.
114. Tagging also assumes the existence of software that recognizes the tags and takes
appropriate action when it notes tagged speech. Neither commercial Web browsers nor
user-based screening software is currently configured to block a -L18 code. Until such
software exists, all speech on the Internet will continue to travel to whomever requests it,
without hindrance. Labelling speech has no effect in itself on the transmission (or not) of
that speech. Neither plaintiffs nor the Government suggest that tagging alone would shield
minors from speech or insulate a speaker from criminal liability under the CDA. It follows
that all speech on any topic that is available to adults will also be available to children
using the Internet (unless it is blocked by screening software running on the computer the
child is using).
115. There is no way that a speaker can use current technology to know if a listener is
using screening software.
116. Tags can not currently activate or deactivate themselves depending on the age or
location of the receiver. Critical Path, which posts on-line safer sex instructions, would be
unable to imbed tags that block its speech only in communities where it may be regarded as
indecent. Critical Path, for example, must choose either to tag its site (blocking its speech in
all communities) or not to tag, blocking its speech in none.
The Problems of Offshore Content and Caching
117. A large percentage, perhaps 40% or more, of content on the Internet originates outside
the United States. At the hearing, a witness demonstrated how an Internet user could
access a Web site of London (which presumably is on a server in England), and then link to
other sites of interest in England. A user can sometimes discern from a URL that content is
coming from overseas, since InterNIC allows a content provider to imbed a country code in
a domain name. Foreign content is otherwise indistinguishable from domestic content (as
long as it is in English), since foreign speech is created, named, and posted in the same
manner as domestic speech. There is no requirement that foreign speech contain a country
code in its URL. It is undisputed that some foreign speech that travels over the Internet is
sexually explicit.
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118. The use of “caching” makes it difficult to determine whether the material originated
from foreign or domestic sources. Because of the high cost of using the trans-Atlantic and
trans-Pacific cables, and because the high demand on those cables leads to bottleneck
delays, content is often “cached”, or temporarily stored, on servers in the United States.
Material from a foreign source in Europe can travel over the trans-Atlantic cable to the
receiver in the United States, and pass through a domestic caching server which then
stores a copy for subsequent retrieval. This domestic caching server, rather than the
original foreign server, will send the material from the cache to the subsequent receivers,
without placing a demand on the trans-oceanic cables. This shortcut effectively eliminates
most of the distance for both the request and the information and, hence, most of the delay.
The caching server discards the stored information according to its configuration (e.g., after
a certain time or as the demand for the information diminishes). Caching therefore
advances core Internet values: the cheap and speedy retrieval of information.
119. Caching is not merely an international phenomenon. Domestic content providers store
popular domestic material on their caching servers to avoid the delay of successive searches
for the same material and to decrease the demand on their Internet connection. America
Online can cache the home page of the New York Times on its servers when a subscriber
first requests it, so that subsequent subscribers who make the same request will receive the
same home page, but from America Online’s caching service rather than from the New York
Times’s server.
120. Put simply, to follow the example in the prior paragraph, America Online has no
control over the content that the New York Times posts to its Web site, and the New York
Times has no control over America Online’s distribution of that content from a caching
server.
Anonymity
121. Anonymity is important to Internet users who seek to access sensitive information,
such as users of the Critical Path AIDS Project’s Web site, the users, particularly gay
youth, of Queer Resources Directory, and users of Stop Prisoner Rape (SPR). Many
members of SPR’s mailing list have asked to remain anonymous due to the stigma of
prisoner rape.
Plaintiffs’ Choices Under the CDA
122. Many speakers who display arguably indecent content on the Internet must choose
between silence and the risk of prosecution. The CDA’s defenses—credit card verification,
adult access codes, and adult personal identification numbers—are effectively unavailable
for non-commercial, not-for-profit entities.
123. The plaintiffs in this action are businesses, libraries, non-commercial and not-for-profit
organizations, and educational societies and consortia. Although some of the material that
plaintiffs post online—such as information regarding protection from AIDS, birth control or
prison rape—is sexually explicit and may be considered “indecent” or “patently offensive” in
some communities, none of the plaintiffs is a commercial purveyor of what is commonly
termed “pornography.”
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Noah v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532 (E.D. Va. 2003)
Ellis, District Judge.
Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and a class of those similarly situated, sues his Internet
service provider (ISP) for damages and injunctive relief, claiming that the ISP wrongfully
refused to prevent participants in an online chat room from posting or submitting harassing
comments that blasphemed and defamed plaintiff’s Islamic religion and his co-religionists.
Specifically, plaintiff claims his ISP’s failure to prevent chat room participants from using
the ISP’s chat room to publish the harassing and defamatory comments constitutes a
breach of the ISP’s customer agreement with plaintiff and a violation of Title II of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq.
At issue on a threshold dismissal motion are
(i) the now familiar and well-litigated question whether a claim, like
plaintiff’s, which seeks to hold an ISP civilly liable as a publisher of third
party statements is barred by the immunity granted ISP’s by the
Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230,
(ii) the less familiar, indeed novel question whether an online chat room is a
“place of public accommodation” under Title II, and
(iii) the rather prosaic question whether plaintiff’s breach of contract claim is
barred by the very contract on which he relies, namely the Member
Agreement contract.
For the reasons that follow, plaintiff’s claims do not survive threshold inspection and must
therefore be dismissed.
I.
Plaintiff Saad Noah, a Muslim, is a resident of Illinois and was a subscriber of defendant
America Online, Inc. (“AOL”)’s Internet service until he cancelled the service in July of
2000. AOL, which is located in the Eastern District of Virginia, is, according to the
complaint, the world’s largest Internet service provider, with more than 30 million
subscribers, or “members,” worldwide. Defendant AOL Time Warner Inc. is the parent
company of AOL.
Among the many services AOL provides its members are what are popularly known as
“chat rooms.” These occur where, as AOL does here, an ISP allows its participants to use its
facilities to engage in real-time electronic conversations. Chat room participants type in
their comments or observations, which are then read by other chat room participants, who
may then type in their responses. Conversations in a chat room unfold in real time; the
submitted comments appear transiently on participants’ screens and then scroll off the
screen as the conversation progresses. AOL chat rooms are typically set up for the
discussion of a particular topic or area of interest, and any AOL member who wishes to join
a conversation in a public chat room may do so.
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Two AOL chat rooms are the focus of plaintiff’s claims: the “Beliefs Islam” chat room and
the “Koran” chat room. It is in these chat rooms that plaintiff alleges that he and other
Muslims have been harassed, insulted, threatened, ridiculed and slandered by other AOL
members due to their religious beliefs. The complaint lists dozens of harassing statements
made by other AOL members in these chat rooms on specified dates, all of which plaintiff
alleges he brought to AOL’s attention together with requests that AOL take action to
enforce its member guidelines and halt promulgation of the harassing statements. The
statements span a period of two and one-half years, from January 10, 1998 to July 1, 2000,
and are attributable to various AOL chat room participants only by virtue of a screen name.
A representative sample of the reported offensive comments follows:
(i) On January 10, 1998 the AOL Member with the screen name “Aristotlee”
wrote “islam is meaniglessssss thought,” “allahsdick cut offfffffff,” “dumballah
bastard,” “allah assssshole,” “allajs dick is in holy dick place hey.” “FUCK
ALLAH,” etc.
(ii) On April 26, 1998, “Twotoneleg” wrote “I HATE MUSLIMS,” “THE
KORAN SUCKS,” etc., and “BOSS30269” wrote “I LIKE SHOOTING
MUSLIMS,” “I WILL BOMB THE MIDDLE EAST,” and “FUCK ISLAM.”
(iii) On November 4, 1998, “Hefedehefe” wrote “SMELLY TOWEL HEADS”
and “MUSLIM TOWEL HEADS.”
(iv) On July 11, 1999, “Jzingher” wrote “The Koran and Islam are creations of
Satan to distract people from the true faith which is Judaism. Mohammed
was merely a huckster who found a simple people he could manipulate.”
(v) On July 18, 1999 “SARGON I” wrote “Qura’n lies about everything-a
Satan made verses of darkness and destruction!”, “Mohammed was no shit,
only a killer, thief, a liar and a adulterer!”, and “BYE STUPID
MUSLIMS....ALL GO TO HELL.”
(vi) On July 1, 2000, “DXfina3000 wrote “muslims suck,” “they suck ass,”
“korans is use to wipe ass,” “fuckin muslins,” and “well allah can suck my
dick you peice of ass.”
Plaintiff understandably complained about these offensive, obnoxious, and indecent
statements, initially through the channels provided by AOL for such complaints and
eventually through emails sent directly to AOL’s CEO Steve Case. Plaintiff alleges that
although he reported every one of the alleged violations to AOL, AOL refused to exercise its
power to eliminate the harassment in the “Beliefs Islam” and “Koran” chat rooms.
Moreover, plaintiff contends that AOL gave a “green light” to the harassment of Muslims in
these forums, claiming that such harassment was not tolerated in chat rooms dealing with
other subjects and faiths. In protest, plaintiff cancelled his AOL account in July 2000.
Plaintiff further alleges that other Muslim members of AOL have also complained to AOL
about similar harassing statements.
The relationship between AOL and each of its subscribing members is governed by the
Terms of Service (“TOS”), which include a Member Agreement and the Community
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Guidelines. The Member Agreement is a “legal document that details [a member’s] rights
and obligations as an AOL member,” and it requires, inter alia, that AOL members adhere
to AOL’s standards for online speech, as set forth in the Community Guidelines. These
Guidelines state, in pertinent part, that
... You will be considered in violation of the Terms of Service if you (or others
using your account) do any of the following: ....
* Harass, threaten, embarrass, or do anything else to another member that is
unwanted. This means: ... don’t attack their race, heritage, etc....
* Transmit or facilitate distribution of content that is harmful, abusive,
racially or ethnically offensive, vulgar, sexually explicit, or in a reasonable
person’s view, objectionable. Community standards may vary, but there is no
place on the service where hate speech is tolerated.
* Disrupt the flow of chat in chat rooms with vulgar language, abusiveness, ...
The Member Agreement states that AOL has the right to enforce these Community
Guidelines “in its sole discretion.” In response to a violation, “AOL may take action against
your account,” ranging from “issuance of a warning about a violation to termination of your
account.” AOL’s Community Action Team is responsible for enforcing the content and
conduct standards and members are encouraged to notify AOL of violations they observe
online. Importantly, however, the Member Agreement states that AOL members “... also
understand and agree that the AOL Community Guidelines and the AOL Privacy Policy,
including AOL’s enforcement of those policies, are not intended to confer, and do not confer,
any rights or remedies upon any person.”
Plaintiff filed this pro se action on September 3, 2002, claiming that AOL’s alleged refusal
to intervene to stop the harassing statements and enforce the TOS constitutes (i)
discrimination in a place of public accommodation, in violation of Title II of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, and (ii) a breach of AOL’s TOS and the Member Agreement.
The action purports to be a class action, brought on behalf of plaintiff and all others
similarly situated.
In addition to these claims raised in the complaint, plaintiff seems to assert a third claim
against defendants in his response to the motion to dismiss, where he alleges new facts
concerning several incidents involving disciplinary actions taken by AOL against plaintiff
and other, unnamed Muslim AOL members. Although the nature of the incidents is not
entirely clear, plaintiff alleges that AOL discriminated against plaintiff and other Muslim
AOL members by issuing false warnings against them and terminating their accounts in an
effort to silence their pro-Islam speech. Plaintiff alleges his own AOL account was briefly
terminated by AOL and subsequently reinstated, but his past messages were not restored.
Relying on these incidents, plaintiff belatedly claims a violation of his First Amendment
rights and of the First Amendment rights of similarly situated Muslims. Although not
properly pled in the complaint, given plaintiff’s pro se status this claim will nonetheless be
considered on this motion to dismiss as if it had been raised in the original complaint.
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Defendants AOL and AOL Time Warner filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims on
January 22, 2003. Nearly a month later, two days before the motion was noticed for a
hearing, plaintiff belatedly requested and ultimately received, as a matter of grace, an
extension of time until March 7, 2003, in which to file his response. Plaintiff missed this
deadline as well, filing his response on March 10, 2003. Thereafter, defendants filed their
reply on March 17, 2003. Because the issues and governing authorities are adequately set
forth in the pleadings, oral argument is unnecessary and may be dispensed with, and this
motion is appropriately disposed of on the papers….
IV.
Plaintiff’s Title II claim fails for two alternate and independent reasons. First, plaintiff’s
claim against AOL is barred because of the immunity granted AOL, as an interactive
computer service provider, by the Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230.
Second, plaintiff’s claim fails because a chat room is not a “place of public accommodation”
as defined by Title II, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b). Each dismissal ground is separately
addressed….
[in Section A, the court concludes that AOL is immunized by 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).]
B.
Even assuming, arguendo, that plaintiff’s Title II claim is not barred by § 230, it must
nonetheless be dismissed for failure to state a claim because AOL’s chat rooms and other
online services do not constitute a “place of public accommodation” under Title II.
Title II provides that “[a]ll persons shall be entitled to full and equal enjoyment of the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public
accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the
ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a). Title II defines a
“place of public accommodation” as follows:
Each of the following establishments which serves the public is a place of
public accommodation within the meaning of this subchapter ...
(1) any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides lodging to
transient guests, other than an establishment located within a building
which contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and which is
actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as his residence;
(2) any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or
other facility principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the
premises, including, but not limited to, any such facility located on the
premises of any retail establishment; or any gas station;
(3) any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium or
other place of exhibition or entertainment; and
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(4) any establishment (A)(i) which is physically located within the premises of
any establishment otherwise covered by this subsection, or (ii) within the
premises of which is physically located any such covered establishment, and
(B) which holds itself out as serving patrons of such covered establishment.
42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b).
The theory of plaintiff’s Title II claim is that he was denied the right of equal enjoyment of
AOL’s chat rooms because of AOL’s alleged failure to take steps to stop the harassing
comments and because of AOL’s warnings to plaintiff and brief termination of plaintiff’s
service. In this regard, plaintiff contends that the chat rooms are “place[s] of ...
entertainment” and thus within the public accommodation definition. Yet, as the relevant
case law and an examination the statute’s exhaustive definition make clear, “places of
public accommodation” are limited to actual, physical places and structures, and thus
cannot include chat rooms, which are not actual physical facilities but instead are virtual
forums for communication provided by AOL to its members.
Title II’s definition of “places of public accommodation” provides a list of “establishments”
that qualify as such places. This list, without exception, consists of actual physical
structures; namely any “inn, hotel, motel, ... restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch
counter, soda fountain, ... gasoline station ... motion picture house, theater, concert hall,
sports arena [or] stadium.” In addition, § 2000a(b)(4) emphasizes the importance of physical
presence by referring to any “establishment ... which is physically located within” an
establishment otherwise covered, or “within ... which” an otherwise covered establishment
“is physically located.” (emphasis added) Thus, in interpreting the catchall phrase “other
place of exhibition or entertainment” on which plaintiff relies, the statute’s consistent
reference to actual physical structures points convincingly to the conclusion that the phrase
does not include forums for entertainment that are not physical structures or locations.
As the Supreme Court has held, § 2000a(b)(3) should be read broadly to give effect to the
statute’s purpose, namely to eliminate the “daily affront and humiliation” caused by
“discriminatory denials of access to facilities ostensibly open to the general public.”
(emphasis added). This broad coverage stems from a “natural reading of [the statute’s]
language,” which should be “given full effect according to its generally accepted meaning.”
As such, it is clear that the reach of Title II, however broad, cannot extend beyond actual
physical facilities. Given Title II’s sharp focus on actual physical facilities, such as inns,
motels, restaurants, gas stations, theaters, and stadiums, it is clear that Congress intended
the statute to reach only the listed facilities and other similar physical structures, not to
“regulate a wide spectrum of consensual human relationships.”
This emphasis on actual physical facilities is reinforced by the cases rejecting Title II claims
against membership organizations. In Welsh, the plaintiffs, who were atheists, claimed that
the Boy Scouts of America violated Title II in denying them membership, arguing that the
Boy Scouts were a “place of ... entertainment.” The majority of the Seventh Circuit panel in
Welsh concluded that the Boy Scouts of America is not a “place of public accommodation”
under Title II because it is not “closely connected to a particular facility.” In doing so, the
Welsh majority distinguished the Boy Scouts from membership organizations in which
membership “functions as a ‘ticket’ to admission to a facility or location,” that have been
consistently held to be places of public accommodation under Title II. Similarly, the Ninth
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Circuit in Clegg held that the Cult Awareness Network, a nonprofit organization that
provides information to the public concerning cults and supports former cult members, was
not a “place of public accommodation” because it had “no affiliation with any public facility.”
In short, it is clear from the cases considering membership organizations that status as a
place of public accommodation under Title II requires some connection to some specific
physical facility or structure. As noted in Welsh and Clegg, to ignore this requirement is to
ignore the plain language of the statute and to render the list of example facilities provided
by the statute superfluous.
In arguing that places of public accommodation are not limited to actual physical facilities
under Title II, plaintiff turns to the case law interpreting the analogous “place of public
accommodation” provision under Title III of the Americans With Disability Act (ADA).
While the case law concerning places of public accommodation under the ADA is more
abundant than that under Title II, it is not entirely uniform. Yet, a detour into the parallel
ADA cases is instructive and ultimately supports the conclusion that “places of public
accommodation” must consist of, or have a clear connection to, actual physical facilities or
structures.
The circuits are split regarding the essential question whether a place of public
accommodation under the ADA must be an actual concrete physical structure. On the one
hand, as plaintiff notes, the First Circuit has held that “places of public accommodation”
under Title III of the ADA are not limited to actual physical facilities. See Carparts
Distribution Center, Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler’s Assoc. of New England, Inc., 37 F.3d
12, 18-20 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that a trade association which administers a health
insurance program, without any connection to a physical facility, can be a “place of public
accommodation”).9 On the other hand, the Third, Sixth and Ninth Circuits, in similar cases
involving health insurance programs, followed the logic of Welsh and Clegg in holding that
places of public accommodation under Title III of the ADA must be physical places. Thus, it
appears that the weight of authority endorses the “actual physical structure” requirement
in the ADA context as well.
Most significantly, two more recent ADA cases involving fact situations much closer to
those at bar reaffirm the principle that a “places of public accommodation,” even under the
ADA’s broader definition, must be actual, physical facilities. In one case, the plaintiffs
claimed that Southwest Airlines was in violation of the ADA because its “southwest.com”
web site was incompatible with “screen reader” programs and thus inaccessible to blind
persons. See Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines, Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1316 (S.D.
Fla. 2002). Thus, the question presented was whether the airline’s web site, which serves as
an online ticket counter, constitutes a “place of public accommodation” under the ADA. The
In reaching this conclusion, the First Circuit in Carparts relied on the ADA’s more expansive definition of
“place of public accommodation,” in particular its inclusion of a “travel service,” “insurance office,” and “other
service establishments” as places of public accommodation. Focusing on these terms, the First Circuit concluded
that “Congress clearly contemplated that ‘service establishments’ include providers of services which do not
require a person to physically enter an actual physical structure,” and thus that the Title III of the ADA is not
limited to “physical structures which person must enter to obtain goods and services.” Simply put, the Carparts
court found it irrational to conclude that Title III of the ADA reaches those who enter an office to purchase
insurance services, but not those who purchase them over the mail or by telephone. Notably, Title II of the Civil
Rights Act does not include a “travel service,” “insurance office,” or “other service establishments” in its
definition, making the relevance of Carparts and its progeny to Title II questionable, at best.
9
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Access Now court held that places of public accommodation under the ADA are limited to
“physical concrete structures,” and that the web site was not an actual physical structure.
Rejecting the invitation to endorse the Carparts approach and apply the ADA to Internet
web sites despite their lack of physical presence, the Access Now court concluded that “[t]o
expand the ADA to cover ‘virtual’ spaces would create new rights without well-defined
standards.”11 Similarly, in another case, plaintiff contended that the defendant’s digital
cable system was in violation of the ADA because its on-screen channel guide was not
accessible to the visually impaired. Here too, the district court rejected the notion that the
digital cable system was a “place of public accommodation,” because “in no way does
viewing the system’s images require the plaintiff to gain access to any actual physical
public place,” Furthermore, the Torres court sensibly concluded that the mere fact that the
digital cable system relied on physical facilities to support and transmit its services did not
convert the cable service into a “physical public place.”
In sum, whether one relies on the Title II case law or looks to the broader ADA definition of
public place of accommodation, it is clear that the logic of the statute and the weight of
authority indicate that “places of entertainment” must be actual physical facilities. With
this principle firmly established, it is clear that AOL’s online chat rooms cannot be
construed as “places of public accommodation” under Title II. An online chat room may
arguably be a “place of entertainment,” but it is not a physical structure to which a member
of the public may be granted or denied access, and as such is fundamentally different from
a “motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, [or] stadium.” Although a chat
room may serve as a virtual forum through which AOL members can meet and converse in
cyberspace, it is not an “establishment,” under the plain meaning of that term as defined by
the statute. Unlike a theater, concert hall, arena, or any of the other “places of
entertainment” specifically listed in § 2000a(b), a chat room does not exist in a particular
physical location, indeed it can be accessed almost anywhere, including from homes,
schools, cybercafes and libraries. In sum, although a chat room or other online forum might
be referred to metaphorically as a “location” or “place,” it lacks the physical presence
necessary to constitute a place of public accommodation under Title II. Accordingly, even if
plaintiff’s Title II claim were not barred by § 230’s grant of immunity to service providers, it
would be fail on the independent ground that AOL’s chat rooms are not places of public
accommodation.
V.
Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim must likewise be dismissed because the contractual
rights plaintiff claims are simply not provided for in AOL’s Member Agreement. The plain
language of the Member Agreement makes clear that AOL is not obligated to take any
action against those who violate its Community Guidelines. Thus, the Member Agreement
provides that AOL “has the right to enforce them in its sole discretion,” and that “if you ...
violate the AOL Community Guidelines, AOL may take action against your account.”
(emphasis added). The Member Agreement also states that “[y]ou also understand and
agree that the AOL Community Guidelines and the AOL Privacy Policy, including AOL’s
But see Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Carparts approvingly and
stating, in dicta, that Title III of the ADA reaches “the owner or operator of a store, hotel, restaurant, dentist’s
office, travel agency, theater, Web site, or other facility (whether in physical space or in electronic space)”)
(emphasis added) (citation omitted).
11
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enforcement of those policies, are not intended to confer, and do not confer, any rights or
remedies upon any person.” (emphasis added). The Member Agreement states that while
AOL “reserve[s] the right to remove content that, in AOL’s judgment, does not meet its
standards or does not comply with AOL’s current Community Guidelines ... AOL is not
responsible for any failure or delay in removing such material.”
In light of this plain contractual language, plaintiff cannot claim that AOL breached a duty
to protect him from the harassing speech of others; the Member Agreement expressly
disclaims any such duty….
Furthermore, plaintiff’s attempt to cast this claim as a third-party beneficiary claim is
unavailing. Under the Member Agreement, AOL no more owes a duty to other AOL
members to enforce its Community Guidelines than it does with respect to plaintiff.
E.
Finally, plaintiff’s belatedly-raised First Amendment claim is easily disposed of at this
stage. In essence, plaintiff claims that AOL violated his First Amendment rights by issuing
him warnings and briefly terminating his account, allegedly in response to his pro-Islamic
statements. Yet, even assuming the truth of plaintiff’s allegations, the First Amendment is
of no avail to him in these circumstances; it does not protect against actions taken by
private entities, rather it is “a guarantee only against abridgment by government, federal
or state.” Plaintiff does not argue that AOL is a state actor, nor is there any evident basis
for such an argument. See Green, 318 F.3d at 472 (noting that AOL is a “private, for profit
company” and rejecting the argument that AOL should be treated as a state actor); Cyber
Promotions Inc. v. American Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436, 441-44 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(rejecting the argument that AOL is a state actor). Accordingly, because AOL is not a state
actor, plaintiff’s First Amendment claim must be dismissed.
NOTES AND QUESTIONS
Who do you find more sympathetic—Noah or AOL?
Why didn’t AOL do more to enforce its user agreement and clean up the chatrooms?
Are the hostile comments experienced by Noah a problem?
Why should we treat online spaces differently than physical spaces?
Cyberspace and “Places of Public Accommodation.” Regarding the boundary between
cyberspace and real space, most cases have reached a similar conclusion to the Noah ruling.
See, e.g., Young v. Facebook, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52711 (N.D. Cal. 2011):
Despite its frequent use of terms such as “posts” and “walls,” Facebook
operates only in cyberspace, and is thus is not a “place of public
accommodation” as construed by the Ninth Circuit. While Facebook’s
physical headquarters obviously is a physical space, it is not a place where
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the online services to which Young claims she was denied access are offered
to the public.
But see National Association of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., 2012 WL 2343666 (D. Mass. June
19, 2012) (finding that Netflix qualified as a place of public accommodation for purposes of
the Americans with Disabilities Act).
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Geolocation: Core To The Local Space And Key To Click-Fraud Detection
by Chris Silver Smith
Search Engine Land
http://searchengineland.com/geolocation-core-to-the-local-space-and-key-to-click-frauddetection-11922
Aug 13, 2007 at 8:20am ET
…How it works
At its most basic, online geolocation we’re referring to is an attempt to identify the actual
physical location of internet users. There are a few different ways that this may be
accomplished. The best-known method is to take the user’s IP address, which is transmitted
with every internet request, and to look up the organization and physical address listed as
the owner of that IP address. Anyone can do this, by querying the Whois information at
ARIN – the American Registry for Internet Numbers. (Note: this is NOT the same as a
domain name Whois query! Many IP addresses may not be associated with a domain name
at all, so a domain name Whois of an IP address may not get you geolocation info.)
For instance, let’s say that I noticed that a visitor to my website came in on IP address
216.64.210.100, according to my server’s log files. I can query ARIN for that IP address, and
I see that it’s an address included within a block of IP addresses owned by The Coca-Cola
Company:
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I could then perhaps figure that this visitor was an employee of The Coca-Cola Company,
perhaps reading an article in the series of pieces I recently did about the Coca-Cola website.
Indeed, my Google Analytics report is showing that I got a few visits from people associated
with Coca-Cola during that time:

Since I can identify visitors from The Coca-Cola Company, I could deliver up content
specific to them—I’ve heard stories about Google and Yahoo delivering up ads for
engineering positions to the employees of Microsoft in Redmond using this method, for
instance. More importantly, I can now assume that this user is likely to be physically
located in Atlanta, Georgia—so I know their City, State, Zip Code, Designated Metro Area,
and Country!
Naturally, it’s likely not feasible to automatically perform an ARIN lookup with each visitor
to your website before delivering up data, because it would take too long. So, there are a
few companies out there who are aggregating and caching the network data and either
providing lookup tables or web service lookups to those who wish to deliver location-specific
content or who are using the data for reporting or fraud detection purposes.
Some ISPs which provide internet access through hotels may now be providing the physical
locations of their networks of access points to the geolocation data aggregators as well, and
in many cases these ISPs are hosting the default web page portals of local information to
the hotel visitors. Some ISPs may also be quietly providing geolocational data to the
aggregators as well, allowing all their customers to be geolocated to varying degrees.
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Also, internet service providers who host Wi-Fi hotspots throughout the world are providing
data to various of these aggregators, allowing the hotspots’ IP addresses to be associated
with precise physical addresses.
Mobile phones are able to be geolocated by triangulating their location from area cell phone
towers, and there are increasing numbers of wireless devices such as phones, PDAs, and
laptops which are getting integrated with GPS satellite pinpointing, paving the way to
associate precise coordinates with them. As more mobile devices like the iPhone leverage
Wi-Fi access, there will be a variety of geolocational methods which will be able to pinpoint
mobile users.
Who provides the geolocation data?
Quova is considered the best-in-class (probably with a price tag to match) of the geolocation
data aggregators, and their data is apparently used by Google, Yahoo!, and MSN to
geotarget content and ads, and likely for the purposes of analytics and fraud detection as
well. They were founded in 2000 and they geolocate users through IP address location data
as well as tracing network gateways and router locations. They also likely traceroute users
coming through proxies to better determine location to some degree, and they analyze
request latency of users passing through proxies to help determine physical distance from
the proxy servers’ physical locations.
Quova recently partnered with Mexens Technology in order to supplement their IP/network
location data with Wi-FI hotspot locations, device GPS, and wireless tower triangulation.
Quova uses Pricewaterhouse Coopers to audit their geolocation data, and are perhaps the
only company allowing independent, third-party validation testing of this sort. Their
GeoDirectory Data Sheet states that PwC does this auditing by testing Quova data against
“…large, independent third-party data sets of actual web users…”. I interpret that to mean
that PwC likely obtains IP addresses from some ISPs who tell them the countries and
states associated with the IP addresses, and they check to see how accurately the Quova
data identifies the locations of those addresses….
[the article discusses some other vendors of geolocation information]
I’ve just touched on some of the companies that are most-interesting to me who are
providing geolocation products and services. There are likely quite a number of companies
which are also doing this in-house to some degree. For instance, I wouldn’t be surprised if
Google wasn’t geolocating through querying and caching of ARIN data on top of data they’re
receiving from other providers listed above. Considering how vital geolocation data is to the
policing of click-fraud, Google could be building out their own complete geolocation data
aggregation infrastructure. Further, it’s also been suggested that Google is likely using
domain’s registration data through Google’s status as a registrar to assist in associating
websites with geographic locations for Google Maps—not precisely the geolocation of users
I’m covering here, but a closely related method that could be useful to local SEO.
Many mobile service providers are also using the geolocational information associated with
their devices in order to deliver up location-specific information on their own, without the
assistance of the geolocation data aggregators.
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How geolocation is used in the local space and in general internet marketing:
Targeting Ads to user’s locality – ads could be targeted by varying levels of locality
including ZIP Code, City, Metro Area (DMA), Region, State, Company, Country, and Time
Zone. For example, I just performed a search in Google for “personal injury lawyers”, and
you can see that they displayed a number of ads for lawyers who’ve targeted ads to the
Dallas, Texas metro area where I’m writing this article:

Targeting locally apropos content to users, including language delivery, currency such as
pounds/euros/dollars/yen/etc—providing native users’ currency on e-com pages and order
forms, location-specific text/images, customization of web search results which may have a
local component, automating Store Locator pages for retailers, etc.
Content Restriction: there are frequently some contractual/legal limits on what products
and services can be sold where. Uses include restricting online gambling from US users;
enforcement of trade embargoes so that certain items won’t be sold to countries disallowed
by federal laws; some items can only be sold in particular areas of the world and some
promotional contests are only allowed by certain states or provincial rules.
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Financial Fraud Detection: denying sales to possibly compromised credit cards or bank
accounts – for instance, if the IP address of the online user is in suspect foreign country, but
account owner address is in the US.
Identity Fraud Detection: geolocation provides additional signal for logins for protecting
user identities.
Advertising Fraud Detection: filtering out invalid or fraudulent clicks – products/services
only available in one country, but Pay-Per-Click advertising clicks are coming from another.
Potential Detection of DoS Attacks: many requests coming in from a wide variety of naturallooking IP addresses, but geolocation of requestors shows requests actually coming all from
one primary location.
Internet Analytics Applications: analyzing and showing from where visitors viewed a
website, and quantifying how many come from particular locations.
Site Server Locations for SEO: there’s some supposition that websites hosted in the country
who’s audience they’re targeting might actually get better rankings within search engines
targeting that country’s users.
The issue of error rates
From the very beginning, geolocation providers have been asked about how much error is
involved in their ability to pinpoint web users, and from the very beginning geodata
consumers have noticed some amount of errors happening. There are a lot of anecdotal tales
of ads and content being incorrectly displayed for users when their geolocation has been
incorrectly assessed.
The classic example of IP locating error is caused where a large internet service provider
may provide web access across the world, but the block of their users’ IP addresses are all
associated with the ISP’s corporate headquarters or network office in one location. With
simplistic IP address mapping, all those users could be geolocated by aggregators to that
single corporate office location, even though they might in actuality be spread out in many
areas. The most famous example of this is the AOL proxy server issue wherein geolocation
aggregators were originally unable to pinpoint AOL users and incorrectly associating them
all with their Virginia address.
Quova used to claim to have beat the AOL proxy barrier to identify where their requests
originate, but specific terminology touting this ability has been considerably toned down
these days in Quova’s collateral materials, and their GeoDirectory data sheet merely
mentions that they have included a flag for AOL. One assumes that their confidence factors
rating for geolocation and general proxy detection/locating ability might be used to give
some level of AOL user identification ability, but the flag must be provided so that the
geodata consumers could opt to not geolocate AOL users if they presumed the data to be too
error-prone.
While the AOL proxy issue is the most famous, many other ISPs likely have some similar
barriers to pinpointing their users. Using one of the previously-mentioned geolocation
32.

services, I just now checked my IP address and was mapped to Keller, Texas, even though
I’m writing this 20 miles away. Large corporations likely have this going on as well. For
instance, in the Coca-Cola IP address example I gave above, I’d bet that the company is
large enough that they probably have offices throughout the states and world, and their
employees addresses might be prone to being incorrectly mapped to their headquarters
locations.
Since IP address mapping using ARIN registrar data could be so prone to error at the more
granular levels, a number of the geolocation providers rush to quote accuracy estimates
based on the broader, country and regional levels:
Quova: “…In audited tests using large, independent third-party data sets of
actual web users, Quova’s country level accuracy was measured at 99.9%. US
state level accuracy was measured at approximately 95%.”
IP2Location: “…over 95 percent matching accuracy at the country level…”
Another factor occurs when users specifically choose to route their requests through a proxy
in order to anonymize their internet usage, either for privacy reasons, or for the sake of
hiding criminal activities. A number of sites out there provide free or paid anonymizing
services, allowing users to submit their internet requests which then get filtered through
another layer of services before the requests reach content providers’ servers.
Obviously, geolocation accuracy could be more accurate through network route mapping
and enhancing IP registration data with data from the large ISPs, along with Wi-Fi and
mobile device location data.
Users browsing the internet through mobile phones and other wireless devices now pose an
additional proxying problem, since most of the wireless carriers will display only a central
IP address for all of their users, and any attempts at network routing will be stymied by the
fact that wireless network traffic isn’t being monitored. For the companies who are
providing content through these wireless carriers’ mobile portals, they may be supplied
geolocation info by the carriers, but this may not help most webmasters who don’t have
such partnerships. As more mobile device users demand open access to the entire internet,
the mobile carrier’s proxies may become an increasing source of error in geolocation data.
Freshness of data weighs in as well since IP address blocks change over time, so if an IP
location source doesn’t update their database, it can result in incorrect targeting, just as
with this incident related by Barry Schwartz where a Texas school district kept getting
content from Google Canada.
The biggest problem in assessing the error rates of geolocation data is the simple fact that
there’s no way to really test well for accuracy. The one and only company which publicly
states that it uses external auditing (Quova), provided by Pricewaterhouse Coopers, is
apparently testing by comparing their geodata with large datasets where they know the
physical locations of the users associated with the IP addresses. But, how broad is that
comparison data? Is the testing comparison working the same as when users are
dynamically being geotargeted through the data in real-time? Does data from just a few
major ISPs (assuming that’s what’s being used) really represent the majority of internet
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users? Does it take into account the huge amount of corporate employees browsing during
their workdays? (I’d guess not, since most large corporations probably shouldn’t be sharing
the locational information associated with their employee’s IP addresses.) What’s the
estimate for accuracy at the city-level and postal-code level?
At best, this is only an estimation and not direct test results for accuracy, so we don’t know
what the error rate really is.
To be fair, it’s simply not possible for any of us to know the actual error rates involved,
since it’s impossible to assess whether all internet users are being accurately geolocated
through any of these services. We can only sample some amount of users, and decide
whether that sample set should be considered representative of all usage or not.
On one hand, this inability to assess error rates more precisely is highly concerning,
particularly for the paid search industry, since it makes the entire policing structure of
click fraud appear to be built upon a house of cards.
On the other hand, the filtering of suspect clicks is primarily based upon identifying the
country where the click is originating. Countries with higher apparent rates of fraudulent
clicks tend to be flagged as less-trustable, and those clicks are discounted from billing.
Based on the logic that most ISPs are fairly country-specific, and that most large companies
might use completely different IP address blocks for their employees in different countries,
I’m willing to believe the industry’s published accuracy rates of 99.9% to 95% at countrylevel geolocation. But, when you’re speaking in terms of processing billions upon billions of
clicks, and millions of dollars, 5% to 0.1% can still amount to a whole lot of money…
Even considering the higher accuracy of country/regional geolocation, there’s still cause for
concern for advertisers who are buying ads and targeting at the more granular levels—are
their ads being shown to the right demographic groups, and are their clicks coming from
the qualified buyers they’re seeking? The more granular levels of geolocation are apparently
still considered to be much more error-prone, and the industry remains quiet about it.
Other downsides to use of geolocation:
Geolocation is probably a very bad method for targeting languages! Better to use content
negotiation through browsers, using the language-accept headers to choose which
languages to display to users (this is what the W3C recommends). While using geolocation
to choose which language to deliver up to an user, search engine spiders may all come in
from a central location or from one of their regional data centers, so using geolocation for
language targeting would not be best practice and could result in less-optimal natural
search marketing.
Even delivering up local-oriented content by geolocation of users can be dicey, if one doesn’t
properly handle search engine spiders. Last year, I informed representatives from
Amazon.com on how their geolocation for the purpose of delivering up their yellow pages
links was ruinous to their SEO of that section, since Googlebot was apparently being
delivered up all Washington, D.C. content, keeping the rest of their national content
unavailable for indexing. Geolocation can be great for targeting content to users, but design
a default for unidentifiable users and search engine bots.
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Geolocation can creep out users who don’t understand how it works and can raise user
privacy concerns. Most users still don’t realize their physical locations are being mapped
while they’re browsing, so many still don’t quite know enough about the technology to be
concerned. The industry hasn’t really addressed this as well as it could. Quova’s FAQ is
rather dismissive of privacy concerns, saying only “Since accuracy is limited to zip code
level, Quova does not pinpoint individual user locations…”, though this seems a bit
inaccurate since they are also apparently incorporating GPS, Wi-Fi, and wireless tower
triangulation through Mexens Technology—meaning the pinpointing of users could be a
whole lot more accurate than mere ZIP code level.
Geolocation can reveal some information you wanted to keep confidential, which is why it
should be on the radar screens of privacy advocates. Don’t want your competitors knowing
you’re examining some of their pages every day? If you’re viewing from a unique city where
average users are unlikely to be viewing your competitor’s site pages, you might want to try
dialing up through an ISP outside of your town or going through a distant proxy or two
before viewing their pages, just to try to obscure your geolocation info. Or, call up a friend
in another state to send you screen-grabs of the site.
For travel-based industries, filtering out PPC clicks from suspect foreign countries could
result in undercounting of valid consumer traffic. That’s cool if you’re a travel business
advertising in PPC networks, since it may get you more free ads and higher apparent
conversion rates. But, it’s not so cool for the ad network companies and publishers
displaying those ads – they’re likely getting a little less revenue than they should since
some of the “good” traffic is inevitably going to be thrown away with the “bad”.
Summary
Geolocation is here to stay in the online local space. Its use in fraud detection and
regulatory compliance is only deepening, and geolocation reporting in web analytics has
become a standard. Geolocation data is a necessity for the geotargeting of ads, and that
would appear to be an increasingly popular choice amongst marketers as online advertising
continues to gain traction among local businesses.
Geolocation use in targeting relevant content to users is still in something of an
experimental stage, and few sites seem to be really making simultaneously extensive and
effective use of it.
It should not really be used in content mediation for delivering different languages, since
this likely will not allow the various translations of the site pages to be properly indexed in
the search engines for various countries/tongues.
Geolocation may have a factor in effective SEO—anecdotal evidence and logical reasoning
would indicate that it could make sense that a site hosted within a particular country might
be more relevant to that country’s citizens than in other countries. I would guess that this
factor wouldn’t apply as much for higher-PR sites or publicly-traded companies, but there’s
not a lot of research evidence out there.
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The biggest issue with geolocation is the lack of transparency in how the aggregators are
gathering the data, and how high the error rates may be with all the levels of granularity.
The geolocation providers all desire to keep their methods proprietary, but this competitive
need for confidentiality makes it difficult for companies to try to estimate relative levels of
accuracy amongst the providers. Many companies may be using cheaper providers than
they should for the purposes of advertising click-fraud detection, leaving themselves open to
liability of fraud claims, and causing innocent advertisers to be paying higher amounts
than they should. Considering how geolocation has become such a major component of the
policing of click-fraud, it’s surprising that there hasn’t been a wider demand for
transparency and standardized methods for testing accuracy. The leaders in the industry
should pursue a greater degree of openness and a greater variety of auditing methods to
check accuracy.
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II.

Jurisdiction

Evaluating if Personal Jurisdiction is Proper
Step 1: Even if personal jurisdiction is proper, is judgment enforceable?
Step 2: General jurisdiction? Requires physical presence or “systematic and continuous
contacts”
Step 3: If no, did defendant consent? If no, specific jurisdiction needs to be established
Step 4: Does state long-arm statute confer jurisdiction?
Step 5: If yes, does jurisdiction satisfy Constitutional Due Process? Alternative tests:
a) Minimum contacts test



Minimum contacts with the forum…
o “purposeful availment” of state’s laws
…Comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice
o “reasonably anticipate” being haled into court

b) “Effects Test”: Defendant expressly aims intentional tortious actions at state and causes
foreseeable harm
c) In rem (15 USC §1125(d)(2))
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Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc. v . Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446 (3d Cir. 2003)
Oberdorfer, District Judge.
Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc. and Geoffrey, Inc. (“Toys”) brought this action against Step Two, S.A. and
Imaginarium Net, S.L. (“Step Two”), alleging that Step Two used its Internet web sites to
engage in trademark infringement, unfair competition, misuse of the trademark notice
symbol, and unlawful “cybersquatting,” in violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1501 et
seq., and New Jersey state law. The District Court denied Toys’ request for jurisdictional
discovery and, simultaneously, granted Step Two’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction. We hold that the District Court should not have denied Toys’ request for
jurisdictional discovery. We therefore reverse and remand for limited jurisdictional
discovery, relating to Step Two’s business activities in the United States, and for
reconsideration of personal jurisdiction with the benefit of the product of that discovery,
with a view to its renewing administration of the case, in the event the District Court finds
that it does have jurisdiction.
I.
Toys, a Delaware corporation with its headquarters in New Jersey, owns retail stores
worldwide where it sells toys, games, and numerous other products. In August 1999, Toys
acquired Imaginarium Toy Centers, Inc., which owned and operated a network of
“Imaginarium” stores for the sale of educational toys and games. As part of this
acquisition, Toys acquired several Imaginarium trademarks, and subsequently filed
applications for the registration of additional Imaginarium marks. Prior to Toys’
acquisition, the owners of the Imaginarium mark had been marketing a line of educational
toys and games since 1985 and had first registered the Imaginarium mark with the United
States Patent and Trademark Office in 1989. Toys currently owns thirty-seven
freestanding Imaginarium stores in the U.S., of which seven are located in New Jersey. In
addition, there are Imaginarium shops within 175 of the Toys “R” Us stores in the U.S.,
including five New Jersey stores.
Step Two is a Spanish corporation that owns or has franchised toy stores operating under
the name “Imaginarium” in Spain and nine other countries. It first registered the
Imaginarium mark in Spain in 1991, and opened its first Imaginarium store in the Spanish
city of Zaragoza in November 1992. Step Two began expanding its chain of Imaginarium
stores by means of a franchise system in 1994. It has registered the Imaginarium mark in
several other countries where its stores are located. There are now 165 Step Two
Imaginarium stores. The stores have the same unique facade and logo as those owned by
Toys, and sell the same types of merchandise as Toys sells in its Imaginarium stores.
However, Step Two does not operate any stores, maintain any offices or bank accounts, or
have any employees anywhere in the United States. Nor does it pay taxes to the U.S. or to
any U.S. state. Step Two maintains that it has not directed any advertising or marketing
efforts towards the United States. The record does, however, indicate some contacts
between Step Two and the United States: for example, a portion of the merchandise sold at
Step Two’s Imaginarium stores is purchased from vendors in the United States.
Additionally, Felix Tena, President of Step Two, attends the New York Toy Fair once each
year.
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In the mid-1990s, both parties turned to the Internet to boost their sales. In 1995,
Imaginarium Toy Centers, Inc. (which Toys later acquired) registered the domain name
<imaginarium.com> and launched a web site featuring merchandise sold at Imaginarium
stores. In 1996, Step Two registered the domain name <imaginarium.es>, and began
advertising merchandise that was available at its Imaginarium stores. In April 1999,
Imaginarium Toy Centers registered the domain name <imaginarium.net>, and launched
another web site where it offered Imaginarium merchandise for sale. In June 1999, Step
Two registered two additional “Imaginarium” domain names, <imaginariumworld.com>
and <imaginarium-world.com>. In May 2000, Step Two registered three more domain
names: <imaginariumnet.com>, <imaginariumnet.net>, and <imaginariumnet.org>. Step
Two’s web sites are maintained by Imaginarium Net, S.L., a subsidiary of Step Two, S.A.
formed in 2000.
At the time this lawsuit was filed, four of the aforementioned sites operated by Step Two
were interactive, allowing users to purchase merchandise online. When buying
merchandise via Step Two’s web sites, purchasers are asked to input their name and email
address, as well as a credit card number, delivery address, and phone number. At no point
during the online purchase process are users asked to input their billing or mailing address.
The web sites provide a contact phone number within Spain that lacks the country code
that a user overseas would need to dial. Moreover, the prices are in Spanish pesetas and
Buros, and goods ordered from those sites can be shipped only within Spain. Step Two’s
Imaginarium web sites are entirely in Spanish.
Visitors to the four sales-oriented Step Two web sites may elect to receive an electronic
newsletter, or sign up for membership in “Club Imaginarium,” a promotional club with
games and information for children. Each registrant for Club Imaginarium is required to
provide a name and an email address. At the time this suit was filed, there was a section
for “voluntary information,” including the registrant’s home address, on the Club
Imaginarium registration page. This optional portion of the page required users to choose
from a pull-down list of Spanish provinces, and did not accommodate mailing addresses in
the United States. After joining Club Imaginarium via the web site, registrants receive an
automatic email response.
Mr. Tena submitted an affidavit stating that Step Two had not made any sales via its web
sites to U.S. residents. Toys, however, adduced evidence of two sales to residents of New
Jersey conducted via Step Two’s Imaginarium web sites. These purchases were initiated by
Toys. Lydia Leon, a legal assistant in the Legal Department of Geoffrey, Inc., made the first
purchase. Ms. Leon, a resident of New Jersey, purchased a toy via
<www.imaginariumworld.com> on January 23, 2001. The second purchase was made in
February 2001 by Luis M. Lopez, an employee of Darby & Darby P.C., attorneys for Toys.
Mr. Lopez is also a resident of New Jersey, and accessed <www.imaginarium.es> to make
his purchase.
For both of these sales, the items were shipped to Angeles Benavides Davila, a Toys
employee in Madrid, Spain; Ms. Benavides Davila then forwarded the items to the offices of
Geoffrey, Inc. in New Jersey. Both purchases were made with credit cards issued by U.S.
banks. Additionally, both purchasers received in New Jersey an email confirming their
purchases, and a subsequent email with a login and password to access Club Imaginarium.
One of the two purchasers also separately registered for Club Imaginarium, exchanged
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emails with a Step Two employee about his purchase, and received a copy of an email
newsletter from Step Two. Aside from these two sales, there is no evidence in the record of
a sale to anyone in the United States. After learning of these two sales, Mr. Tena submitted
a second affidavit stating that his company does not know where its purchasers reside, as
that information is not apparent from a purchaser’s email address, and Step Two keeps
records only of shipping addresses….
II.
In the following discussion, we first consider the standard for personal jurisdiction based
upon a defendant’s operation of a commercially interactive web site, as articulated by courts
within this circuit and other Courts of Appeals. In light of that standard and the arguments
presented in the proceeding below, we then assess the propriety of the District Court’s
denial of jurisdictional discovery.
A. Personal Jurisdiction Based on the Operation of a Web Site
The advent of the Internet has required courts to fashion guidelines for when personal
jurisdiction can be based on a defendant’s operation of a web site. Courts have sought to
articulate a standard that both embodies traditional rules and accounts for new factual
scenarios created by the Internet. Under traditional jurisdictional analysis, the exercise of
specific personal jurisdiction requires that the “plaintiff’s cause of action is related to or
arises out of the defendant’s contacts with the forum.” Beyond this basic nexus, for a
finding of specific personal jurisdiction, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
requires (1) that the “defendant ha[ve] constitutionally sufficient ‘minimum contacts’ with
the forum,” id. (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985)), and (2)
that “subjecting the defendant to the court’s jurisdiction comports with ‘traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice,’” id. (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
316 (1945)). The first requirement, “minimum contacts,” has been defined as “‘some act by
which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.’” Asahi Metal
Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102, 109 (1987) (quoting Burger
King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475). Second, jurisdiction exists only if its exercise “comports with
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,” i.e., the defendant “should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court” in that forum. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
The precise question raised by this case is whether the operation of a commercially
interactive web site accessible in the forum state is sufficient to support specific personal
jurisdiction, or whether there must be additional evidence that the defendant has
“purposefully availed” itself of the privilege of engaging in activity in that state. Prior
decisions indicate that such evidence is necessary, and that it should reflect intentional
interaction with the forum state. If a defendant web site operator intentionally targets the
site to the forum state, and/or knowingly conducts business with forum state residents via
the site, then the “purposeful availment” requirement is satisfied. Below, we first review
cases from this and other circuits that articulate this requirement. Next, we consider the
role of related non-Internet contacts in demonstrating purposeful availment. We then
assess whether the “purposeful availment” requirement has been satisfied in the present
case.
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1. The “Purposeful Availment” Requirement in Internet Cases
a. Third Circuit Cases
The opinion in Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997)
has become a seminal authority regarding personal jurisdiction based upon the operation of
an Internet web site. The court in Zippo stressed that the propriety of exercising
jurisdiction depends on where on a sliding scale of commercial interactivity the web site
falls. In cases where the defendant is clearly doing business through its web site in the
forum state, and where the claim relates to or arises out of use of the web site, the Zippo
court held that personal jurisdiction exists. In reaching this conclusion, the Zippo court
relied on CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996), which found the
exercise of personal jurisdiction to be proper where the commercial web site’s interactivity
reflected specifically intended interaction with residents of the forum state.
Analyzing the case before it, the Zippo court similarly underscored the intentional nature of
the defendant’s conduct vis-a-vis the forum state. In Zippo, the defendant had purposefully
availed itself of doing business in Pennsylvania when it “repeatedly and consciously chose
to process Pennsylvania residents’ applications and to assign them passwords,” knowing
that the contacts would result in business relationships with Pennsylvania customers. The
court summarized the pivotal importance of intentionality as follows:
When a defendant makes a conscious choice to conduct business with the
residents of a forum state, ‘it has clear notice that it is subject to suit there.’
... If [the defendant] had not wanted to be amenable to jurisdiction in
Pennsylvania, ... it could have chosen not to sell its services to Pennsylvania
residents.
Since Zippo, several district court decisions from this Circuit have made explicit the
requirement that the defendant intentionally interact with the forum state via the web site
in order to show purposeful availment and, in turn, justify the exercise of specific personal
jurisdiction. As another district court in this Circuit put it, “[c]ourts have repeatedly
recognized that there must be ‘something more’ ... to demonstrate that the defendant
directed its activity towards the forum state.”
b. Case Law from Other Circuits
Several Courts of Appeals decisions have adopted “purposeful availment” requirements that
are consistent with the principles articulated in the Zippo line of cases. The Fourth Circuit,
in ALS Scan v. Digital Service Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707 (4th Cir. 2002), expressly
incorporated an “intentionality” requirement when fashioning a test for personal
jurisdiction in the context of the Internet:
a State may, consistent with due process, exercise judicial power over a
person outside of the State when that person (1) directs electronic activity
into the State, (2) with the manifested intent of engaging in business or other
interactions within the State, and (3) that activity creates, in a person within
the State, a potential cause of action cognizable in the State’s courts.
41.

In Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997), the Ninth Circuit
considered an infringement action brought against a Florida web site operator whose
allegedly infringing site was accessible in Arizona, the state where the plaintiff had its
principal place of business. In declining to exercise specific personal jurisdiction, the
Cybersell court found there must be “‘something more’ [beyond the mere posting of a
passive web site] to indicate that the defendant purposefully (albeit electronically) directed
his activity in a substantial way to the forum state.” Decisions from other circuits have
articulated similar standards. See, e.g., Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d
883, 890 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that the purposeful availment requirement is satisfied “if
the web site is interactive to a degree that reveals specifically intended interaction with
residents of the state”) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
2. Non-Internet Contacts
In deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction over a cause of action arising from a defendant’s
operation of a web site, a court may consider the defendant’s related non-Internet activities
as part of the “purposeful availment” calculus. One case that relies on non-Internet contacts
for the exercise of jurisdiction—a case Toys repeatedly cites—is Euromarket Designs, Inc. v.
Crate and Barrel Ltd., 96 F. Supp. 2d 824 (N.D. Ill. 2000). In Euromarket, the court
exercised jurisdiction over an Irish manufacturer based on its commercially interactive web
site, even though the products purchased through the web site could not be shipped to
Illinois. The court identified a number of non-Internet contacts between the defendant and
Illinois, including the fact that the defendant’s vendors included Illinois suppliers, its
attendance at trade shows in Illinois, and its advertisement in publications that circulate in
the United States (albeit originating outside). The Euromarket court also relied on the fact
that the defendant billed Illinois customers, collected revenues from Illinois customers, and
recorded sales from goods ordered from Illinois, and that the web site was designed to
accommodate addresses in the United States.
Thus far, Toys has not shown that Step Two maintained the type of contacts that supported
jurisdiction in Euromarket—i.e., that the defendant intentionally and knowingly transacted
business with residents of the forum state, and had significant other contacts with the
forum besides those generated by its web site. This limited record does not provide an
occasion for us to spell out the exact mix of Internet and non-Internet contacts required to
support an exercise of personal jurisdiction. That determination should be made on a caseby-case basis by assessing the “nature and quality” of the contacts. However, non-internet
contacts such as serial business trips to the forum state, telephone and fax communications
directed to the forum state, purchase contracts with forum state residents, contracts that
apply the law of the forum state, and advertisements in local newspapers, may form part of
the “something more” needed to establish personal jurisdiction. It is noteworthy that the
Supreme Court in Burger King Corp., when expounding on the “minimum contacts”
requirement, referred generally to a defendant’s “activities” in the forum state—a term that
includes the aforementioned non-Internet contacts.
3. Personal Jurisdiction over Step Two
As Zippo and the Courts of Appeals decisions indicate, the mere operation of a
commercially interactive web site should not subject the operator to jurisdiction anywhere
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in the world. Rather, there must be evidence that the defendant “purposefully availed”
itself of conducting activity in the forum state, by directly targeting its web site to the state,
knowingly interacting with residents of the forum state via its web site, or through
sufficient other related contacts.
Based on the facts established in this case thus far, Toys has failed to satisfy the purposeful
availment requirement. Step Two’s web sites, while commercial and interactive, do not
appear to have been designed or intended to reach customers in New Jersey. Step Two’s
web sites are entirely in Spanish; prices for its merchandise are in pesetas or Euros, and
merchandise can be shipped only to addresses within Spain. Most important, none of the
portions of Step Two’s web sites are designed to accommodate addresses within the United
States. While it is possible to join Club Imaginarium and receive newsletters with only an
email address, Step Two asks registrants to indicate their residence using fields that are
not designed for addresses in the United States.
Moreover, the record may not now support a finding that Step Two knowingly conducted
business with residents of New Jersey. The only documented sales to persons in the United
States are the two contacts orchestrated by Toys, and it appears that Step Two scarcely
recognized that sales with U.S. residents had been consummated.5
At best, Toys has presented only inconclusive circumstantial evidence to suggest that Step
Two targeted its web site to New Jersey residents, or that it purposefully availed itself of
any effort to conduct activity in New Jersey. Many of the grounds for jurisdiction that Toys
advanced below have been deemed insufficient by the courts. First, the two documented
sales appear to be the kind of “fortuitous,” “random,” and “attenuated” contacts that the
Supreme Court has held insufficient to warrant the exercise of jurisdiction. As for the
electronic newsletters and other email correspondence, “telephone communication or mail
sent by a defendant [do] not trigger personal jurisdiction if they ‘do not show purposeful
availment.’” The court in Barrett found that the exchange of three emails between the
plaintiff and defendant regarding the contents of the defendant’s web site, without more,
did not “amount to the level of purposeful targeting required under the minimum contacts
analysis.” Non-Internet contacts, such as Mr. Tena’s visits to New York and the
relationships with U.S. vendors, have not been explored sufficiently to determine whether
they are related to Toys’ cause of action, or whether they reflect “purposeful availment.”
Absent further evidence showing purposeful availment, Toys cannot establish specific
jurisdiction over Step Two.6 However, any information regarding Step Two’s intent vis-a-vis
Toys argues that Step Two was aware that it was conducting business with New Jersey residents. In
particular, Toys points to the email correspondence between Mr. Luis M. Lopez and a representative of Step
Two regarding Mr. Lopez’s overpayment. Mr. Lopez requested that the difference be mailed to his home address
in “South Orange, NJ 07079,” but did not spell out “New Jersey” or specify that he resided in the United States.
The Step Two representative, apparently uncertain about the address, sent a reply stating “I have received your
address and as far as I can see, it is pretty far from here (we are in Zaragoza). I would appreciate your giving me
more information on the address so that I can be sure that it will arrive.” Mr. Lopez’s response to this
message—if he sent one—is not included in the record. Although Step Two ultimately learned that Mr. Lopez is
a United States resident, a trier of fact could reasonably find from the correspondence that the company did not
contemplate that sales would occur with U.S.-based purchasers.
6 As an alternative to the “minimum contacts” analysis for specific jurisdiction, Toys argues that jurisdiction
over Step Two may be based on the “effects” test. Following the lead of the Supreme Court in Calder v. Jones,
465 U.S. 783, 788-89 (1984), the Third Circuit has held that personal jurisdiction may, under certain
5
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its Internet business and regarding other related contacts is known by Step Two, and can
be learned by Toys only through discovery. The District Court’s denial of jurisdictional
discovery is thus a critical issue, insofar as it may have prevented Toys from obtaining the
information needed to establish personal jurisdiction. We next turn to whether the District
Court properly denied Toys’ request for jurisdictional discovery.
B. Jurisdictional Discovery…
Toys requested jurisdictional discovery for the purpose of establishing either specific
personal jurisdiction, or jurisdiction under the federal long-arm statute, Fed. R. Civ. P.
4(k)(2).7 The District Court denied Toys’ request, explaining that “the clear focus of the
Court is directed, as it should be, to the web site[,] [a]nd to the activity of the defendants
related to that web site, which is making sales here, ...” The court added that “the apparent
contradictions, if such there will be in the Tena affidavit, [and] what else Mr. Tena might
have been doing here, just have no relationship to where the eye is directed and should stay
and that is, the web site activities of this defendant.”
We are persuaded that the District Court erred when it denied Toys’ request for
jurisdictional discovery. The court’s unwavering focus on the web site precluded
consideration of other Internet and non-Internet contacts—indicated in various parts of the
record—which, if explored, might provide the “something more” needed to bring Step Two
within our jurisdiction. Although the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating facts that
support personal jurisdiction, courts are to assist the plaintiff by allowing jurisdictional
discovery unless the plaintiff’s claim is “clearly frivolous.” If a plaintiff presents factual
allegations that suggest “with reasonable particularity” the possible existence of the
requisite “contacts between [the party] and the forum state,” the plaintiff’s right to conduct
jurisdictional discovery should be sustained.
Where the plaintiff has made this required threshold showing, courts within this Circuit
have sustained the right to conduct discovery before the district court dismisses for lack of
personal jurisdiction. Here, instead of adopting a deferential approach to Toys’ request for
discovery, the District Court appears to have focused entirely on the web site, thereby
preventing further inquiry into non-Internet contacts.
The record before the District Court contained sufficient non-frivolous allegations (and
admissions) to support the request for jurisdictional discovery. First, Toys’ complaint
alleges that Step Two has “completely copied the IMAGINARIUM concept” from Toys. For
example, Toys alleges that “the mix of toys sold by Step Two is identical to the mix of toys
circumstances, be based on the effects in the forum state of a defendant’s tortious actions elsewhere. One of the
Third Circuit’s requirements is that the “defendant expressly aimed his tortious conduct at the forum....”
Even assuming that Step Two’s registration of the Imaginarium domain names and its operation of web
sites under that name bring about an injury to Toys in New Jersey (its corporate headquarters), Toys has failed
to establish that Step Two engaged in intentionally tortious conduct expressly aimed at New Jersey. In the
present case, this intentionality requirement is the key missing component for jurisdiction under either the
“minimum contacts” analysis or the “effects” test.
7 The federal long-arm statute sanctions personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants for claims arising under
federal law when the defendant has sufficient contacts with the nation as a whole to justify the imposition of
U.S. law, but without sufficient contacts to satisfy the due process concerns of the long-arm statute of any
particular state.
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sold by Toys under the IMAGINARIUM mark,” and that “Step Two continues to copy Toys’
marketing developments and Intellectual property.” Underlying Toys’ complaint is its
concern that Step Two is “attempt[ing] to expand [its] business throughout the world
including the United States by operating international web sites that offer goods similar to
the goods offered in Toy’s [sic] IMAGINARIUM stores.” Step Two’s intent, according to
Toys, is to “capitalize for [its] own pecuniary gain on the goodwill and excellent reputation
of Toys....”
It is well established that in deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, a court is
required to accept the plaintiff’s allegations as true, and is to construe disputed facts in
favor of the plaintiff. Given the allegations as to Step Two’s mimicry of Toys’ ventures on
the Internet and its copy-cat marketing efforts, it would be reasonable to allow more
detailed discovery into Step Two’s business plans for purchases, sales, and marketing.
Limited discovery relating to these matters would shed light on the extent, if any, Step
Two’s business activity—including, but not limited to, its web site—were aimed towards the
United States. This information, known only to Step Two, would speak to an essential
element of the personal jurisdiction calculus.
Other aspects of the record should have also alerted the District Court to the possible
existence of the “something else” needed to exercise personal jurisdiction. For example, Step
Two concedes that a portion of the merchandise sold through its Imaginarium stores and
web sites are purchased from U.S. vendors, and that Mr. Tena attends the New York Toy
Fair each year. Further discovery into the vendor relationships and Mr. Tena’s activities
here, if any, may shed light on Step Two’s intentions with respect to the U.S. market, or the
extent of its business contacts in the United States. Discovery might also reveal whether
these non-Internet contacts directly facilitate Step Two’s alleged exploitation of Toys’
marketing techniques by providing it with a supply of items identical to Toys’ inventory to
sell on its web sites.
The two documented sales to residents of New Jersey—and the subsequent emails sent
from Step Two to the two purchasers—also speak “with reasonable particularity” to the
possible existence of contacts needed to support jurisdiction. Although affiliates of Toys
orchestrated the two sales, Mr. Tena’s conflicting affidavits raise the possibility that
additional sales to U.S. residents may have been conducted via the web sites. The need for
additional discovery regarding sales is further underscored by the parties’ uncertainty as to
whether the residence of purchasers can be determined from their credit card number or
through some other electronic means.8
Counsel for Toys mentioned some of these contacts when it explained to the District Court
why it should be allowed jurisdictional discovery:

In its brief on appeal, Step Two contends that Toys should not be allowed discovery because there is simply no
basis for believing that there are any other contacts to find and, moreover, seeking discovery about other web
site-generated contacts would be futile as Step Two does not keep track of billing addresses or the physical
location of its email correspondents. At oral argument, however, counsel for Toys suggested there are means by
which an individual’s residence can be determined from a credit card number. Toys also suggests, in its brief on
appeal, that the residence of on-line purchasers may be determined from the phone number that purchasers are
required to input. These possibilities can be explored through discovery.

8
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Mr. Tena states in his affidavit that he has substantial regular and
systematic contacts with the United States, [and] he attends trade shows. He
purchases from vendors in the United States. I think at the very least, Your
Honor, we should be able to inquire into what these substantial and
continuing contacts are. Because apparently he buys a lot of the toys that he
resells from U.S. vendors, because the ones that we have got were in English
that we would be permitted to take discovery on that aspect. To determine
whether or not ... he has made more sales within the State of New Jersey and
in the United States as a whole, as far as accepting orders from United States
residents. And/or whether there’s a basis for general jurisdiction under Rule
4(k)(2), because of his regular and systematic contacts with the United
States. Apparently a lot of his toys are obtained through United States
vendors.
Toys’ request for jurisdictional discovery was specific, non-frivolous, and a logical follow-up
based on the information known to Toys. The District Court erred by denying this
reasonable request. Toys should be allowed jurisdictional discovery, on the limited issue of
Step Two’s business activities in the United States, including business plans, marketing
strategies, sales, and other commercial interactions. Although Step Two does not appear to
have widespread contacts with the United States, this limited discovery will also help
determine whether jurisdiction exists under the federal long-arm statute. Accordingly, on
remand, the District Court should consider whether any newly discovered facts will support
jurisdiction under traditional jurisdictional analysis, or under Rule 4(k)(2).
CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons set forth above, we reverse the District Court’s denial of Toys’ request
for jurisdictional discovery, vacate the District Court’s dismissal of Toys’ complaint, and
remand the case for limited jurisdictional discovery guided by the foregoing analysis, and
for reconsideration of jurisdiction with the benefit of the product of that discovery.
NOTES AND QUESTIONS
Enforceability. Let’s assume Toys ‘R’ Us wins the lawsuit and the court awards Toys ‘R’ Us
every remedy it requests. How will it enforce the judgment?
Denouement. After this ruling, the case settled without a further substantive ruling.
Shortly thereafter, Toys ‘R’ Us shut down its standalone Imaginarium stores, integrated the
brand into Toys ‘R’ Us stores, and progressively wound down the brand.
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Illinois v. Hemi Group LLC, 622 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2010)
Kanne, Circuit Judge.
The state of Illinois sued Hemi Group LLC for selling cigarettes to Illinois residents in
violation of state laws and for failing to report those sales in violation of federal law. The
district court denied Hemi’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding that
the Internet transactions sufficed to establish personal jurisdiction over Hemi in Illinois.
We affirm….
1. Minimum Contacts
We find that Hemi’s contacts with Illinois were sufficient to satisfy due process. Hemi
maintained commercial websites through which customers could purchase cigarettes,
calculate their shipping charges using their zip codes, and create accounts. Hemi stated
that it would ship to any state in the country except New York. This statement is
important for two reasons. First, Hemi expressly elected to do business with the residents
of forty-nine states. Although listing all forty-nine states by name would have made a
stronger case for jurisdiction in this case, inasmuch as it would have expressly stated that
Hemi wanted to do business with Illinois residents, the net result is the same—Hemi stood
ready and willing to do business with Illinois residents. And Hemi, in fact, knowingly did
do business with Illinois residents. In light of this, Hemi’s argument that it did not
purposefully avail itself of doing business in Illinois rings particularly hollow.
Second, the fact that Hemi excluded New York residents from its customer pool shows both
that Hemi knew that conducting business with residents of a particular state could subject
it to jurisdiction there and also that it knew how to protect itself from being haled into court
in any particular state….
Hemi argues that its sales to customers, specifically the sales to the special agent of the
Illinois Department of Revenue, cannot constitute the required minimum contacts because
the purchases were unilateral actions by the customers. Characterizing the sales as
unilateral is misleading, however, because it ignores several of Hemi’s own actions that led
up to and followed the sales. Hemi created several commercial, interactive websites
through which customers could purchase cigarettes from Hemi. Hemi held itself out as
open to do business with every state (including Illinois) except New York. After the
customers made their purchases online, Hemi shipped the cigarettes to their various
destinations. It is Hemi reaching out to residents of Illinois, and not the residents reaching
back, that creates the sufficient minimum contacts with Illinois that justify exercising
personal jurisdiction over Hemi in Illinois.
We wish to point out that we have done the entire minimum contacts analysis without
resorting to the sliding scale approach first developed in Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com,
Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997). This was not by mistake. Although several
other circuits have explicitly adopted the sliding scale approach, our court has expressly
declined to do so.… Long before the Internet became a medium for defamation, the
Supreme Court in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), had decided the relevant
jurisdictional standard for intentional torts that cross state lines. We concluded that “the
principles articulated [in Calder] can be applied to cases involving tortious conduct
committed over the Internet.”
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We reach the same conclusion here. Zippo’s sliding scale was always just short-hand for
determining whether a defendant had established sufficient minimum contacts with a
forum to justify exercising personal jurisdiction over him in the forum state. But we think
that the traditional due process inquiry described earlier is not so difficult to apply to cases
involving Internet contacts that courts need some sort of easier-to-apply categorical test….
3. Fairness…
We conclude that exercising jurisdiction over Hemi in Illinois is fair. Hemi set up an
expansive, sophisticated commercial venture online. It held itself out to conduct business
nationwide and was apparently successful in reaching customers across the country. It was
savvy enough to at least try to limit its exposure to lawsuits in states in which it felt that
the upside of doing business was outweighed by the risk of litigation. Hemi wants to have
its cake and eat it, too: it wants the benefit of a nationwide business model with none of the
exposure. There is nothing constitutionally unfair about allowing Illinois, a state with
which Hemi has had sufficient minimum contacts, to exercise personal jurisdiction over
Hemi.
To be sure, defending against a lawsuit in Illinois may prove to be a burden on Hemi, whose
physical business operations are located entirely in New Mexico. However, Illinois courts
have a strong interest in providing a forum to resolve a dispute involving the state itself,
and it would be most convenient to the state of Illinois (and likely New Mexico) to
adjudicate a dispute based on Illinois law in Illinois courts. None of the other relevant
factors weighs conclusively in Hemi’s favor….
We note the legitimate concern that “[p]remising personal jurisdiction on the maintenance
of a website, without requiring some level of ‘interactivity’ between the defendant and
consumers in the forum state, would create almost universal personal jurisdiction because
of the virtually unlimited accessibility of websites across the country.” Courts should be
careful in resolving questions about personal jurisdiction involving online contacts to
ensure that a defendant is not haled into court simply because the defendant owns or
operates a website that is accessible in the forum state, even if that site is “interactive.”
Here, we affirm the district court’s conclusion that Hemi is subject to personal jurisdiction
in Illinois, not merely because it operated several “interactive” websites, but because Hemi
had sufficient voluntary contacts with the state of Illinois. We make no comment on
whether Hemi may be subject to personal jurisdiction in any other state….
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III.

Contracts

Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002).
Sotomayor, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Southern District of New York denying a motion
by defendants-appellants Netscape Communications Corporation and its corporate parent,
America Online, Inc. (collectively, “defendants” or “Netscape”), to compel arbitration and to
stay court proceedings. In order to resolve the central question of arbitrability presented
here, we must address issues of contract formation in cyberspace. Principally, we are asked
to determine whether plaintiffs-appellees (“plaintiffs”), by acting upon defendants’
invitation to download free software made available on defendants’ webpage, agreed to be
bound by the software’s license terms (which included the arbitration clause at issue), even
though plaintiffs could not have learned of the existence of those terms unless, prior to
executing the download, they had scrolled down the webpage to a screen located below the
download button. We agree with the district court that a reasonably prudent Internet user
in circumstances such as these would not have known or learned of the existence of the
license terms before responding to defendants’ invitation to download the free software, and
that defendants therefore did not provide reasonable notice of the license terms. In
consequence, plaintiffs’ bare act of downloading the software did not unambiguously
manifest assent to the arbitration provision contained in the license terms.
We also agree with the district court that plaintiffs’ claims relating to the software at
issue—a “plug-in” program entitled SmartDownload (“SmartDownload” or “the plug-in
program”), offered by Netscape to enhance the functioning of the separate browser program
called Netscape Communicator (“Communicator” or “the browser program”)—are not
subject to an arbitration agreement contained in the license terms governing the use of
Communicator. Finally, we conclude that the district court properly rejected defendants’
argument that plaintiff website owner Christopher Specht, though not a party to any
Netscape license agreement, is nevertheless required to arbitrate his claims concerning
SmartDownload because he allegedly benefited directly under SmartDownload’s license
agreement. Defendants’ theory that Specht benefited whenever visitors employing
SmartDownload downloaded certain files made available on his website is simply too
tenuous and speculative to justify application of the legal doctrine that requires a nonparty
to an arbitration agreement to arbitrate if he or she has received a direct benefit under a
contract containing the arbitration agreement.
We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of defendants’ motion to compel arbitration
and to stay court proceedings.
BACKGROUND
I. Facts
In three related putative class actions, plaintiffs alleged that, unknown to them, their use
of SmartDownload transmitted to defendants private information about plaintiffs’
downloading of files from the Internet, thereby effecting an electronic surveillance of their
online activities in violation of two federal statutes, the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 et seq., and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
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Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that when they first used Netscape’s Communicator—a
software program that permits Internet browsing—the program created and stored on each
of their computer hard drives a small text file known as a “cookie” that functioned “as a
kind of electronic identification tag for future communications” between their computers
and Netscape. Plaintiffs further alleged that when they installed SmartDownload—a
separate software “plug-in”2 that served to enhance Communicator’s browsing
capabilities—SmartDownload created and stored on their computer hard drives another
string of characters, known as a “Key,” which similarly functioned as an identification tag
in future communications with Netscape. According to the complaints in this case, each
time a computer user employed Communicator to download a file from the Internet,
SmartDownload “assume[d] from Communicator the task of downloading” the file and
transmitted to Netscape the address of the file being downloaded together with the cookie
created by Communicator and the Key created by SmartDownload. These processes,
plaintiffs claim, constituted unlawful “eavesdropping” on users of Netscape’s software
products as well as on Internet websites from which users employing SmartDownload
downloaded files.
In the time period relevant to this litigation, Netscape offered on its website various
software programs, including Communicator and SmartDownload, which visitors to the site
were invited to obtain free of charge. It is undisputed that five of the six named plaintiffs—
Michael Fagan, John Gibson, Mark Gruber, Sean Kelly, and Sherry Weindorf—downloaded
Communicator from the Netscape website. These plaintiffs acknowledge that when they
proceeded to initiate installation3 of Communicator, they were automatically shown a
scrollable text of that program’s license agreement and were not permitted to complete the
installation until they had clicked on a “Yes” button to indicate that they accepted all the
license terms.4 If a user attempted to install Communicator without clicking “Yes,” the
installation would be aborted. All five named user plaintiffs5 expressly agreed to
Communicator’s license terms by clicking “Yes.” The Communicator license agreement that
2 Netscape’s website defines “plug-ins” as “software programs that extend the capabilities of the Netscape
Browser in a specific way—giving you, for example, the ability to play audio samples or view video movies from
within your browser.” SmartDownload purportedly made it easier for users of browser programs like
Communicator to download files from the Internet without losing their progress when they paused to engage in
some other task, or if their Internet connection was severed.
3 There is a difference between downloading and installing a software program. When a user downloads a
program from the Internet to his or her computer, the program file is stored on the user’s hard drive but
typically is not operable until the user installs or executes it, usually by double-clicking on the file and causing
the program to run.
4 This kind of online software license agreement has come to be known as “clickwrap” (by analogy to
“shrinkwrap,” used in the licensing of tangible forms of software sold in packages) because it “presents the user
with a message on his or her computer screen, requiring that the user manifest his or her assent to the terms of
the license agreement by clicking on an icon. The product cannot be obtained or used unless and until the icon is
clicked.” Just as breaking the shrinkwrap seal and using the enclosed computer program after encountering
notice of the existence of governing license terms has been deemed by some courts to constitute assent to those
terms in the context of tangible software, see, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451 (7th Cir. 1996),
so clicking on a webpage’s clickwrap button after receiving notice of the existence of license terms has been held
by some courts to manifest an Internet user’s assent to terms governing the use of downloadable intangible
software.
5 The term “user plaintiffs” here and elsewhere in this opinion denotes those plaintiffs who are suing for harm
they allegedly incurred as computer users, in contrast to plaintiff Specht, who alleges that he was harmed in his
capacity as a website owner.
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these plaintiffs saw made no mention of SmartDownload or other plug-in programs, and
stated that “[t]hese terms apply to Netscape Communicator and Netscape Navigator”6 and
that “all disputes relating to this Agreement (excepting any dispute relating to intellectual
property rights)” are subject to “binding arbitration in Santa Clara County, California.”
Although Communicator could be obtained independently of SmartDownload, all the named
user plaintiffs, except Fagan, downloaded and installed Communicator in connection with
downloading SmartDownload.7 Each of these plaintiffs allegedly arrived at a Netscape
webpage captioned “SmartDownload Communicator” that urged them to “Download With
Confidence Using SmartDownload!” At or near the bottom of the screen facing plaintiffs
was the prompt “Start Download” and a tinted button labeled “Download.” By clicking on
the button, plaintiffs initiated the download of SmartDownload. Once that process was
complete, SmartDownload, as its first plug-in task, permitted plaintiffs to proceed with
downloading and installing Communicator, an operation that was accompanied by the
clickwrap display of Communicator’s license terms described above.
The signal difference between downloading Communicator and downloading
SmartDownload was that no clickwrap presentation accompanied the latter operation.
Instead, once plaintiffs Gibson, Gruber, Kelly, and Weindorf had clicked on the “Download”
button located at or near the bottom of their screen, and the downloading of
SmartDownload was complete, these plaintiffs encountered no further information about
the plug-in program or the existence of license terms governing its use.9 The sole reference
to SmartDownload’s license terms on the “SmartDownload Communicator” webpage was
located in text that would have become visible to plaintiffs only if they had scrolled down to
the next screen.
Had plaintiffs scrolled down instead of acting on defendants’ invitation to click on the
“Download” button, they would have encountered the following invitation: “Please review
and agree to the terms of the Netscape SmartDownload software license agreement before
downloading and using the software.” Plaintiffs Gibson, Gruber, Kelly, and Weindorf
averred in their affidavits that they never saw this reference to the SmartDownload license
agreement when they clicked on the “Download” button. They also testified during
depositions that they saw no reference to license terms when they clicked to download
SmartDownload, although under questioning by defendants’ counsel, some plaintiffs added
that they could not “remember” or be “sure” whether the screen shots of the

While Navigator was Netscape’s “stand-alone” Internet browser program during the period in question,
Communicator was a “software suite” that comprised Navigator and other software products. All five named
user plaintiffs stated in affidavits that they had obtained upgraded versions of Communicator. Fagan, who, as
noted below, allegedly did not obtain the browser program in connection with downloading SmartDownload,
expressed some uncertainty during his deposition as to whether he had acquired Communicator or Navigator.
The identity of Fagan’s browser program is immaterial to this appeal, however, as Communicator and
Navigator shared the same license agreement.
7 Unlike the four other user plaintiffs, Fagan chose the option of obtaining Netscape’s browser program without
first downloading SmartDownload. As discussed below, Fagan allegedly obtained SmartDownload from a
separate “shareware” website unrelated to Netscape.
9 Plaintiff Kelly, a relatively sophisticated Internet user, testified that when he clicked to download
SmartDownload, he did not think that he was downloading a software program at all, but rather that
SmartDownload “was merely a piece of download technology.” He later became aware that SmartDownload was
residing as software on his hard drive when he attempted to download electronic files from the Internet.
6
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SmartDownload page attached to their affidavits reflected precisely what they had seen on
their computer screens when they downloaded SmartDownload.
In sum, plaintiffs Gibson, Gruber, Kelly, and Weindorf allege that the process of obtaining
SmartDownload contrasted sharply with that of obtaining Communicator. Having selected
SmartDownload, they were required neither to express unambiguous assent to that
program’s license agreement nor even to view the license terms or become aware of their
existence before proceeding with the invited download of the free plug-in program.
Moreover, once these plaintiffs had initiated the download, the existence of
SmartDownload’s license terms was not mentioned while the software was running or at
any later point in plaintiffs’ experience of the product.
Even for a user who, unlike plaintiffs, did happen to scroll down past the download button,
SmartDownload’s license terms would not have been immediately displayed in the manner
of Communicator’s clickwrapped terms. Instead, if such a user had seen the notice of
SmartDownload’s terms and then clicked on the underlined invitation to review and agree
to the terms, a hypertext link would have taken the user to a separate webpage entitled
“License & Support Agreements.” The first paragraph on this page read, in pertinent part:
The use of each Netscape software product is governed by a license
agreement. You must read and agree to the license agreement terms
BEFORE acquiring a product. Please click on the appropriate link below to
review the current license agreement for the product of interest to you before
acquisition. For products available for download, you must read and agree to
the license agreement terms BEFORE you install the software. If you do not
agree to the license terms, do not download, install or use the software.
Below this paragraph appeared a list of license agreements, the first of which was “License
Agreement for Netscape Navigator and Netscape Communicator Product Family (Netscape
Navigator, Netscape Communicator and Netscape SmartDownload).” If the user clicked on
that link, he or she would be taken to yet another webpage that contained the full text of a
license agreement that was identical in every respect to the Communicator license
agreement except that it stated that its “terms apply to Netscape Communicator, Netscape
Navigator, and Netscape SmartDownload.” The license agreement granted the user a
nonexclusive license to use and reproduce the software, subject to certain terms:
BY CLICKING THE ACCEPTANCE BUTTON OR INSTALLING OR USING
NETSCAPE COMMUNICATOR, NETSCAPE NAVIGATOR, OR NETSCAPE
SMARTDOWNLOAD SOFTWARE (THE “PRODUCT”), THE INDIVIDUAL
OR ENTITY LICENSING THE PRODUCT (“LICENSEE”) IS CONSENTING
TO BE BOUND BY AND IS BECOMING A PARTY TO THIS AGREEMENT.
IF LICENSEE DOES NOT AGREE TO ALL OF THE TERMS OF THIS
AGREEMENT, THE BUTTON INDICATING NON-ACCEPTANCE MUST
BE SELECTED, AND LICENSEE MUST NOT INSTALL OR USE THE
SOFTWARE.
Among the license terms was a provision requiring virtually all disputes relating to the
agreement to be submitted to arbitration:
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Unless otherwise agreed in writing, all disputes relating to this Agreement
(excepting any dispute relating to intellectual property rights) shall be
subject to final and binding arbitration in Santa Clara County, California,
under the auspices of JAMS/EndDispute, with the losing party paying all
costs of arbitration.
[Editor’s note: these four screenshots were not included in the opinion but may be helpful]
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Unlike the four named user plaintiffs who downloaded SmartDownload from the Netscape
website, the fifth named plaintiff, Michael Fagan, claims to have downloaded the plug-in
program from a “shareware” website operated by ZDNet, an entity unrelated to Netscape.
Shareware sites are websites, maintained by companies or individuals, that contain
libraries of free, publicly available software. The pages that a user would have seen while
downloading SmartDownload from ZDNet differed from those that he or she would have
encountered while downloading SmartDownload from the Netscape website. Notably,
instead of any kind of notice of the SmartDownload license agreement, the ZDNet pages
offered only a hypertext link to “more information” about SmartDownload, which, if clicked
on, took the user to a Netscape webpage that, in turn, contained a link to the license
agreement. Thus, a visitor to the ZDNet website could have obtained SmartDownload, as
Fagan avers he did, without ever seeing a reference to that program’s license terms, even if
he or she had scrolled through all of ZDNet’s webpages.
The sixth named plaintiff, Christopher Specht, never obtained or used SmartDownload, but
instead operated a website from which visitors could download certain electronic files that
permitted them to create an account with an internet service provider called WhyWeb.
Specht alleges that every time a user who had previously installed SmartDownload visited
his website and downloaded WhyWeb-related files, defendants intercepted this information.
Defendants allege that Specht would receive a representative’s commission from WhyWeb
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every time a user who obtained a WhyWeb file from his website subsequently subscribed to
the WhyWeb service. Thus, argue defendants, because the “Netscape license agreement ...
conferred on each user the right to download and use both Communicator and
SmartDownload software,” Specht received a benefit under that license agreement in that
SmartDownload “assisted in obtaining the WhyWeb file and increased the likelihood of
success in the download process.” This benefit, defendants claim, was direct enough to
require Specht to arbitrate his claims pursuant to Netscape’s license terms. Specht,
however, maintains that he never received any commissions based on the WhyWeb files
available on his website….
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review and Applicable Law…
If a court finds that the parties agreed to arbitrate, it should then consider whether the
dispute falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement. A district court’s determination
of the scope of an arbitration agreement is reviewed de novo. In addition, whether a party
may be compelled to arbitrate as a result of direct benefits that he or she allegedly received
under a contract entered into by others is an issue of arbitrability that is reviewed de novo.
The FAA provides that a “written provision in any ... contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract or transaction ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” It is well settled that
a court may not compel arbitration until it has resolved “the question of the very existence”
of the contract embodying the arbitration clause. “[A]rbitration is a matter of contract and a
party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to
submit.” Unless the parties clearly provide otherwise, “the question of arbitrability—
whether a[n] ... agreement creates a duty for the parties to arbitrate the particular
grievance—is undeniably an issue for judicial determination.”
The district court properly concluded that in deciding whether parties agreed to arbitrate a
certain matter, a court should generally apply state-law principles to the issue of contract
formation. Therefore, state law governs the question of whether the parties in the present
case entered into an agreement to arbitrate disputes relating to the SmartDownload license
agreement. The district court further held that California law governs the question of
contract formation here; the parties do not appeal that determination….
III. Whether the User Plaintiffs Had Reasonable Notice of and Manifested Assent to the
SmartDownload License Agreement
Whether governed by the common law or by Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(“UCC”), a transaction, in order to be a contract, requires a manifestation of agreement
between the parties. See…Cal. Com. Code § 2204(1) (“A contract for sale of goods may be
made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties which
recognizes the existence of such a contract.”).13 Mutual manifestation of assent, whether by
13 The district court concluded that the SmartDownload transactions here should be governed by “California law
as it relates to the sale of goods, including the Uniform Commercial Code in effect in California.” It is not
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written or spoken word or by conduct, is the touchstone of contract…cf. Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 19(2) (1981) (“The conduct of a party is not effective as a
manifestation of his assent unless he intends to engage in the conduct and knows or has
reason to know that the other party may infer from his conduct that he assents.”). Although
an onlooker observing the disputed transactions in this case would have seen each of the
user plaintiffs click on the SmartDownload “Download” button, see Cedars Sinai Med. Ctr.
v. Mid-West Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 118 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1008 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (“In California,
a party’s intent to contract is judged objectively, by the party’s outward manifestation of
consent.”), a consumer’s clicking on a download button does not communicate assent to
contractual terms if the offer did not make clear to the consumer that clicking on the
download button would signify assent to those terms, see Windsor Mills, 25 Cal. App. 3d at
992 (“[W]hen the offeree does not know that a proposal has been made to him this objective
standard does not apply.”). California’s common law is clear that “an offeree, regardless of
apparent manifestation of his consent, is not bound by inconspicuous contractual provisions
of which he is unaware, contained in a document whose contractual nature is not obvious.”
Arbitration agreements are no exception to the requirement of manifestation of assent.
“This principle of knowing consent applies with particular force to provisions for
arbitration.” Clarity and conspicuousness of arbitration terms are important in securing
informed assent. “If a party wishes to bind in writing another to an agreement to arbitrate
future disputes, such purpose should be accomplished in a way that each party to the
arrangement will fully and clearly comprehend that the agreement to arbitrate exists and
binds the parties thereto.” Thus, California contract law measures assent by an objective
standard that takes into account both what the offeree said, wrote, or did and the
transactional context in which the offeree verbalized or acted.

obvious, however, that UCC Article 2 (“sales of goods”) applies to the licensing of software that is downloadable
from the Internet. There is no doubt that a sale of tangible goods over the Internet is governed by Article 2 of
the UCC. Some courts have also applied Article 2, occasionally with misgivings, to sales of off-the-shelf software
in tangible, packaged formats. See, e.g., ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450 (“[W]e treat the [database] licenses as ordinary
contracts accompanying the sale of products, and therefore as governed by the common law of contracts and the
Uniform Commercial Code. Whether there are legal differences between ‘contracts’ and ‘licenses’ (which may
matter under the copyright doctrine of first sale) is a subject for another day.”); I.Lan Sys., Inc. v. Nextpoint
Networks, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 (D. Mass. 2002) (stating, in the context of a dispute between business
parties, that “Article 2 technically does not, and certainly will not in the future, govern software licenses, but for
the time being, the Court will assume that it does”).
Downloadable software, however, is scarcely a “tangible” good, and, in part because software may be
obtained, copied, or transferred effortlessly at the stroke of a computer key, licensing of such Internet products
has assumed a vast importance in recent years. Recognizing that “a body of law based on images of the sale of
manufactured goods ill fits licenses and other transactions in computer information,” the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has promulgated the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
(“UCITA”), a code resembling UCC Article 2 in many respects but drafted to reflect emergent practices in the
sale and licensing of computer information. UCITA—originally intended as a new Article 2B to supplement
Articles 2 and 2A of the UCC but later proposed as an independent code—has been adopted by two states,
Maryland and Virginia.
We need not decide today whether UCC Article 2 applies to Internet transactions in downloadable
products. The district court’s analysis and the parties’ arguments on appeal show that, for present purposes,
there is no essential difference between UCC Article 2 and the common law of contracts. We therefore apply the
common law, with exceptions as noted.

56.

A. The Reasonably Prudent Offeree of Downloadable Software
Defendants argue that plaintiffs must be held to a standard of reasonable prudence and
that, because notice of the existence of SmartDownload license terms was on the next
scrollable screen, plaintiffs were on “inquiry notice” of those terms.14 We disagree with the
proposition that a reasonably prudent offeree in plaintiffs’ position would necessarily have
known or learned of the existence of the SmartDownload license agreement prior to acting,
so that plaintiffs may be held to have assented to that agreement with constructive notice
of its terms. It is true that “[a] party cannot avoid the terms of a contract on the ground
that he or she failed to read it before signing.” But courts are quick to add: “An exception to
this general rule exists when the writing does not appear to be a contract and the terms are
not called to the attention of the recipient. In such a case, no contract is formed with respect
to the undisclosed term.”
Most of the cases cited by defendants in support of their inquiry-notice argument are drawn
from the world of paper contracting. See, e.g., Taussig v. Bode & Haslett, 134 Cal. 260, 66
P. 259 (1901) (where party had opportunity to read leakage disclaimer printed on
warehouse receipt, he had duty to do so); In re First Capital Life Ins. Co., 34 Cal. App. 4th
1283, 1288 (1995) (purchase of insurance policy after opportunity to read and understand
policy terms creates binding agreement); King v. Larsen Realty, Inc., 121 Cal. App. 3d 349,
356 (1981) (where realtors’ board manual specifying that party was required to arbitrate
was “readily available,” party was “on notice” that he was agreeing to mandatory
arbitration); Cal. State Auto. Ass’n Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Barrett Garages, Inc., 257 Cal.
App. 2d 71, 76 (1967) (recipient of airport parking claim check was bound by terms printed
on claim check, because a “ordinarily prudent” person would have been alerted to the
terms); Larrus v. First Nat’l Bank, 122 Cal. App. 2d 884, 888 (1954) (“clearly printed”
statement on bank card stating that depositor agreed to bank’s regulations provided
sufficient notice to create agreement, where party had opportunity to view statement and to
ask for full text of regulations, but did not do so)….
As the foregoing cases suggest, receipt of a physical document containing contract terms or
notice thereof is frequently deemed, in the world of paper transactions, a sufficient
circumstance to place the offeree on inquiry notice of those terms. “Every person who has
actual notice of circumstances sufficient to put a prudent man upon inquiry as to a
particular fact, has constructive notice of the fact itself in all cases in which, by prosecuting
such inquiry, he might have learned such fact.” Cal. Civ. Code § 19. These principles apply
equally to the emergent world of online product delivery, pop-up screens, hyperlinked
pages, clickwrap licensing, scrollable documents, and urgent admonitions to “Download
Now!”. What plaintiffs saw when they were being invited by defendants to download this
fast, free plug-in called SmartDownload was a screen containing praise for the product and,
at the very bottom of the screen, a “Download” button. Defendants argue that under the
principles set forth in the cases cited above, a “fair and prudent person using ordinary care”
would have been on inquiry notice of SmartDownload’s license terms.
We are not persuaded that a reasonably prudent offeree in these circumstances would have
known of the existence of license terms. Plaintiffs were responding to an offer that did not
carry an immediately visible notice of the existence of license terms or require
14

“Inquiry notice” is “actual notice of circumstances sufficient to put a prudent man upon inquiry.”
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unambiguous manifestation of assent to those terms. Thus, plaintiffs’ “apparent
manifestation of ... consent” was to terms “contained in a document whose contractual
nature [was] not obvious.” Moreover, the fact that, given the position of the scroll bar on
their computer screens, plaintiffs may have been aware that an unexplored portion of the
Netscape webpage remained below the download button does not mean that they
reasonably should have concluded that this portion contained a notice of license terms. In
their deposition testimony, plaintiffs variously stated that they used the scroll bar “[o]nly if
there is something that I feel I need to see that is on—that is off the page,” or that the
elevated position of the scroll bar suggested the presence of “mere[ ] formalities, standard
lower banner links” or “that the page is bigger than what I can see.” Plaintiffs testified, and
defendants did not refute, that plaintiffs were in fact unaware that defendants intended to
attach license terms to the use of SmartDownload.
We conclude that in circumstances such as these, where consumers are urged to download
free software at the immediate click of a button, a reference to the existence of license terms
on a submerged screen is not sufficient to place consumers on inquiry or constructive notice
of those terms.15 The SmartDownload webpage screen was “printed in such a manner that
it tended to conceal the fact that it was an express acceptance of [Netscape’s] rules and
regulations.” Internet users may have, as defendants put it, “as much time as they need[ ]”
to scroll through multiple screens on a webpage, but there is no reason to assume that
viewers will scroll down to subsequent screens simply because screens are there. When
products are “free” and users are invited to download them in the absence of reasonably
conspicuous notice that they are about to bind themselves to contract terms, the
transactional circumstances cannot be fully analogized to those in the paper world of arm’slength bargaining. In the next two sections, we discuss case law and other legal authorities
that have addressed the circumstances of computer sales, software licensing, and online
transacting. Those authorities tend strongly to support our conclusion that plaintiffs did
not manifest assent to SmartDownload’s license terms.
B. Shrinkwrap Licensing and Related Practices
Defendants cite certain well-known cases involving shrinkwrap licensing and related
commercial practices in support of their contention that plaintiffs became bound by the
SmartDownload license terms by virtue of inquiry notice. For example, in Hill v. Gateway
2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997), the Seventh Circuit held that where a purchaser
had ordered a computer over the telephone, received the order in a shipped box containing
the computer along with printed contract terms, and did not return the computer within
the thirty days required by the terms, the purchaser was bound by the contract. In ProCD,
Inc. v. Zeidenberg, the same court held that where an individual purchased software in a
box containing license terms which were displayed on the computer screen every time the
user executed the software program, the user had sufficient opportunity to review the terms
and to return the software, and so was contractually bound after retaining the product.
ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452; cf. Moore v. Microsoft Corp., 293 A.D.2d 587, 587 (2d Dep’t 2002)
(software user was bound by license agreement where terms were prominently displayed on
computer screen before software could be installed and where user was required to indicate
15 We do not address the district court’s alternative holding that notice was further vitiated by the fact that the
reference to SmartDownload’s license terms, even if scrolled to, was couched in precatory terms (“a mild
request”) rather than mandatory ones.

58.

assent by clicking “I agree”); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 246 A.D.2d 246, 251 (1st Dep’t
1998) (buyer assented to arbitration clause shipped inside box with computer and software
by retaining items beyond date specified by license terms); M.A. Mortenson Co. v.
Timberline Software Corp., 93 Wash.App. 819 (1999) (buyer manifested assent to software
license terms by installing and using software), aff’d, 140 Wash.2d 568, 998 P.2d 305
(2000); see also I.Lan Sys., 183 F. Supp. 2d at 338 (business entity “explicitly accepted the
clickwrap license agreement [contained in purchased software] when it clicked on the box
stating ‘I agree’”).
These cases do not help defendants. To the extent that they hold that the purchaser of a
computer or tangible software is contractually bound after failing to object to printed
license terms provided with the product, Hill and Brower do not differ markedly from the
cases involving traditional paper contracting discussed in the previous section. Insofar as
the purchaser in ProCD was confronted with conspicuous, mandatory license terms every
time he ran the software on his computer, that case actually undermines defendants’
contention that downloading in the absence of conspicuous terms is an act that binds
plaintiffs to those terms. In Mortenson, the full text of license terms was printed on each
sealed diskette envelope inside the software box, printed again on the inside cover of the
user manual, and notice of the terms appeared on the computer screen every time the
purchaser executed the program. In sum, the foregoing cases are clearly distinguishable
from the facts of the present action.
C. Online Transactions
Cases in which courts have found contracts arising from Internet use do not assist
defendants, because in those circumstances there was much clearer notice than in the
present case that a user’s act would manifest assent to contract terms.16 See, e.g., Hotmail
Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie Inc., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1020, 1025 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (granting
preliminary injunction based in part on breach of “Terms of Service” agreement, to which
defendants had assented); America Online, Inc. v. Booker, 781 So.2d 423, 425 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2001) (upholding forum selection clause in “freely negotiated agreement” contained in
online terms of service); Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 323 N.J. Super. 118 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (upholding forum selection clause where subscribers to online
software were required to review license terms in scrollable window and to click “I Agree”
or “I Don’t Agree”); Barnett v. Network Solutions, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 200, 203-04 (Tex. App.
2001) (upholding forum selection clause in online contract for registering Internet domain
names that required users to scroll through terms before accepting or rejecting them); cf.
Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 981-82 (E.D. Cal. 2000) (expressing concern
that notice of license terms had appeared in small, gray text on a gray background on a
linked webpage, but concluding that it was too early in the case to order dismissal).17

Defendants place great importance on Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000),
which held that a user of the Internet domain-name database, Register.com, had “manifested its assent to be
bound” by the database’s terms of use when it electronically submitted queries to the database. But Verio is not
helpful to defendants. There, the plaintiff’s terms of use of its information were well known to the defendant,
which took the information daily with full awareness that it was using the information in a manner prohibited
by the terms of the plaintiff’s offer. The case is not closely analogous to ours.
17 Although the parties here do not refer to it, California’s consumer fraud statute, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §
17538, is one of the few state statutes to regulate online transactions in goods or services. The statute provides
16
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After reviewing the California common law and other relevant legal authority, we conclude
that under the circumstances here, plaintiffs’ downloading of SmartDownload did not
constitute acceptance of defendants’ license terms. Reasonably conspicuous notice of the
existence of contract terms and unambiguous manifestation of assent to those terms by
consumers are essential if electronic bargaining is to have integrity and credibility. We hold
that a reasonably prudent offeree in plaintiffs’ position would not have known or learned,
prior to acting on the invitation to download, of the reference to SmartDownload’s license
terms hidden below the “Download” button on the next screen. We affirm the district court’s

that in disclosing information regarding return and refund policies and other vital consumer information, online
vendors must legibly display the information either:
(i) [on] the first screen displayed when the vendor’s electronic site is accessed, (ii) on the screen
on which goods or services are first offered, (iii) on the screen on which a buyer may place the
order for goods or services, (iv) on the screen on which the buyer may enter payment
information, such as a credit card account number, or (v) for nonbrowser-based technologies, in
a manner that gives the user a reasonable opportunity to review that information.
The statute’s clear purpose is to ensure that consumers engaging in online transactions have relevant
information before they can be bound. Although consumer fraud as such is not alleged in the present action, and
§ 17538 protects only California residents, we note that the statute is consistent with the principle of
conspicuous notice of the existence of contract terms that is also found in California’s common law of contracts.
In addition, the model code, UCITA, discussed above, generally recognizes the importance of
conspicuous notice and unambiguous manifestation of assent in online sales and licensing of computer
information. For example, § 112, which addresses manifestation of assent, provides that a user’s opportunity to
review online contract terms exists if a “record” (or electronic writing) of the contract terms is “made available
in a manner that ought to call it to the attention of a reasonable person and permit review.” Section 112 also
provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] person manifests assent to a record or term if the person, acting with
knowledge of, or after having an opportunity to review the record or term or a copy of it ... intentionally engages
in conduct or makes statements with reason to know that the other party or its electronic agent may infer from
the conduct or statement that the person assents to the record or term.” In the case of a “mass-market license,”
a party adopts the terms of the license only by manifesting assent “before or during the party’s initial
performance or use of or access to the information.”
UCITA § 211 sets forth a number of guidelines for “internet-type” transactions involving the supply of
information or software. For example, a licensor should make standard terms “available for review” prior to
delivery or obligation to pay (1) by “displaying prominently and in close proximity to a description of the
computer information, or to instructions or steps for acquiring it, the standard terms or a reference to an
electronic location from which they can be readily obtained,” or (2) by “disclosing the availability of the standard
terms in a prominent place on the site from which the computer information is offered and promptly furnishing
a copy of the standard terms on request before the transfer of the computer information.” The commentary to §
211 adds: “The intent of the close proximity standard is that the terms or the reference to them would be called
to the attention of an ordinary reasonable person.” The commentary also approves of prominent hypertext links
that draw attention to the existence of a standard agreement and allow users to view the terms of the license.
We hasten to point out that UCITA, which has been enacted into law only in Maryland and Virginia,
does not govern the parties’ transactions in the present case, but we nevertheless find that UCITA’s provisions
offer insight into the evolving online “circumstances” that defendants argue placed plaintiffs on inquiry notice of
the existence of the SmartDownload license terms. UCITA has been controversial as a result of the perceived
breadth of some of its provisions. Compare Margaret Jane Radin, Humans Computers, and Binding
Commitment, 75 IND. L.J. 1125, 1141 (2000) (arguing that “UCITA’s definition of manifestation of assent
stretches the ordinary concept of consent”), with Joseph H. Sommer, Against Cyberlaw, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1145, 1187 (2000) (“There are no new legal developments [in UCITA’s assent provisions]. The revolution—if
any—occurred with [Karl] Llewellyn’s old Article 2, which abandoned most formalisms of contract formation,
and sought a contract wherever it could be found.”). Nonetheless, UCITA’s notice and assent provisions seem to
be consistent with well-established principles governing contract formation and enforcement. See Robert A.
Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 491
(2002) (“[W]e contend that UCITA maintains the contextual, balanced approach to standard terms that can be
found in the paper world.”).
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conclusion that the user plaintiffs, including Fagan, are not bound by the arbitration clause
contained in those terms.18
IV. Whether Plaintiffs’ Assent to Communicator’s License Agreement Requires Them To
Arbitrate Their Claims Regarding SmartDownload
Plaintiffs do not dispute that they assented to the license terms governing Netscape’s
Communicator. The parties disagree, however, over the scope of that license’s arbitration
clause. Defendants contend that the scope is broad enough to encompass plaintiffs’ claims
regarding SmartDownload, even if plaintiffs did not separately assent to SmartDownload’s
license terms and even though Communicator’s license terms did not expressly mention
SmartDownload. Thus, defendants argue, plaintiffs must arbitrate.
The scope of an arbitration agreement is a legal issue that we review de novo. “[A]ny doubts
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”
Although “the FAA does not require parties to arbitrate when they have not agreed to do
so,” arbitration is indicated unless it can be said “with positive assurance” that an
arbitration clause is not susceptible to an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.
The Communicator license agreement, which required arbitration of “all disputes relating
to this Agreement (excepting any dispute relating to intellectual property rights),” must be
classified as “broad.” Where the scope of an arbitration agreement is broad,
there arises a presumption of arbitrability; if, however, the dispute is in
respect of a matter that, on its face, is clearly collateral to the contract, then a
court should test the presumption by reviewing the allegations underlying
the dispute and by asking whether the claim alleged implicates issues of
contract construction or the parties’ rights and obligations under it....
[C]laims that present no question involving construction of the contract, and
no questions in respect of the parties’ rights and obligations under it, are
beyond the scope of the arbitration agreement.
In determining whether a particular claim falls within the scope of the parties’ arbitration
agreement, this Court “focus[es] on the factual allegations in the complaint rather than the
legal causes of action asserted.” If those allegations “touch matters” covered by the
Netscape license agreement, plaintiffs’ claims must be arbitrated.
To begin with, we find that the underlying dispute in this case—whether defendants
violated plaintiffs’ rights under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act and the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act—involves matters that are clearly collateral to the
Communicator license agreement. While the SmartDownload license agreement expressly
applied “to Netscape Communicator, Netscape Navigator, and Netscape SmartDownload,”
the Communicator license agreement expressly applied only “to Netscape Communicator
18 Because we conclude that the Netscape webpage did not provide reasonable notice of the existence of
SmartDownload’s license terms, it is irrelevant to our decision whether plaintiff Fagan obtained
SmartDownload from that webpage, as defendants contend, or from a shareware website that provided less or
no notice of that program’s license terms, as Fagan maintains. In either case, Fagan could not be bound by the
SmartDownload license agreement….
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and Netscape Navigator.” Thus, on its face, the Communicator license agreement governed
disputes concerning Netscape’s browser programs only, not disputes concerning a plug-in
program like SmartDownload. Moreover, Communicator’s license terms included a merger
or integration clause stating that “[t]his Agreement constitutes the entire agreement
between the parties concerning the subject matter hereof.” SmartDownload’s license terms
contained the same clause. Such provisions are recognized by California courts as a means
of excluding prior or contemporaneous parol evidence from the scope of a contract. Although
the presence of merger clauses is not dispositive here, we note that defendants’ express
desire to limit the reach of the respective license agreements, combined with the absence of
reference to SmartDownload in the Communicator license agreement, suggests that a
dispute regarding defendants’ allegedly unlawful use of SmartDownload is clearly collateral
to the Communicator license agreement.
This conclusion is reinforced by the other terms of the Communicator license agreement,
which include a provision describing the non-exclusive nature of the grant and permission
to reproduce the software for personal and internal business purposes; restrictions on
modification, decompilation, redistribution or other sale or transfer, and removal or
alteration of trademarks or other intellectual property; provisions for the licensor’s right to
terminate and its proprietary rights; a complete disclaimer of warranties (“as is”) and an
entire-risk clause; a limitation of liability clause for consequential and other damages,
together with a liquidated damages term; clauses regarding encryption and export; a
disclaimer of warranties for high risk activities; and a miscellaneous paragraph that
contains merger, choice-of-law, arbitration, and severability clauses, non-waiver and nonassignment provisions, a force majeure term, and a clause providing for reimbursement of
the prevailing party in any dispute. Apart from the potential generic applicability of the
warranty and liability disclaimers, a dispute concerning alleged electronic eavesdropping
via transmissions from a separate plug-in program would not appear to fall within
Communicator’s license terms. We conclude, therefore, that this dispute concerns matters
that, on their face, are clearly collateral to the Communicator license agreement.
Having determined this much, we next must test the presumption of arbitrability by asking
whether plaintiffs’ allegations implicate or touch on issues of contract construction or the
parties’ rights and obligations under the contract. That is, even though the parties’ dispute
concerns matters clearly collateral to the Communicator license terms, we must determine
whether plaintiffs by their particular allegations have brought the dispute within the
license terms. Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ complaints “literally bristled with
allegations that Communicator and SmartDownload operated in conjunction with one
another to eavesdrop on Plaintiffs’ Internet communications.” We disagree. Plaintiffs’
allegations nowhere collapse or blur the distinction between Communicator and
SmartDownload, but instead consistently separate the two software programs and assert
that SmartDownload alone is responsible for unlawful eavesdropping. Plaintiffs begin by
alleging that “SmartDownload facilitates the transfer of large files over the Internet by
permitting a transfer to be resumed if it is interrupted.” Plaintiffs then explain that “[o]nce
SmartDownload is downloaded and running on a Web user’s computer, it automatically
connects to Netscape’s file servers and downloads the installation program for
Communicator.” Plaintiffs add that defendants also encourage visitors to Netscape’s
website “to download and install SmartDownload even if they are not installing or
upgrading Communicator.”
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Plaintiffs go on to point out that installing Communicator “automatically creates and stores
on the Web user’s computer a small text file known as a ‘cookie.’” There follow two
paragraphs essentially alleging that cookies were originally intended to perform such
innocuous tasks as providing “temporary identification for purposes such as electronic
commerce,” and that the Netscape cookie performs this original identifying, and entirely
lawful, function. Separate paragraphs then describe the “Key” or “UserID” that
SmartDownload allegedly independently places on user’s computers, and point out that
“SmartDownload assumes from Communicator the task of downloading various files.
Communicator itself could and would perform these downloading tasks if SmartDownload
were not installed.” “Thereafter,” the complaints continue,
each time a Web user downloads any file from any site on the Internet using
SmartDownload, SmartDownload automatically transmits to defendants the
name and Internet address of the file and the Web site from which it is being
sent. Within the same transmission, SmartDownload also includes the
contents of the Netscape cookie previously created by Communicator and the
“Key” previously created by SmartDownload.
In the course of their description of the installation and downloading process, plaintiffs
keep SmartDownload separate from Communicator and clearly indicate that it is
SmartDownload that performed the allegedly unlawful eavesdropping and made use of the
otherwise innocuous Communicator cookie as well as its own “Key” and “UserID” to
transmit plaintiffs’ information to Netscape. The complaints refer to “SmartDownload’s
spying” and explain that “Defendants are using SmartDownload to eavesdrop.” Plaintiffs’
allegations consistently distinguish and isolate the functions of SmartDownload in such a
way as to make it clear that it is through SmartDownload, not Communicator, that
defendants committed the abuses that are the subject of the complaints.
After careful review of these allegations, we conclude that plaintiffs’ claims “present no
question involving construction of the [Communicator license agreement], and no questions
in respect of the parties’ rights and obligations under it.” It follows that the claims of the
five user plaintiffs are beyond the scope of the arbitration clause contained in the
Communicator license agreement. Because those claims are not arbitrable under that
agreement or under the SmartDownload license agreement, to which plaintiffs never
assented, we affirm the district court’s holding that the five user plaintiffs may not be
compelled to arbitrate their claims….
NOTES AND QUESTIONS
How Did This Happen? Netscape had a large in-house legal department with many skillful
attorneys. How did this problem occur?
Paper vs. Electronic Contract Presentation. Should the law treat contracts presented
electronically different from contracts presented on paper, even if their content is identical?
Some social science suggests that readers may better retain information they read on paper
than if they read the same content electronically. See Maia Szalavitz, Do E-Books Make It
Harder to Remember What You Just Read?, TIME, Mar. 14, 2012.
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Denouement. The New York Attorney General also pursued AOL for the operation of
SmartDownload. AOL settled both cases. It paid $100,000 to the NY Attorney General but
didn’t pay any money to consumers. AOL ended up not having to pay attorneys’ fees to
Specht’s counsel due to a litigation error on their part. AOL also had to delete the data
collected via SmartDownload, had to provide a new version of the software, and made some
other minor promises, such as agreeing to third party audits.
Netscape also modified its download screen. Does this satisfy the requirements of the
Specht case?
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Does Epinions’ contract formation procedure satisfy the requirements of the Specht case?
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Does eBay’s (as depicted in this screenshot)?
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Do you agree with this comic? (used with permission of the Doghouse Diaries,
http://www.thedoghousediaries.com/)
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Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004).
Leval, Circuit Judge.*
Defendant, Verio, Inc. (“Verio”) appeals from an order of the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York (Barbara S. Jones, J.) granting the motion of plaintiff
Register.com, Inc. (“Register”) for a preliminary injunction. The court’s order enjoined Verio
from (1) using Register’s trademarks; (2) representing or otherwise suggesting to third
parties that Verio’s services have the sponsorship, endorsement, or approval of Register; (3)
accessing Register’s computers by use of automated software programs performing multiple
successive queries; and (4) using data obtained from Register’s database of contact
information of registrants of Internet domain names to solicit the registrants for the sale of
web site development services by electronic mail, telephone calls, or direct mail. We
affirm.1…
BACKGROUND
This plaintiff Register is one of over fifty companies serving as registrars for the issuance of
domain names on the world wide web. As a registrar, Register issues domain names to
persons and entities preparing to establish web sites on the Internet. Web sites are
identified and accessed by reference to their domain names.
Register was appointed a registrar of domain names by the Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers, known by the acronym “ICANN.” ICANN is a private, nonprofit public benefit corporation which was established by agencies of the U.S. government
to administer the Internet domain name system. To become a registrar of domain names,
Register was required to enter into a standard form agreement with ICANN, designated as
the ICANN Registrar Accreditation Agreement, November 1999 version (referred to herein
as the “ICANN Agreement”).
Applicants to register a domain name submit to the registrar contact information, including
at a minimum, the applicant’s name, postal address, telephone number, and electronic mail
address. The ICANN Agreement, referring to this registrant contact information under the
rubric “WHOIS information,” requires the registrar, under terms discussed in greater detail
below, to preserve it, update it daily, and provide for free public access to it through the
Internet as well as through an independent access port, called port 43.
Section II.F.5 of the ICANN Agreement (which furnishes a major basis for the appellant
Verio’s contentions on this appeal) requires that the registrar “not impose terms and
The Honorable Fred I. Parker was a member of the panel but died on August 12, 2003. Judge Parker would
have voted to reverse the district court’s order. This appeal is being decided by the two remaining members of
the panel, who are in agreement.
1 Judge Parker was not in agreement with this disposition. Deliberations have followed an unusual course.
Judge Parker initially was assigned to prepare a draft opinion affirming the district court. In the course of
preparing the draft, Judge Parker changed his mind and proposed to rule in favor of the defendant, overturning
the injunction in most respects. Judge Parker’s draft opinion, however, failed to convince the other members of
the panel, who adhered to the view that the injunction should be affirmed. Judge Parker died shortly thereafter,
prior to the circulation of a draft opinion affirming the injunction, from which Judge Parker presumably would
have dissented. [Editor’s note: The court attached Judge Parker’s draft opinion as an Appendix. It’s a scholarly
and thoughtful opinion that will reward interested readers.]
*
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conditions” on the use made by others of its WHOIS data “except as permitted by ICANNadopted policy.” In specifying what restrictions may be imposed, the ICANN Agreement
requires the registrar to permit use of its WHOIS data “for any lawful purposes except to: ...
support the transmission of mass unsolicited, commercial advertising or solicitations via
email (spam); [and other listed purposes not relevant to this appeal].” (emphasis added).
Another section of the ICANN Agreement (upon which appellee Register relies) provides as
follows,
No Third-Party Beneficiaries: This Agreement shall not be construed to
create any obligation by either ICANN or Registrar to any non-party to this
Agreement ....
Third parties could nonetheless seek enforcement of a registrar’s obligations set forth in the
ICANN Agreement by resort to a grievance process under ICANN’s auspices.
In compliance with § II.F.1 of the ICANN Agreement, Register updated the WHOIS
information on a daily basis and established Internet and port 43 service, which allowed
free public query of its WHOIS information. An entity making a WHOIS query through
Register’s Internet site or port 43 would receive a reply furnishing the requested WHOIS
information, captioned by a legend devised by Register, which stated,
By submitting a WHOIS query, you agree that you will use this data only for
lawful purposes and that under no circumstances will you use this data to ...
support the transmission of mass unsolicited, commercial advertising or
solicitation via email.
The terms of that legend tracked § II.F.5 of the ICANN Agreement in specifying the
restrictions Register imposed on the use of its WHOIS data. Subsequently, as explained
below, Register amended the terms of this legend to impose more stringent restrictions on
the use of the information gathered through such queries.
In addition to performing the function of a registrar of domain names, Register also
engages in the business of selling web-related services to entities that maintain web sites.
These services cover various aspects of web site development. In order to solicit business for
the services it offers, Register sends out marketing communications. Among the entities it
solicits for the sale of such services are entities whose domain names it registered.
However, during the registration process, Register offers registrants the opportunity to
elect whether or not they will receive marketing communications from it.
The defendant Verio, against whom the preliminary injunction was issued, is engaged in
the business of selling a variety of web site design, development and operation services. In
the sale of such services, Verio competes with Register’s web site development business. To
facilitate its pursuit of customers, Verio undertook to obtain daily updates of the WHOIS
information relating to newly registered domain names. To achieve this, Verio devised an
automated software program, or robot, which each day would submit multiple successive
WHOIS queries through the port 43 accesses of various registrars. Upon acquiring the
WHOIS information of new registrants, Verio would send them marketing solicitations by
email, telemarketing and direct mail. To the extent that Verio’s solicitations were sent by
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email, the practice was inconsistent with the terms of the restrictive legend Register
attached to its responses to Verio’s queries.
At first, Verio’s solicitations addressed to Register’s registrants made explicit reference to
their recent registration through Register. This led some of the recipients of Verio’s
solicitations to believe the solicitation was initiated by Register (or an affiliate), and was
sent in violation of the registrant’s election not to receive solicitations from Register.
Register began to receive complaints from registrants. Register in turn complained to Verio
and demanded that Verio cease and desist from this form of marketing. Register asserted
that Verio was harming Register’s goodwill, and that by soliciting via email, was violating
the terms to which it had agreed on submitting its queries for WHOIS information. Verio
responded to the effect that it had stopped mentioning Register in its solicitation message.
In the meantime, Register changed the restrictive legend it attached to its responses to
WHOIS queries. While previously the legend conformed to the terms of § II F.5, which
authorized Register to prohibit use of the WHOIS information for mass solicitations “via
email,” its new legend undertook to bar mass solicitation “via direct mail, electronic mail, or
by telephone.”2 Section II.F.5 of Register’s ICANN Agreement, as noted above, required
Register to permit use of the WHOIS data “for any lawful purpose except to ... support the
transmission of mass unsolicited solicitations via email (spam).” Thus, by undertaking to
prohibit Verio from using the WHOIS information for solicitations “via direct mail ... or by
telephone,” Register was acting in apparent violation of this term of its ICANN Agreement.
Register wrote to Verio demanding that it cease using WHOIS information derived from
Register not only for email marketing, but also for marketing by direct mail and telephone.
Verio ceased using the information in email marketing, but refused to stop marketing by
direct mail and telephone. [Register then sued Verio in August 2000]….

2

The new legend stated:
By submitting a WHOIS query, you agree that ... under no circumstances will you use this
data to ... support the transmission of mass unsolicited ... advertising or solicitations via direct
mail, electronic mail, or by telephone.
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[Editor’s note: the following diagram may help you understand the relationships visually]
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DISCUSSION
Standard of review and preliminary injunction standard…
(a) Verio’s enforcement of the restrictions placed on Register by the ICANN Agreement
Verio conceded that it knew of the restrictions Register placed on the use of the WHOIS
data and knew that, by using Register’s WHOIS data for direct mail and telemarketing
solicitations, it was violating Register’s restrictions. Verio’s principal argument is that
Register was not authorized to forbid Verio from using the data for direct mail and
telemarketing solicitation because the ICANN Agreement prohibited Register from
imposing any “terms and conditions” on use of WHOIS data, “except as permitted by
ICANN-adopted policy,” which specified that Register was required to permit “any lawful
purpose, except ... mass solicitation[ ] via email.”
Register does not deny that the restrictions it imposed contravened this requirement of the
ICANN Agreement. Register contends, however, that the question whether it violated §
II.F.5 of its Agreement with ICANN is a matter between itself and ICANN, and that Verio
cannot enforce the obligations placed on Register by the ICANN Agreement. Register points
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to § II.S.2 of the ICANN Agreement, captioned “No Third-Party Beneficiaries,” which, as
noted, states that the agreement is not to be construed “to create any obligation by either
ICANN or Registrar to any non-party.” Register asserts that Verio, a non-party, is asking
the court to construe § II.F.5 as creating an obligation owed by Register to Verio, and that
the Agreement expressly forbids such a construction.
ICANN intervened in the district court as an amicus curiae and strongly supports
Register’s position, opposing Verio’s right to invoke Register’s contractual promises to
ICANN. ICANN explained that ICANN has established a remedial process for the
resolution of such disputes through which Verio might have sought satisfaction. “If Verio
had concerns regarding Register.com’s conditions for access to WHOIS data, it should have
raised them within the ICANN process rather [than] simply taking Register.com’s data,
violating the conditions [imposed by Register], and then seeking to justify its violation in
this Court .... [Verio’s claim was] intended to be addressed only within the ICANN process.”
ICANN asserted that the No Third-Party Beneficiary provision, barring third parties from
seeking to enforce promises made by a registrar to ICANN through court proceedings, was
“vital to the overall scheme of [its] various agreements.”
This is because proper expression of the letter and spirit of ICANN policies is most
appropriately achieved through the ICANN process itself, and not through forums that lack
the every day familiarity with the intricate technical and policy issues that the ICANN
process was designed to address.
ICANN’s brief went on to state:
[E]nforcement of agreements with ICANN [was to] be informed by the
judgment of the various segments of the internet community as expressed
through ICANN. In the fast-paced environment of the Internet, new issues
and situations arise quickly, and sometimes the language of contractual
provisions does not perfectly match the underlying policies. For this and
other reasons, hard-and-fast enforcement [by courts] of the letter of every
term of every agreement is not always appropriate. An integral part of the
agreements that the registrars ... entered with ICANN is the understanding
that these situations would be handled through consultation and
consideration within the ICANN process .... Allowing issues under the
agreements registrars make with ICANN to be diverted from [ICANN’s]
carefully crafted remedial scheme to the courts, at the behest of third parties
..., would seriously threaten the Internet community’s ability, under the
auspices of ICANN, to achieve a proper balance of the competing policy
values that are so frequently involved.
We are persuaded by the arguments Register and ICANN advance. It is true Register
incurred a contractual obligation to ICANN not to prevent the use of its WHOIS data for
direct mail and telemarketing solicitation. But ICANN deliberately included in the same
contract that persons aggrieved by Register’s violation of such a term should seek
satisfaction within the framework of ICANN’s grievance policy, and should not be heard in
courts of law to plead entitlement to enforce Register’s promise to ICANN. As experience
develops in the fast changing world of the Internet, ICANN, informed by the various
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constituencies in the Internet community, might well no longer consider it salutary to
enforce a policy which it earlier expressed in the ICANN Agreement. For courts to
undertake to enforce promises made by registrars to ICANN at the instance of third parties
might therefore be harmful to ICANN’s efforts to develop well-informed and sound Internet
policy.
Verio’s invocation of the ICANN Agreement necessarily depends on its entitlement to
enforce Register’s promises to ICANN in the role of third party beneficiary. The ICANN
Agreement specified that it should be deemed to have been made in California, where
ICANN is located. Under § 1559 of the California Civil Code, a “contract, made expressly
for the benefit of a third person, may be enforced by him.” For Verio to seek to enforce
Register’s promises it made to ICANN in the ICANN Agreement, Verio must show that the
Agreement was made for its benefit. Verio did not meet this burden. To the contrary, the
Agreement expressly and intentionally excluded non-parties from claiming rights under it
in court proceedings.
We are not persuaded by the arguments Judge Parker advanced in his draft. Although
acknowledging that Verio could not claim third party beneficiary rights to enforce
Register’s promises to ICANN, Judge Parker nonetheless found three reasons for enforcing
Verio’s claim: (i) “public policy interests at stake,” (ii) Register’s “indisputable obligations to
ICANN as a registrar,” and (iii) the equities, involving Register’s “unclean hands” in
imposing a restriction it was contractually bound not to impose. We respectfully disagree.
As for the first argument, that Register’s restriction violated public policy, it is far from
clear that this is so. It is true that the ICANN Agreement at the time ICANN presented it
to Register permitted mass solicitation by means other than email. But it is not clear that
at the time of this dispute, ICANN intended to adhere to that policy. As ICANN’s amicus
brief suggested, the world of the Internet changes rapidly, and public policy as to how that
world should be governed may change rapidly as well. ICANN in fact has since changed the
terms of its standard agreement for the accreditation of registrars to broaden the uses of
WHOIS information that registrars may prohibit to include not only mass email
solicitations but also mass telephone and fax solicitations. It is far from clear that ICANN
continues to view public policy the way it did at the time it crafted Register’s agreement. In
any event, if Verio wished to have the dispute resolved in accordance with public policy, it
was free to bring its grievance to ICANN. Verio declined to do so. ICANN included the “No
Third-Party Beneficiary” provision precisely so that it would retain control of enforcement
of policy, rather than yielding it to courts.
As for Judge Parker’s second argument, Register’s “indisputable obligation to ICANN as a
registrar” to permit Verio to use the WHOIS information for mass solicitation by mail and
telephone, we do not see how this argument differs from Verio’s claim of entitlement as a
third party beneficiary, which § II.S.2 explicitly negates. The fact that Register owed a
contractual obligation to ICANN not to impose certain restrictions on use of WHOIS
information does not mean that it owed an obligation to Verio not to impose such
restrictions. As ICANN’s brief in the district court indicates, ICANN was well aware of
Register’s deviation from the restrictions imposed by the ICANN Agreement, but ICANN
chose not to take steps to compel Register to adhere to its contract.
Nor are we convinced by Judge Parker’s third argument of Register’s “unclean hands.”
Judge Parker characterizes Register’s failure to honor its contractual obligation to ICANN
73.

as unethical conduct, making Register ineligible for equitable relief. But Register owed no
duty in that regard to anyone but ICANN, and ICANN has expressed no dissatisfaction
with Register’s failure to adhere to that term of the contract. Verio was free to seek
ICANN’s intervention on its behalf, but declined to do so, perhaps because it knew or
suspected that ICANN would decline to compel Register to adhere to the contract term.
Under the circumstances, we see no reason to assume on appeal that Register’s conduct
should be considered unethical, especially where the district court made no such finding.
(b) Verio’s assent to Register’s contract terms
Verio’s next contention assumes that Register was legally authorized to demand that takers
of WHOIS data from its systems refrain from using it for mass solicitation by mail and
telephone, as well as by email. Verio contends that it nonetheless never became
contractually bound to the conditions imposed by Register’s restrictive legend because, in
the case of each query Verio made, the legend did not appear until after Verio had
submitted the query and received the WHOIS data. Accordingly, Verio contends that in no
instance did it receive legally enforceable notice of the conditions Register intended to
impose. Verio therefore argues it should not be deemed to have taken WHOIS data from
Register’s systems subject to Register’s conditions.
Verio’s argument might well be persuasive if its queries addressed to Register’s computers
had been sporadic and infrequent. If Verio had submitted only one query, or even if it had
submitted only a few sporadic queries, that would give considerable force to its contention
that it obtained the WHOIS data without being conscious that Register intended to impose
conditions, and without being deemed to have accepted Register’s conditions. But Verio was
daily submitting numerous queries, each of which resulted in its receiving notice of the
terms Register exacted. Furthermore, Verio admits that it knew perfectly well what terms
Register demanded. Verio’s argument fails.
The situation might be compared to one in which plaintiff P maintains a roadside fruit
stand displaying bins of apples. A visitor, defendant D, takes an apple and bites into it. As
D turns to leave, D sees a sign, visible only as one turns to exit, which says “Apples—50
cents apiece.” D does not pay for the apple. D believes he has no obligation to pay because
he had no notice when he bit into the apple that 50 cents was expected in return. D’s view is
that he never agreed to pay for the apple. Thereafter, each day, several times a day, D
revisits the stand, takes an apple, and eats it. D never leaves money.
P sues D in contract for the price of the apples taken. D defends on the ground that on no
occasion did he see P’s price notice until after he had bitten into the apples. D may well
prevail as to the first apple taken. D had no reason to understand upon taking it that P was
demanding the payment. In our view, however, D cannot continue on a daily basis to take
apples for free, knowing full well that P is offering them only in exchange for 50 cents in
compensation, merely because the sign demanding payment is so placed that on each
occasion D does not see it until he has bitten into the apple.
Verio’s circumstance is effectively the same. Each day Verio repeatedly enters Register’s
computers and takes that day’s new WHOIS data. Each day upon receiving the requested
data, Verio receives Register’s notice of the terms on which it makes the data available—
that the data not be used for mass solicitation via direct mail, email, or telephone. Verio
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acknowledges that it continued drawing the data from Register’s computers with full
knowledge that Register offered access subject to these restrictions. Verio is no more free to
take Register’s data without being bound by the terms on which Register offers it, than D
was free, in the example, once he became aware of the terms of P’s offer, to take P’s apples
without obligation to pay the 50 cent price at which P offered them.
Verio seeks support for its position from cases that have dealt with the formation of
contracts on the Internet. An excellent example, although decided subsequent to the
submission of this case, is Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir.
2002). The dispute was whether users of Netscape’s software, who downloaded it from
Netscape’s web site, were bound by an agreement to arbitrate disputes with Netscape,
where Netscape had posted the terms of its offer of the software (including the obligation to
arbitrate disputes) on the web site from which they downloaded the software. We ruled
against Netscape and in favor of the users of its software because the users would not have
seen the terms Netscape exacted without scrolling down their computer screens, and there
was no reason for them to do so. The evidence did not demonstrate that one who had
downloaded Netscape’s software had necessarily seen the terms of its offer.
Verio, however, cannot avail itself of the reasoning of Specht. In Specht, the users in whose
favor we decided visited Netscape’s web site one time to download its software. Netscape’s
posting of its terms did not compel the conclusion that its downloaders took the software
subject to those terms because there was no way to determine that any downloader had
seen the terms of the offer. There was no basis for imputing to the downloaders of
Netscape’s software knowledge of the terms on which the software was offered. This case is
crucially different. Verio visited Register’s computers daily to access WHOIS data and each
day saw the terms of Register’s offer; Verio admitted that, in entering Register’s computers
to get the data, it was fully aware of the terms on which Register offered the access.
Verio’s next argument is that it was not bound by Register’s terms because it rejected them.
Even assuming Register is entitled to demand compliance with its terms in exchange for
Verio’s entry into its systems to take WHOIS data, and even acknowledging that Verio was
fully aware of Register’s terms, Verio contends that it still is not bound by Register’s terms
because it did not agree to be bound. In support of its claim, Verio cites a district court case
from the Central District of California, Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., 2000 WL
1887522 (C.D. Cal. Aug.10, 2000), in which the court rejected Ticketmaster’s application for
a preliminary injunction to enforce posted terms of use of data available on its website
against a regular user. Noting that the user of Ticketmaster’s web site is not required to
check an “I agree” box before proceeding, the court concluded that there was insufficient
proof of agreement to support a preliminary injunction.
We acknowledge that the Ticketmaster decision gives Verio some support, but not enough.
In the first place, the Ticketmaster court was not making a definitive ruling rejecting
Ticketmaster’s contract claim. It was rather exercising a district court’s discretion to deny a
preliminary injunction because of a doubt whether the movant had adequately shown
likelihood of success on the merits.
But more importantly, we are not inclined to agree with the Ticketmaster court’s analysis.
There is a crucial difference between the circumstances of Specht, where we declined to
enforce Netscape’s specified terms against a user of its software because of inadequate
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evidence that the user had seen the terms when downloading the software, and those of
Ticketmaster, where the taker of information from Ticketmaster’s site knew full well the
terms on which the information was offered but was not offered an icon marked, “I agree,”
on which to click. Under the circumstances of Ticketmaster, we see no reason why the
enforceability of the offeror’s terms should depend on whether the taker states (or clicks), “I
agree.”
We recognize that contract offers on the Internet often require the offeree to click on an “I
agree” icon. And no doubt, in many circumstances, such a statement of agreement by the
offeree is essential to the formation of a contract. But not in all circumstances. While new
commerce on the Internet has exposed courts to many new situations, it has not
fundamentally changed the principles of contract. It is standard contract doctrine that
when a benefit is offered subject to stated conditions, and the offeree makes a decision to
take the benefit with knowledge of the terms of the offer, the taking constitutes an
acceptance of the terms, which accordingly become binding on the offeree. See, e.g.,
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 69(1)(a) (1981) (“[S]ilence and inaction operate as an
acceptance ... [w]here an offeree takes the benefit of offered services with reasonable
opportunity to reject them and reason to know that they were offered with the expectation
of compensation.”); 2 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 6:9 (4th ed. 1991) (“[T]he
acceptance of the benefit of services may well be held to imply a promise to pay for them if
at the time of acceptance the offeree has a reasonable opportunity to reject the service and
knows or has reason to know that compensation is expected.”); Arthur Linton Corbin,
Corbin on Contracts § 71 (West 1 vol. ed. 1952) (“The acceptance of the benefit of the
services is a promise to pay for them, if at the time of accepting the benefit the offeree has a
reasonable opportunity to reject it and knows that compensation is expected.”); Jones v.
Brisbin, 41 Wash.2d 167, 172 (1952) (“Where a person, with reasonable opportunity to
reject offered services, takes the benefit of them under circumstances which would indicate,
to a reasonable man, that they were offered with the expectation of compensation, a
contract, complete with mutual assent, results.”); Markstein Bros. Millinery Co. v. J.A.
White & Co., 151 Ark. 1 (1921) (buyer of hats was bound to pay for hats when buyer failed
to return them to seller within five days of inspection as seller requested in clear and
obvious notice statement).
Returning to the apple stand, the visitor, who sees apples offered for 50 cents apiece and
takes an apple, owes 50 cents, regardless whether he did or did not say, “I agree.” The
choice offered in such circumstances is to take the apple on the known terms of the offer or
not to take the apple. As we see it, the defendant in Ticketmaster and Verio in this case had
a similar choice. Each was offered access to information subject to terms of which they were
well aware. Their choice was either to accept the offer of contract, taking the information
subject to the terms of the offer, or, if the terms were not acceptable, to decline to take the
benefits.
We find that the district court was within its discretion in concluding that Register showed
likelihood of success on the merits of its contract claim….
NOTES AND QUESTIONS
Did Verio act ethically? Did Register.com?
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Seeing how the case turned out, if you represented Verio, what would you do differently?
Even though it won in court, should Register.com have done anything differently?
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Harris v. Blockbuster Inc., 622 F. Supp. 2d 396 (N.D. Tex. 2009).
Lynn, District Judge.
Background
This case arises out of alleged violations of the Video Privacy Protection Act by Defendant
Blockbuster Inc. (“Blockbuster”). Blockbuster operates a service called Blockbuster Online,
which allows customers to rent movies through the internet. Blockbuster entered into an
agreement with Facebook (“the Blockbuster contract”) which caused Blockbuster’s
customers’ movie rental choices to be disseminated on the customers’ Facebook accounts
through Facebook’s “Beacon” program. In short, when a customer rented a video from
Blockbuster Online, the Beacon program would transmit the customer’s choice to Facebook,
which would then broadcast the choice to the customer’s Facebook friends.
Plaintiff claims that this arrangement violated the Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2710, which prohibits a videotape service provider from disclosing personally identifiable
information about a customer unless given informed, written consent at the time the
disclosure is sought. The Act provides for liquidated damages of $2,500 for each violation.
Blockbuster attempted to invoke an arbitration provision in its “Terms and Conditions,”
which includes a paragraph governing “Dispute Resolution” that states, in pertinent part:
“[a]ll claims, disputes or controversies ... will be referred to and determined by binding
arbitration.” It further purportedly waives the right of its users to commence any class
action. As a precondition to joining Blockbuster Online, customers were required to click on
a box certifying that they had read and agreed to the Terms and Conditions.
On August 30, 2008, before the case was transferred to this Court, the Defendant moved to
enforce the arbitration provision. The Plaintiffs argued that the arbitration provision is
unenforceable, principally for two reasons: (1) it is illusory; and (2) it is unconscionable.
Because the Court concludes that the arbitration provision is illusory, the Court does not
reach the unconscionability issue.
Legal Standard
In Texas, a contract must be supported by consideration, and if it is not, it is illusory and
cannot be enforced. In Morrison v. Amway Corp., the Fifth Circuit analyzed a very similar
arbitration provision to that in the subject Terms and Conditions and held it to be illusory.
In Morrison, defendant, a seller of household products marketed through a chain of
distributors, was sued by its distributors for a variety of torts, including racketeering and
defamation. The defendant sought to enforce an arbitration provision in which each
distributor agreed:
“[T]o conduct [his or her] business according to the Amway Code of Ethics
and Rules of Conduct, as they are amended and published from time to time
in official Amway literature .... I agree I will give notice in writing of any
claim or dispute arising out of or relating to my Amway distributorship, or
the Amway Sales and Marketing Plan or Rules of Conduct to the other party
or parties .... I agree to submit any remaining claim or dispute arising out of
or relating to any Amway distributorship, the Amway Sales and Marketing
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Plan, or the Amway Rules of Conduct ... to binding arbitration in accordance
with the Amway Arbitration rules, which are set forth in the Amway
Business Compendium.”
The Morrison court held that the provision was illusory because “[t]here is no express
exemption of the arbitration provisions from Amway’s ability to unilaterally modify all
rules, and the only express limitation on that unilateral right is published notice. While it
is inferable that an amendment thus unilaterally made by Amway to the arbitration
provision would not become effective until published, there is nothing to suggest that once
published the amendment would be inapplicable to disputes arising, or arising out of events
occurring, before such publication.”
The Morrison court distinguished In re Halliburton Co., in which the Texas Supreme Court
rejected an argument that an arbitration clause was illusory. The provision in Halliburton
specifically limited the defendant’s ability to apply changes to the agreement as follows:
[N]o amendment shall apply to a Dispute of which the Sponsor [Halliburton]
had actual notice on the date of amendment .... termination [of the
arbitration agreement] shall not be effective until 10 days after reasonable
notice of termination is given to Employees or as to Disputes which arose
prior to the date of termination.
In Morrison, the Fifth Circuit held that the limitation on the ability to unilaterally modify
or terminate the agreement in Halliburton is what caused the Texas Supreme Court to rule
that it was enforceable. Because the Morrison agreement contained no “Halliburton type
savings clauses,” which would “preclude application of such amendments to disputes which
arose (or of which Amway had notice) before the amendment,” the agreement in Morrison
was illusory.
Analysis
The basis for the Plaintiffs’ claim that the arbitration provision is illusory is that
Blockbuster reserves the right to modify the Terms and Conditions, including the section
that contains the arbitration provision, “at its sole discretion” and “at any time,” and such
modifications will be effective immediately upon being posted on the site. Under the
heading “Changes to Terms and Conditions,” the contract states:
Blockbuster may at any time, and at its sole discretion, modify these Terms
and Conditions of Use, including without limitation the Privacy Policy, with
or without notice. Such modifications will be effective immediately upon
posting. You agree to review these Terms and Conditions of Use periodically
and your continued use of this Site following such modifications will indicate
your acceptance of these modified Terms and Conditions of Use. If you do not
agree to any modification of these Terms and Conditions of Use, you must
immediately stop using this Site.
The Court concludes that the Blockbuster arbitration provision is illusory for the same
reasons as that in Morrison. Here, as in Morrison, there is nothing in the Terms and
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Conditions that prevents Blockbuster from unilaterally changing any part of the contract
other than providing that such changes will not take effect until posted on the website.
There are likewise no “Halliburton type savings clauses,” as there is “nothing to suggest
that once published the amendment would be inapplicable to disputes arising, or arising
out of events occurring, before such publication.” The Fifth Circuit in Morrison noted the
lack of an “express exemption” of the ability to unilaterally modify all rules, which the
Blockbuster agreement also does not contain. The Blockbuster contract only states that
modifications “will be effective immediately upon posting,” and the natural reading of that
clause does not limit application of the modifications to earlier disputes.
The Court addresses two differences between the Blockbuster contract and that in
Morrison. Under Texas law, where, as here, an arbitration provision is incorporated within
a larger contract, the benefits of the underlying contract can serve as consideration. The
Morrison contract was a stand-alone agreement, and as such required independent
consideration. Second, in Morrison, the defendant was actually attempting to retroactively
apply the arbitration agreement to events that had happened before it was in effect, and
there is no such suggestion here.
Neither distinction affects this Court’s determination that the Blockbuster contract is
illusory. First, the Supreme Court has broadly held that challenges to a contract as a whole,
and not specifically to the arbitration clause, must go to the arbitrator. Defendant argues
that because Plaintiffs challenge a provision that applies to the contract as a whole, the
challenge must be heard by the arbitrator. The Court disagrees. Plaintiffs’ challenge is to
the arbitration provision, and therefore the challenge is properly before the Court.
Second, the rule in Morrison applies to cases where there was no attempt to apply a
contract modification to prior events. In Simmons v. Quixtar, Inc., the court stated that “a
close reading of the Fifth Circuit’s opinion [in Morrison] is not predicated on that sole
ground [of applying modification to earlier actions]. The Court’s reasoning applies to the
Rules of Conduct and Amway’s (Quixtar’s) ability to unilaterally change the rules of the
game.” The court continued: “[t]he language of the Circuit’s [Morrison] opinion ... decided
the issue on the basis that the ability to change the rules at any time made the contract
merely illusory.” The Court agrees with that analysis and finds that the Morrison rule
applies even when no retroactive modification has been attempted.
Conclusion
For these reasons, the Court concludes that the arbitration provision of the Blockbuster
contract is illusory and unenforceable, and accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Compel
Individual Arbitration is denied.
NOTES AND QUESTIONS
In light of this ruling, how should Blockbuster amend its user agreement over time?
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IV.

Trespass/Computer Fraud & Abuse Act

Comparison of Trespass to Chattels Legal Doctrines

Chattel Interference

Damage

Restatements
(Common law)

intentional use or physical contact

•
•
•
•

18 USC 1030
(a)(5)(A)

knowingly transmit
program/info/code/command

intentionally impair integrity/availability of data, program, system
or information without authorization which causes
• loss of $5k/yr (includes remediation costs and costs/lost
revenues from service interruption)
• [medical harm] or physical injury
• threat to public health/safety
• damage to government computer
• damage to 10+ computers/yr

18 USC 1030
(a)(5)(B) & (C)

intentional access without
authorization

impair integrity/availability of data, program, system or
information which causes
• loss of $5k/yr (includes remediation costs and costs/lost
revenues from service interruption)
• [medical harm] or physical injury
• threat to public health/safety
• damage to government computer
• damage to 10+ computers/yr
Note: (B) requires reckless impairment; (C) requires “loss”

CA Penal 502(c)

Knowingly without permission
(2) access and take/copy/use data
from computer system/network
(3) use computer services
(7) access computer
system/network

any damage or loss (including verification expenses)

dispossess
impair condition/quality/value
lost use for substantial time period
bodily harm or harm to legally protected interest
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Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 30 Cal.4th 1342 (Cal. 2003).
Werdegar, Justice.
Intel Corporation (Intel) maintains an electronic mail system, connected to the Internet,
through which messages between employees and those outside the company can be sent
and received, and permits its employees to make reasonable nonbusiness use of this system.
On six occasions over almost two years, Kourosh Kenneth Hamidi, a former Intel employee,
sent e-mails criticizing Intel’s employment practices to numerous current employees on
Intel’s electronic mail system. Hamidi breached no computer security barriers in order to
communicate with Intel employees. He offered to, and did, remove from his mailing list any
recipient who so wished. Hamidi’s communications to individual Intel employees caused
neither physical damage nor functional disruption to the company’s computers, nor did they
at any time deprive Intel of the use of its computers. The contents of the messages,
however, caused discussion among employees and managers.
On these facts, Intel brought suit, claiming that by communicating with its employees over
the company’s e-mail system Hamidi committed the tort of trespass to chattels. The trial
court granted Intel’s motion for summary judgment and enjoined Hamidi from any further
mailings. A divided Court of Appeal affirmed.
After reviewing the decisions analyzing unauthorized electronic contact with computer
systems as potential trespasses to chattels, we conclude that under California law the tort
does not encompass, and should not be extended to encompass, an electronic
communication that neither damages the recipient computer system nor impairs its
functioning. Such an electronic communication does not constitute an actionable trespass to
personal property, i.e., the computer system, because it does not interfere with the
possessor’s use or possession of, or any other legally protected interest in, the personal
property itself. The consequential economic damage Intel claims to have suffered, i.e., loss
of productivity caused by employees reading and reacting to Hamidi’s messages and
company efforts to block the messages, is not an injury to the company’s interest in its
computers—which worked as intended and were unharmed by the communications—any
more than the personal distress caused by reading an unpleasant letter would be an injury
to the recipient’s mailbox, or the loss of privacy caused by an intrusive telephone call would
be an injury to the recipient’s telephone equipment.
Our conclusion does not rest on any special immunity for communications by electronic
mail; we do not hold that messages transmitted through the Internet are exempt from the
ordinary rules of tort liability. To the contrary, e-mail, like other forms of communication,
may in some circumstances cause legally cognizable injury to the recipient or to third
parties and may be actionable under various common law or statutory theories. Indeed, on
facts somewhat similar to those here, a company or its employees might be able to plead
causes of action for interference with prospective economic relations, interference with
contract or intentional infliction of emotional distress. And, of course, as with any other
means of publication, third party subjects of e-mail communications may under appropriate
facts make claims for defamation, publication of private facts, or other speech-based torts.
Intel’s claim fails not because e-mail transmitted through the Internet enjoys unique
immunity, but because the trespass to chattels tort—unlike the causes of action just
mentioned—may not, in California, be proved without evidence of an injury to the plaintiff’s
personal property or legal interest therein.
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Nor does our holding affect the legal remedies of Internet service providers (ISP’s) against
senders of unsolicited commercial bulk e-mail (UCE), also known as “spam.” A series of
federal district court decisions, beginning with CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc.
(S.D. Ohio 1997) 962 F. Supp. 1015, has approved the use of trespass to chattels as a theory
of spammers’ liability to ISP’s, based upon evidence that the vast quantities of mail sent by
spammers both overburdened the ISP’s own computers and made the entire computer
system harder to use for recipients, the ISP’s customers. In those cases, discussed in
greater detail below, the underlying complaint was that the extraordinary quantity of UCE
impaired the computer system’s functioning. In the present case, the claimed injury is
located in the disruption or distraction caused to recipients by the contents of the e-mail
messages, an injury entirely separate from, and not directly affecting, the possession or
value of personal property.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND…
Hamidi, a former Intel engineer, together with others, formed an organization named
Former and Current Employees of Intel (FACE-Intel) to disseminate information and views
critical of Intel’s employment and personnel policies and practices. FACE-Intel maintained
a Web site (which identified Hamidi as Webmaster and as the organization’s spokesperson)
containing such material. In addition, over a 21-month period Hamidi, on behalf of FACEIntel, sent six mass e-mails to employee addresses on Intel’s electronic mail system. The
messages criticized Intel’s employment practices, warned employees of the dangers those
practices posed to their careers, suggested employees consider moving to other companies,
solicited employees’ participation in FACE-Intel, and urged employees to inform themselves
further by visiting FACE-Intel’s Web site. The messages stated that recipients could, by
notifying the sender of their wishes, be removed from FACE-Intel’s mailing list; Hamidi did
not subsequently send messages to anyone who requested removal.
Each message was sent to thousands of addresses (as many as 35,000 according to FACEIntel’s Web site), though some messages were blocked by Intel before reaching employees.
Intel’s attempt to block internal transmission of the messages succeeded only in part;
Hamidi later admitted he evaded blocking efforts by using different sending computers.
When Intel, in March 1998, demanded in writing that Hamidi and FACE-Intel stop sending
e-mails to Intel’s computer system, Hamidi asserted the organization had a right to
communicate with willing Intel employees; he sent a new mass mailing in September 1998.
The summary judgment record contains no evidence Hamidi breached Intel’s computer
security in order to obtain the recipient addresses for his messages; indeed, internal Intel
memoranda show the company’s management concluded no security breach had occurred.1
Hamidi stated he created the recipient address list using an Intel directory on a floppy disk
anonymously sent to him. Nor is there any evidence that the receipt or internal distribution
of Hamidi’s electronic messages damaged Intel’s computer system or slowed or impaired its
To the extent, therefore, that Justice Mosk suggests Hamidi breached the security of Intel’s internal computer
network by “circumvent [ing]” Intel’s “security measures” and entering the company’s “intranet”, the evidence
does not support such an implication. An “intranet” is “a network based on TCP/IP protocols (an internet)
belonging to an organization, usually a corporation, accessible only by the organization’s members, employees,
or others with authorization.” Hamidi used only a part of Intel’s computer network accessible to outsiders.
1
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functioning. Intel did present uncontradicted evidence, however, that many employee
recipients asked a company official to stop the messages and that staff time was consumed
in attempts to block further messages from FACE-Intel. According to the FACE-Intel Web
site, moreover, the messages had prompted discussions between “[e]xcited and nervous
managers” and the company’s human resources department.
[Editor’s note: here is a screenshot of the FACE-Intel website from 1999, after Hamidi had
already been sued by Intel]

Intel sued Hamidi and FACE-Intel, pleading causes of action for trespass to chattels and
nuisance, and seeking both actual damages and an injunction against further e-mail
messages. Intel later voluntarily dismissed its nuisance claim and waived its demand for
damages. The trial court entered default against FACE-Intel upon that organization’s
failure to answer. The court then granted Intel’s motion for summary judgment,
permanently enjoining Hamidi, FACE-Intel, and their agents “from sending unsolicited email to addresses on Intel’s computer systems.” Hamidi appealed; FACE-Intel did not.
The Court of Appeal, with one justice dissenting, affirmed the grant of injunctive relief. The
majority took the view that the use of or intermeddling with another’s personal property is
actionable as a trespass to chattels without proof of any actual injury to the personal
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property; even if Intel could not show any damages resulting from Hamidi’s sending of
messages, “it showed he was disrupting its business by using its property and therefore is
entitled to injunctive relief based on a theory of trespass to chattels.” The dissenting justice
warned that the majority’s application of the trespass to chattels tort to “unsolicited
electronic mail that causes no harm to the private computer system that receives it” would
“expand the tort of trespass to chattel in untold ways and to unanticipated
circumstances.”…
DISCUSSION
I. Current California Tort Law
Dubbed by Prosser the “little brother of conversion,” the tort of trespass to chattels allows
recovery for interferences with possession of personal property “not sufficiently important
to be classed as conversion, and so to compel the defendant to pay the full value of the thing
with which he has interfered.”
Though not amounting to conversion, the defendant’s interference must, to be actionable,
have caused some injury to the chattel or to the plaintiff’s rights in it. Under California law,
trespass to chattels “lies where an intentional interference with the possession of personal
property has proximately caused injury.” (Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek (1996) 46 Cal. App.
4th 1559, 1566, italics added.) In cases of interference with possession of personal property
not amounting to conversion, “the owner has a cause of action for trespass or case, and may
recover only the actual damages suffered by reason of the impairment of the property or the
loss of its use.” In modern American law generally, “[t]respass remains as an occasional
remedy for minor interferences, resulting in some damage, but not sufficiently serious or
sufficiently important to amount to the greater tort” of conversion. (Prosser & Keeton,
Torts, supra, § 15, p. 90, italics added.)
The Restatement, too, makes clear that some actual injury must have occurred in order for
a trespass to chattels to be actionable. Under section 218 of the Restatement Second of
Torts, dispossession alone, without further damages, is actionable, but other forms of
interference require some additional harm to the personal property or the possessor’s
interests in it. “The interest of a possessor of a chattel in its inviolability, unlike the similar
interest of a possessor of land, is not given legal protection by an action for nominal
damages for harmless intermeddlings with the chattel. In order that an actor who
interferes with another’s chattel may be liable, his conduct must affect some other and
more important interest of the possessor. Therefore, one who intentionally intermeddles
with another’s chattel is subject to liability only if his intermeddling is harmful to the
possessor’s materially valuable interest in the physical condition, quality, or value of the
chattel, or if the possessor is deprived of the use of the chattel for a substantial time, or some
other legally protected interest of the possessor is affected as stated in Clause (c). Sufficient
legal protection of the possessor’s interest in the mere inviolability of his chattel is afforded
by his privilege to use reasonable force to protect his possession against even harmless
interference.”
The Court of Appeal (quoting 7 Speiser et al., American Law of Torts (1990) Trespass, §
23:23, p. 667) referred to “‘a number of very early cases [showing that] any unlawful
interference, however slight, with the enjoyment by another of his personal property, is a
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trespass.’” But while a harmless use or touching of personal property may be a technical
trespass, an interference (not amounting to dispossession) is not actionable, under modern
California and broader American law, without a showing of harm. As already discussed,
this is the rule embodied in the Restatement (Rest.2d Torts, § 218) and adopted by
California law (Zaslow v. Kroenert, supra, 29 Cal.2d at p. 551; Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek,
supra, 46 Cal. App. 4th at p. 1566).
In this respect, as Prosser explains, modern day trespass to chattels differs both from the
original English writ and from the action for trespass to land: “Another departure from the
original rule of the old writ of trespass concerns the necessity of some actual damage to the
chattel before the action can be maintained. Where the defendant merely interferes without
doing any harm—as where, for example, he merely lays hands upon the plaintiff’s horse, or
sits in his car—there has been a division of opinion among the writers, and a surprising
dearth of authority. By analogy to trespass to land there might be a technical tort in such a
case .... Such scanty authority as there is, however, has considered that the dignitary interest
in the inviolability of chattels, unlike that as to land, is not sufficiently important to require
any greater defense than the privilege of using reasonable force when necessary to protect
them. Accordingly it has been held that nominal damages will not be awarded, and that in
the absence of any actual damage the action will not lie.”
Intel suggests that the requirement of actual harm does not apply here because it sought
only injunctive relief, as protection from future injuries. But as Justice Kolkey, dissenting
below, observed, “[t]he fact the relief sought is injunctive does not excuse a showing of
injury, whether actual or threatened.” Indeed, in order to obtain injunctive relief the
plaintiff must ordinarily show that the defendant’s wrongful acts threaten to cause
irreparable injuries, ones that cannot be adequately compensated in damages. Even in an
action for trespass to real property, in which damage to the property is not an element of
the cause of action, “the extraordinary remedy of injunction” cannot be invoked without
showing the likelihood of irreparable harm. A fortiori, to issue an injunction without a
showing of likely irreparable injury in an action for trespass to chattels, in which injury to
the personal property or the possessor’s interest in it is an element of the action, would
make little legal sense.
The dispositive issue in this case, therefore, is whether the undisputed facts demonstrate
Hamidi’s actions caused or threatened to cause damage to Intel’s computer system, or
injury to its rights in that personal property, such as to entitle Intel to judgment as a
matter of law. To review, the undisputed evidence revealed no actual or threatened damage
to Intel’s computer hardware or software and no interference with its ordinary and
intended operation. Intel was not dispossessed of its computers, nor did Hamidi’s messages
prevent Intel from using its computers for any measurable length of time. Intel presented
no evidence its system was slowed or otherwise impaired by the burden of delivering
Hamidi’s electronic messages. Nor was there any evidence transmission of the messages
imposed any marginal cost on the operation of Intel’s computers. In sum, no evidence
suggested that in sending messages through Intel’s Internet connections and internal
computer system Hamidi used the system in any manner in which it was not intended to
function or impaired the system in any way. Nor does the evidence show the request of any
employee to be removed from FACE-Intel’s mailing list was not honored. The evidence did
show, however, that some employees who found the messages unwelcome asked
management to stop them and that Intel technical staff spent time and effort attempting to
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block the messages. A statement on the FACE-Intel Web site, moreover, could be taken as
an admission that the messages had caused “[e]xcited and nervous managers” to discuss
the matter with Intel’s human resources department.
Relying on a line of decisions, most from federal district courts, applying the tort of trespass
to chattels to various types of unwanted electronic contact between computers, Intel
contends that, while its computers were not damaged by receiving Hamidi’s messages, its
interest in the “physical condition, quality or value” of the computers was harmed. We
disagree. The cited line of decisions does not persuade us that the mere sending of
electronic communications that assertedly cause injury only because of their contents
constitutes an actionable trespass to a computer system through which the messages are
transmitted. Rather, the decisions finding electronic contact to be a trespass to computer
systems have generally involved some actual or threatened interference with the
computers’ functioning.
In Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, supra, 46 Cal. App. 4th at pages 1566-1567 (Thrifty-Tel), the
California Court of Appeal held that evidence of automated searching of a telephone
carrier’s system for authorization codes supported a cause of action for trespass to chattels.
The defendant’s automated dialing program “overburdened the [plaintiff’s] system, denying
some subscribers access to phone lines”, showing the requisite injury.
Following Thrifty-Tel, a series of federal district court decisions held that sending UCE
through an ISP’s equipment may constitute trespass to the ISP’s computer system. The
lead case, CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., supra, 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1021-1023
(CompuServe), was followed by Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie, Inc. (N.D. Cal., Apr. 16,
1998) 1998 WL 388389, page *7, America Online, Inc. v. IMS (E.D. Va. 1998) 24 F. Supp. 2d
548, 550-551, and America Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc. (E.D. Va. 1998) 46 F. Supp. 2d 444,
451-452.
In each of these spamming cases, the plaintiff showed, or was prepared to show, some
interference with the efficient functioning of its computer system. In CompuServe, the
plaintiff ISP’s mail equipment monitor stated that mass UCE mailings, especially from
nonexistent addresses such as those used by the defendant, placed “a tremendous burden”
on the ISP’s equipment, using “disk space and drain[ing] the processing power,” making
those resources unavailable to serve subscribers. (CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at p. 1022.)
Similarly, in Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie, Inc., 1998 WL 388389 at page *7, the court
found the evidence supported a finding that the defendant’s mailings “fill[ed] up Hotmail’s
computer storage space and threaten [ed] to damage Hotmail’s ability to service its
legitimate customers.” America Online, Inc. v. IMS, decided on summary judgment, was
deemed factually indistinguishable from CompuServe; the court observed that in both cases
the plaintiffs “alleged that processing the bulk e-mail cost them time and money and
burdened their equipment.” The same court, in America Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., supra,
46 F. Supp. 2d at page 452, simply followed CompuServe and its earlier America Online
decision, quoting the former’s explanation that UCE burdened the computer’s processing
power and memory.
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Building on the spamming cases, in particular CompuServe, three even more recent district
court decisions addressed whether unauthorized robotic data collection4 from a company’s
publicly accessible Web site is a trespass on the company’s computer system. (eBay, Inc. v.
Bidder’s Edge, Inc., supra, 100 F. Supp. 2d at pp. 1069-1072 (eBay); Register.com, Inc. v.
Verio, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 248-251; Ticketmaster Corp. v.
Tickets.com, Inc., supra, 2000 WL 1887522 at p. *4.) The two district courts that found such
automated data collection to constitute a trespass relied, in part, on the deleterious impact
this activity could have, especially if replicated by other searchers, on the functioning of a
Web site’s computer equipment.
In the leading case, eBay, the defendant Bidder’s Edge (BE), operating an auction
aggregation site, accessed the eBay Web site about 100,000 times per day, accounting for
between 1 and 2 percent of the information requests received by eBay and a slightly smaller
percentage of the data transferred by eBay. The district court rejected eBay’s claim that it
was entitled to injunctive relief because of the defendant’s unauthorized presence alone, or
because of the incremental cost the defendant had imposed on operation of the eBay site,
but found sufficient proof of threatened harm in the potential for others to imitate the
defendant’s activity: “If BE’s activity is allowed to continue unchecked, it would encourage
other auction aggregators to engage in similar recursive searching of the eBay system such
that eBay would suffer irreparable harm from reduced system performance, system
unavailability, or data losses.” Again, in addressing the likelihood of eBay’s success on its
trespass to chattels cause of action, the court held the evidence of injury to eBay’s computer
system sufficient to support a preliminary injunction: “If the court were to hold otherwise, it
would likely encourage other auction aggregators to crawl the eBay site, potentially to the
point of denying effective access to eBay’s customers. If preliminary injunctive relief were
denied, and other aggregators began to crawl the eBay site, there appears to be little doubt
that the load on eBay’s computer system would qualify as a substantial impairment of
condition or value.”
Another district court followed eBay on similar facts—a domain name registrar’s claim
against a Web hosting and development site that robotically searched the registrar’s
database of newly registered domain names in search of business leads—in Register.com,
Inc. v. Verio, Inc. Although the plaintiff was unable to measure the burden the defendant’s
searching had placed on its system, the district court, quoting the declaration of one of the
plaintiff’s officers, found sufficient evidence of threatened harm to the system in the
possibility the defendant’s activities would be copied by others: “‘I believe that if Verio’s
searching of Register.com’s WHOIS database were determined to be lawful, then every
purveyor of Internet-based services would engage in similar conduct.’” Like eBay, the court
observed, Register.com had a legitimate fear “that its servers will be flooded by search
robots.”
In the third decision discussing robotic data collection as a trespass, Ticketmaster Corp. v.
Tickets.com, Inc. (Ticketmaster), the court, distinguishing eBay, found insufficient evidence
of harm to the chattel to constitute an actionable trespass: “A basic element of trespass to
chattels must be physical harm to the chattel (not present here) or some obstruction of its
Data search and collection robots, also known as “Web bots” or “spiders,” are programs designed to rapidly
search numerous Web pages or sites, collecting, retrieving, and indexing information from these pages. Their
uses include creation of searchable databases, Web catalogues and comparison shopping services.

4
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basic function (in the court’s opinion not sufficiently shown here).... The comparative use
[by the defendant of the plaintiff’s computer system] appears very small and there is no
showing that the use interferes to any extent with the regular business of [the plaintiff]....
Nor here is the specter of dozens or more parasites joining the fray, the cumulative total of
which could affect the operation of [the plaintiff’s] business.”
In the decisions so far reviewed, the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s computer system was
held sufficient to support an action for trespass when it actually did, or threatened to,
interfere with the intended functioning of the system, as by significantly reducing its
available memory and processing power. In Ticketmaster, the one case where no such effect,
actual or threatened, had been demonstrated, the court found insufficient evidence of harm
to support a trespass action. These decisions do not persuade us to Intel’s position here, for
Intel has demonstrated neither any appreciable effect on the operation of its computer
system from Hamidi’s messages, nor any likelihood that Hamidi’s actions will be replicated
by others if found not to constitute a trespass.
That Intel does not claim the type of functional impact that spammers and robots have been
alleged to cause is not surprising in light of the differences between Hamidi’s activities and
those of a commercial enterprise that uses sheer quantity of messages as its
communications strategy. Though Hamidi sent thousands of copies of the same message on
six occasions over 21 months, that number is minuscule compared to the amounts of mail
sent by commercial operations. The individual advertisers sued in America Online, Inc. v.
IMS, and America Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., were alleged to have sent more than 60
million messages over 10 months and more than 92 million messages over seven months,
respectively. Collectively, UCE has reportedly come to constitute about 45 percent of all email. The functional burden on Intel’s computers, or the cost in time to individual
recipients, of receiving Hamidi’s occasional advocacy messages cannot be compared to the
burdens and costs caused ISP’s and their customers by the ever-rising deluge of commercial
e-mail.
Intel relies on language in the eBay decision suggesting that unauthorized use of another’s
chattel is actionable even without any showing of injury: “Even if, as [defendant] BE
argues, its searches use only a small amount of eBay’s computer system capacity, BE has
nonetheless deprived eBay of the ability to use that portion of its personal property for its
own purposes. The law recognizes no such right to use another’s personal property.” But as
the eBay court went on immediately to find that the defendant’s conduct, if widely
replicated, would likely impair the functioning of the plaintiff’s system, we do not read the
quoted remarks as expressing the court’s complete view of the issue. In isolation, moreover,
they would not be a correct statement of California or general American law on this point.
While one may have no right temporarily to use another’s personal property, such use is
actionable as a trespass only if it “has proximately caused injury.” (Thrifty-Tel, supra, 46
Cal. App. 4th at p. 1566.) “[I]n the absence of any actual damage the action will not lie.”
(Prosser & Keeton, Torts, supra, § 14, p. 87.) Short of dispossession, personal injury, or
physical damage (not present here), intermeddling is actionable only if “the chattel is
impaired as to its condition, quality, or value, or [¶] ... the possessor is deprived of the use of
the chattel for a substantial time.” (Rest.2d Torts, § 218, pars. (b), (c).) In particular, an
actionable deprivation of use “must be for a time so substantial that it is possible to
estimate the loss caused thereby. A mere momentary or theoretical deprivation of use is not
sufficient unless there is a dispossession....” That Hamidi’s messages temporarily used some
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portion of the Intel computers’ processors or storage is, therefore, not enough; Intel must,
but does not, demonstrate some measurable loss from the use of its computer system.5
In addition to impairment of system functionality, CompuServe and its progeny also refer to
the ISP’s loss of business reputation and customer goodwill, resulting from the
inconvenience and cost that spam causes to its members, as harm to the ISP’s legally
protected interests in its personal property. Intel argues that its own interest in employee
productivity, assertedly disrupted by Hamidi’s messages, is a comparable protected interest
in its computer system. We disagree.
Whether the economic injuries identified in CompuServe were properly considered injuries
to the ISP’s possessory interest in its personal property, the type of property interest the
tort is primarily intended to protect, has been questioned.6 “[T]he court broke the chain
between the trespass and the harm, allowing indirect harms to CompuServe’s business
interests—reputation, customer goodwill, and employee time—to count as harms to the
chattel (the server).” (Quilter, The Continuing Expansion of Cyberspace Trespass to
Chattels, 17 Berkeley Tech. L.J. at pp. 429-430.) “[T]his move cuts trespass to chattels free
from its moorings of dispossession or the equivalent, allowing the court free reign [sic] to
hunt for ‘impairment.’” (Burk, The Trouble with Trespass (2000) 4 J. Small & Emerging
Bus. L. 27, 35.) But even if the loss of goodwill identified in CompuServe were the type of
injury that would give rise to a trespass to chattels claim under California law, Intel’s
position would not follow, for Intel’s claimed injury has even less connection to its personal
property than did CompuServe’s.
CompuServe’s customers were annoyed because the system was inundated with unsolicited
commercial messages, making its use for personal communication more difficult and costly.
Their complaint, which allegedly led some to cancel their CompuServe service, was about
the functioning of CompuServe’s electronic mail service. Intel’s workers, in contrast, were
allegedly distracted from their work not because of the frequency or quantity of Hamidi’s
messages, but because of assertions and opinions the messages conveyed. Intel’s complaint
is thus about the contents of the messages rather than the functioning of the company’s email system. Even accepting CompuServe’s economic injury rationale, therefore, Intel’s
position represents a further extension of the trespass to chattels tort, fictionally
In the most recent decision relied upon by Intel, Oyster Software, Inc. v. Forms Processing, Inc. (N.D. Cal.,
Dec. 6, 2001) 2001 WL 1736382, pages *12-*13, a federal magistrate judge incorrectly read eBay as establishing,
under California law, that mere unauthorized use of another’s computer system constitutes an actionable
trespass. The plaintiff accused the defendant, a business competitor, of copying the metatags (code describing
the contents of a Web site to a search engine) from the plaintiff’s Web site, resulting in diversion of potential
customers for the plaintiff’s services. With regard to the plaintiff’s trespass claim (the plaintiff also pleaded
causes of action for, inter alia, misappropriation, copyright and trademark infringement), the magistrate judge
concluded that eBay imposed no requirement of actual damage and that the defendant’s conduct was sufficient
to establish a trespass “simply because [it] amounted to ‘use’ of Plaintiff’s computer.” But as just explained, we
do not read eBay as holding that the actual injury requirement may be dispensed with, and such a suggestion
would, in any event, be erroneous as a statement of California law.
6 In support of its reasoning, the CompuServe court cited paragraph (d) of section 218 of the Restatement Second
of Torts, which refers to harm “to some person or thing in which the possessor has a legally protected interest.”
As the comment to this paragraph explains, however, it is intended to cover personal injury to the possessor or
another person in whom the possessor has a legal interest, or injury to “other chattel or land” in which the
possessor of the chattel subject to the trespass has a legal interest. No personal injury was claimed either in
CompuServe or in the case at bar, and neither the lost goodwill in CompuServe nor the loss of employee
efficiency claimed in the present case is chattel or land.
5
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recharacterizing the allegedly injurious effect of a communication’s contents on recipients
as an impairment to the device which transmitted the message.
This theory of “impairment by content” (Burk, The Trouble with Trespass, 4 J. Small &
Emerging Bus. L. at p. 37) threatens to stretch trespass law to cover injuries far afield from
the harms to possession the tort evolved to protect. Intel’s theory would expand the tort of
trespass to chattels to cover virtually any unconsented-to communication that, solely
because of its content, is unwelcome to the recipient or intermediate transmitter. As the
dissenting justice below explained, “‘Damage’ of this nature—the distraction of reading or
listening to an unsolicited communication—is not within the scope of the injury against
which the trespass-to-chattel tort protects, and indeed trivializes it. After all, ‘[t]he property
interest protected by the old action of trespass was that of possession; and this has
continued to affect the character of the action.’ Reading an e-mail transmitted to equipment
designed to receive it, in and of itself, does not affect the possessory interest in the
equipment. [¶] Indeed, if a chattel’s receipt of an electronic communication constitutes a
trespass to that chattel, then not only are unsolicited telephone calls and faxes trespasses
to chattel, but unwelcome radio waves and television signals also constitute a trespass to
chattel every time the viewer inadvertently sees or hears the unwanted program.” We
agree. While unwelcome communications, electronic or otherwise, can cause a variety of
injuries to economic relations, reputation and emotions, those interests are protected by
other branches of tort law; in order to address them, we need not create a fiction of injury to
the communication system.
Nor may Intel appropriately assert a property interest in its employees’ time. “The
Restatement test clearly speaks in the first instance to the impairment of the chattel.... But
employees are not chattels (at least not in the legal sense of the term).” (Burk, The Trouble
with Trespass, 4 J. Small & Emerging Bus. L. at p. 36.) Whatever interest Intel may have
in preventing its employees from receiving disruptive communications, it is not an interest
in personal property, and trespass to chattels is therefore not an action that will lie to
protect it. Nor, finally, can the fact Intel staff spent time attempting to block Hamidi’s
messages be bootstrapped into an injury to Intel’s possessory interest in its computers. To
quote, again, from the dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeal: “[I]t is circular to premise
the damage element of a tort solely upon the steps taken to prevent the damage. Injury can
only be established by the completed tort’s consequences, not by the cost of the steps taken
to avoid the injury and prevent the tort; otherwise, we can create injury for every supposed
tort.”
Intel connected its e-mail system to the Internet and permitted its employees to make use
of this connection both for business and, to a reasonable extent, for their own purposes. In
doing so, the company necessarily contemplated the employees’ receipt of unsolicited as
well as solicited communications from other companies and individuals. That some
communications would, because of their contents, be unwelcome to Intel management was
virtually inevitable. Hamidi did nothing but use the e-mail system for its intended
purpose—to communicate with employees. The system worked as designed, delivering the
messages without any physical or functional harm or disruption. These occasional
transmissions cannot reasonably be viewed as impairing the quality or value of Intel’s
computer system. We conclude, therefore, that Intel has not presented undisputed facts
demonstrating an injury to its personal property, or to its legal interest in that property,
that support, under California tort law, an action for trespass to chattels.
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II. Proposed Extension of California Tort Law
We next consider whether California common law should be extended to cover, as a
trespass to chattels, an otherwise harmless electronic communication whose contents are
objectionable. We decline to so expand California law. Intel, of course, was not the recipient
of Hamidi’s messages, but rather the owner and possessor of computer servers used to relay
the messages, and it bases this tort action on that ownership and possession. The property
rule proposed is a rigid one, under which the sender of an electronic message would be
strictly liable to the owner of equipment through which the communication passes—here,
Intel—for any consequential injury flowing from the contents of the communication….
…Creating an absolute property right to exclude undesired communications from one’s email and Web servers might help force spammers to internalize the costs they impose on
ISP’s and their customers. But such a property rule might also create substantial new costs,
to e-mail and e-commerce users and to society generally, in lost ease and openness of
communication and in lost network benefits. In light of the unresolved controversy, we
would be acting rashly to adopt a rule treating computer servers as real property for
purposes of trespass law.
The Legislature has already adopted detailed regulations governing UCE. (Bus. & Prof.
Code, §§ 17538.4, 17538.45) It may see fit in the future also to regulate noncommercial email, such as that sent by Hamidi, or other kinds of unwanted contact between computers
on the Internet, such as that alleged in eBay. But we are not persuaded that these
perceived problems call at present for judicial creation of a rigid property rule of computer
server inviolability. We therefore decline to create an exception, covering Hamidi’s
unwanted electronic messages to Intel employees, to the general rule that a trespass to
chattels is not actionable if it does not involve actual or threatened injury to the personal
property or to the possessor’s legally protected interest in the personal property. No such
injury having been shown on the undisputed facts, Intel was not entitled to summary
judgment in its favor.
III. Constitutional Considerations
Because we conclude no trespass to chattels was shown on the summary judgment record,
making the injunction improper on common law grounds, we need not address at length the
dissenters’ constitutional arguments. A few clarifications are nonetheless in order.
Justice Mosk asserts that this case involves only “a private entity seeking to enforce private
trespass rights.” But the injunction here was issued by a state court. While a private
refusal to transmit another’s electronic speech generally does not implicate the First
Amendment, because no governmental action is involved (see Cyber Promotions, Inc. v.
American Online, Inc. (E.D. Penn. 1996) 948 F. Supp. 436, 441-445 [spammer could not
force private ISP to carry its messages]), the use of government power, whether in
enforcement of a statute or ordinance or by an award of damages or an injunction in a
private lawsuit, is state action that must comply with First Amendment limits. Nor does
the nonexistence of a “constitutional right to trespass” make an injunction in this case per
se valid. Unlike, for example, the trespasser-to-land defendant in Church of Christ in
Hollywood v. Superior Court (2002) 99 Cal. App. 4th 1244, Hamidi himself had no tangible
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presence on Intel property, instead speaking from his own home through his computer. He
no more invaded Intel’s property than does a protester holding a sign or shouting through a
bullhorn outside corporate headquarters, posting a letter through the mail, or telephoning
to complain of a corporate practice.
Justice Brown relies upon a constitutional “right not to listen,” rooted in the listener’s
“personal autonomy”, as compelling a remedy against Hamidi’s messages, which she asserts
were sent to “unwilling” listeners. Even assuming a corporate entity could under some
circumstances claim such a personal right, here the intended and actual recipients of
Hamidi’s messages were individual Intel employees, rather than Intel itself. The record
contains no evidence Hamidi sent messages to any employee who notified him such
messages were unwelcome. In any event, such evidence would, under the dissent’s rationale
of a right not to listen, support only a narrow injunction aimed at protecting individual
recipients who gave notice of their rejection. (See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.
(1983) 463 U.S. 60, 72 [government may not act on behalf of all addressees by generally
prohibiting mailing of materials related to contraception, where those recipients who may
be offended can simply ignore and discard the materials]; Martin v. City of Struthers (1943)
319 U.S. 141, 144 [anti-canvassing ordinance improperly “substitutes the judgment of the
community for the judgment of the individual householder”]; cf. Rowan v. U.S. Post Office
Dept. (1970) 397 U.S. 728, 736 [“householder” may exercise “individual autonomy” by
refusing delivery of offensive mail].) The principle of a right not to listen, founded in
personal autonomy, cannot justify the sweeping injunction issued here against all
communication to Intel addresses, for such a right, logically, can be exercised only by, or at
the behest of, the recipient himself or herself.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed.
WE CONCUR: KENNARD, MORENO and PERREN*, JJ.
[Concurring opinion by Justice Kennard and dissenting opinion by Justice Brown are
omitted.]
Dissenting Opinion by MOSK, J.**
The majority hold that the California tort of trespass to chattels does not encompass the
use of expressly unwanted electronic mail that causes no physical damage or impairment to
the recipient’s computer system. They also conclude that because a computer system is not
like real property, the rules of trespass to real property are also inapplicable to the
circumstances in this case. Finally, they suggest that an injunction to preclude mass,
noncommercial, unwelcome e-mails may offend the interests of free communication.

Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
** Associate Justice, Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution
*
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I respectfully disagree and would affirm the trial court’s decision. In my view, the repeated
transmission of bulk e-mails by appellant Kourosh Kenneth Hamidi (Hamidi) to the
employees of Intel Corporation (Intel) on its proprietary confidential e-mail lists, despite
Intel’s demand that he cease such activities, constituted an actionable trespass to chattels.
The majority fail to distinguish open communication in the public “commons” of the
Internet from unauthorized intermeddling on a private, proprietary intranet. Hamidi is not
communicating in the equivalent of a town square or of an unsolicited “junk” mailing
through the United States Postal Service. His action, in crossing from the public Internet
into a private intranet, is more like intruding into a private office mailroom,
commandeering the mail cart, and dropping off unwanted broadsides on 30,000 desks.
Because Intel’s security measures have been circumvented by Hamidi, the majority leave
Intel, which has exercised all reasonable self-help efforts, with no recourse unless he causes
a malfunction or systems “crash.” Hamidi’s repeated intrusions did more than merely
“prompt[ ] discussions between ‘[e]xcited and nervous managers’ and the company’s human
resource department”; they also constituted a misappropriation of Intel’s private computer
system contrary to its intended use and against Intel’s wishes.
The law of trespass to chattels has not universally been limited to physical damage. I
believe it is entirely consistent to apply that legal theory to these circumstances—that is,
when a proprietary computer system is being used contrary to its owner’s purposes and
expressed desires, and self-help has been ineffective. Intel correctly expects protection from
an intruder who misuses its proprietary system, its nonpublic directories, and its
supposedly controlled connection to the Internet to achieve his bulk mailing objectives—
incidentally, without even having to pay postage.
I
Intel maintains an intranet—a proprietary computer network—as a tool for transacting
and managing its business, both internally and for external business communications.1 The
network and its servers constitute a tangible entity that has value in terms of the costs of
its components and its function in enabling and enhancing the productivity and efficiency of
Intel’s business operations. Intel has established costly security measures to protect the
integrity of its system, including policies about use, proprietary internal e-mail addresses
that it does not release to the public for use outside of company business, and a gateway for
blocking unwanted electronic mail—a so-called firewall.
The Intel computer usage guidelines, which are promulgated for its employees, state that
the computer system is to be “used as a resource in conducting business. Reasonable
personal use is permitted, but employees are reminded that these resources are the
property of Intel and all information on these resources is also the property of Intel.”
The Oxford English Dictionary defines an intranet as “A local or restricted computer network; spec. a private
or corporate network that uses Internet protocols. An intranet may (but need not) be connected to the Internet
and be accessible externally to authorized users.” (OED Online, new ed., draft entry, Mar. 2003,
<http://dictionary.oed.com/> [as of June 30, 2003]; see also Kokka, Property Rights on an Intranet, 3 Spring
1998 J. Tech.L. & Policy 3, WL 3 UFLJTLP 3 at *3, *6 [defining an intranet as “an internal network of
computers, servers, routers and browser software designed to organize, secure, distribute and collect
information within an organization,” which in large organizations generally includes a wide range of services,
including e-mail].) Contrary to the majority’s assertion, there is nothing incorrect about characterizing Hamidi’s
unauthorized bulk e-mails as intrusions onto Intel’s intranet.

1
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Examples of personal use that would not be considered reasonable expressly include “use
that adversely affects productivity.” Employee e-mail communications are neither private
nor confidential.
Hamidi, a former Intel employee who had sued Intel and created an organization to
disseminate negative information about its employment practices, sent bulk electronic mail
on six occasions to as many as 35,000 Intel employees on its proprietary computer system,
using Intel’s confidential employee e-mail lists and adopting a series of different origination
addresses and encoding strategies to elude Intel’s blocking efforts. He refused to stop when
requested by Intel to do so, asserting that he would ignore its demands: “I don’t care. I have
grown deaf.” Intel sought injunctive relief, alleging that the disruptive effect of the bulk
electronic mail, including expenses from administrative and management personnel,
damaged its interest in the proprietary nature of its network.
The trial court, in its order granting summary judgment and a permanent injunction, made
the following pertinent findings regarding Hamidi’s transmission of bulk electronic mail:
“Intel has requested that Hamidi stop sending the messages, but Hamidi has refused, and
has employed surreptitious means to circumvent Intel’s efforts to block entry of his
messages into Intel’s system.... [¶] ... The e-mail system is dedicated for use in conducting
business, including communications between Intel employees and its customers and
vendors. Employee e-mail addresses are not published for use outside company business....
[¶] The intrusion by Hamidi into the Intel e-mail system has resulted in the expenditure of
company resources to seek to block his mailings and to address employee concerns about
the mailings. Given Hamidi’s evasive techniques to avoid blocking, the self help remedy
available to Intel is ineffective.” The trial court concluded that “the evidence establishes
(without dispute) that Intel has been injured by diminished employee productivity and in
devoting company resources to blocking efforts and to addressing employees about Hamidi’s
e-mails.” The trial court further found that the “massive” intrusions “impaired the value to
Intel of its e-mail system.”
The majority agree that an impairment of Intel’s system would result in an action for
trespass to chattels, but find that Intel suffered no injury. As did the trial court, I conclude
that the undisputed evidence establishes that Intel was substantially harmed by the costs
of efforts to block the messages and diminished employee productivity. Additionally, the
injunction did not affect Hamidi’s ability to communicate with Intel employees by other
means; he apparently continues to maintain a Web site to publicize his messages
concerning the company. Furthermore, I believe that the trial court and the Court of Appeal
correctly determined that the tort of trespass to chattels applies in these circumstances.
The Restatement Second of Torts explains that a trespass to a chattel occurs if “the chattel
is impaired as to its condition, quality, or value” or if “harm is caused to some ... thing in
which the possessor has a legally protected interest.” (Rest.2d Torts, § 218, subds. (b) & (d),
p. 420, italics added.) As to this tort, a current prominent treatise on the law of torts
explains that “[t]he defendant may interfere with the chattel by interfering with the
plaintiff’s access or use” and observes that the tort has been applied so as “to protect
computer systems from electronic invasions by way of unsolicited email or the like.” (1
Dobbs, The Law of Torts (2001) § 60, pp. 122-123.) Moreover, “[t]he harm necessary to
trigger liability for trespass to chattels can be ... harm to something other than the chattel
itself.” (Id., pp. 124-125; see also 1 Harper et al., The Law of Torts (3d ed. 1996 & 2003
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supp.) § 2.3, pp. 2:14-2:18.) The Restatement points out that, unlike a possessor of land, a
possessor of a chattel is not given legal protection from harmless invasion, but “the actor”
may be liable if the conduct affects “some other and more important interest of the
possessor.” (Rest.2d Torts, § 218, com. (e), p. 421, italics added.)
The Restatement explains that the rationale for requiring harm for trespass to a chattel but
not for trespass to land is the availability and effectiveness of self-help in the case of
trespass to a chattel. “Sufficient legal protection of the possessor’s interest in the mere
inviolability of his chattel is afforded by his privilege to use reasonable force to protect his
possession against even harmless interference.” (Rest.2d Torts, § 218, com. (e), p. 422.)
Obviously, “force” is not available to prevent electronic trespasses. As shown by Intel’s
inability to prevent Hamidi’s intrusions, self-help is not an adequate alternative to
injunctive relief.
The common law tort of trespass to chattels does not require physical disruption to the
chattel. It also may apply when there is impairment to the “quality” or “value” of the
chattel. (Rest.2d Torts, § 218, subd. (b), p. 420; see also id., com. (e), pp. 421-422 [liability if
“intermeddling is harmful to the possessor’s materially valuable interest in the physical
condition, quality, or value of the chattel”].) Moreover, as we held in Zaslow v. Kroenert
(1946) 29 Cal.2d 541, 551, it also applies “[w]here the conduct complained of does not
amount to a substantial interference with possession or the right thereto, but consists of
intermeddling with or use of or damages to the personal property.”2
Here, Hamidi’s deliberate and continued intermeddling, and threatened intermeddling,
with Intel’s proprietary computer system for his own purposes that were hostile to Intel,
certainly impaired the quality and value of the system as an internal business device for
Intel and forced Intel to incur costs to try to maintain the security and integrity of its
server—efforts that proved ineffective. These included costs incurred to mitigate injuries
that had already occurred. It is not a matter of “bootstrapp[ing]” to consider those costs a
damage to Intel. Indeed, part of the value of the proprietary computer system is the ability
to exclude intermeddlers from entering it for significant uses that are disruptive to its
owner’s business operations.
If Intel, a large business with thousands of former employees, is unable to prevent Hamidi
from continued intermeddling, it is not unlikely that other outsiders who obtain access to
its proprietary electronic mail addresses would engage in similar conduct, further reducing
the value of, and perhaps debilitating, the computer system as a business productivity
mechanism. Employees understand that a firewall is in place and expect that the messages
they receive are from senders permitted by the corporation. Violation of this expectation
increases the internal disruption caused by messages that circumvent the company’s
attempt to exclude them. The time that each employee must spend to evaluate, delete or
respond to the message, when added up, constitutes an amount of compensated time that
translates to quantifiable financial damage.3
2 In Zaslow, we observed that when the trespass involves “intermeddling with or use of” another’s property, the
owner “may recover only the actual damages suffered by reason of the impairment of the property or the loss of
its use.” (Zaslow v. Kroenert, supra, 29 Cal.2d at p. 551) We did not state that such damages were a
requirement for a cause of action; nor did we address the availability of injunctive relief.
3 As the recent spate of articles on “spam”—unsolicited bulk e-mail—suggests, the effects on business of such
unwanted intrusions are not trivial. “Spam is not just a nuisance. It absorbs bandwidth and overwhelms

96.

All of these costs to protect the integrity of the computer system and to deal with the
disruptive effects of the transmissions and the expenditures attributable to employee time,
constitute damages sufficient to establish the existence of a trespass to chattels, even if the
computer system was not overburdened to the point of a “crash” by the bulk electronic mail.
The several courts that have applied the tort of trespass to chattels to deliberate
intermeddling with proprietary computer systems have, for the most part, used a similar
analysis. Thus, the court in CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc. (S.D. Ohio 1997)
962 F. Supp. 1015, 1022, applied the Restatement to conclude that mass mailings and
evasion of the server’s filters diminished the value of the mail processing computer
equipment to CompuServe “even though it is not physically damaged by defendant’s
conduct.” The inconvenience to users of the system as a result of the mass messages
“decrease[d] the utility of CompuServe’s e-mail service” and was actionable as a trespass to
chattels. (Id. at p. 1023.)
The court in America Online, Inc. v. IMS (E.D. Va. 1998) 24 F. Supp. 2d 548, on facts
similar to those in the present case, also applied the Restatement in a trespass to chattels
claim. There, defendant sent unauthorized e-mails to America Online’s computer system,
persisting after receiving notice to desist and causing the company “to spend technical
resources and staff time to ‘defend’ its computer system and its membership” against the
unwanted messages. The company was not required to show that its computer system was
overwhelmed or suffered a diminution in performance; mere use of the system by the
defendant was sufficient to allow the plaintiff to prevail on the trespass to chattels claim.
Similarly, the court in eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2000) 100 F. Supp. 2d
1058 determined that there was a trespass to chattels when the quality or value of a
computer system was diminished by unauthorized “web crawlers,”4 despite the fact that
eBay had not alleged any “particular service disruption” or “specific incremental damages”
to the computer system. Intermeddling with eBay’s private property was sufficient to
establish a cause of action: “A trespasser is liable when the trespass diminishes the
condition, quality or value of personal property”; “[e]ven if [defendant’s intrusions] use only
a small amount of eBay’s computer ... capacity, [defendant] has nonetheless deprived eBay
of the ability to use that portion of its personal property for its own purposes. The law
recognizes no such right to use another’s personal property.” ([S]ee also, e.g., Oyster
Internet service providers. Corporate tech staffs labor to deploy filtering technology to protect their networks.
The cost is now widely estimated (though all such estimates are largely guesswork) at billions of dollars a year.
The social costs are immeasurable.... [¶] ‘Spam has become the organized crime of the Internet.’ ... ‘[M]ore and
more it’s becoming a systems and engineering and networking problem.’” (Gleick, Tangled Up in Spam, N.Y.
Times (Feb. 9, 2003) magazine p. 1 [as of June 30, 2003]; see also Cooper & Shogren, U.S., States Turn Focus to
Curbing Spam, L.A. Times (May 1, 2003) p. A21, col. 2 [“Businesses are losing money with every moment that
employees spend deleting”]; Turley, Congress Must Send Spammers a Message, L.A. Times (Apr. 21, 2003) p.
B13, col. 5 [“Spam now costs American businesses about $9 billion a year in lost productivity and screening”];
Taylor, Spam’s Big Bang! (June 16, 2003) Time, p. 51 [“The time we spend deleting or defeating spam costs an
estimated $8.9 billion a year in lost productivity”].) But the occasional spam addressed to particular employees
does not pose nearly the same threat of impaired value as the concerted bulk mailings into one e-mail system at
issue here, which mailings were sent to thousands of employees with the express purpose of disrupting business
as usual.
4 A “web crawler” is a computer program that operates across the Internet to obtain information from the
websites of others.
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Software, Inc. v. Forms Processing, Inc. (N.D. Cal., Dec. 6, 200) 2001 WL 1736382 at *12*13 [trespass to chattels claim did not require company to demonstrate physical damage];
accord, Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 250; cf.
Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek (1996) 46 Cal. App. 4th 1559, 1566-1567 [unconsented
electronic access to a computer system constituted a trespass to chattels].)
These cases stand for the simple proposition that owners of computer systems, like owners
of other private property, have a right to prevent others from using their property against
their interests. That principle applies equally in this case. By his repeated intermeddling,
Hamidi converted Intel’s private employee e-mail system into a tool for harming
productivity and disrupting Intel’s workplace. Intel attempted to put a stop to Hamidi’s
intrusions by increasing its electronic screening measures and by requesting that he desist.
Only when self-help proved futile, devolving into a potentially endless joust between
attempted prevention and circumvention, did Intel request and obtain equitable relief in
the form of an injunction to prevent further threatened injury.
The majority suggest that Intel is not entitled to injunctive relief because it chose to allow
its employees access to e-mail through the Internet and because Hamidi has apparently
told employees that he will remove them from his mailing list if they so request. They
overlook the proprietary nature of Intel’s intranet system; Intel’s system is not merely a
conduit for messages to its employees. As the owner of the computer system, it is Intel’s
request that Hamidi stop that must be respected. The fact that, like most large businesses,
Intel’s intranet includes external e-mail access for essential business purposes does not
logically mean, as the majority suggest, that Intel has forfeited the right to determine who
has access to its system. Its intranet is not the equivalent of a common carrier or public
communications licensee that would be subject to requirements to provide service and
access. Just as Intel can, and does, regulate the use of its computer system by its
employees, it should be entitled to control its use by outsiders and to seek injunctive relief
when self-help fails.
The majority also propose that Intel has sufficient avenues for legal relief outside of
trespass to chattels, such as interference with prospective economic relations, interference
with contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and defamation; Hamidi urges
that an action for nuisance is more appropriate. Although other causes of action may under
certain circumstances also apply to Hamidi’s conduct, the remedy based on trespass to
chattels is the most efficient and appropriate. It simply requires Hamidi to stop the
unauthorized use of property without regard to the content of the transmissions. Unlike
trespass to chattels, the other potential causes of action suggested by the majority and
Hamidi would require an evaluation of the transmissions’ content and, in the case of a
nuisance action, for example, would involve questions of degree and value judgments based
on competing interests.
II
As discussed above, I believe that existing legal principles are adequate to support Intel’s
request for injunctive relief. But even if the injunction in this case amounts to an extension
of the traditional tort of trespass to chattels, this is one of those cases in which, as Justice
Cardozo suggested, “[t]he creative element in the judicial process finds its opportunity and
power” in the development of the law.
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The law has evolved to meet economic, social, and scientific changes in society. The
industrial revolution, mass production, and new transportation and communication
systems all required the adaptation and evolution of legal doctrines.
The age of computer technology and cyberspace poses new challenges to legal principles. As
this court has said, “the so-called Internet revolution has spawned a host of new legal
issues as courts have struggled to apply traditional legal frameworks to this new
communication medium.” The court must now grapple with proprietary interests, privacy,
and expression arising out of computer-related disputes. Thus, in this case the court is
faced with “that balancing of judgment, that testing and sorting of considerations of
analogy and logic and utility and fairness” that Justice Cardozo said he had “been trying to
describe.” Additionally, this is a case in which equitable relief is sought. As Bernard Witkin
has written, “equitable relief is flexible and expanding, and the theory that ‘for every wrong
there is a remedy’ [Civ.Code, § 3523] may be invoked by equity courts to justify the
invention of new methods of relief for new types of wrongs.” That the Legislature has dealt
with some aspects of commercial unsolicited bulk e-mail (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 17538.4,
17538.45) should not inhibit the application of common law tort principles to deal with email transgressions not covered by the legislation.
Before the computer, a person could not easily cause significant disruption to another’s
business or personal affairs through methods of communication without significant cost.
With the computer, by a mass mailing, one person can at no cost disrupt, damage, and
interfere with another’s property, business, and personal interests. Here, the law should
allow Intel to protect its computer-related property from the unauthorized, harmful, free
use by intruders.
III
As the Court of Appeal observed, connecting one’s driveway to the general system of roads
does not invite demonstrators to use the property as a public forum. Not mindful of this
precept, the majority blur the distinction between public and private computer networks in
the interest of “ease and openness of communication.” By upholding Intel’s right to exercise
self-help to restrict Hamidi’s bulk e-mails, they concede that he did not have a right to send
them through Intel’s proprietary system. Yet they conclude that injunctive relief is
unavailable to Intel because it connected its e-mail system to the Internet and thus,
“necessarily contemplated” unsolicited communications to its employees. Their exposition
promotes unpredictability in a manner that could be as harmful to open communication as
it is to property rights. It permits Intel to block Hamidi’s e-mails entirely, but offers no
recourse if he succeeds in breaking through its security barriers, unless he physically or
functionally degrades the system.
By making more concrete damages a requirement for a remedy, the majority has rendered
speech interests dependent on the impact of the e-mails. The sender will never know when
or if the mass e-mails sent by him (and perhaps others) will use up too much space or cause
a crash in the recipient system, so as to fulfill the majority’s requirement of damages. Thus,
the sender is exposed to the risk of liability because of the possibility of damages. If, as the
majority suggest, such a risk will deter “ease and openness of communication”, the
majority’s formulation does not eliminate such deterrence. Under the majority’s position,
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the lost freedom of communication still exists. In addition, a business could never reliably
invest in a private network that can only be kept private by constant vigilance and
inventiveness, or by simply shutting off the Internet, thus limiting rather than expanding
the flow of information.6 Moreover, Intel would have less incentive to allow employees
reasonable use of its equipment to send and receive personal e-mails if such allowance is
justification for preventing restrictions on unwanted intrusions into its computer system. I
believe the best approach is to clearly delineate private from public networks and identify
as a trespass to chattels the kind of intermeddling involved here.
The views of the amici curiae group of intellectual property professors that a ruling in favor
of Intel will interfere with communication are similarly misplaced because here, Intel,
contrary to most users, expressly informed Hamidi that it did not want him sending
messages through its system. Moreover, as noted above, all of the problems referred to will
exist under the apparently accepted law that there is a cause of action if there is some
actionable damage.
Hamidi and other amici curiae raise, for the first time on appeal, certain labor law issues,
including the matter of protected labor-related communications. Even assuming that these
issues are properly before this court, to the extent the laws allow what would otherwise be
trespasses for some labor-related communications, my position does not exclude that here
too. But there has been no showing that the communications are labor-law protected.7
Finally, with regard to alleged constitutional free speech concerns raised by Hamidi and
others, this case involves a private entity seeking to enforce private rights against trespass.
Unlike the majority, I have concluded that Hamidi did invade Intel’s property. His actions
constituted a trespass—in this case a trespass to chattels. There is no federal or state
constitutional right to trespass. (Adderley v. Florida (1966) 385 U.S. 39, 47 [“Nothing in the
Constitution of the United States prevents Florida from even-handed enforcement of its
general trespass statute....”]; Church of Christ in Hollywood v. Superior Court (2002) 99
Cal. App. 4th 1244, 1253-1254 [affirming a restraining order preventing former church
member from entering church property: “[the United States Supreme Court] has never held
that a trespasser or an uninvited guest may exercise general rights of free speech on
property privately owned”]; see also CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F.
Supp. at p. 1026 [“the mere judicial enforcement of neutral trespass laws by the private
owner of property does not alone render it a state actor”]; Cyber Promotions, Inc. v.
American Online, Inc. (E.D. Pa. 1996) 948 F. Supp. 436, 456 [“a private company such as
Cyber simply does not have the unfettered right under the First Amendment to invade
AOL’s private property....”].) Accordingly, the cases cited by the majority regarding
restrictions on speech, not trespass, are not applicable. Nor does the connection of Intel’s email system to the Internet transform it into a public forum any more than any connection
between private and public properties. Moreover, as noted above, Hamidi had adequate
alternative means for communicating with Intel employees so that an injunction would not,
under any theory, constitute a free speech violation.
Thus, the majority’s approach creates the perverse incentive for companies to invest less in computer capacity
in order to protect its property. In the view of the majority, Hamidi’s massive e-mails would be actionable only if
Intel had insufficient server or storage capacity to manage them.
7 The bulk e-mail messages from Hamidi, a nonemployee, did not purport to spur employees into any collective
action; he has conceded that “[t]his is not a drive to unionize.” Nor was his disruptive conduct part of any bona
fide labor dispute.
6
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IV
The trial court granted an injunction to prevent threatened injury to Intel. That is the
purpose of an injunction. Intel should not be helpless in the face of repeated and threatened
abuse and contamination of its private computer system. The undisputed facts, in my view,
rendered Hamidi’s conduct legally actionable. Thus, the trial court’s decision to grant a
permanent injunction was not “a clear abuse of discretion” that may be “disturbed on
appeal.”
The injunction issued by the trial court simply required Hamidi to refrain from further
trespassory conduct, drawing no distinction based on the content of his e-mails. Hamidi
remains free to communicate with Intel employees and others outside the walls—both
physical and electronic—of the company.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
I CONCUR: GEORGE, C.J.
NOTES AND QUESTIONS
Who did you feel more sympathetic towards: Hamidi or Intel?
As recounted by the dissent, “[t]he trial court further found that the ‘massive’ intrusions
‘impaired the value to Intel of its e-mail system.’” Why didn’t that lower court finding of
fact satisfy the majority’s legal standard?
Intel brought, and subsequently dropped, a nuisance claim against Hamidi. How was
Hamidi’s activity like a “nuisance”?
If Hamidi continues to send unwanted email to Intel employees, what can Intel do, and
what can’t it do?
The dissent says “the majority’s approach creates the perverse incentive for companies to
invest less in computer capacity in order to protect its property.” How likely is it that
companies will underinvest in their email capacity due to this ruling?
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Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004).
Leval, Circuit Judge.
…Verio also attacks the grant of the preliminary injunction against its accessing Register’s
computers by automated software programs performing multiple successive queries. This
prong of the injunction was premised on Register’s claim of trespass to chattels. Verio
contends the ruling was in error because Register failed to establish that Verio’s conduct
resulted in harm to Register’s servers and because Verio’s robot access to the WHOIS
database through Register was “not unauthorized.” We believe the district court’s findings
were within the range of its permissible discretion.
“A trespass to a chattel may be committed by intentionally ... using or intermeddling with a
chattel in the possession of another,” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 217(b) (1965), where
“the chattel is impaired as to its condition, quality, or value.”
The district court found that Verio’s use of search robots, consisting of software programs
performing multiple automated successive queries, consumed a significant portion of the
capacity of Register’s computer systems. While Verio’s robots alone would not incapacitate
Register’s systems, the court found that if Verio were permitted to continue to access
Register’s computers through such robots, it was “highly probable” that other Internet
service providers would devise similar programs to access Register’s data, and that the
system would be overtaxed and would crash. We cannot say these findings were
unreasonable.
Nor is there merit to Verio’s contention that it cannot be engaged in trespass when Register
had never instructed it not to use its robot programs. As the district court noted, Register’s
complaint sufficiently advised Verio that its use of robots was not authorized and, according
to Register’s contentions, would cause harm to Register’s systems….
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WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 2012 WL 3039213 (4th Cir. 2012)
Floyd, Circuit Judge.
…I.
A.
In 1984, Congress initiated a campaign against computer crime by passing the Counterfeit
Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984. Shortly thereafter, in 1986, it
expanded the Act with a revised version, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986.
Today, the CFAA remains primarily a criminal statute designed to combat hacking.
Nevertheless, it permits a private party “who suffers damage or loss by reason of a violation
of [the statute]” to bring a civil action “to obtain compensatory damages and injunctive
relief or other equitable relief.” Notably, although proof of at least one of five additional
factors is necessary to maintain a civil action, a violation of any of the statute’s provisions
exposes the offender to both civil and criminal liability….
B.
WEC and Arc are competitors, providing specialized welding and related services to the
power generation industry. Both companies are incorporated in South Carolina and
maintain their principal places of business in York County, South Carolina. Prior to April
30, 2010, WEC employed Mike Miller as a Project Director and Emily Kelley as his
assistant. Both individuals now work for Arc.
When Miller worked for WEC, the company provided him with a laptop computer and cell
phone, and authorized his access to the company’s intranet and computer servers.
According to WEC’s complaint, “Miller had access to numerous confidential and trade secret
documents stored on ... computer servers, including pricing terms, pending projects[,] and
the technical capabilities of WEC.” To protect its confidential information and trade secrets,
WEC instituted policies that prohibited using the information without authorization or
downloading it to a personal computer. These policies did not restrict Miller’s authorization
to access the information, however.
On April 30, 2010, Miller resigned from WEC. WEC alleges that prior to resigning, Miller,
at Arc’s direction, “either by himself or by his assistant, Kelley, downloaded a substantial
number of WEC’s confidential documents” and emailed them to his personal e-mail address.
WEC also alleges that Miller and Kelley downloaded confidential information to a personal
computer. Twenty days after leaving WEC, Miller reportedly used the downloaded
information to make a presentation on behalf of Arc to a potential WEC customer.
The customer ultimately awarded two projects to Arc. WEC contends that as a result of
Miller’s and Kelley’s actions, it “has suffered and will continue to suffer impairment to the
integrity of its data, programs, systems or information, including economic damages, and
loss aggregating substantially more than $5,000 during a one-year period.”…
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II….
A.
WEC alleges that Appellees violated §§ 1030(a)(2)(C), (a)(4), (a)(5)(B), and (a)(5)(C), each of
which require that a party either access a computer “without authorization” or “exceed[ ]
authorized access.” The district court held that Appellees’ alleged conduct—the violation of
policies regarding the use and downloading of confidential information—did not contravene
any of these provisions. Accordingly, the crux of the issue presented here is the scope of
“without authorization” and “exceeds authorized access.” We particularly examine whether
these terms extend to violations of policies regarding the use of a computer or information
on a computer to which a defendant otherwise has access. Before delving into statutory
analysis, however, we briefly review the perspectives of our sister circuits.
In short, two schools of thought exist. The first, promulgated by the Seventh Circuit and
advanced by WEC here, holds that when an employee accesses a computer or information
on a computer to further interests that are adverse to his employer, he violates his duty of
loyalty, thereby terminating his agency relationship and losing any authority he has to
access the computer or any information on it. Thus, for example, the Seventh Circuit held
that an employee who erased crucial data on his company laptop prior to turning it in at
the end of his employment violated the CFAA. It reasoned that his “breach of his duty of
loyalty terminated his agency relationship ... and with it his authority to access the laptop,
because the only basis of his authority had been that relationship.”
The second, articulated by the Ninth Circuit and followed by the district court here,
interprets “without authorization” and “exceeds authorized access” literally and narrowly,
limiting the terms’ application to situations where an individual accesses a computer or
information on a computer without permission. See United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854,
863 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc); LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1134–35 (9th
Cir. 2009). Thus, in Nosal, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the defendant’s coconspirators, a group of employees at an executive search firm, did not violate the CFAA
when they retrieved confidential information via their company user accounts and
transferred it to the defendant, a competitor and former employee. It reasoned that the
CFAA fails to provide a remedy for misappropriation of trade secrets or violation of a use
policy where authorization has not been rescinded. As we explain below, we agree with this
latter view.
B….
Where, as here, our analysis involves a statute whose provisions have both civil and
criminal application, our task merits special attention because our interpretation applies
uniformly in both contexts. Thus, we follow “the canon of strict construction of criminal
statutes, or rule of lenity.” In other words, in the interest of providing fair warning “of what
the law intends to do if a certain line is passed,” we will construe this criminal statute
strictly and avoid interpretations not “clearly warranted by the text.”
1.
The CFAA is concerned with the unauthorized access of protected computers. Thus, we note
at the outset that “access” means “[t]o obtain, acquire,” or “[t]o gain admission to.”
Moreover, per the CFAA, a “computer” is a high-speed processing device “and includes any
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data storage facility or communications facility directly related to or operating in
conjunction with such device.” A computer becomes a “protected computer” when it “is used
in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce.”
With respect to the phrase, “without authorization,” the CFAA does not define
“authorization.” Nevertheless, the Oxford English Dictionary defines “authorization” as
“formal warrant, or sanction.” Regarding the phrase “exceeds authorized access,” the CFAA
defines it as follows: “to access a computer with authorization and to use such access to
obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or
alter.”
Recognizing that the distinction between these terms is arguably minute, we nevertheless
conclude based on the “ordinary, contemporary, common meaning” of “authorization,” that
an employee is authorized to access a computer when his employer approves or sanctions
his admission to that computer. Thus, he accesses a computer “without authorization” when
he gains admission to a computer without approval. Similarly, we conclude that an
employee “exceeds authorized access” when he has approval to access a computer, but uses
his access to obtain or alter information that falls outside the bounds of his approved
access. Notably, neither of these definitions extends to the improper use of information
validly accessed.
2.
WEC presses instead an ostensibly plain-language interpretation articulated in the Nosal
panel decision, which was subsequently reversed en banc. In that decision, the panel
fixated on the word “so” in the definition of “exceeds authorized access.” The panel declared
that, in context, this conjunction means “in a manner or way that is indicated or
suggested.” Thus, it found that an employee “exceed[s][his] authorized access” if he uses
such access “to obtain or alter information [on] the computer that [he] is not entitled [in
that manner] to obtain or alter.” Armed with this interpretation, the court held that the
defendant’s co-conspirators “exceed[ed] their authorized access” because although they had
permission to access the proprietary information that they transferred to the defendant,
they violated the company’s policy regarding the use and disclosure of that information.
The court reasoned that the co-conspirators’ violation of the use and disclosure policy
constituted access “in a manner” to which they were not entitled. Thus, they violated the
CFAA.
As an initial manner, we believe the Nosal panel’s conclusion is a non sequitur. To us,
defining “so” as “in that manner” only elucidates our earlier conclusion that “exceeds
authorized access” refers to obtaining or altering information beyond the limits of the
employee’s authorized access. It does not address the use of information after access.
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit indicated as much in its en banc reversal, when it declined to
hold that the interpretation of “so” as “in that manner” necessarily means employees can be
liable for use-policy violations. Instead, the court offered hypotheticals illustrating how the
panel’s interpretation of “so” referred to the means of obtaining information, not the use of
information. For example, if an employee who has access to view information, but not to
download it, disregards company policy by “cop[ying] the information to a thumb drive and
walk[ing] out of the building with it,” he obtains information “in a manner” that lacks
authorization. Similarly, if an employee has complete access to information with his own
username and password, but accesses information using another employee’s username and
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password, he also obtains information “in a manner” that is not authorized. In contrast,
however, where such an employee uses his own username and password to access the
information and then puts it to an impermissible use, his “manner” of access remains valid.
Thus, in the Ninth Circuit’s view, and ours, interpreting “so” as “in that manner” fails to
mandate CFAA liability for the improper use of information that is accessed with
authorization.
Nevertheless, because WEC alleges that Miller and Kelley obtained information by
downloading it to a personal computer in violation of company policy, we go a step further.
Although we believe that interpreting “so” as “in that manner” fails to subject an employee
to liability for violating a use policy, we nonetheless decline to adopt the Nosal panel’s
interpretation of the conjunction. The interpretation is certainly plausible, but it is not
“clearly warranted by the text.” Indeed, Congress may have intended “so” to mean “in that
manner,” but it “could just as well have included ‘so’ as a connector or for emphasis.” Thus,
faced with the option of two interpretations, we yield to the rule of lenity and choose the
more obliging route. “[W]hen [a] choice has to be made between two readings of what
conduct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher
alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and
definite.” Here, Congress has not clearly criminalized obtaining or altering information “in
a manner” that is not authorized. Rather, it has simply criminalized obtaining or altering
information that an individual lacked authorization to obtain or alter.
And lest we appear to be needlessly splitting hairs, we maintain that the Nosal panel’s
interpretation would indeed be a harsher approach. For example, such an interpretation
would impute liability to an employee who with commendable intentions disregards his
employer’s policy against downloading information to a personal computer so that he can
work at home and make headway in meeting his employer’s goals. Such an employee has
authorization to obtain and alter the information that he downloaded. Moreover, he has no
intent to defraud his employer. But under the Nosal panel’s approach, because he obtained
information “in a manner” that was not authorized (i.e., by downloading it to a personal
computer), he nevertheless would be liable under the CFAA. Believing that Congress did
not clearly intend to criminalize such behavior, we decline to interpret “so” as “in that
manner.”
In so doing, we adopt a narrow reading of the terms “without authorization” and “exceeds
authorized access” and hold that they apply only when an individual accesses a computer
without permission or obtains or alters information on a computer beyond that which he is
authorized to access.
3.
In adopting these definitions, we reject any interpretation that grounds CFAA liability on a
cessation-of-agency theory. The deficiency of a rule that revokes authorization when an
employee uses his access for a purpose contrary to the employer’s interests is apparent:
Such a rule would mean that any employee who checked the latest Facebook posting or
sporting event scores in contravention of his employer’s use policy would be subject to the
instantaneous cessation of his agency and, as a result, would be left without any
authorization to access his employer’s computer systems. We recognize that the Seventh
Circuit applied its reasoning to egregious behavior that clearly violated the duty of loyalty.
Nevertheless, we believe that the theory has far-reaching effects unintended by Congress.
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Although an employer might choose to rescind an employee’s authorization for violating a
use policy, we do not think Congress intended an immediate end to the agency relationship
and, moreover, the imposition of criminal penalties for such a frolic.
III.
WEC founds its CFAA claim on Miller’s and Kelley’s violations of its policies “prohibiting
the use of any confidential information and trade secrets unless authorized” and prohibiting
the “download[ing][of] confidential and proprietary information to a personal computer.”
Notably, however, WEC fails to allege that Miller and Kelley accessed a computer or
information on a computer without authorization. Indeed, WEC’s complaint belies such a
conclusion because it states that Miller “had access to WEC’s intranet and computer
servers” and “to numerous confidential and trade secret documents stored on these
computer servers, including pricing, terms, pending projects[,] and the technical
capabilities of WEC.” Thus, we agree with the district court that although Miller and Kelley
may have misappropriated information, they did not access a computer without
authorization or exceed their authorized access. Moreover, because Miller’s and Kelley’s
conduct failed to violate the CFAA, Arc cannot be liable under the statute for any role that
it played in encouraging such conduct. Accordingly, we hold that WEC failed to state a
claim for which the CFAA can grant relief, and we affirm the district court’s dismissal of
the claim.
IV.
Our conclusion here likely will disappoint employers hoping for a means to rein in rogue
employees. But we are unwilling to contravene Congress’s intent by transforming a statute
meant to target hackers into a vehicle for imputing liability to workers who access
computers or information in bad faith, or who disregard a use policy. Providing such
recourse not only is unnecessary, given that other legal remedies exist for these
grievances,4 but also is violative of the Supreme Court’s counsel to construe criminal
statutes strictly. Thus, we reject an interpretation of the CFAA that imposes liability on
employees who violate a use policy, choosing instead to limit such liability to individuals
who access computers without authorization or who obtain or alter information beyond the
bounds of their authorized access.
NOTES AND QUESTIONS
Can employers avoid this result by saying in their computer use policies that employees are
authorized to access company computers only if they don’t misuse the information on those
computers?

4 As evidenced by WEC’s complaint, nine other state-law causes of action potentially provide relief, including
conversion, tortious interference with contractual relations, civil conspiracy, and misappropriation of trade
secrets.
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V.

Copyright

Copyright Basics, Copyright Office Circular 1 (from
http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ1.pdf) (accessed July 6, 2010)
What Is Copyright?
Copyright is a form of protection provided by the laws of the United States (title 17, U. S.
Code) to the authors of “original works of authorship,” including literary, dramatic, musical,
artistic, and certain other intellectual works. This protection is available to both published
and unpublished works. Section 106 of the 1976 Copyright Act generally gives the owner of
copyright the exclusive right to do and to authorize others to do the following:
• To reproduce the work in copies or phonorecords;
• To prepare derivative works based upon the work;
• To distribute copies or phonorecords of the work to the public by sale or other transfer of
ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
• To perform the work publicly, in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and
choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
• To display the work publicly, in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work; and
• In the case of sound recordings,* to perform the work publicly by means of a digital audio
transmission.
In addition, certain authors of works of visual art have the rights of attribution and
integrity as described in section 106A of the 1976 Copyright Act….
It is illegal for anyone to violate any of the rights provided by the copyright law to the
owner of copyright. These rights, however, are not unlimited in scope. Sections 107 through
121 of the 1976 Copyright Act establish limitations on these rights. In some cases, these
limitations are specified exemptions from copyright liability. One major limitation is the
doctrine of “fair use,” which is given a statutory basis in section 107 of the 1976 Copyright
Act. In other instances, the limitation takes the form of a “compulsory license” under which
certain limited uses of copyrighted works are permitted upon payment of specified royalties
and compliance with statutory conditions….
Who Can Claim Copyright?
Copyright protection subsists from the time the work is created in fixed form. The copyright
in the work of authorship immediately becomes the property of the author who created the
work. Only the author or those deriving their rights through the author can rightfully claim
copyright. In the case of works made for hire, the employer and not the employee is
Sound recordings are defined in the law as “works that result from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken,
or other sounds, but not including the sounds accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work.”
Common examples include recordings of music, drama, or lectures. A sound recording is not the same as a
phonorecord. A phonorecord is the physical object in which works of authorship are embodied. The word
“phonorecord” includes cassette tapes, CDs, and vinyl disks as well as other formats.
*
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considered to be the author. Section 101 of the copyright law defines a “work made for hire”
as:
1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or
2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as:
• a contribution to a collective work
• a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work
• a translation
• a supplementary work
• a compilation
• an instructional text
• a test
• answer material for a test
• an atlas
if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be
considered a work made for hire.
The authors of a joint work are co-owners of the copyright in the work, unless there is an
agreement to the contrary.
Copyright in each separate contribution to a periodical or other collective work is distinct
from copyright in the collective work as a whole and vests initially with the author of the
contribution.
Two General Principles
• Mere ownership of a book, manuscript, painting, or any other copy or phonorecord does
not give the possessor the copyright. The law provides that transfer of ownership of any
material object that embodies a protected work does not of itself convey any rights in the
copyright.
• Minors may claim copyright, but state laws may regulate the business dealings involving
copyrights owned by minors….
What Works Are Protected?
Copyright protects “original works of authorship” that are fixed in a tangible form of
expression. The fixation need not be directly perceptible so long as it may be communicated
with the aid of a machine or device. Copyrightable works include the following categories:
1) literary works
2) musical works, including any accompanying words
3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music
4) pantomimes and choreographic works
5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works
6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works
7) sound recordings
8) architectural works
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These categories should be viewed broadly. For example, computer programs and most
“compilations” may be registered as “literary works”; maps and architectural plans may be
registered as “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works.”
What Is Not Protected by Copyright?
Several categories of material are generally not eligible for federal copyright protection.
These include among others:
• Works that have not been fixed in a tangible form of expression (for example,
choreographic works that have not been notated or recorded, or improvisational speeches or
performances that have not been written or recorded)
• Titles, names, short phrases, and slogans; familiar symbols or designs; mere variations of
typographic ornamentation, lettering, or coloring; mere listings of ingredients or contents
• Ideas, procedures, methods, systems, processes, concepts, principles, discoveries, or
devices, as distinguished from a description, explanation, or illustration
• Works consisting entirely of information that is common property and containing no
original authorship (for example: standard calendars, height and weight charts, tape
measures and rulers, and lists or tables taken from public documents or other common
sources)
How to Secure a Copyright
Copyright Secured Automatically upon Creation
The way in which copyright protection is secured is frequently misunderstood. No
publication or registration or other action in the Copyright Office is required to secure
copyright. There are, however, certain definite advantages to registration.
Copyright is secured automatically when the work is created, and a work is “created” when
it is fixed in a copy or phonorecord for the first time. “Copies” are material objects from
which a work can be read or visually perceived either directly or with the aid of a machine
or device, such as books, manuscripts, sheet music, film, videotape, or microfilm.
“Phonorecords” are material objects embodying fixations of sounds (excluding, by statutory
definition, motion picture soundtracks), such as cassette tapes, CDs, or vinyl disks. Thus,
for example, a song (the “work”) can be fixed in sheet music (“copies”) or in phonograph
disks (“phonorecords”), or both. If a work is prepared over a period of time, the part of the
work that is fixed on a particular date constitutes the created work as of that date.
Publication
Publication is no longer the key to obtaining federal copyright as it was under the
Copyright Act of 1909. However, publication remains important to copyright owners.
The 1976 Copyright Act defines publication as follows:
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“Publication” is the distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.
The offering to distribute copies or phonorecords to a group of persons for
purposes of further distribution, public performance, or public display
constitutes publication. A public performance or display of a work does not of
itself constitute publication.
Note: Before 1978, federal copyright was generally secured by the act of
publication with notice of copyright, assuming compliance with all other
relevant statutory conditions. U. S. works in the public domain on January 1,
1978, (for example, works published without satisfying all conditions for
securing federal copyright under the Copyright Act of 1909) remain in the
public domain under the 1976 Copyright Act….
Federal copyright could also be secured before 1978 by the act of registration
in the case of certain unpublished works and works eligible for ad interim
copyright. The 1976 Copyright Act automatically extends to full term (section
304 sets the term) copyright for all works, including those subject to ad
interim copyright if ad interim registration has been made on or before June
30, 1978.
A further discussion of the definition of “publication” can be found in the legislative history
of the 1976 Copyright Act. The legislative reports define “to the public” as distribution to
persons under no explicit or implicit restrictions with respect to disclosure of the contents.
The reports state that the definition makes it clear that the sale of phonorecords constitutes
publication of the underlying work, for example, the musical, dramatic, or literary work
embodied in a phonorecord. The reports also state that it is clear that any form of
dissemination in which the material object does not change hands, for example,
performances or displays on television, is not a publication no matter how many people are
exposed to the work. However, when copies or phonorecords are offered for sale or lease to a
group of wholesalers, broadcasters, or motion picture theaters, publication does take place
if the purpose is further distribution, public performance, or public display.
Publication is an important concept in the copyright law for several reasons:
• Works that are published in the United States are subject to mandatory deposit with the
Library of Congress….
• Publication of a work can affect the limitations on the exclusive rights of the copyright
owner that are set forth in sections 107 through 121 of the law.
• The year of publication may determine the duration of copyright protection for
anonymous and pseudonymous works (when the author’s identity is not revealed in the
records of the Copyright Office) and for works made for hire.
• Deposit requirements for registration of published works differ from those for registration
of unpublished works….
• When a work is published, it may bear a notice of copyright to identify the year of
publication and the name of the copyright owner and to inform the public that the work is
protected by copyright. Copies of works published before March 1, 1989, must bear the
notice or risk loss of copyright protection….
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Notice of Copyright
The use of a copyright notice is no longer required under U. S. law, although it is often
beneficial. Because prior law did contain such a requirement, however, the use of notice is
still relevant to the copyright status of older works.
Notice was required under the 1976 Copyright Act. This requirement was eliminated when
the United States adhered to the Berne Convention, effective March 1, 1989….
The Copyright Office does not take a position on whether copies of works first published
with notice before March 1, 1989, which are distributed on or after March 1, 1989, must
bear the copyright notice.
Use of the notice may be important because it informs the public that the work is protected
by copyright, identifies the copyright owner, and shows the year of first publication.
Furthermore, in the event that a work is infringed, if a proper notice of copyright appears
on the published copy or copies to which a defendant in a copyright infringement suit had
access, then no weight shall be given to such a defendant’s interposition of a defense based
on innocent infringement in mitigation of actual or statutory damages, except as provided
in section 504(c)(2) of the copyright law. Innocent infringement occurs when the infringer
did not realize that the work was protected.
The use of the copyright notice is the responsibility of the copyright owner and does not
require advance permission from, or registration with, the Copyright Office.
Form of Notice for Visually Perceptible Copies
The notice for visually perceptible copies should contain all the following three elements:
1) The symbol © (the letter C in a circle), or the word “Copyright,” or the abbreviation
“Copr.”; and
2) The year of first publication of the work. In the case of compilations or derivative works
incorporating previously published material, the year date of first publication of the
compilation or derivative work is sufficient. The year date may be omitted where a pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural work, with accompanying textual matter, if any, is reproduced in or
on greeting cards, postcards, stationery, jewelry, dolls, toys, or any useful article; and
3) The name of the owner of copyright in the work, or an abbreviation by which the name
can be recognized, or a generally known alternative designation of the owner.
Example: © 2008 John Doe….
How Long Copyright Protection Endures
Works Originally Created on or after January 1, 1978
A work that was created (fixed in tangible form for the first time) on or after January 1,
1978, is automatically protected from the moment of its creation and is ordinarily given a
term enduring for the author’s life plus an additional 70 years after the author’s death. In
the case of “a joint work prepared by two or more authors who did not work for hire,” the
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term lasts for 70 years after the last surviving author’s death. For works made for hire, and
for anonymous and pseudonymous works (unless the author’s identity is revealed in
Copyright Office records), the duration of copyright will be 95 years from publication or 120
years from creation, whichever is shorter….
Transfer of Copyright
Any or all of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights or any subdivision of those rights may
be transferred, but the transfer of exclusive rights is not valid unless that transfer is in
writing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner’s duly authorized
agent. Transfer of a right on a nonexclusive basis does not require a written agreement. A
copyright may also be conveyed by operation of law and may be bequeathed by will or pass
as personal property by the applicable laws of intestate succession.
Copyright is a personal property right, and it is subject to the various state laws and
regulations that govern the ownership, inheritance, or transfer of personal property as well
as terms of contracts or conduct of business….
The law does provide for the recordation in the Copyright Office of transfers of copyright
ownership. Although recordation is not required to make a valid transfer between the
parties, it does provide certain legal advantages and may be required to validate the
transfer as against third parties….
Termination of Transfers
Under the previous law, the copyright in a work reverted to the author, if living, or if the
author was not living, to other specified beneficiaries, provided a renewal claim was
registered in the 28th year of the original term. The present law drops the renewal feature
except for works already in the first term of statutory protection when the present law took
effect. Instead, the present law permits termination of a grant of rights after 35 years under
certain conditions by serving written notice on the transferee within specified time limits….
International Copyright Protection
There is no such thing as an “international copyright” that will automatically protect an
author’s writings throughout the entire world. Protection against unauthorized use in a
particular country depends, basically, on the national laws of that country. However, most
countries do offer protection to foreign works under certain conditions, and these conditions
have been greatly simplified by international copyright treaties and conventions….
Copyright Registration
In general, copyright registration is a legal formality intended to make a public record of
the basic facts of a particular copyright. However, registration is not a condition of
copyright protection. Even though registration is not a requirement for protection, the
copyright law provides several inducements or advantages to encourage copyright owners to
make registration.
Among these advantages are the following:
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• Registration establishes a public record of the copyright claim.
• Before an infringement suit may be filed in court, registration is necessary for works of
U.S. origin.
• If made before or within five years of publication, registration will establish prima facie
evidence in court of the validity of the copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate.
• If registration is made within three months after publication of the work or prior to an
infringement of the work, statutory damages and attorney’s fees will be available to the
copyright owner in court actions. Otherwise, only an award of actual damages and profits is
available to the copyright owner.
• Registration allows the owner of the copyright to record the registration with the U. S.
Customs Service for protection against the importation of infringing copies….
Registration may be made at any time within the life of the copyright. Unlike the law
before 1978, when a work has been registered in unpublished form, it is not necessary to
make another registration when the work becomes published, although the copyright owner
may register the published edition, if desired….
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Fair Use Summary
First Factor (Nature of Use)
Spectrum of commercial to educational uses, where commercial uses are less fair and
educational uses are more fair. Some courts treat commercial uses as presumptively unfair
(Sony), but Campbell rejected this presumption.
Courts will also consider if the use is transformative or just redistributive. Transformative
uses “add something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first
with new expression, meaning or message” (Campbell). Rarely, courts do not require
adding something new if the use has a different purpose (Kelly v. Arriba, but compare
Texaco). Transformative uses are more likely to be fair use, and the other three factors are
less important (Campbell).
Second Factor (Nature of Work).
Spectrum of fact to fiction, where taking factual works is more fair and taking fiction is less
fair.
Some courts deem taking unpublished works presumptively unfair (Harper & Row), but
§107 was amended to supersede this presumption.
Some courts treat fact/fiction and published/unpublished as two separate sub-factors.
Third Factor (Amount/Substantiality of Portion Taken).
Some courts say that taking the entire work is presumptively unfair. Taking the “heart of
the work,” even if a small amount, usually isn’t fair.
Fourth Factor (Market Effect).
The fourth factor is routinely characterized as the most important factor (Harper & Row).
The factor evaluates (1) whether unrestricted and widespread conduct like the defendant’s
would substantively and adversely impact the market, and (2) the harm to the market for
derivative works when these derivative markets are “traditional, reasonable, or likely to be
developed markets” (Texaco), but some courts give the copyright owner the option not to
pursue a market (Castle Rock). Increasing demand for the underlying work doesn’t
mitigate harm to a derivative market (Harper & Row; Napster).
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Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008)
Walker, Jr., Circuit Judge.
Defendant-Appellant Cablevision Systems Corporation (“Cablevision”) wants to market a
new “Remote Storage” Digital Video Recorder system (“RS-DVR”), using a technology akin
to both traditional, set-top digital video recorders, like TiVo (“DVRs”), and the video-ondemand (“VOD”) services provided by many cable companies. Plaintiffs-Appellees produce
copyrighted movies and television programs that they provide to Cablevision pursuant to
numerous licensing agreements. They contend that Cablevision, through the operation of
its RS-DVR system as proposed, would directly infringe their copyrights both by making
unauthorized reproductions, and by engaging in public performances, of their copyrighted
works. The material facts are not in dispute. Because we conclude that Cablevision would
not directly infringe plaintiffs’ rights under the Copyright Act by offering its RS-DVR
system to consumers, we reverse the district court’s award of summary judgment to
plaintiffs, and we vacate its injunction against Cablevision.
BACKGROUND
Today’s television viewers increasingly use digital video recorders (“DVRs”) instead of video
cassette recorders (“VCRs”) to record television programs and play them back later at their
convenience. DVRs generally store recorded programming on an internal hard drive rather
than a cassette. But, as this case demonstrates, the generic term “DVR” actually refers to a
growing number of different devices and systems. Companies like TiVo sell a stand-alone
DVR device that is typically connected to a user’s cable box and television much like a VCR.
Many cable companies also lease to their subscribers “set-top storage DVRs,” which
combine many of the functions of a standard cable box and a stand-alone DVR in a single
device.
In March 2006, Cablevision, an operator of cable television systems, announced the advent
of its new “Remote Storage DVR System.” As designed, the RS-DVR allows Cablevision
customers who do not have a stand-alone DVR to record cable programming on central hard
drives housed and maintained by Cablevision at a “remote” location. RS-DVR customers
may then receive playback of those programs through their home television sets, using only
a remote control and a standard cable box equipped with the RS-DVR software. Cablevision
notified its content providers, including plaintiffs, of its plans to offer RS-DVR, but it did
not seek any license from them to operate or sell the RS-DVR.
Plaintiffs, which hold the copyrights to numerous movies and television programs, sued
Cablevision for declaratory and injunctive relief. They alleged that Cablevision’s proposed
operation of the RS-DVR would directly infringe their exclusive rights to both reproduce
and publicly perform their copyrighted works. Critically for our analysis here, plaintiffs
alleged theories only of direct infringement, not contributory infringement, and defendants
waived any defense based on fair use.
Ultimately, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Denny
Chin, Judge), awarded summary judgment to the plaintiffs and enjoined Cablevision from
operating the RS-DVR system without licenses from its content providers. At the outset, we
think it helpful to an understanding of our decision to describe, in greater detail, both the
RS-DVR and the district court’s opinion.
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I. Operation of the RS-DVR System
Cable companies like Cablevision aggregate television programming from a wide variety of
“content providers”—the various broadcast and cable channels that produce or provide
individual programs—and transmit those programs into the homes of their subscribers via
coaxial cable. At the outset of the transmission process, Cablevision gathers the content of
the various television channels into a single stream of data. Generally, this stream is
processed and transmitted to Cablevision’s customers in real time. Thus, if a Cartoon
Network program is scheduled to air Monday night at 8pm, Cartoon Network transmits
that program’s data to Cablevision and other cable companies nationwide at that time, and
the cable companies immediately re-transmit the data to customers who subscribe to that
channel.
Under the new RS-DVR, this single stream of data is split into two streams. The first is
routed immediately to customers as before. The second stream flows into a device called the
Broadband Media Router (“BMR”), which buffers the data stream, reformats it, and sends it
to the “Arroyo Server,” which consists, in relevant part, of two data buffers and a number of
high-capacity hard disks. The entire stream of data moves to the first buffer (the “primary
ingest buffer”), at which point the server automatically inquires as to whether any
customers want to record any of that programming. If a customer has requested a
particular program, the data for that program move from the primary buffer into a
secondary buffer, and then onto a portion of one of the hard disks allocated to that
customer. As new data flow into the primary buffer, they overwrite a corresponding
quantity of data already on the buffer. The primary ingest buffer holds no more than 0.1
seconds of each channel’s programming at any moment. Thus, every tenth of a second, the
data residing on this buffer are automatically erased and replaced. The data buffer in the
BMR holds no more than 1.2 seconds of programming at any time. While buffering occurs at
other points in the operation of the RS-DVR, only the BMR buffer and the primary ingest
buffer are utilized absent any request from an individual subscriber.
As the district court observed, “the RS-DVR is not a single piece of equipment,” but rather
“a complex system requiring numerous computers, processes, networks of cables, and
facilities staffed by personnel twenty-four hours a day and seven days a week.” To the
customer, however, the processes of recording and playback on the RS-DVR are similar to
that of a standard set-top DVR. Using a remote control, the customer can record
programming by selecting a program in advance from an on-screen guide, or by pressing
the record button while viewing a given program. A customer cannot, however, record the
earlier portion of a program once it has begun. To begin playback, the customer selects the
show from an on-screen list of previously recorded programs. The principal difference in
operation is that, instead of sending signals from the remote to an on-set box, the viewer
sends signals from the remote, through the cable, to the Arroyo Server at Cablevision’s
central facility. In this respect, RS-DVR more closely resembles a VOD service, whereby a
cable subscriber uses his remote and cable box to request transmission of content, such as a
movie, stored on computers at the cable company’s facility. But unlike a VOD service, RSDVR users can only play content that they previously requested to be recorded.
Cablevision has some control over the content available for recording: a customer can only
record programs on the channels offered by Cablevision (assuming he subscribes to them).
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Cablevision can also modify the system to limit the number of channels available and
considered doing so during development of the RS-DVR….
[Editor’s note: the following diagram may help you visualize Cablevision’s network]
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DISCUSSION…
“Section 106 of the Copyright Act grants copyright holders a bundle of exclusive rights....”
This case implicates two of those rights: the right “to reproduce the copyrighted work in
copies,” and the right “to perform the copyrighted work publicly.” 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (4). As
discussed above, the district court found that Cablevision infringed the first right by 1)
buffering the data from its programming stream and 2) copying content onto the Arroyo
Server hard disks to enable playback of a program requested by an RS-DVR customer. In
addition, the district court found that Cablevision would infringe the public performance
right by transmitting a program to an RS-DVR customer in response to that customer’s
playback request. We address each of these three allegedly infringing acts in turn.
I. The Buffer Data
It is undisputed that Cablevision, not any customer or other entity, takes the content from
one stream of programming, after the split, and stores it, one small piece at a time, in the
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BMR buffer and the primary ingest buffer. As a result, the information is buffered before
any customer requests a recording, and would be buffered even if no such request were
made. The question is whether, by buffering the data that make up a given work,
Cablevision “reproduce[s]” that work “in copies,” 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), and thereby infringes
the copyright holder’s reproduction right.
“Copies,” as defined in the Copyright Act, “are material objects ... in which a work is fixed
by any method ... and from which the work can be ... reproduced.” The Act also provides
that a work is “‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment ... is
sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be ... reproduced ... for a period of more than
transitory duration.” We believe that this language plainly imposes two distinct but related
requirements: the work must be embodied in a medium, i.e., placed in a medium such that
it can be perceived, reproduced, etc., from that medium (the “embodiment requirement”),
and it must remain thus embodied “for a period of more than transitory duration” (the
“duration requirement”). Unless both requirements are met, the work is not “fixed” in the
buffer, and, as a result, the buffer data is not a “copy” of the original work whose data is
buffered.
The district court mistakenly limited its analysis primarily to the embodiment requirement.
As a result of this error, once it determined that the buffer data was “[c]learly ... capable of
being reproduced,” i.e., that the work was embodied in the buffer, the district court
concluded that the work was therefore “fixed” in the buffer, and that a copy had thus been
made. In doing so, it relied on a line of cases beginning with MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak
Computer Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993). It also relied on the United States Copyright
Office’s 2001 report on the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which states, in essence, that
an embodiment is fixed “[u]nless a reproduction manifests itself so fleetingly that it cannot
be copied.” (emphasis added).
The district court’s reliance on cases like MAI Systems is misplaced. In general, those cases
conclude that an alleged copy is fixed without addressing the duration requirement; it does
not follow, however, that those cases assume, much less establish, that such a requirement
does not exist. Indeed, the duration requirement, by itself, was not at issue in MAI Systems
and its progeny. As a result, they do not speak to the issues squarely before us here: If a
work is only “embodied” in a medium for a period of transitory duration, can it be “fixed” in
that medium, and thus a copy? And what constitutes a period “of more than transitory
duration”?
In MAI Systems, defendant Peak Computer, Inc., performed maintenance and repairs on
computers made and sold by MAI Systems. In order to service a customer’s computer, a
Peak employee had to operate the computer and run the computer’s copyrighted operating
system software. The issue in MAI Systems was whether, by loading the software into the
computer’s RAM,1 the repairman created a “copy” as defined in § 101. The resolution of this
issue turned on whether the software’s embodiment in the computer’s RAM was “fixed,”
within the meaning of the same section. The Ninth Circuit concluded that

To run a computer program, the data representing that program must be transferred from a data storage
medium (such as a floppy disk or a hard drive) to a form of Random Access Memory (“RAM”) where the data can
be processed. The data buffers at issue here are also a form of RAM.

1
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by showing that Peak loads the software into the RAM and is then able to
view the system error log and diagnose the problem with the computer, MAI
has adequately shown that the representation created in the RAM is
“sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.”
The MAI Systems court referenced the “transitory duration” language but did not discuss or
analyze it. The opinion notes that the defendants “vigorously” argued that the program’s
embodiment in the RAM was not a copy, but it does not specify the arguments defendants
made. This omission suggests that the parties did not litigate the significance of the
“transitory duration” language, and the court therefore had no occasion to address it. This
is unsurprising, because it seems fair to assume that in these cases the program was
embodied in the RAM for at least several minutes.
Accordingly, we construe MAI Systems and its progeny as holding that loading a program
into a computer’s RAM can result in copying that program. We do not read MAI Systems as
holding that, as a matter of law, loading a program into a form of RAM always results in
copying. Such a holding would read the “transitory duration” language out of the definition,
and we do not believe our sister circuit would dismiss this statutory language without even
discussing it. It appears the parties in MAI Systems simply did not dispute that the
duration requirement was satisfied; this line of cases simply concludes that when a
program is loaded into RAM, the embodiment requirement is satisfied—an important
holding in itself, and one we see no reason to quibble with here.
At least one court, relying on MAI Systems in a highly similar factual setting, has made this
point explicitly. In Advanced Computer Services of Michigan, Inc. v. MAI Systems Corp.,
the district court expressly noted that the unlicensed user in that case ran copyrighted
diagnostic software “for minutes or longer,” but that the program’s embodiment in the
computer’s RAM might be too ephemeral to be fixed if the computer had been shut down
“within seconds or fractions of a second” after loading the copyrighted program. We have no
quarrel with this reasoning; it merely makes explicit the reasoning that is implicit in the
other MAI Systems cases. Accordingly, those cases provide no support for the conclusion
that the definition of “fixed” does not include a duration requirement.
Nor does the Copyright Office’s 2001 DMCA Report, also relied on by the district court in
this case, explicitly suggest that the definition of “fixed” does not contain a duration
requirement. However, as noted above, it does suggest that an embodiment is fixed
“[u]nless a reproduction manifests itself so fleetingly that it cannot be copied, perceived or
communicated.” As we have stated, to determine whether a work is “fixed” in a given
medium, the statutory language directs us to ask not only 1) whether a work is “embodied”
in that medium, but also 2) whether it is embodied in the medium “for a period of more
than transitory duration.” According to the Copyright Office, if the work is capable of being
copied from that medium for any amount of time, the answer to both questions is “yes.” The
problem with this interpretation is that it reads the “transitory duration” language out of
the statute.
We assume, as the parties do, that the Copyright Office’s pronouncement deserves only
Skidmore deference, deference based on its “power to persuade.” And because the Office’s
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interpretation does not explain why Congress would include language in a definition if it
intended courts to ignore that language, we are not persuaded.
In sum, no case law or other authority dissuades us from concluding that the definition of
“fixed” imposes both an embodiment requirement and a duration requirement. Accord
CoStar Group Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 551 (4th Cir. 2004) (while temporary
reproductions “may be made in this transmission process, they would appear not to be
‘fixed’ in the sense that they are ‘of more than transitory duration’”). We now turn to
whether, in this case, those requirements are met by the buffer data.
Cablevision does not seriously dispute that copyrighted works are “embodied” in the buffer.
Data in the BMR buffer can be reformatted and transmitted to the other components of the
RS-DVR system. Data in the primary ingest buffer can be copied onto the Arroyo hard disks
if a user has requested a recording of that data. Thus, a work’s “embodiment” in either
buffer “is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced,” (as in
the case of the ingest buffer) “or otherwise communicated” (as in the BMR buffer). The
result might be different if only a single second of a much longer work was placed in the
buffer in isolation. In such a situation, it might be reasonable to conclude that only a
minuscule portion of a work, rather than “a work” was embodied in the buffer. Here,
however, where every second of an entire work is placed, one second at a time, in the buffer,
we conclude that the work is embodied in the buffer.
Does any such embodiment last “for a period of more than transitory duration”? No bit of
data remains in any buffer for more than a fleeting 1.2 seconds. And unlike the data in
cases like MAI Systems, which remained embodied in the computer’s RAM memory until
the user turned the computer off, each bit of data here is rapidly and automatically
overwritten as soon as it is processed. While our inquiry is necessarily fact-specific, and
other factors not present here may alter the duration analysis significantly, these facts
strongly suggest that the works in this case are embodied in the buffer for only a
“transitory” period, thus failing the duration requirement.
Against this evidence, plaintiffs argue only that the duration is not transitory because the
data persist “long enough for Cablevision to make reproductions from them.” As we have
explained above, however, this reasoning impermissibly reads the duration language out of
the statute, and we reject it. Given that the data reside in no buffer for more than 1.2
seconds before being automatically overwritten, and in the absence of compelling
arguments to the contrary, we believe that the copyrighted works here are not “embodied”
in the buffers for a period of more than transitory duration, and are therefore not “fixed” in
the buffers. Accordingly, the acts of buffering in the operation of the RS-DVR do not create
copies, as the Copyright Act defines that term. Our resolution of this issue renders it
unnecessary for us to determine whether any copies produced by buffering data would be de
minimis, and we express no opinion on that question.
II. Direct Liability for Creating the Playback Copies
In most copyright disputes, the allegedly infringing act and the identity of the infringer are
never in doubt. These cases turn on whether the conduct in question does, in fact, infringe
the plaintiff’s copyright. In this case, however, the core of the dispute is over the authorship
of the infringing conduct. After an RS-DVR subscriber selects a program to record, and that
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program airs, a copy of the program—a copyrighted work—resides on the hard disks of
Cablevision’s Arroyo Server, its creation unauthorized by the copyright holder. The
question is who made this copy. If it is Cablevision, plaintiffs’ theory of direct infringement
succeeds; if it is the customer, plaintiffs’ theory fails because Cablevision would then face,
at most, secondary liability, a theory of liability expressly disavowed by plaintiffs.
Few cases examine the line between direct and contributory liability. Both parties cite a
line of cases beginning with Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line
Communication Services, 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995). In Netcom, a third-party
customer of the defendant Internet service provider (“ISP”) posted a copyrighted work that
was automatically reproduced by the defendant’s computer. The district court refused to
impose direct liability on the ISP, reasoning that “[a]lthough copyright is a strict liability
statute, there should still be some element of volition or causation which is lacking where a
defendant’s system is merely used to create a copy by a third party.” Recently, the Fourth
Circuit endorsed the Netcom decision, noting that
to establish direct liability under ... the Act, something more must be shown
than mere ownership of a machine used by others to make illegal copies.
There must be actual infringing conduct with a nexus sufficiently close and
causal to the illegal copying that one could conclude that the machine owner
himself trespassed on the exclusive domain of the copyright owner.”
CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 2004).
Here, the district court pigeon-holed the conclusions reached in Netcom and its progeny as
“premised on the unique attributes of the Internet.” While the Netcom court was plainly
concerned with a theory of direct liability that would effectively “hold the entire Internet
liable” for the conduct of a single user, its reasoning and conclusions, consistent with
precedents of this court and the Supreme Court, and with the text of the Copyright Act,
transcend the Internet. Like the Fourth Circuit, we reject the contention that “the Netcom
decision was driven by expedience and that its holding is inconsistent with the established
law of copyright,” and we find it “a particularly rational interpretation of § 106,” rather
than a special-purpose rule applicable only to ISPs.
When there is a dispute as to the author of an allegedly infringing instance of reproduction,
Netcom and its progeny direct our attention to the volitional conduct that causes the copy to
be made. There are only two instances of volitional conduct in this case: Cablevision’s
conduct in designing, housing, and maintaining a system that exists only to produce a copy,
and a customer’s conduct in ordering that system to produce a copy of a specific program. In
the case of a VCR, it seems clear—and we know of no case holding otherwise—that the
operator of the VCR, the person who actually presses the button to make the recording,
supplies the necessary element of volition, not the person who manufactures, maintains, or,
if distinct from the operator, owns the machine. We do not believe that an RS-DVR
customer is sufficiently distinguishable from a VCR user to impose liability as a direct
infringer on a different party for copies that are made automatically upon that customer’s
command.
The district court emphasized the fact that copying is “instrumental” rather than
“incidental” to the function of the RS-DVR system. While that may distinguish the RS-DVR
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from the ISPs in Netcom and CoStar, it does not distinguish the RS-DVR from a VCR, a
photocopier, or even a typical copy shop. And the parties do not seem to contest that a
company that merely makes photocopiers available to the public on its premises, without
more, is not subject to liability for direct infringement for reproductions made by customers
using those copiers. They only dispute whether Cablevision is similarly situated to such a
proprietor.
The district court found Cablevision analogous to a copy shop that makes course packs for
college professors. In the leading case involving such a shop, for example, “[t]he professor
[gave] the copyshop the materials of which the coursepack [was] to be made up, and the
copyshop [did] the rest.” Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381,
1384 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc). There did not appear to be any serious dispute in that case
that the shop itself was directly liable for reproducing copyrighted works. The district court
here found that Cablevision, like this copy shop, would be “doing” the copying, albeit “at the
customer’s behest.”
But because volitional conduct is an important element of direct liability, the district court’s
analogy is flawed. In determining who actually “makes” a copy, a significant difference
exists between making a request to a human employee, who then volitionally operates the
copying system to make the copy, and issuing a command directly to a system, which
automatically obeys commands and engages in no volitional conduct. In cases like Princeton
University Press, the defendants operated a copying device and sold the product they made
using that device. See 99 F.3d at 1383 (“The corporate defendant ... is a commercial
copyshop that reproduced substantial segments of copyrighted works of scholarship, bound
the copies into ‘coursepacks,’ and sold the coursepacks to students....”). Here, by selling
access to a system that automatically produces copies on command, Cablevision more
closely resembles a store proprietor who charges customers to use a photocopier on his
premises, and it seems incorrect to say, without more, that such a proprietor “makes” any
copies when his machines are actually operated by his customers. Some courts have held to
the contrary, but they do not explicitly explain why, and we find them unpersuasive. See,
e.g., Elektra Records Co. v. Gem Elec. Distribs., Inc., 360 F. Supp. 821, 823 (E.D.N.Y. 1973)
(concluding that, “regardless” of whether customers or defendants’ employees operated the
tape-copying machines at defendants’ stores, defendant had actively infringed copyrights).
The district court also emphasized Cablevision’s “unfettered discretion in selecting the
programming that it would make available for recording.” This conduct is indeed more
proximate to the creation of illegal copying than, say, operating an ISP or opening a copy
shop, where all copied content was supplied by the customers themselves or other third
parties. Nonetheless, we do not think it sufficiently proximate to the copying to displace the
customer as the person who “makes” the copies when determining liability under the
Copyright Act. Cablevision, we note, also has subscribers who use home VCRs or DVRs
(like TiVo), and has significant control over the content recorded by these customers. But
this control is limited to the channels of programming available to a customer and not to
the programs themselves. Cablevision has no control over what programs are made
available on individual channels or when those programs will air, if at all. In this respect,
Cablevision possesses far less control over recordable content than it does in the VOD
context, where it actively selects and makes available beforehand the individual programs
available for viewing. For these reasons, we are not inclined to say that Cablevision, rather
than the user, “does” the copying produced by the RS-DVR system. As a result, we find that
123.

the district court erred in concluding that Cablevision, rather than its RS-DVR customers,
makes the copies carried out by the RS-DVR system.
Our refusal to find Cablevision directly liable on these facts is buttressed by the existence
and contours of the Supreme Court’s doctrine of contributory liability in the copyright
context. After all, the purpose of any causation-based liability doctrine is to identify the
actor (or actors) whose “conduct has been so significant and important a cause that [he or
she] should be legally responsible.” But here, to the extent that we may construe the
boundaries of direct liability more narrowly, the doctrine of contributory liability stands
ready to provide adequate protection to copyrighted works.
Most of the facts found dispositive by the district court—e.g., Cablevision’s “continuing
relationship” with its RS-DVR customers, its control over recordable content, and the
“instrumental[ity]” of copying to the RS-DVR system—seem to us more relevant to the
question of contributory liability. In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
the lack of an “ongoing relationship” between Sony and its VCR customers supported the
Court’s conclusion that it should not impose contributory liability on Sony for any infringing
copying done by Sony VCR owners. The Sony Court did deem it “just” to impose liability on
a party in a “position to control” the infringing uses of another, but as a contributory, not
direct, infringer. And asking whether copying copyrighted material is only “incidental” to a
given technology is akin to asking whether that technology has “commercially significant
noninfringing uses,” another inquiry the Sony Court found relevant to whether imposing
contributory liability was just.
The Supreme Court’s desire to maintain a meaningful distinction between direct and
contributory copyright infringement is consistent with congressional intent. The Patent
Act, unlike the Copyright Act, expressly provides that someone who “actively induces
infringement of a patent” is “liable as an infringer,” just like someone who commits the
underlying infringing act by “us[ing]” a patented invention without authorization. In
contrast, someone who merely “sells ... a material or apparatus for use in practicing a
patented process” faces only liability as a “contributory infringer.” If Congress had meant to
assign direct liability to both the person who actually commits a copyright-infringing act
and any person who actively induces that infringement, the Patent Act tells us that it knew
how to draft a statute that would have this effect. Because Congress did not do so, the Sony
Court concluded that “[t]he Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable for
infringement committed by another.” Furthermore, in cases like Sony, the Supreme Court
has strongly signaled its intent to use the doctrine of contributory infringement, not direct
infringement, to “identify[ ] the circumstances in which it is just to hold one individual
accountable for the actions of another.” Thus, although Sony warns us that “the lines
between direct infringement, contributory infringement, and vicarious liability are not
clearly drawn,” that decision does not absolve us of our duty to discern where that line falls
in cases, like this one, that require us to decide the question.
The district court apparently concluded that Cablevision’s operation of the RS-DVR system
would contribute in such a major way to the copying done by another that it made sense to
say that Cablevision was a direct infringer, and thus, in effect, was “doing” the relevant
copying. There are certainly other cases, not binding on us, that follow this approach. See,
e.g., Playboy Enters. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503, 513 (N.D. Ohio 1997)
(noting that defendant ISP’s encouragement of its users to copy protected files was “crucial”
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to finding that it was a direct infringer). We need not decide today whether one’s
contribution to the creation of an infringing copy may be so great that it warrants holding
that party directly liable for the infringement, even though another party has actually
made the copy. We conclude only that on the facts of this case, copies produced by the RSDVR system are “made” by the RS-DVR customer, and Cablevision’s contribution to this
reproduction by providing the system does not warrant the imposition of direct liability.
Therefore, Cablevision is entitled to summary judgment on this point, and the district court
erred in awarding summary judgment to plaintiffs….
[In the third section, the Second Circuit held that Cablevision’s playback of the recording
did not constitute an infringing public performance:
Because each RS-DVR playback transmission is made to a single subscriber
using a single unique copy produced by that subscriber, we conclude that
such transmissions are not performances “to the public,” and therefore do not
infringe any exclusive right of public performance.]
NOTES AND QUESTIONS
Is web browsing an infringement; and if so, by whom? Does your answer change if
the browsed file is uploaded without permission?
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Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
Souter, Justice.
The question is under what circumstances the distributor of a product capable of both
lawful and unlawful use is liable for acts of copyright infringement by third parties using
the product. We hold that one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use
to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster
infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.
I
A
Respondents, Grokster, Ltd., and StreamCast Networks, Inc., defendants in the trial court,
distribute free software products that allow computer users to share electronic files through
peer-to-peer networks, so called because users’ computers communicate directly with each
other, not through central servers. The advantage of peer-to-peer networks over
information networks of other types shows up in their substantial and growing popularity.
Because they need no central computer server to mediate the exchange of information or
files among users, the high-bandwidth communications capacity for a server may be
dispensed with, and the need for costly server storage space is eliminated. Since copies of a
file (particularly a popular one) are available on many users’ computers, file requests and
retrievals may be faster than on other types of networks, and since file exchanges do not
travel through a server, communications can take place between any computers that
remain connected to the network without risk that a glitch in the server will disable the
network in its entirety. Given these benefits in security, cost, and efficiency, peer-to-peer
networks are employed to store and distribute electronic files by universities, government
agencies, corporations, and libraries, among others.1
Other users of peer-to-peer networks include individual recipients of Grokster’s and
StreamCast’s software, and although the networks that they enjoy through using the
software can be used to share any type of digital file, they have prominently employed those
networks in sharing copyrighted music and video files without authorization. A group of
copyright holders (MGM for short, but including motion picture studios, recording
companies, songwriters, and music publishers) sued Grokster and StreamCast for their
users’ copyright infringements, alleging that they knowingly and intentionally distributed
their software to enable users to reproduce and distribute the copyrighted works in
violation of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. MGM sought damages and an
injunction.
Discovery during the litigation revealed the way the software worked, the business aims of
each defendant company, and the predilections of the users. Grokster’s eponymous software
employs what is known as FastTrack technology, a protocol developed by others and
licensed to Grokster. StreamCast distributes a very similar product except that its
Peer-to-peer networks have disadvantages as well. Searches on peer-to-peer networks may not reach and
uncover all available files because search requests may not be transmitted to every computer on the network.
There may be redundant copies of popular files. The creator of the software has no incentive to minimize storage
or bandwidth consumption, the costs of which are borne by every user of the network. Most relevant here, it is
more difficult to control the content of files available for retrieval and the behavior of users.
1
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software, called Morpheus, relies on what is known as Gnutella technology. A user who
downloads and installs either software possesses the protocol to send requests for files
directly to the computers of others using software compatible with FastTrack or Gnutella.
On the FastTrack network opened by the Grokster software, the user’s request goes to a
computer given an indexing capacity by the software and designated a supernode, or to
some other computer with comparable power and capacity to collect temporary indexes of
the files available on the computers of users connected to it. The supernode (or indexing
computer) searches its own index and may communicate the search request to other
supernodes. If the file is found, the supernode discloses its location to the computer
requesting it, and the requesting user can download the file directly from the computer
located. The copied file is placed in a designated sharing folder on the requesting user’s
computer, where it is available for other users to download in turn, along with any other
file in that folder.
In the Gnutella network made available by Morpheus, the process is mostly the same,
except that in some versions of the Gnutella protocol there are no supernodes. In these
versions, peer computers using the protocol communicate directly with each other. When a
user enters a search request into the Morpheus software, it sends the request to computers
connected with it, which in turn pass the request along to other connected peers. The
search results are communicated to the requesting computer, and the user can download
desired files directly from peers’ computers. As this description indicates, Grokster and
StreamCast use no servers to intercept the content of the search requests or to mediate the
file transfers conducted by users of the software, there being no central point through which
the substance of the communications passes in either direction.4
Although Grokster and StreamCast do not therefore know when particular files are copied,
a few searches using their software would show what is available on the networks the
software reaches. MGM commissioned a statistician to conduct a systematic search, and his
study showed that nearly 90% of the files available for download on the FastTrack system
were copyrighted works.5 Grokster and StreamCast dispute this figure, raising
methodological problems and arguing that free copying even of copyrighted works may be
authorized by the rightholders. They also argue that potential noninfringing uses of their
software are significant in kind, even if infrequent in practice. Some musical performers,
for example, have gained new audiences by distributing their copyrighted works for free
across peer-to-peer networks, and some distributors of unprotected content have used peerto-peer networks to disseminate files, Shakespeare being an example. Indeed, StreamCast
has given Morpheus users the opportunity to download the briefs in this very case, though
their popularity has not been quantified.
As for quantification, the parties’ anecdotal and statistical evidence entered thus far to
show the content available on the FastTrack and Gnutella networks does not say much
about which files are actually downloaded by users, and no one can say how often the
software is used to obtain copies of unprotected material. But MGM’s evidence gives reason
4 There is some evidence that both Grokster and StreamCast previously operated supernodes, which compiled
indexes of files available on all of the nodes connected to them. This evidence, pertaining to previous versions of
the defendants’ software, is not before us and would not affect our conclusions in any event.
5 By comparison, evidence introduced by the plaintiffs in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004
(C.A.9 2001), showed that 87% of files available on the Napster file-sharing network were copyrighted.
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to think that the vast majority of users’ downloads are acts of infringement, and because
well over 100 million copies of the software in question are known to have been
downloaded, and billions of files are shared across the FastTrack and Gnutella networks
each month, the probable scope of copyright infringement is staggering.
Grokster and StreamCast concede the infringement in most downloads, and it is
uncontested that they are aware that users employ their software primarily to download
copyrighted files, even if the decentralized FastTrack and Gnutella networks fail to reveal
which files are being copied, and when. From time to time, moreover, the companies have
learned about their users’ infringement directly, as from users who have sent e-mail to each
company with questions about playing copyrighted movies they had downloaded, to whom
the companies have responded with guidance. And MGM notified the companies of 8 million
copyrighted files that could be obtained using their software.
Grokster and StreamCast are not, however, merely passive recipients of information about
infringing use. The record is replete with evidence that from the moment Grokster and
StreamCast began to distribute their free software, each one clearly voiced the objective
that recipients use it to download copyrighted works, and each took active steps to
encourage infringement.
After the notorious file-sharing service, Napster, was sued by copyright holders for
facilitation of copyright infringement, A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d
896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (C.A.9 2001), StreamCast
gave away a software program of a kind known as OpenNap, designed as compatible with
the Napster program and open to Napster users for downloading files from other Napster
and OpenNap users’ computers. Evidence indicates that “[i]t was always [StreamCast’s]
intent to use [its OpenNap network] to be able to capture email addresses of [its] initial
target market so that [it] could promote [its] StreamCast Morpheus interface to them”;
indeed, the OpenNap program was engineered “‘to leverage Napster’s 50 million user base.’”
StreamCast monitored both the number of users downloading its OpenNap program and
the number of music files they downloaded. It also used the resulting OpenNap network to
distribute copies of the Morpheus software and to encourage users to adopt it. Internal
company documents indicate that StreamCast hoped to attract large numbers of former
Napster users if that company was shut down by court order or otherwise, and that
StreamCast planned to be the next Napster. A kit developed by StreamCast to be delivered
to advertisers, for example, contained press articles about StreamCast’s potential to
capture former Napster users, and it introduced itself to some potential advertisers as a
company “which is similar to what Napster was.” It broadcast banner advertisements to
users of other Napster-compatible software, urging them to adopt its OpenNap. An internal
e-mail from a company executive stated: “‘We have put this network in place so that when
Napster pulls the plug on their free service ... or if the Court orders them shut down prior to
that ... we will be positioned to capture the flood of their 32 million users that will be
actively looking for an alternative.’”
Thus, StreamCast developed promotional materials to market its service as the best
Napster alternative. One proposed advertisement read: “Napster Inc. has announced that it
will soon begin charging you a fee. That’s if the courts don’t order it shut down first. What
will you do to get around it?” Another proposed ad touted StreamCast’s software as the “# 1
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alternative to Napster” and asked “[w]hen the lights went off at Napster ... where did the
users go?” (ellipsis in original).7 StreamCast even planned to flaunt the illegal uses of its
software; when it launched the OpenNap network, the chief technology officer of the
company averred that “[t]he goal is to get in trouble with the law and get sued. It’s the best
way to get in the new[s].”
The evidence that Grokster sought to capture the market of former Napster users is sparser
but revealing, for Grokster launched its own OpenNap system called Swaptor and inserted
digital codes into its Web site so that computer users using Web search engines to look for
“Napster” or “[f]ree file sharing” would be directed to the Grokster Web site, where they
could download the Grokster software. And Grokster’s name is an apparent derivative of
Napster.
StreamCast’s executives monitored the number of songs by certain commercial artists
available on their networks, and an internal communication indicates they aimed to have a
larger number of copyrighted songs available on their networks than other file-sharing
networks. The point, of course, would be to attract users of a mind to infringe, just as it
would be with their promotional materials developed showing copyrighted songs as
examples of the kinds of files available through Morpheus. Morpheus in fact allowed users
to search specifically for “Top 40” songs, which were inevitably copyrighted. Similarly,
Grokster sent users a newsletter promoting its ability to provide particular, popular
copyrighted materials.
In addition to this evidence of express promotion, marketing, and intent to promote further,
the business models employed by Grokster and StreamCast confirm that their principal
object was use of their software to download copyrighted works. Grokster and StreamCast
receive no revenue from users, who obtain the software itself for nothing. Instead, both
companies generate income by selling advertising space, and they stream the advertising to
Grokster and Morpheus users while they are employing the programs. As the number of
users of each program increases, advertising opportunities become worth more. While there
is doubtless some demand for free Shakespeare, the evidence shows that substantive
volume is a function of free access to copyrighted work. Users seeking Top 40 songs, for
example, or the latest release by Modest Mouse, are certain to be far more numerous than
those seeking a free Decameron, and Grokster and StreamCast translated that demand into
dollars.
Finally, there is no evidence that either company made an effort to filter copyrighted
material from users’ downloads or otherwise impede the sharing of copyrighted files.
Although Grokster appears to have sent e-mails warning users about infringing content
when it received threatening notice from the copyright holders, it never blocked anyone
from continuing to use its software to share copyrighted files. StreamCast not only rejected
another company’s offer of help to monitor infringement, but blocked the Internet Protocol
addresses of entities it believed were trying to engage in such monitoring on its networks….

The record makes clear that StreamCast developed these promotional materials but not whether it released
them to the public. Even if these advertisements were not released to the public and do not show
encouragement to infringe, they illuminate StreamCast’s purposes.
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II
A
MGM and many of the amici fault the Court of Appeals’s holding for upsetting a sound
balance between the respective values of supporting creative pursuits through copyright
protection and promoting innovation in new communication technologies by limiting the
incidence of liability for copyright infringement. The more artistic protection is favored, the
more technological innovation may be discouraged; the administration of copyright law is
an exercise in managing the tradeoff. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, supra, at
442.
The tension between the two values is the subject of this case, with its claim that digital
distribution of copyrighted material threatens copyright holders as never before, because
every copy is identical to the original, copying is easy, and many people (especially the
young) use file-sharing software to download copyrighted works. This very breadth of the
software’s use may well draw the public directly into the debate over copyright policy, and
the indications are that the ease of copying songs or movies using software like Grokster’s
and Napster’s is fostering disdain for copyright protection. As the case has been presented
to us, these fears are said to be offset by the different concern that imposing liability, not
only on infringers but on distributors of software based on its potential for unlawful use,
could limit further development of beneficial technologies.8
The argument for imposing indirect liability in this case is, however, a powerful one, given
the number of infringing downloads that occur every day using StreamCast’s and
Grokster’s software. When a widely shared service or product is used to commit
infringement, it may be impossible to enforce rights in the protected work effectively
against all direct infringers, the only practical alternative being to go against the
distributor of the copying device for secondary liability on a theory of contributory or
vicarious infringement.
One infringes contributorily by intentionally inducing or encouraging direct infringement,
see Gershwin Pub. Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (C.A.2
1971), and infringes vicariously by profiting from direct infringement while declining to
exercise a right to stop or limit it, Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304,
307 (C.A.2 1963).9 Although “[t]he Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable for
infringement committed by another,” Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S., at

The mutual exclusivity of these values should not be overstated, however. On the one hand technological
innovators, including those writing file-sharing computer programs, may wish for effective copyright protections
for their work. On the other hand the widespread distribution of creative works through improved technologies
may enable the synthesis of new works or generate audiences for emerging artists.
9 We stated in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), that “‘the lines
between direct infringement, contributory infringement and vicarious liability are not clearly drawn’
....[R]easoned analysis of [the Sony plaintiffs’ contributory infringement claim] necessarily entails consideration
of arguments and case law which may also be forwarded under the other labels, and indeed the parties ... rely
upon such arguments and authority in support of their respective positions on the issue of contributory
infringement.” In the present case MGM has argued a vicarious liability theory, which allows imposition of
liability when the defendant profits directly from the infringement and has a right and ability to supervise the
direct infringer, even if the defendant initially lacks knowledge of the infringement. Because we resolve the case
based on an inducement theory, there is no need to analyze separately MGM’s vicarious liability theory.
8
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434, these doctrines of secondary liability emerged from common law principles and are
well established in the law.
B
Despite the currency of these principles of secondary liability, this Court has dealt with
secondary copyright infringement in only one recent case, and because MGM has tailored
its principal claim to our opinion there, a look at our earlier holding is in order. In Sony
Corp. v. Universal City Studios, this Court addressed a claim that secondary liability for
infringement can arise from the very distribution of a commercial product. There, the
product, novel at the time, was what we know today as the videocassette recorder or VCR.
Copyright holders sued Sony as the manufacturer, claiming it was contributorily liable for
infringement that occurred when VCR owners taped copyrighted programs because it
supplied the means used to infringe, and it had constructive knowledge that infringement
would occur. At the trial on the merits, the evidence showed that the principal use of the
VCR was for “‘time-shifting,’” or taping a program for later viewing at a more convenient
time, which the Court found to be a fair, not an infringing, use. There was no evidence that
Sony had expressed an object of bringing about taping in violation of copyright or had taken
active steps to increase its profits from unlawful taping. Although Sony’s advertisements
urged consumers to buy the VCR to “‘record favorite shows’” or “‘build a library’” of recorded
programs, neither of these uses was necessarily infringing.
On those facts, with no evidence of stated or indicated intent to promote infringing uses, the
only conceivable basis for imposing liability was on a theory of contributory infringement
arising from its sale of VCRs to consumers with knowledge that some would use them to
infringe. But because the VCR was “capable of commercially significant noninfringing
uses,” we held the manufacturer could not be faulted solely on the basis of its distribution.
This analysis reflected patent law’s traditional staple article of commerce doctrine, now
codified, that distribution of a component of a patented device will not violate the patent if
it is suitable for use in other ways. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). The doctrine was devised to identify
instances in which it may be presumed from distribution of an article in commerce that the
distributor intended the article to be used to infringe another’s patent, and so may justly be
held liable for that infringement. “One who makes and sells articles which are only adapted
to be used in a patented combination will be presumed to intend the natural consequences
of his acts; he will be presumed to intend that they shall be used in the combination of the
patent.”
In sum, where an article is “good for nothing else” but infringement, there is no legitimate
public interest in its unlicensed availability, and there is no injustice in presuming or
imputing an intent to infringe. Conversely, the doctrine absolves the equivocal conduct of
selling an item with substantial lawful as well as unlawful uses, and limits liability to
instances of more acute fault than the mere understanding that some of one’s products will
be misused. It leaves breathing room for innovation and a vigorous commerce.
The parties and many of the amici in this case think the key to resolving it is the Sony rule
and, in particular, what it means for a product to be “capable of commercially significant
noninfringing uses.” Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, supra, at 442. MGM advances
the argument that granting summary judgment to Grokster and StreamCast as to their
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current activities gave too much weight to the value of innovative technology, and too little
to the copyrights infringed by users of their software, given that 90% of works available on
one of the networks was shown to be copyrighted. Assuming the remaining 10% to be its
noninfringing use, MGM says this should not qualify as “substantial,” and the Court should
quantify Sony to the extent of holding that a product used “principally” for infringement
does not qualify. As mentioned before, Grokster and StreamCast reply by citing evidence
that their software can be used to reproduce public domain works, and they point to
copyright holders who actually encourage copying. Even if infringement is the principal
practice with their software today, they argue, the noninfringing uses are significant and
will grow.
We agree with MGM that the Court of Appeals misapplied Sony, which it read as limiting
secondary liability quite beyond the circumstances to which the case applied. Sony barred
secondary liability based on presuming or imputing intent to cause infringement solely
from the design or distribution of a product capable of substantial lawful use, which the
distributor knows is in fact used for infringement. The Ninth Circuit has read Sony’s
limitation to mean that whenever a product is capable of substantial lawful use, the
producer can never be held contributorily liable for third parties’ infringing use of it; it read
the rule as being this broad, even when an actual purpose to cause infringing use is shown
by evidence independent of design and distribution of the product, unless the distributors
had “specific knowledge of infringement at a time at which they contributed to the
infringement, and failed to act upon that information.” Because the Circuit found the
StreamCast and Grokster software capable of substantial lawful use, it concluded on the
basis of its reading of Sony that neither company could be held liable, since there was no
showing that their software, being without any central server, afforded them knowledge of
specific unlawful uses.
This view of Sony, however, was error, converting the case from one about liability resting
on imputed intent to one about liability on any theory. Because Sony did not displace other
theories of secondary liability, and because we find below that it was error to grant
summary judgment to the companies on MGM’s inducement claim, we do not revisit Sony
further, as MGM requests, to add a more quantified description of the point of balance
between protection and commerce when liability rests solely on distribution with knowledge
that unlawful use will occur. It is enough to note that the Ninth Circuit’s judgment rested
on an erroneous understanding of Sony and to leave further consideration of the Sony rule
for a day when that may be required.
C
Sony’s rule limits imputing culpable intent as a matter of law from the characteristics or
uses of a distributed product. But nothing in Sony requires courts to ignore evidence of
intent if there is such evidence, and the case was never meant to foreclose rules of faultbased liability derived from the common law.10 Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, supra,
at 439 (“If vicarious liability is to be imposed on Sony in this case, it must rest on the fact
that it has sold equipment with constructive knowledge” of the potential for infringement).
Thus, where evidence goes beyond a product’s characteristics or the knowledge that it may
10 Nor does the Patent Act’s exemption from liability for those who distribute a staple article of commerce, 35
U.S.C. § 271(c), extend to those who induce patent infringement, § 271(b).

132.

be put to infringing uses, and shows statements or actions directed to promoting
infringement, Sony’s staple-article rule will not preclude liability.
The classic case of direct evidence of unlawful purpose occurs when one induces commission
of infringement by another, or “entic[es] or persuad[es] another” to infringe, as by
advertising. Thus at common law a copyright or patent defendant who “not only expected
but invoked [infringing use] by advertisement” was liable for infringement “on principles
recognized in every part of the law.”
The rule on inducement of infringement as developed in the early cases is no different
today. Evidence of “active steps ... taken to encourage direct infringement,” such as
advertising an infringing use or instructing how to engage in an infringing use, show an
affirmative intent that the product be used to infringe, and a showing that infringement
was encouraged overcomes the law’s reluctance to find liability when a defendant merely
sells a commercial product suitable for some lawful use.
For the same reasons that Sony took the staple-article doctrine of patent law as a model for
its copyright safe-harbor rule, the inducement rule, too, is a sensible one for copyright. We
adopt it here, holding that one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use
to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster
infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties. We are, of
course, mindful of the need to keep from trenching on regular commerce or discouraging the
development of technologies with lawful and unlawful potential. Accordingly, just as Sony
did not find intentional inducement despite the knowledge of the VCR manufacturer that
its device could be used to infringe, mere knowledge of infringing potential or of actual
infringing uses would not be enough here to subject a distributor to liability. Nor would
ordinary acts incident to product distribution, such as offering customers technical support
or product updates, support liability in themselves. The inducement rule, instead, premises
liability on purposeful, culpable expression and conduct, and thus does nothing to
compromise legitimate commerce or discourage innovation having a lawful promise.
III
A
The only apparent question about treating MGM’s evidence as sufficient to withstand
summary judgment under the theory of inducement goes to the need on MGM’s part to
adduce evidence that StreamCast and Grokster communicated an inducing message to
their software users. The classic instance of inducement is by advertisement or solicitation
that broadcasts a message designed to stimulate others to commit violations. MGM claims
that such a message is shown here. It is undisputed that StreamCast beamed onto the
computer screens of users of Napster-compatible programs ads urging the adoption of its
OpenNap program, which was designed, as its name implied, to invite the custom of
patrons of Napster, then under attack in the courts for facilitating massive infringement.
Those who accepted StreamCast’s OpenNap program were offered software to perform the
same services, which a factfinder could conclude would readily have been understood in the
Napster market as the ability to download copyrighted music files. Grokster distributed an
electronic newsletter containing links to articles promoting its software’s ability to access
popular copyrighted music. And anyone whose Napster or free file-sharing searches turned
up a link to Grokster would have understood Grokster to be offering the same file-sharing
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ability as Napster, and to the same people who probably used Napster for infringing
downloads; that would also have been the understanding of anyone offered Grokster’s
suggestively named Swaptor software, its version of OpenNap. And both companies
communicated a clear message by responding affirmatively to requests for help in locating
and playing copyrighted materials.
In StreamCast’s case, of course, the evidence just described was supplemented by other
unequivocal indications of unlawful purpose in the internal communications and
advertising designs aimed at Napster users (“When the lights went off at Napster ... where
did the users go?”). Whether the messages were communicated is not to the point on this
record. The function of the message in the theory of inducement is to prove by a defendant’s
own statements that his unlawful purpose disqualifies him from claiming protection (and
incidentally to point to actual violators likely to be found among those who hear or read the
message). Proving that a message was sent out, then, is the preeminent but not exclusive
way of showing that active steps were taken with the purpose of bringing about infringing
acts, and of showing that infringing acts took place by using the device distributed. Here,
the summary judgment record is replete with other evidence that Grokster and
StreamCast, unlike the manufacturer and distributor in Sony, acted with a purpose to
cause copyright violations by use of software suitable for illegal use.
Three features of this evidence of intent are particularly notable. First, each company
showed itself to be aiming to satisfy a known source of demand for copyright infringement,
the market comprising former Napster users. StreamCast’s internal documents made
constant reference to Napster, it initially distributed its Morpheus software through an
OpenNap program compatible with Napster, it advertised its OpenNap program to Napster
users, and its Morpheus software functions as Napster did except that it could be used to
distribute more kinds of files, including copyrighted movies and software programs.
Grokster’s name is apparently derived from Napster, it too initially offered an OpenNap
program, its software’s function is likewise comparable to Napster’s, and it attempted to
divert queries for Napster onto its own Web site. Grokster and StreamCast’s efforts to
supply services to former Napster users, deprived of a mechanism to copy and distribute
what were overwhelmingly infringing files, indicate a principal, if not exclusive, intent on
the part of each to bring about infringement.
Second, this evidence of unlawful objective is given added significance by MGM’s showing
that neither company attempted to develop filtering tools or other mechanisms to diminish
the infringing activity using their software. While the Ninth Circuit treated the defendants’
failure to develop such tools as irrelevant because they lacked an independent duty to
monitor their users’ activity, we think this evidence underscores Grokster’s and
StreamCast’s intentional facilitation of their users’ infringement.12
Third, there is a further complement to the direct evidence of unlawful objective. It is useful
to recall that StreamCast and Grokster make money by selling advertising space, by
directing ads to the screens of computers employing their software. As the record shows, the
Of course, in the absence of other evidence of intent, a court would be unable to find contributory
infringement liability merely based on a failure to take affirmative steps to prevent infringement, if the device
otherwise was capable of substantial noninfringing uses. Such a holding would tread too close to the Sony safe
harbor.
12
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more the software is used, the more ads are sent out and the greater the advertising
revenue becomes. Since the extent of the software’s use determines the gain to the
distributors, the commercial sense of their enterprise turns on high-volume use, which the
record shows is infringing.13 This evidence alone would not justify an inference of unlawful
intent, but viewed in the context of the entire record its import is clear.
The unlawful objective is unmistakable.
B
In addition to intent to bring about infringement and distribution of a device suitable for
infringing use, the inducement theory of course requires evidence of actual infringement by
recipients of the device, the software in this case. As the account of the facts indicates, there
is evidence of infringement on a gigantic scale, and there is no serious issue of the adequacy
of MGM’s showing on this point in order to survive the companies’ summary judgment
requests. Although an exact calculation of infringing use, as a basis for a claim of damages,
is subject to dispute, there is no question that the summary judgment evidence is at least
adequate to entitle MGM to go forward with claims for damages and equitable relief.
***
In sum, this case is significantly different from Sony and reliance on that case to rule in
favor of StreamCast and Grokster was error. Sony dealt with a claim of liability based
solely on distributing a product with alternative lawful and unlawful uses, with knowledge
that some users would follow the unlawful course. The case struck a balance between the
interests of protection and innovation by holding that the product’s capability of substantial
lawful employment should bar the imputation of fault and consequent secondary liability
for the unlawful acts of others.
MGM’s evidence in this case most obviously addresses a different basis of liability for
distributing a product open to alternative uses. Here, evidence of the distributors’ words
and deeds going beyond distribution as such shows a purpose to cause and profit from
third-party acts of copyright infringement. If liability for inducing infringement is
ultimately found, it will not be on the basis of presuming or imputing fault, but from
inferring a patently illegal objective from statements and actions showing what that
objective was.
There is substantial evidence in MGM’s favor on all elements of inducement, and summary
judgment in favor of Grokster and StreamCast was error. On remand, reconsideration of
MGM’s motion for summary judgment will be in order….
Grokster and StreamCast contend that any theory of liability based on their conduct is not properly before
this Court because the rulings in the trial and appellate courts dealt only with the present versions of their
software, not “past acts ... that allegedly encouraged infringement or assisted ... known acts of infringement.”
This contention misapprehends the basis for their potential liability. It is not only that encouraging a particular
consumer to infringe a copyright can give rise to secondary liability for the infringement that results.
Inducement liability goes beyond that, and the distribution of a product can itself give rise to liability where
evidence shows that the distributor intended and encouraged the product to be used to infringe. In such a case,
the culpable act is not merely the encouragement of infringement but also the distribution of the tool intended
for infringing use.
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[Ginsburg and Breyer concurrences omitted].
NOTES AND QUESTIONS
Who were the direct infringers in this case? Why didn’t the plaintiffs sue them?
Does this holding mean that Grokster and Streamcast could be liable even if no one ever
actually directly infringed?
“Fixing” Inducement. Assume for a moment that Grokster deliberately induced copyright
infringement at its outset. However, before any copyright owners sued, it voluntarily
decided to mend its ways and stop inducing. How would it do so? Is there any way a
company can “cure” historical inducement? Or would Grokster’s only hope be to wait out
the statute of limitations?
This is a central issue in the Viacom v. YouTube case, discussed below. Assume that
YouTube historically induced infringement and subsequently YouTube’s service became
extremely socially valuable. Is it possible that tools with long-term social value might
initially look threatening to copyright owners? Note that for decades, copyright owners
have contested virtually every major technological development that enables third parties
to do something new with their copyrighted work. See Mark A. Lemley, Is the Sky Falling
on the Content Industries?, 9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 125 (2011). Could Grokster
and Streamcast have evolved into a legitimate and important social resource if this ruling
hadn’t effectively shut them down? If your answer is yes, consider this when judging the
practices of start-up companies whose future remains unwritten.
Denouement. On remand, Grokster lost in court, and subsequently it shut down operations.
Its website displayed the following announcement/warning (the IP address is redacted;
screen shot taken August 3, 2011):
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UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 667 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir.
2011)
Fisher, Circuit Judge.
…BACKGROUND
Veoh allows people to share video content over the Internet. Users can view videos
uploaded by other users as well as authorized “partner content” made available by major
copyright holders such as SonyBMG, ABC and ESPN. There are two ways to use Veoh’s
service: through a standalone software client application launched in late 2005, or through
the veoh.com website launched in early 2006 that users access via a standard web browser.
Both services are provided free of charge. Veoh generates revenue from advertising
displayed along with the videos. “As of April 2009, Veoh had well over a million videos
available for viewing, and users had uploaded more than four million videos to Veoh.”
Before a user may share a video through Veoh, he must register at veoh.com by providing
an email address, user name and password. He must then state that he has read and
agreed to Veoh’s “Publisher Terms and Conditions” (PTC). The PTC instructs users that
they “may not submit [material] ... that contains any ... infringing ... or illegal content” and
directs that they “may only upload and publish[material] on the Veoh Service to which
[they] have sufficient rights and licenses to permit the distribution of [their] [material] via
the Veoh Services.” The PTC agreement also gives Veoh a license to “publicly display,
publicly perform, transmit, distribute, copy, store, reproduce and/or provide” the uploaded
video “through the Veoh Service, either in its original form, copy or in the form of an
encoded work.”
A user who wants to share a video must also agree to Veoh’s “Terms of Use,” which give
Veoh a license “to use, reproduce, modify, distribute, prepare derivative works of, display,
publish, perform and transmit” the video. The Terms of Use provide that “you expressly
represent and warrant that you own or have the necessary licenses, rights, consents, and
permissions to use and authorize Veoh to use all ... copyright or other proprietary rights in
and to any and all[material shared on Veoh].” Users must agree “not to (a) take any action
or (b) upload, download, post, submit or otherwise distribute or facilitate distribution of any
[material] ... through the Veoh Service, that ... infringes any ... copyright.” Once a user
agrees to the PTC and Terms of Use, he may upload a video. Each time a user begins to
upload a video to Veoh’s website, a message appears stating, “Do not upload videos that
infringe copyright, are pornographic, obscene, violent, or any other videos that violate
Veoh’s Terms of Use.”
When a video is uploaded, various automated processes take place. Veoh’s software
automatically breaks down the video file into smaller 256–kilobyte “chunks,” which
facilitate making the video accessible to others. Veoh’s software also automatically
converts, or “transcodes,” the video file into Flash 7 format. This is done because “the vast
majority of internet users have software that can play videos” in this format. Veoh presets
the requisite settings for the Flash conversion. If the user is a “Pro” user, Veoh’s software
also converts the uploaded video into Flash 8 and MPEG–4 formats, which are playable on
some portable devices. Accordingly, when a Pro user uploads a video, Veoh automatically
creates and retains four copies: the chunked file, the Flash 7 file, the Flash 8 file and the
MPEG–4 file. None of these automated conversions affects the content of the video.
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Veoh’s computers also automatically extract metadata from information users provide to
help others locate the video for viewing. Users can provide a title, as well as tags or
keywords that describe the video, and can also select pre-set categories describing the
video, such as “music,” “faith” or “politics.” The Veoh system then automatically assigns
every uploaded video a “permalink,” or web address, that uniquely identifies the video and
makes it available to users. Veoh employees do not review the user-submitted video, title or
tags before the video is made available.2
Veoh’s system allows users to access shared videos in two ways. First, the video may be
“streamed” from a server, whereby the user’s web browser begins displaying the video
almost immediately, before the entire file has been transmitted to the user’s computer.
Depending on whether the user stops his web browser from streaming the full video, a
partial or full copy of the video is stored temporarily on the user’s computer. Second, the
user can download a copy of the video through Veoh’s website or client software application.
Veoh transfers a “chunked” copy of the file to the user’s computer, and the software
reassembles the chunks into a viewable copy. The downloaded file is stored on the user’s
computer in a Veoh directory, which gives Veoh the ability to terminate access to the files.
Veoh employs various technologies to automatically prevent copyright infringement on its
system. In 2006, Veoh adopted “hash filtering” software. Whenever Veoh disables access to
an infringing video, the hash filter also automatically disables access to any identical videos
and blocks any subsequently submitted duplicates. Veoh also began developing an
additional filtering method of its own, but in 2007 opted instead to adopt a third-party
filtering solution produced by a company called Audible Magic. Audible Magic’s technology
takes audio “fingerprints” from video files and compares them to a database of copyrighted
content provided by copyright holders. If a user attempts to upload a video that matches a
fingerprint from Audible Magic’s database of forbidden material, the video never becomes
available for viewing. Approximately nine months after beginning to apply the Audible
Magic filter to all newly uploaded videos, Veoh applied the filter to its backlog of previously
uploaded videos. This resulted in the removal of more than 60,000 videos, including some
incorporating UMG’s works. Veoh has also implemented a policy for terminating users who
repeatedly upload infringing material, and has terminated thousands of user accounts.
Despite Veoh’s efforts to prevent copyright infringement on its system, both Veoh and UMG
agree that some of Veoh’s users were able to download unauthorized videos containing
songs for which UMG owns the copyright. The parties also agree that before UMG filed its
complaint, the only notices Veoh received regarding alleged infringements of UMG’s works
were sent by the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA). The RIAA notices
listed specific videos that were allegedly infringing, and included links to those videos. The
notices did not assert rights to all works by the identified artists, and did not mention
UMG. UMG does not dispute that Veoh removed the material located at the links identified
in the RIAA notices….

2 Veoh employees do monitor already accessible videos for pornography, which is removed, using a “porn tool” to
review thumbnail images of uploaded videos tagged as “sexy.”
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DISCUSSION…
II.
“Difficult and controversial questions of copyright liability in the online world prompted
Congress to enact Title II of the DMCA, the Online Copyright Infringement Liability
Limitation Act (OCILLA).” Congress recognized that “[i]n the ordinary course of their
operations service providers must engage in all kinds of acts that expose them to potential
copyright infringement liability.” S. Rep. No. 105–190, at 8 (1998). Although Congress was
aware that the services provided by companies like Veoh are capable of being misused to
facilitate copyright infringement, it was loath to permit the specter of liability to chill
innovation that could also serve substantial socially beneficial functions. Congress decided
that “by limiting [service providers’] liability,” it would “ensure[ ] that the efficiency of the
Internet will continue to improve and that the variety and quality of services on the
Internet will continue to expand.” To that end, OCILLA created four safe harbors that
preclude imposing monetary liability on service providers for copyright infringement that
occurs as a result of specified activities. The district court concluded that Veoh qualified for
one such safe harbor, under 17 U.S.C. § 512(c). UMG challenges that determination and the
consequent entry of summary judgment in Veoh’s favor….
A.
We must first decide whether the functions automatically performed by Veoh’s software
when a user uploads a video fall within the meaning of “by reason of the storage at the
direction of a user.” Although UMG concedes that “[s]torage on computers involves making
a copy of the underlying data,” it argues that “nothing in the ordinary definition of ‘storage’
encompasses” the automatic processes undertaken to facilitate public access to useruploaded videos. Facilitation of access, UMG argues, goes beyond “storage.” Therefore the
creation of chunked and Flash files and the streaming and downloading of videos fall
outside § 512(c). UMG also contends that these automatic processes are not undertaken “at
the direction of the user.”
The district court concluded that UMG’s reading of § 512(c) was too narrow, wrongly
requiring “that the infringing conduct be storage,” rather than be “‘by reason of the
storage,’” as its terms provide. We agree that the phrase “by reason of the storage at the
direction of the user” is broader causal language than UMG contends, “clearly meant to
cover more than mere electronic storage lockers.” We hold that the language and structure
of the statute, as well as the legislative intent that motivated its enactment, clarify that §
512(c) encompasses the access-facilitating processes that automatically occur when a user
uploads a video to Veoh….
B.
Under § 512(c)(1)(A), a service provider can receive safe harbor protection only if it “(i) does
not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the material on the system
or network is infringing;” “(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts
or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or” “(iii) upon obtaining such
knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material.”
UMG has never disputed that when Veoh became aware of allegedly infringing material as
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a result of the RIAA’s DMCA notices, it removed the files. Rather, it argues that Veoh had
knowledge or awareness of other infringing videos that it did not remove. The district court
found that UMG failed to rebut Veoh’s showing “that when it did acquire knowledge of
allegedly infringing material—whether from DMCA notices, informal notices, or other
means—it expeditiously removed such material.” UMG argues on appeal that the district
court erred by improperly construing the knowledge requirement to unduly restrict the
circumstances in which a service provider has “actual knowledge” under subsection (i) and
setting too stringent a standard for what we have termed “red flag” awareness based on
facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent under subsection (ii). We
hold that the district court properly construed these requirements.
1.
It is undisputed that, until the filing of this lawsuit, UMG “had not identified to Veoh any
specific infringing video available on Veoh’s system.” UMG’s decision to forgo the DMCA
notice protocol “stripped it of the most powerful evidence of a service provider’s
knowledge—actual notice of infringement from the copyright holder.” Nevertheless, UMG
contends that Veoh hosted a category of copyrightable content—music—for which it had no
license from any major music company. UMG argues Veoh thus must have known this
content was unauthorized, given its general knowledge that its services could be used to
post infringing material. UMG urges us to hold that this sufficiently demonstrates
knowledge of infringement. We cannot, for several reasons.
As an initial matter, contrary to UMG’s contentions, there are many music videos that
could in fact legally appear on Veoh. “Among the types of videos subject to copyright
protection but lawfully available on Veoh’s system were videos with music created by users
and videos that Veoh provided pursuant to arrangements it reached with major copyright
holders, such as SonyBMG.” Further, Congress’ express intention that the DMCA “facilitate
making available quickly and conveniently via the Internet ... movies, music, software, and
literary works”—precisely the service Veoh provides—makes us skeptical that UMG’s
narrow interpretation of § 512(c) is plausible. S. Rep. No. 105–190, at 8. Finally, if merely
hosting material that falls within a category of content capable of copyright protection, with
the general knowledge that one’s services could be used to share unauthorized copies of
copyrighted material, was sufficient to impute knowledge to service providers, the § 512(c)
safe harbor would be rendered a dead letter: § 512(c) applies only to claims of copyright
infringement, yet the fact that a service provider’s website contained copyrightable material
would remove the service provider from § 512(c) eligibility.
Cases analyzing knowledge in the secondary copyright infringement context also counsel
against UMG’s general knowledge approach. In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), the Supreme Court held that there was “no precedent in
the law of copyright for the imposition of” liability based on the theory that the defendant
had “sold equipment with constructive knowledge of the fact that their customers may use
that equipment to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted material.” So long as the
product was “capable of substantial noninfringing uses,” the Court refused to impute
knowledge of infringement. Applying Sony to the Internet context, we held in A & M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001), that “if a computer system
operator learns of specific infringing material available on his system and fails to purge
such material from the system, the operator knows of and contributes to direct
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infringement.” But “absent any specific information which identifies infringing activity, a
computer system operator cannot be liable for contributory infringement merely because
the structure of the system allows for the exchange of copyrighted material.”
Requiring specific knowledge of particular infringing activity makes good sense in the
context of the DMCA, which Congress enacted to foster cooperation among copyright
holders and service providers in dealing with infringement on the Internet. See S. Rep. No.
105–190, at 20 (noting OCILLA was intended to provide “strong incentives for service
providers and copyright owners to cooperate to detect and deal with copyright
infringements”). Copyright holders know precisely what materials they own, and are thus
better able to efficiently identify infringing copies than service providers like Veoh, who
cannot readily ascertain what material is copyrighted and what is not. See S. Rep. No. 105–
190, at 48; (“[A] [service] provider could not be expected, during the course of its brief
cataloguing visit, to determine whether [a] photograph was still protected by copyright or
was in the public domain; if the photograph was still protected by copyright, whether the
use was licensed; and if the use was not licensed, whether it was permitted under the fair
use doctrine.”).
These considerations are reflected in Congress’ decision to enact a notice and takedown
protocol encouraging copyright holders to identify specific infringing material to service
providers. They are also evidenced in the “exclusionary rule” that prohibits consideration of
substantially deficient § 512(c)(3)(A) notices for purposes of “determining whether a service
provider has actual knowledge or is aware of facts and circumstances from which infringing
activity is apparent.” Congress’ intention is further reflected in the DMCA’s direct
statement that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to condition the applicability of
subsections (a) through (d) on ... a service provider monitoring its service or affirmatively
seeking facts indicating infringing activity.” Congress made a considered policy
determination that the “DMCA notification procedures [would] place the burden of policing
copyright infringement—identifying the potentially infringing material and adequately
documenting infringement—squarely on the owners of the copyright.” In parsing §
512(c)(3), we have “decline[d] to shift [that] substantial burden from the copyright owner to
the provider.”
UMG asks us to change course with regard to § 512(c)(1)(A) by adopting a broad conception
of the knowledge requirement. We see no principled basis for doing so. We therefore hold
that merely hosting a category of copyrightable content, such as music videos, with the
general knowledge that one’s services could be used to share infringing material, is
insufficient to meet the actual knowledge requirement under § 512(c)(1)(A)(i).
We reach the same conclusion with regard to the § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) inquiry into whether a
service provider is “aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is
apparent.” The district court’s conception of this “red flag test” properly followed our
analysis in CCBill, which reiterated that the burden remains with the copyright holder
rather than the service provider. The plaintiffs in CCBill argued that there were a number
of red flags that made it apparent infringing activity was afoot, noting that the defendant
hosted sites with names such as “illegal.net” and “stolencelebritypics.com,” as well as
password hacking websites, which obviously infringe. See id. We disagreed that these were
sufficient red flags because “[w]e do not place the burden of determining whether
[materials] are actually illegal on a service provider,” and “[w]e impose no such
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investigative duties on service providers.” For the same reasons, we hold that Veoh’s
general knowledge that it hosted copyrightable material and that its services could be used
for infringement is insufficient to constitute a red flag.
2.
We are not persuaded that UMG’s other purported evidence of Veoh’s actual or apparent
knowledge of infringement warrants trial. First, UMG points to the tagging of videos on
Veoh’s service as “music videos.” Relying on the theory rejected above, UMG contends that
this demonstrates Veoh’s knowledge that it hosted a category of infringing content.
Relatedly, UMG argues that Veoh’s purchase of certain search terms through the Google
AdWords program demonstrates knowledge of infringing activity because some of the terms
purchased, such as “50 Cent,” “Avril Lavigne” and “Britney Spears,” are the names of UMG
artists. However, artists are not always in exclusive relationships with recording
companies, so just because UMG owns the copyrights for some Britney Spears songs does
not mean it owns the copyright for all Britney Spears songs. Indeed, 50 Cent, Avril Lavigne
and Britney Spears are also affiliated with Sony–BMG, which gave Veoh permission to
stream its videos by these artists. Furthermore, even if Veoh had not had such permission,
we recognize that companies sometimes purchase search terms they believe will lead
potential customers to their websites even if the terms do not describe goods or services the
company actually provides. For example, a sunglass company might buy the search terms
“sunscreen” or “vacation” because it believed that people interested in such searches would
often also be interested in sunglasses. Accordingly, Veoh’s search term purchases do little to
demonstrate that it knew it hosted infringing material.
UMG also argues that Veoh’s removal of unauthorized content identified in RIAA notices
demonstrates knowledge, even if Veoh complied with § 512(c)’s notice and takedown
procedures. According to UMG, Veoh should have taken the initiative to use search and
indexing tools to locate and remove from its website any other content by the artists
identified in the notices. Relatedly, UMG argues that some of the videos on Veoh that had
been pulled from MTV or other broadcast television stations bore information about the
artist, song title and record label. UMG contends that Veoh should have used this
information to find and remove unauthorized videos. As we have explained, however, to so
require would conflict with § 512(m), § 512(c)(1)(C) and CCBill’s refusal to “impose ...
investigative duties on service providers.” It could also result in removal of noninfringing
content.
UMG also points to news articles discussing the availability of copyrighted materials on
Veoh. One article reported that “several major media companies ... say that Veoh.com has
been among the least aggressive video sharing sites in fighting copyrighted content,” and
has thus “become a haven for pirated content.” Another article reported that,
Veoh Networks CEO Dmitry Shapiro acknowledges that only a week after
the company’s official debut, Veoh.com is host to a wide range of
unauthorized and full-length copies of popular programs. But Shapiro says
it’s not his upstart company’s fault: ... “We have a policy that specifically
states that when we see copyright material posted, we take it down,” Shapiro
said. “This problem is the democratization of publishing. Anyone can now
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post a video to the Internet. Sometimes the material belongs to someone else.
We take this very seriously.”
UMG elicited deposition testimony from Shapiro that he had heard of these articles, and
was aware that, “from time to time,” “material belonging to someone else end[ed] up on”
Veoh. UMG argues that this evidence of knowledge that, as a general matter, unauthorized
materials had been previously posted on Veoh is sufficient to meet the § 512(c)(1)(A)
requirements.
At base, this argument relies on UMG’s primary theory, which we rejected above. Here, as
well, more specific information than UMG has adduced is required. The DMCA’s detailed
notice and takedown procedure assumes that, “from time to time,” “material belonging to
someone else ends up” on service providers’ websites, and establishes a process for ensuring
the prompt removal of such unauthorized material. If Veoh’s CEO’s acknowledgment of this
general problem and awareness of news reports discussing it was enough to remove a
service provider from DMCA safe harbor eligibility, the notice and takedown procedures
would make little sense and the safe harbors would be effectively nullified. We cannot
conclude that Congress intended such a result, and we therefore hold that this evidence is
insufficient to warrant a trial.
UMG comes closer to meeting the § 512(c)(1)(A) requirements with its evidence of emails
sent to Veoh executives and investors by copyright holders and users identifying infringing
content. One email, sent by the CEO of Disney, a major copyright holder, to Michael Eisner,
a Veoh investor, stated that the movie Cinderella III and various episodes from the
television show Lost were available on Veoh without Disney’s authorization. If this
notification had come from a third party, such as a Veoh user, rather than from a copyright
holder, it might meet the red flag test because it specified particular infringing material.13
As a copyright holder, however, Disney is subject to the notification requirements in §
512(c)(3), which this informal email failed to meet. Accordingly, this deficient notice “shall
not be considered under paragraph (1)(A) in determining whether a service provider has
actual knowledge or is aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is
apparent.” Further, even if this email could have created actual knowledge or qualified as a
red flag, Eisner’s email in response assured Disney that he would instruct Veoh to “take it
down,” and Eisner copied Veoh’s founder to ensure this happened “right away.” UMG
nowhere alleges that the offending material was not immediately removed, and accordingly
Veoh would be saved by § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii), which preserves the safe harbor for service
providers with such knowledge so long as they “act[ ] expeditiously to remove, or disable
access to, the material.”
UMG also points to an email from a Veoh user whose video was rejected for containing
infringing content. Upset that Veoh would not post his unauthorized material, he stated
that he had seen “plenty of [other] copyright infringement material” on the site, and
identified another user who he said posted infringing content. It is possible that this email
would be sufficient to constitute a red flag under § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii), even though it would not
qualify as sufficient notice from a copyright holder under § 512(c)(3). But even assuming
Of course, even then it would not be obvious how Veoh’s awareness of apparent infringement of Disney’s
copyrights over movies and television shows would advance UMG’s claims that Veoh hosted unauthorized UMG
music videos.

13
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that is so, UMG has not specifically alleged that Veoh failed to expeditiously remove the
infringing content identified by the user’s email, or that the content at issue was owned by
UMG. Accordingly, this too fails to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding Veoh’s
knowledge of infringement.14
A service provider is eligible for the § 512(c) safe harbor only if it “does not receive a
financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which the
service provider has the right and ability to control such activity.” UMG appeals the district
court’s determination that Veoh did not have the necessary right and ability to control
infringing activity and thus remained eligible for safe harbor protection. We conclude the
district court was correct, and therefore affirm….
Whether Veoh had the requisite “ability to control” the infringing activity at issue depends
on what the statute means by that phrase, which the statute does not define. Looking first
to the dictionary, “ability” is defined as “the quality or state of being able: physical, mental,
or legal power to perform: competence in doing”; and “able” is in turn defined as “possessed
of needed powers (as intelligence or strength) or of needed resources (as means or influence)
to accomplish an objective ...: constituted or situated so as to be susceptible or readily
subjected to some action or treatment.” “Control” is defined as having the “power or
authority to guide or manage: directing or restraining domination.” Where, as here, it is a
practical impossibility for Veoh to ensure that no infringing material is ever uploaded to its
site, or to remove unauthorized material that has not yet been identified to Veoh as
infringing, we do not believe that Veoh can properly be said to possess the “needed powers
... or needed resources” to be “competen[t] in” exercising the sort of “restraining domination”
that § 512(c)(1)(B) requires for denying safe harbor eligibility.
As discussed, in the knowledge context it is not enough for a service provider to know as a
general matter that users are capable of posting unauthorized content; more specific
knowledge is required. Similarly, a service provider may, as a general matter, have the
legal right and necessary technology to remove infringing content, but until it becomes
aware of specific unauthorized material, it cannot exercise its “power or authority” over the
specific infringing item. In practical terms, it does not have the kind of ability to control
infringing activity the statute contemplates. See Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718
F.Supp.2d 514, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ( “[T]he provider must know of the particular case
before he can control it.” (emphasis added)); cf. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508
F.3d 1146, 1174 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Google’s supervisory power is limited because Google’s
software lacks the ability to analyze every image on the [I]nternet, compare each image to
all the other copyrighted images that exist in the world ... and determine whether a certain
image on the web infringes someone’s copyright.” (alterations in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
Our reading of § 512(c)(1)(B) is informed and reinforced by our concern that the statute
would be internally inconsistent were we to interpret the “right and ability to control”
14 We do not credit UMG’s contention that the district court conflated the actual knowledge and red flag
awareness tests. A user email informing Veoh of infringing material and specifying its location provides a good
example of the distinction. Although the user’s allegations would not give Veoh actual knowledge under §
512(c)(1)(A)(i), because Veoh would have no assurance that a third party who does not hold the copyright in
question could know whether the material was infringing, the email could act as a red flag under §
512(c)(1)(A)(ii) provided its information was sufficiently specific.
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language as UMG urges. First, § 512(m) cuts against holding that Veoh’s general
knowledge that infringing material could be uploaded to its site triggered an obligation to
“police” its services to the “fullest extent” possible. As we have explained, § 512(m) provides
that § 512(c)’s safe harbor protection may not be conditioned on “a service provider
monitoring its service or affirmatively seeking facts indicating infringing activity.” UMG’s
reading of the “right and ability to control” language would similarly run afoul of CCBill,
which likewise clarified that § 512(c) “impose[s] no such investigative duties on service
providers,” and “place[s] the burden of policing copyright infringement ... squarely on the
owners of the copyright.” We are not persuaded by UMG’s suggestion that Congress meant
this limitation on the duty to monitor to apply only to service providers who do not receive a
direct financial benefit under subsection (B). Rather, we conclude that a service provider
must be aware of specific infringing material to have the ability to control that infringing
activity within the meaning of § 512(c)(1)(B). Only then would its failure to exercise its
ability to control deny it a safe harbor.
Second, § 512(c) actually presumes that service providers have the sort of control that UMG
argues satisfies the § 512(c)(1)(B) “right and ability to control” requirement: they must
“remove[ ] or disable access to” infringing material when they become aware of it. Quoting
Napster, 239 F.3d at 1024, UMG argues that service providers have “the right and ability to
control” infringing activity, § 512(c)(1)(B), as long as they have “the ability to locate
infringing material” and “terminate users’ access.” Under that reading, service providers
would have the “right and ability to control” infringing activity regardless of their becoming
“aware of” the material. Under that interpretation, the prerequisite to § 512(c) protection
under § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) and (C), would at the same time be a disqualifier under §
512(c)(1)(B). We agree with Judge Matz that “Congress could not have intended for courts
to hold that a service provider loses immunity under the safe harbor provision of the DMCA
because it engages in acts that are specifically required by the DMCA.”
Accordingly, we hold that the “right and ability to control” under § 512(c) requires control
over specific infringing activity the provider knows about. A service provider’s general right
and ability to remove materials from its services is, alone, insufficient. Of course, a service
provider cannot willfully bury its head in the sand to avoid obtaining such specific
knowledge. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to UMG, as we must here, we
agree with the district court there is no evidence that Veoh acted in such a manner. Rather,
the evidence demonstrates that Veoh promptly removed infringing material when it became
aware of specific instances of infringement. Although the parties agree, in retrospect, that
at times there was infringing material available on Veoh’s services, the DMCA recognizes
that service providers who are not able to locate and remove infringing materials they do
not specifically know of should not suffer the loss of safe harbor protection.
UMG seeks to avoid our reading of the statute’s plain language and structure by arguing
that we should instead interpret § 512(c) as we read similar language in the common law
vicarious liability context in Napster, 239 F.3d at 1024. We are unpersuaded for several
reasons, and conclude instead, as previously discussed, that whereas the vicarious liability
standard applied in Napster can be met by merely having the general ability to locate
infringing material and terminate users’ access, § 512(c) requires “something more.”
First, § 512(c) nowhere mentions the term “vicarious liability.” Although it uses a set of
words that has sometimes been used to describe common law vicarious liability, the
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language used in the common law standard is loose and has varied. For example, Metro–
Goldwyn–Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 n. 9 (2005), refers to
“supervis[ing] the direct infringer” rather than “control[ing] such [infringing] activity,” §
512(c)(1)(B), and “supervise” and “control” are different in potentially significant ways.
“Control,” which we have noted means having the “power or authority to guide or manage:
directing or restraining domination,” involves more command than “supervise,” which
means “to look over, inspect, oversee.”
Second, Napster was decided after the DMCA was enacted, so Congress could not have
intended to codify Napster’s precise application upon which UMG relies. Third, although
not definitive, the legislative history informs our conclusion that Congress did not intend to
exclude from § 512(c)’s safe harbor all service providers who would be vicariously liable for
their users’ infringing activity under the common law. The legislative history did, at one
point, suggest an intention to codify the “right and ability to control” element of vicarious
infringement, and § 512(c)(1)(B) was not modified following that report. That report,
however, referred to a version of the bill different from the one ultimately passed, and the
discussion of vicarious liability is omitted from all later reports and, notably, from the
statutory language.
Subsequent legislative statements help clarify Congress’ intent. First, Congress explicitly
stated in three different reports that the DMCA was intended to “protect qualifying service
providers from liability for all monetary relief for direct, vicarious and contributory
infringement.” H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105–796, at 64, 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 649 (emphasis
added); S. Rep. No. 105–190, at 18, 36; H.R. Rep. No. 105–551, pt. 2, at 50. Under UMG’s
interpretation, however, every service provider subject to vicarious liability would be
automatically excluded from safe harbor protection. Second, Congress made clear that it
intended to provide safe harbor protection not by altering the common law vicarious
liability standards, but rather by carving out permanent safe harbors to that liability for
Internet service providers even while the common law standards continue to evolve. See
S.Rep. No. 105–190, at 17 (“There have been several cases relevant to service provider
liability for copyright infringement. Most have approached the issue from the standpoint of
contributory and vicarious liability. Rather than embarking upon a wholesale clarification
of these doctrines, the Committee decided to leave current law in its evolving state and,
instead, to create a series of ‘safe harbors,’ for certain common activities of service
providers. A service provider which qualifies for a safe harbor, receives the benefit of
limited liability.” (footnote omitted)).
Given Congress’ explicit intention to protect qualifying service providers who would
otherwise be subject to vicarious liability, it would be puzzling for Congress to make §
512(c) entirely coextensive with the vicarious liability requirements, which would
effectively exclude all vicarious liability claims from the § 512(c) safe harbor. In addition, it
is difficult to envision, from a policy perspective, why Congress would have chosen to
exclude vicarious infringement from the safe harbors, but retain protection for contributory
infringement. It is not apparent why the former might be seen as somehow worse than the
latter.
Furthermore, if Congress had intended that the § 512(c)(1)(B) “right and ability to control”
requirement be coextensive with vicarious liability law, the statute could have
accomplished that result in a more direct manner.
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It is conceivable that Congress [would have] intended that [service providers]
which receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing
activity would not, under any circumstances, be able to qualify for the
subsection (c) safe harbor. But if that was indeed their intention, it would
have been far simpler and much more straightforward to simply say as much.
The Court does not accept that Congress would express its desire to do so by
creating a confusing, self-contradictory catch–22 situation that pits
512(c)(1)(B) and 512(c)(1)(C) directly at odds with one another, particularly
when there is a much simpler explanation: the DMCA requires more than the
mere ability to delete and block access to infringing material after that
material has been posted in order for the [service provider] to be said to have
“the right and ability to control such activity.”
Indeed, in the anti-circumvention provision in Title I of the DMCA, which was enacted at
the same time as the § 512 safe harbors, Congress explicitly stated, “Nothing in this section
shall enlarge or diminish vicarious or contributory liability for copyright infringement in
connection with any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof.” “If
Congress had intended to exclude vicarious liability from the DMCA [Title II] safe harbors,
it would have done so expressly as it did in Title I of the DMCA.”
In light of the DMCA’s language, structure, purpose and legislative history, we are
compelled to reject UMG’s argument that the district court should have employed Napster’s
vicarious liability standard to evaluate whether Veoh had sufficient “right and ability to
control” infringing activity under § 512(c). Although in some cases service providers subject
to vicarious liability will be excluded from the § 512(c) safe harbor, in others they will not.
Because we conclude that Veoh met all the § 512(c) requirements, we affirm the entry of
summary judgment in its favor.
III.
UMG also appeals the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of its complaint against the
Investor Defendants for vicarious infringement, contributory infringement and inducement
of infringement. It is well-established that “[s]econdary liability for copyright infringement
does not exist in the absence of direct infringement....” UMG argues, however, that even if
summary judgment was properly granted to Veoh on the basis of the DMCA safe harbor, as
we have held it was, “the [Investor] Defendants remain potentially liable for their related
indirect infringement” because the district court did not “make a finding regarding Veoh’s
direct infringement,” and the Investor Defendants do not qualify as “service providers” who
can receive DMCA safe harbor protection. The Investor Defendants argue that it would be
illogical to impose greater liability on them than on Veoh itself. Although we agree that this
would create an anomalous result, we assume without deciding that the suit against the
Investor Defendants can properly proceed even though Veoh is protected from monetary
liability by the DMCA.18 Reaching the merits of UMG’s secondary liability arguments, we
hold that the district court properly dismissed the complaint.
18 …We remain concerned about the possibility of imposing secondary liability on tangentially involved parties,
like Visa and the Investor Defendants, while those accused of direct infringement receive safe harbor protection.
“[B]y limiting the liability of service providers,” the DMCA sought to assuage any “hesitat[ion] to make the
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UMG first alleges that the Investor Defendants are liable for contributory infringement.
“[O]ne who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially
contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a ‘contributory’
infringer.” In Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264, we established the “site and facilities” test:
“providing the site and facilities for known infringing activity is sufficient to establish
contributory liability” where the defendant “actively strives to provide the environment and
the market for counterfeit ... sales to thrive.” The district court concluded this test was not
met, dismissing the complaint because UMG did “not allege sufficiently that [the Investor
Defendants] gave material assistance in helping Veoh or its users accomplish
infringement.” We agree.
UMG acknowledges that funding alone cannot satisfy the material assistance requirement.
It thus argues that the Investor Defendants “provided Veoh’s necessary funding and
directed its spending” on “basic operations including ... hardware, software, and
employees”—”elements” UMG argues “form ‘the site and facilities’ for Veoh’s direct
infringement.” UMG thus attempts to liken its case to UMG Recordings, Inc. v.
Bertelsmann AG et al., 222 F.R.D. 408 (N.D. Cal. 2004), where the district court denied an
investor’s motion to dismiss claims of contributory infringement. In Bertelsmann, however,
the investor was Napster’s “only available source of funding,” and thus “held significant
power and control over Napster’s operations.” Here, by contrast, there were multiple
investors, and none of the Investor Defendants could individually control Veoh.
Accordingly, UMG hinges its novel theory of secondary liability on the contention that the
three Investor Defendants together took control of Veoh’s operations by “obtain[ing] three of
the five seats on Veoh’s Board of Directors,” and effectively provided the “site and facilities”
for direct infringement by wielding their majority power to direct spending.
Even assuming that such joint control, not typically an element of contributory
infringement, could satisfy Fonovisa’s site and facilities requirement, UMG’s argument fails
on its own terms, because the complaint nowhere alleged that the Investor Defendants
agreed to work in concert to this end. UMG suggests that it “did allege that the [Investor]
Defendants agreed to ‘operate’ Veoh jointly—UMG alleged that the [Investor] Defendants
operated Veoh by ‘s[eeking] and obtain[ing] seats on Veoh’s Board of Directors as a
condition of their investments.’ “ But three investors individually acquiring one seat apiece
is not the same as agreeing to operate as a unified entity to obtain and leverage majority
control. Unless the three independent investors were on some level working in concert, then
none of them actually had sufficient control over the Board to direct Veoh in the way UMG
contends. This missing allegation is critical because finding secondary liability without it
would allow plaintiffs to sue any collection of directors making up 51 percent of the board
on the theory that they constitute a majority, and therefore together they control the
company. Without this lynchpin allegation, UMG’s claim that the Investor Defendants had
sufficient control over Veoh to direct its spending and operations in a manner that might

necessary investment in the expansion of the speed and capacity of the Internet.” S. Rep. No. 105–190, at 7.
Congress was no doubt well aware that service providers can make the desired investment only if they receive
funding from investors like the Investor Defendants. Although we do not decide the matter today, were we to
hold that Veoh was protected, but its investors were not, investors might hesitate to provide the necessary
funding to companies like Veoh, and Congress’ purpose in passing the DMCA would be undermined.
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theoretically satisfy the “site and facilities” test falls apart. We therefore affirm the
dismissal of UMG’s contributory infringement claim.
This missing allegation likewise requires us to affirm the district court’s dismissal of
UMG’s vicarious liability and inducement of infringement claims. Inducement liability is
proper where “one [ ] distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe
copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster
infringement.” Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936–37. Vicarious liability is warranted if “the
defendant profits directly from the infringement and has a right and ability to supervise the
direct infringer.” Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930 n. 9. UMG’s arguments that the Investor
Defendants “distribute[d]” Veoh’s services and had the right and ability to supervise the
infringing users are premised on the unalleged contention that the Investor Defendants
agreed to act in concert, and thus together they held a majority of seats on the Board and
“maintained operational control over the company.” We therefore affirm the dismissal of the
complaint against the Investor Defendants….
NOTES AND QUESTIONS
Viacom v. YouTube. After this ruling, the Second Circuit issued its opinion in Viacom v.
YouTube, dealing with similar facts. Viacom Intern., Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d
Cir. 2012). The opinion is mostly consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s UMG opinion, but it
expressly disagreed with the Ninth Circuit regarding the safe harbor’s meaning of “right
and ability to control”—saying the concept “involve[s] a service provider exerting
substantial influence on the activities of users, without necessarily—or even frequently—
acquiring knowledge of specific infringing activity.” This standard is vague and opaque,
leaving lots of room for future arguments. The Second Circuit also more expressly
acknowledged that a service provider’s willful blindness could defeat the safe harbor; but as
with the “right and ability to control” phrase, the opinion didn’t define what behavior
constitutes willful blindness.
In light of the Viacom v. YouTube ruling, the Ninth Circuit asked the litigants in UMG v.
Shelter Capital to submit briefs on whether it should modify the opinion you just read. As
of August 2, 2012, the Ninth Circuit had not amended its opinion, but that remains a
possibility as of press time.
The Viacom v. YouTube litigation is especially puzzling because the litigants have so much
incentive to work together rather than fight each other. Indeed, Viacom has acknowledged
that it has no objections to YouTube’s practices since May 2008, when YouTube deployed
more aggressive technology filters. Indeed, Viacom currently heavily uses YouTube to
promote its offerings. So what’s the problem that needs to be resolved in court?
Takedown Notices. Why didn’t UMG just send Veoh proper takedown notices instead of
suing it in court? If UMG had sent proper takedown notices, what do you think Veoh would
have done with them?
Red Flags of Infringement. What, exactly, constitutes a “red flag” of infringement? If a
website provides a tool letting users report problems with content, and one user flags
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another user’s content item as infringing, does the website have a “red flag” of
infringement—and if so, of what?
The Challenges of Determining Infringement. Viacom’s marketing team and affiliates
uploaded videos to YouTube for their marketing benefit. In some cases, Viacom
deliberately altered clips to look like an unauthorized upload to make it look more
interesting to viewers. The Viacom legal team would complain about clips posted by
Viacom’s marketing team because they wouldn’t realize the uploads were authorized. If
Viacom’s legal team doesn’t know that some clips were authorized by its own marketing
department, how is YouTube supposed to know?
Also, Viacom routinely acquiesced to leaving up user-posted video clips, but it constantly
changed its acquiescence policy—and never disclosed the policy to YouTube. If Viacom is
constantly changing its mind about which user postings it objects to, how is YouTube
supposed to know?
Also, Viacom TWICE withdrew clips from its complaint which it subsequently determined
weren’t infringing. If Viacom’s litigators can’t figure out which clips are infringing well
enough to file an accurate complaint—when they have full access to Viacom’s information
and its lawyers are under Rule 11’s investigatory duty—how is YouTube supposed to figure
it out?
Willful Blindness. The UMG court hints that a service provider’s willful blindness would
disqualify it from the statute. What types of actions on a service provider’s part might
satisfy the Ninth Circuit that the service provider engaged in willful blindness? Note the
statute and caselaw already cover other scienter standards, including “actual knowledge,”
“red flags” and “inducement.” What’s left for “willful blindness” to address?
Copyright Owner Over-Claiming. Does it strike you as odd that UMG took the position that
Veoh couldn’t advertise the availability of material from 50 Cent, Avril Lavigne and Britney
Spears, even though UMG did not completely control those artists’ catalogs?
Wordsmithing. Does it strike you as odd that the court effectively concludes that the
phrase “right and ability to control” means something different depending on whether it’s
being used in the common law test for vicarious copyright infringement or in the safe
harbor statute?
Investor Liability. Why weren’t the investors automatically protected by the corporate veil?
If you were a potential investor in a new user-generated content website, would this ruling
deter you from making the investment? See Michael A. Carrier, Copyright and Innovation:
The Untold Story, 2012 WISC. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2099876.
Discovery Implications. Imagine that you are a copyright owner’s counsel. In light of this
opinion, what kinds of onerous discovery requests might you legitimately make of a service
provider defendant? What kinds of onerous discovery requests might you legitimately
make of the service provider’s investors?
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Denouement. In this opinion, the Ninth Circuit declares that Veoh properly complied with
the legal expectations of Congress. This is great news for Veoh, right? Yes, except that
Voeh’s litigation costs for this and other cases (such as Io v. Veoh) drained its bank account,
forcing Veoh to shut down—meaning its investors lost their investment, its employees lost
their jobs, and users who uploaded videos to Veoh had those videos taken offline. So the
case produces an anomaly: the courts gave Veoh a clean bill of health, but getting that clean
bill of health killed Veoh.
Indeed, Google has disclosed that it spent $100 million on litigation costs in Viacom v.
YouTube up to the point it filed its summary judgment motions. Obviously, it has spent
more—much more—on legal fees since making those filings. Google can afford to spend
over $100M defending YouTube, but smaller market players—like Veoh—can’t.
What implications might these facts (i.e., Veoh is legal but dead) have for the proper design
of immunities and safe harbors? Compare the litigation costs associated with the 47 U.S.C.
§ 230 immunity discussed later in the casebook.
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Celebrating (?) the Six-Month Anniversary of SOPA’s Demise
By Eric Goldman
Posted July 18, 2012 to http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2012/07/18/celebratingthe-six-month-anniversary-of-sopas-demise/.
Six months ago today–January 18, 2012–was a major day in the Internet’s history. Some of
the most heavily trafficked websites went dark or rallied their users against proposed
legislation called the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and its sister bill the Protect IP Act
(PIPA). The resulting outcry effectively killed the legislation that day. But with 6 months
of perspective, plus plenty of new developments, it’s clear there may not be much to
celebrate about the developments of January 18.
What Happened on January 18
January 18 witnessed some unprecedented political developments. In response to massive
voter feedback to Congress, a remarkable 19 United States Senators (nearly 20% of all
senators) either changed their position on PIPA (from supporting to opposing) or newly
announced a position on PIPA by coming out opposed to it. I’m not aware of any other
single day in American history when so many senators publicly changed their opinion on a
pending bill in response to voter advocacy.
Even more remarkably, this meant consumers had squarely defeated a determined
copyright owner lobby led by the MPAA, although they were hardly alone. (Trademark
owners also supported the proposals, but they were less visible in the process). For
decades, individual consumers have had virtually no voice in American copyright policy.
Generally the process has been:
1) Copyright owners give lots of money to members of Congress.
2) Copyright owners then redeem this patronage by getting broad Congressional support for
their legislative wish-lists.
3) The technology community, and other repeat-player groups that depend on third party
copyrighted materials (like libraries), fight vigorously to make minor changes to the
copyright owners’ wish-list.
4) Congress passes the lightly modified proposal and then, feel self-satisfied, pats itself on
the back for having engaged all of the relevant constituencies in a vigorous multistakeholder legislative process.
This cycle has played itself out a few dozen times over the decades, and SOPA/PIPA were
well on their way to following this pattern–until January 18.
And then, an upset outcome. David defeated Goliath. The amateur boxer knocked out the
undefeated heavyweight boxing champion. Copyright owners had never outright lost a
legislative battle they choose to fight. Yet, on January 18, they did. And they lost that
battle to consumers–the constituency who isn’t even at the bargaining table. In the words
of Vizzini from the Princess Bride: “Inconceivable!”
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How January 18 Was a Turning Point
The defeat of SOPA/PIPA immediately shook the corridors of power and continues to ripple
through policy circles. Two examples:
ACTA’s Demise. The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) is a trade agreement
putatively designed to encourage trans-border cooperation to fight counterfeiting.
Unfortunately, ACTA did more than that, potentially upsetting existing delicate balances
between IP owners and consumers. Worse, ACTA was negotiated virtually entirely out of
the public eye. While industry insiders (such as the copyright lobby) had prominent seats
at the table, consumers got very limited disclosures of the drafts and no meaningful
opportunity to comment on the proposals. Thus, for consumers, ACTA had potentially
unacceptable substantive terms and was developed via an unquestionably unacceptable
process.
President Obama signed the agreement without getting Congressional approval, despite
significant protests. Other countries started signing ACTA. ACTA looked like a fait
accompli.
Then, partially inspired by the SOPA/PIPA protests in the United States, European
consumers started protesting ACTA. Their voices were heard. The European Parliament
overwhelmingly rejected ACTA, which most likely takes all of Europe out of ACTA–which,
in turn, largely moots ACTA. There are still wranglings and shenanigans involving ACTA,
so it’s too early to declare it dead. Still, the most likely outcome is that European
consumers’ protests scuttled an otherwise unstoppable international trade agreement on IP
issues–just like US consumers derailed SOPA/PIPA. Could SOPA have been the first spark
to ignite effective consumer input into future IP policy-making worldwide?
No Legislator Wants to Be “SOPAed.” Back in the United States, politicians are walking on
eggshells. Multiple Washington DC insiders have told me that no legislator wants to be
“SOPAed,” presumably a verb for having massive consumer protests melting the legislator’s
phones. To avoid the risk of being SOPAed, I’m hearing that some legislators are changing
their proposals–presumably to tone them down–before they even are introduced. So even
without lifting another finger, consumers may be beneficially influencing the legislative
process.
How January 18 Didn’t Make a Difference at All
For all of that good news, I believe the better analysis is that the events of January 18
made no real difference. Some examples supporting my conclusion:
SOPA’s Death = Status Quo. I can imagine some backroom Hollywood strategist shaking
his head, thinking to himself, “Those [insert pejorative expletive] shut down the Internet
and melted the phone lines in Washington DC, and what did they get? NOTHING.” For all
of the work that went into the anti-SOPA/PIPA campaign, the reality is that its demise just
preserved the status quo. As the maxim goes, it’s a lot easier to kill legislation than to get
it passed. And it’s hardly easy to kill proposed copyright legislation; it took a favorable
confluence of multiple things going right just to kill SOPA/PIPA. But in the end, all of that
enormous effort didn’t change anything.
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Congress Is Making the Same Systematic Mistakes. Procedurally, the advocates of
SOPA/PIPA made several mistakes. First, the substantive proposals massively
overreached. Legislators’ fear of being SOPAed reduces the chance that error will recur, at
least in the short run.
Second, SOPA/PIPA would have created some serious technical problems that the
legislators simply did not understand. In response to this glaring lack of knowledge, Rep.
Chaffetz suggested that Congress should “bring in the nerds” to advise Congress on the
technical implications of its proposals. Despite that suggestion, Congress continues to
regulate the Internet without adequate guidance from “the nerds.” For example, despite
protests from many expert technologists, the House passed a cyber-security bill (CISPA).
Third, SOPA/PIPA were drafted largely in secret by a few legislators and a coterie of
industry lobbyists who have bought access to the legislative process; once this cabal was
satisfied, the bills were introduced and then fast-tracked for passage. Yet, amazingly, Rep.
Lamar Smith–a key figure in the SOPA battles–announced he was introducing a bill (the IP
Attaché Act) resurrecting a small part of SOPA after preparing the bill behind closed doors,
and then intended to fast-track the bill. (The amount of overlap between SOPA and the IP
Attaché Act is complicated; this BNA report tries to unpack the issue). As Techdirt’s Mike
Masnick asked rhetorically, “Dear Lamar Smith & House Judiciary: Have You Learned
Nothing from SOPA?” So for all of the whispertalk that legislators are running scared of
being SOPAed, at least some legislators still think it’s OK to procedurally navigate
controversial bills in a way that (deliberately?) suppresses the public’s ability to participate
in the process.
Plaintiffs Are Getting SOPA’s Remedies (or Better) in Court. As I indicated, SOPA/PIPA’s
demise preserved the status quo–but the status quo isn’t so great for consumers. Without
any new legislation, IP owners are already getting extraordinary remedies in court that
compare favorably to the remedies contemplated by SOPA/PIPA. My co-blogger Venkat
Balasubramani and I have cataloged some of these cases. Typically these cases involve
foreign defendants who don’t show up, meaning that the court only hears one side of the
story (the plaintiff’s) and basically gives the plaintiffs whatever they ask for. In many
cases, this includes court orders that purport to bind third party service providers (who also
aren’t in court to defend their interests), even though Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule
65 doesn’t allow judges to tell non-litigants what to do.
In my “favorite” example, involving a Chinese website allegedly selling counterfeit
cigarettes, the court ordered Western Union (who wasn’t in court and wasn’t a defendant)
to interdict all money buyers were sending to the website and put it into a special account
for an unspecified period of time. In other words, buyers–who may not have realized they
were buying counterfeit goods–weren’t getting their ordered cigarettes but also weren’t
getting their money back. Compare an alternative approach, where the court could have
told Western Union to reject the payments and simply return the money to the buyers.
Without buyers or Western Union appearing in court to defend their interests, the court
overly catered to the plaintiffs’ interests. So much for due process.
Until judges start pushing back on plaintiff demands in these cases where defendants noshow, and until judges become more circumspect about their ability to reach non-litigants
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under Rule 65, who needs SOPA/PIPA? IP owners can synthetically achieve the same or
better results without a new statute.
The Obama Administration is Implementing SOPA Even Though Congress Didn’t Approve
It. Even though Congress did not approve SOPA/PIPA, the Obama administration
repeatedly has been tone-deaf to consumer concerns about SOPA and its underlying
policies. Three examples of the Obama administration’s efforts to create SOPA-like
outcomes through its executive branch powers:
* Megaupload prosecution. On January 19, the day after SOPA/PIPA melted down and the
copyright lobby was publicly grumbling that their years of campaign contributions weren’t
buying the patronage they expected, the Obama administration’s Department of Justice
loudly announced the criminal prosecution of a foreign cyberlocker–one of the types of
websites that SOPA/PIPA nominally targeted. In effect, copyright owners convinced the US
government (at taxpayer expense!) to enforce SOPA-like remedies even without SOPA on
the books. Worse, as we’ve seen in the past 6 months, the Megaupload prosecution is
deeply troubled, and the DOJ has not looked good at any step in the prosecution.
Personally, I believe that the prosecution was lawless from inception, a point I explained
more fully on my blog.
* Domain name seizures. For a couple of years, the Department of Homeland Security’s
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) division has been seizing (without any
judicial oversight) hundreds and hundreds of domain names it thinks are used for
infringing conduct. The bad news: ICE’s legal authority for such domain name grabs is
dubious at best. (PIPA and SOPA would have codified the government authority for these
ex parte domain name seizures). Worse news: ICE has been acting on unverified claims
from self-interested copyright owners. We learned, for example, that ICE seized Dajaz1′s
domain name based on an unverified report from the RIAA; and when ICE asked for
supporting verification (after it had already seized the domain name), the RIAA didn’t
produce anything for an entire year–at which point ICE simply gave Dajaz1 its domain
name back, without an apology or an explanation. The worst news: ICE’s Dajaz1-related
court proceedings were conducted in secret, meaning Dajaz1 could not see the court file or
respond to it because, as near as we can, the file sat in a clerk’s desk drawer rather than in
the normal place where files are stored. Secret judicial proceedings where the defendant
has no ability to see the charges or respond to them? That sounds more like a Kafka book
than the country I know and love.
* “Voluntary” industry initiatives. Obama’s “IP Czar,” Victoria Espinel, has been actively
negotiating “voluntary” industry agreements that replicate some of SOPA’s key features.
First, Espinel helped broker a “voluntary” agreement where Internet access providers
agreed to implement a “graduated response” program. Effectively, the access providers will
build a system to process copyright owners’ claims (which usually will be automatically
generated) of copyright infringement via peer-to-peer file sharing. Each notice against a
user will count as a “strike.” When users get too many strikes, the Internet access provider
will progressively subject the user to more stringent discipline, including potentially
terminating the user’s Internet access account completely. Users can protest the strikes,
but only via a kangaroo court which is not designed to let users win. Corynne McSherry
and I previously explained the anti-consumer aspects of the graduated response deal.
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The fact that Internet access providers agreed to this deal is fascinating. They were
already legally immunized from copyright infringement liability for users’ conduct in 17
U.S.C. Sec. 512(a); they agreed to implement a technical system at a not-inconsiderable
expense to them; and the ultimate remedy of firing their customers will cost them money
too. One has to wonder just how hard the Obama administration leaned on Internet access
providers to do something so clearly contrary to their interests; and one further has to
wonder why the Obama administration would favor something designed to stack the deck
against consumers. Perhaps not including adequate consumer representation at the table
had something to do with that.
Second, Espinel brokered a deal where advertiser and ad agency industry groups
“voluntarily” encouraged their members to adopt policies against displaying ads on websites
that facilitate infringement–another key component of SOPA. This was a little easier sale
than the graduated response deal. One of the recommended policy terms is that advertisers
shouldn’t pay publishers who run their ads alongside infringing content. Well, naturally,
the advertisers weren’t opposed to anything that would let them get advertising they don’t
have to pay for. More troubling is the apparent intent to develop a blacklist of allegedly
infringing websites that advertisers should cut off. It remains to be seen if the private
blacklist will offer an appropriate level of public accountability, transparency and due
process.
In a related development, Espinel is also pressuring Yahoo, Google, AOL, and Microsoft to
cut off allegedly infringing websites from their ad networks.
The graduated response system hasn’t come online yet, and it remains to be seen just how
vigorously advertisers will undertake their implied promise to police publishers who are
engaged in infringing activity. So it’s not clear if these government-brokered voluntary
agreements will amount to much. But the fact that the Obama administration is going
around to industry groups asking them to do what SOPA would have required or coerced
them to do is a good sign that the Obama administration plans to implement SOPA if
Congress won’t.
One more data point showing that the Obama administration hasn’t internalized the
messages of January 18. Its trade reps, especially US Trade Representative Ron Kirk, have
mishandled the latest trade agreement negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP), committing the same sins that poisoned ACTA. Just like ACTA, all of the
negotiations have taken place in backrooms, with no consumer representation but plenty of
industry lobbyists around the table. Furthermore, the process has been not transparent at
all (despite Kirk’s twisted insistence otherwise, using a “day is night” definition of
transparency). Drafts have not been made available to the public, so outsiders can only
speculate what’s even being discussed. As the EFF asked, “Is the TPP–Framed as a ‘21st
Century Agreement’–the Best Way to Build a 21st Century Society?” More than anything,
January 18 was about consumers rejecting backroom policy-making designed to bypass
democratic governance. Yet, that’s exactly what the Obama administration keeps doing,
over and over again.
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Conclusion
Franklin D. Roosevelt once said:
[L]et us never forget that government is ourselves and not an alien power
over us. The ultimate rulers of our democracy are not a President and
Senators and Congressmen and Government officials but the voters of this
country.
For one day, on January 18, we reminded our government of this fact. But the burden is on
us–the voters–to make our voices heard again and again. One day isn’t enough. If you don’t
like what you see from the system we have, you do have the power–and, I would argue, the
responsibility–to remind your elected officials of your displeasure. In response to my
unhappiness with some of my elected representatives’ stances on SOPA and copyright
issues, I’ve changed my votes in June–and my vote for President is up-for-grabs in
November based in part on the candidates’ stances on IP (an especially salient issue given
how many times the Obama administration has sold out consumers on IP issues). If you
believe the system needs fixing, I hope you’ll send that message to the folks who are
supposed to be working for you.
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Ticketmaster L.L.C. v. RMG Technologies, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 1096 (C.D. Cal.
2007).
Collins, District Judge.
…I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In this action, Plaintiff Ticketmaster (“Plaintiff” or “Ticketmaster”) alleges that Defendant
RMG has developed and marketed automated devices to access and navigate through
Ticketmaster’s website, thereby infringing Plaintiff’s copyrights and violating the website’s
Terms of Use and a number of federal and state statutes.
Plaintiff Ticketmaster sells tickets for entertainment and sports events on behalf of its
clients to the general public through a variety of means, including its copyrighted website
ticketmaster.com (“website”). Recognizing that competition to purchase tickets can be
intense, Plaintiff contends that it attempts to ensure a fair and equitable ticket buying
process on the website by contract and through technological means. First, visitors to
ticketmaster.com are required to accept contractual provisions set forth in the website’s
“Terms of Use.” These terms permit viewers to use ticketmaster.com for personal use only,
prohibit commercial use, prohibit the use of automatic devices, prohibit users from
accessing ticketing pages more than once during any three second interval, and prohibit
consumers from purchasing more than a specific number of tickets in a single transaction.
Second, Plaintiff contends that it employs a number of technological means to ensure that
ticket buying over the website is fair and equitable. One of these measures is a computer
security program known as CAPTCHA that is designed to distinguish between human
users and computer programs, and thereby prevent purchasers from using automated
devices to purchase tickets.
Plaintiff contends that Defendant RMG has marketed and sold applications that enable
Defendant’s customers to use automated devices to enter and navigate through its website
in violation of the Terms of Use governing the website, thereby causing injury to Plaintiff.
For example, Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s applications are prohibited “automatic
devices,” that the applications circumvent Plaintiff’s access control and copy protection
systems, including CAPTCHA, inundate Plaintiff’s computers with thousands of automatic
requests thereby preventing ordinary consumers from accessing the website, and enable
Defendant’s clients to purchase large quantities of tickets. Based on these allegations,
Plaintiff’s FAC, filed on June 25, 2007, states eleven causes of action against Defendant.
Plaintiff now moves for a preliminary injunction based on five of its claims. Plaintiff’s
evidence in support of its motion includes declarations from its Senior Director of
Applications Support, Kevin McLain, wherein Mr. McLain testifies how he was able to trace
ticket requests and purchases made on ticketmaster.com back to individual users and,
ultimately, to Defendant. Based on his methodology, McLain discovered, for example, that
Chris Kovach, a ticket broker and one of Defendant’s clients, purchased over 9,500 ticket
orders—or 24,000 tickets—over the last several years. McLain also explains that he
identified Gary Charles Bonner and Thomas J. Prior as Defendant’s clients. Using IP
addresses registered to Defendant, Bonner made almost 13,000 ticket purchases over
several years, and made more than 425,000 ticket requests in a single day. Using IP
addresses registered to Defendant, Prior made almost 22,000 ticket orders over several
159.

years, and made more than 600,000 ticket requests in a single day. Plaintiff also submitted
declarations from Kovach; Adam Lieb, a computer and internet consultant; Steven Obara,
Plaintiff’s Director of Customer Service Operations; Mark Lee, an attorney representing
Plaintiff in this matter; and a number of exhibits.
Defendant challenges the Motion on both legal and factual grounds. Defendant states that
the computer application Plaintiff seeks to enjoin Defendant from using and selling is its
Ticket Broker Acquisition Tool (“TBAT”), and that this application is not an “automated
device” but, rather, is simply a type of internet browser, akin to Internet Explorer,
requiring human interaction. Defendant also urges that it should not be bound by the
Terms of Use and that, in any case, Plaintiff has presented no evidence upon which it—as
opposed to the persons using TBAT—can be enjoined. Defendant also argues that Plaintiff’s
legal theories are flawed in various ways….
III. ANALYSIS
The five claims on which Plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction are its claims for violation
of the United States Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 501 et seq., the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (“DMCA”) 17 U.S.C. § 1201, California Penal Code § 502, and the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g), and on its breach of contract claim.
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits.
1. Plaintiff’s Copyright Claim
To prevail on its claim for copyright infringement, Plaintiff must (1) “show ownership of the
allegedly infringed material and (2) [it] must demonstrate that the alleged infringers
violate at least one exclusive right granted to copyright holders under 17 U.S.C. § 106.”
Ticketmaster alleges that RMG is violating its copyright in the ticketmaster.com website.
Ticketmaster has submitted evidence that it owns registered copyrights in the website
ticketmaster.com, and, separately, in portions of the website. “A website may constitute a
work of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression ... Copyright protection for a
website may extend to both the screen displays and the computer code for the website.”
Defendant does not dispute Plaintiff’s claim that its website is copyrighted. Ticketmaster
has thus satisfied the first element of its copyright claim.
Ticketmaster alleges that RMG infringes its copyrights in ticketmaster.com both directly
and indirectly. First, Ticketmaster states that each time Defendant views a page from
ticketmaster.com, a copy of that page is necessarily downloaded or “cached” from Plaintiff’s
computers onto the Defendant’s computer’s random access memory (“RAM”), thus
rendering Defendant directly liable for such copying. Plaintiff also argues that Defendant
directly participates in its customers’ unauthorized access of the website because its
customers do not acquire physical possession of the software. Rather, Defendant’s devices
are kept on Defendant’s own computer systems; in order to gain access to Defendant’s
devices, its customers must log onto Defendant’s website ticketbrokertools.com, and use the
devices hosted on ticketbrokertools.com to improperly access ticketmaster.com. Thus,
Defendant allows and, indeed, requires its customers to go through its own infrastructure
in order to employ the devices that access ticketmaster.com. Defendant denies this factual
allegation and states that “TBAT [has never been] operated from RMG’s computer system
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on behalf of any client, as it is not, nor has it ever, been centrally run on behalf of any
client.”
Second, Plaintiff states that Defendant is indirectly liable for contributory infringement,
vicarious infringement, and inducing copyright infringement because it provides its clients
with bots and other automated devices to infringe Plaintiff’s copyright in its website. Both
direct and indirect infringement occur insofar as the person viewing the website does so in
excess of the authorization Plaintiff grants through the website’s Terms of Use.
a. Defendant’s Direct Liability for Copyright Infringement
Defendant’s direct liability for copyright infringement is based on the automatically-created
copies of ticketmaster.com webpages that are stored on Defendant’s computer each time
Defendant accesses ticketmaster.com. Defendant does not contest that, as a technological
question, whenever a webpage is viewed on a computer, copies of the viewed pages are
made and stored on the viewer’s computer. However, Defendant contends that such
“cached” copies are not “copies” within the meaning of the Copyright Act, that such copies
could not give rise to copyright liability because their creation constitutes fair use, and that
Plaintiff has not shown that any pages from ticketmaster.com were ever downloaded or
stored on Defendant’s computer.
Section 101 of the Copyright Act defines “copies” as “material objects, other than
phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and
from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device.” The Copyright Act also provides that “[a]
work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or
phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to
permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than
transitory duration.”
The copies of webpages stored automatically in a computer’s cache or random access
memory (“RAM”) upon a viewing of the webpage fall within the Copyright Act’s definition of
“copy.” See, e.g., MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir.
1993) (“We recognize that these authorities are somewhat troubling since they do not
specify that a copy is created regardless of whether the software is loaded into the RAM,
the hard disk or the read only memory (‘ROM’). However, since we find that the copy
created in the RAM can be ‘perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,’ we hold
that the loading of software into the RAM creates a copy under the Copyright Act.”) See
also Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Systems Corp., 478 F. Supp. 2d 607,
621 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (agreeing with the “numerous courts [that] have held that the
transmission of information through a computer’s random access memory or RAM ...
creates a ‘copy’ for purposes of the Copyright Act,” and citing cases.) Thus, copies of
ticketmaster.com webpages automatically stored on a viewer’s computer are “copies” within
the meaning of the Copyright Act.
The Court must next determine whether Plaintiff has shown by a preponderance of the
evidence that Defendant did in fact view the website, thereby copying its webpages.
Although Plaintiff does not present direct evidence of such viewing, the logic from which
such an inference may be drawn is compelling. Plaintiff presents expert testimony that
Defendant necessarily had to view ticketmaster.com in order to create the applications that
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enable Defendant’s customers to enter and navigate through the website. Indeed, in order
to test the applications to determine whether they worked as intended, Defendant would
have had to actually use the applications to purchase tickets from the website. By
Defendant’s own description, TBAT is “a browser geared for the purchase of tickets from a
variety of websites including ... ticketmaster.com.” It also follows that Defendant’s clients
would have had to visit the website, and thus copy pages, in order to make ticket purchases.
The Court thus finds that Plaintiff is indeed likely to prove that Defendant visited (and
used) ticketmaster.com and necessarily made copies of pages from the copyrighted website.
Plaintiff also argues that Defendant is directly liable for infringement because its clients
must work through Defendant’s website and computer system in order to use Defendant’s
ticket purchasing software and thereby gain unauthorized access to ticketmaster.com.
Defendant disputes this allegation. However, the Court finds it unnecessary to decide
whether Plaintiff will prevail in its claim for direct infringement by showing that
Defendant directly participates in its clients’ conduct by acting as an intermediary for their
unauthorized use of ticketmaster.com. As discussed above, Plaintiff will likely succeed in its
claim for direct liability by showing that Defendant itself viewed and/or used the website.4
Next, the Court will consider whether Plaintiff is likely to demonstrate that such copying
constitutes copyright infringement. Plaintiff contends that Defendant infringed its
copyrights by accessing and using the copyrighted website in excess of the authorization
granted in the website’s Terms of Use, which Plaintiff contends creates a non-exclusive
license to view (and thus copy) pages from the website. Defendant presents a number of
legal and factual arguments against this theory, but none of them is meritorious.
First, the Court agrees that the Terms of Use presented on ticketmaster.com create a nonexclusive license to copy the website. “The word ‘license,’ means permission, or authority;
and a license to do any particular thing, is a permission or authority to do that thing.” “No
magic words must be included in a document” to create a copyright license. Furthermore,
nonexclusive licenses can be implied from conduct. See Effects Associates, Inc. v. Cohen,
908 F.2d 555, 558-559 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that by creating a work at defendant’s
request and handing it over to defendant to copy and distribute, plaintiff granted defendant
an implied nonexclusive license to the work.) Use of a work in excess of a license gives rise
to liability for copyright infringement.
Plaintiff has presented evidence showing that access to the website is governed by specific
Terms of Use, and that any person viewing the website is put on notice of the Terms of Use.
For example, the ticketmaster.com homepage displays the following warning: “Use of this
website is subject to express Terms of Use which prohibit commercial use of this site. By
continuing past this page, you agree to abide by these terms.” The underlined phrase
“Terms of Use” is a hyperlink to the full Terms of Use; the same phrase appears on almost
every page of ticketmaster.com. In addition, since 2003, users of ticketmaster.com have had
to affirmatively agree to the Terms of Use as part of the procedure to set up an account, and
since mid-2006, users have had to affirmatively agree to the Terms of Use for every ticket
purchase.
In addition, even accepting Defendant’s version of the facts—that its clients download TBAT onto their own
computers and operate it independent of Defendant—its conduct would still render it liable for contributory
infringement, discussed infra.

4
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Having determined that Plaintiff is highly likely to succeed in showing that Defendants
viewed and navigated through ticketmaster.com, the Court further concludes that Plaintiff
is highly likely to succeed in showing that Defendant received notice of the Terms of Use
and assented to them by actually using the website. See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio,
Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (where website’s terms of use stated “by
submitting this query, you agree to abide by these terms,” court held “there can be no
question that [the user of website] manifested its assent to be bound” by the terms of use
when it electronically submitted queries to the database); Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie
Inc., 1998 WL 388389, *2, 6 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (granting preliminary injunction based in part
on breach of “Terms of Service” agreement, to which defendants had assented.) Indeed,
Defendant does not contest that it was on notice of the Terms of Use; rather, Defendant
argues that the Terms of Use do not amount to an agreement or a license, and that the
Terms are too uncertain to be enforced. The Court finds no merit in these arguments.
The Terms of Use governing ticketmaster.com include the following terms:
“You [the viewer] agree that you are only authorized to visit, view and to
retain a copy of pages of this site for your own personal use, and that you
shall not duplicate, download, [or] modify ... the material on this Site for any
purpose other than to review event and promotions information, for personal
use ...”
“No ... areas of this Site may be used by our visitors for any commercial
purposes ...”
“You agree that you will not use any robot, spider or other automated device,
process, or means to access the Site.... You agree that you will not use any
device, software or routine that interferes with the proper working of the Site
nor shall you attempt to interfere with the proper working of the Site.”
“You agree that you will not take any action that imposes an unreasonable or
disproportionately large load on our infrastructure.”
“You agree that you will not access, reload or ‘refresh’ transactional event or
ticketing pages, or make any other request to transactional servers, more
than once during any three second interval.”
“You do not have permission to access this Site in any way that violates ...
these terms of use.”
“You understand and agree that ... Ticketmaster may terminate your access
to this Site, cancel your ticket order or tickets acquired through your ticket
order ... if Ticketmaster believes that your conduct or the conduct of any
person with whom Ticketmaster believes you act in concert ... violates or is
inconsistent with these Terms or the law, or violates the rights of
Ticketmaster, a client of Ticketmaster or another user of the Site.”
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Viewers are thus authorized to view—and thereby copy—pages of the website when they do
so in accordance with the Terms of Use. In addition, Plaintiff reserves the right to
terminate any person’s access to the website if it believes that person violated the Terms of
Use. Thus, by the Terms of Use, Plaintiff grants a nonexclusive license to consumers to copy
pages from the website in compliance with those Terms. Inasmuch as Defendant used the
website, Defendant assented to the terms.
Nor are the terms so vague as to be unenforceable. The above terms permit access for
personal use only, prohibit commercial use, prohibit the use of bots and automated devices,
limit the frequency with which users can make requests of the website, and require the
user to agree not to interfere with the proper working of the website. Defendant argues,
however, that the term “automated device” is confusing. Specifically, Defendant’s President,
Cipriano Garibay, a software designer, testifies in his declaration that TBAT—which he
appears to claim is the only product in issue in this case—is just a web browser and is not
an “automated device” because it requires human interaction to function. Garibay further
claims that he does not know what Plaintiff is referring to by the term “automated device”
because “every computer in the world, as well as all computer programs and web browsers,
have [sic] a large degree of automation built in since they are not run manually. Clearly,
Ticketmaster is not seeking to prohibit all computers and browsers from accessing its
website, otherwise the website would be useless. However, as Ticketmaster has not defined
‘automated device’ in its ‘Terms of Use,’ I can only speculate as to what it means by same.”
This claim is specious. First, the term appears in the provision in which website viewers
agree to “not use any robot, spider or other automated device, process, or means to access
the Site.” (emphasis added). Although the terms of use include no additional definition of
“automated device,” they identify robots and spiders as examples of such devices, which
Garibay states are “programs which by their very nature run without interfacing with
humans.” Plaintiff has submitted credible testimony showing that Defendant’s applications
are, in fact, automated devices. For example, Adam Lieb, a computer consultant who
studied a directory Defendant placed on Kovach’s computer, testified that “the term
‘automated device’ is easy to understand in the context of computer programming”—a field
in which Garibay claims 10 years of experience—and that TBAT is an automated device.
Lieb explains that even though TBAT may require human initialization or set up, the
application generates automated requests thereafter. Based on his examination of the
“super proxy” log files on Kovach’s computer, Lieb states that “several webpage requests
per second were made to Ticketmaster, via the proxy, from the same source IP address.
Thousands of requests were made per day. No human would be able to generate that many
requests during manual, non-automated web browsing. These were automated request[s]
made by an ‘automated device.’”
Based on his personal experience, Kovach describes Defendant’s software as “including
automated devices that RMG calls ‘workers’ that can automatically navigate the
Ticketmaster website.... [M]y level of service enabled me to use multiple workers—
sometimes over one hundred of them—simultaneously to search for and request tickets.”
Kovach further describes how he could command the workers to search for tickets according
to parameters that he would set, and that the workers would search for tickets
automatically and alert him when they found tickets matching his parameters. Indeed,
Defendant’s own website advertises its products as “let[ting] you do the work of a dozen
people at once. Just enter the event information ... and the moment the event goes on sale,
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PurchaseMaster goes into action.” In view of all of the evidence, Plaintiff is highly likely to
succeed on its claim that Defendant’s applications are automated devices that violate the
Terms of Use.
However, even setting aside Plaintiff’s prohibition of automated devices, the application as
described would violate other provisions of the Terms of Use. For example, using an
application that enables a person to make several requests per second would violate the
provision limiting the frequency of requests to no more than one every three seconds.
Furthermore, use of an application designed to thwart Plaintiff’s access control by, in
Defendant’s own description, “stealth technology [that] lets you hide your IP address, so you
never get blocked by Ticketmaster,” (original emphasis) would breach the user’s
agreement to “not use any device, software or routine that interferes with the proper
working of the Site nor shall you attempt to interfere with the proper working of the Site.”
See also Kovach Decl. ¶ 8 (explaining his understanding that the “workers are specifically
designed to navigate or otherwise avoid various security measures on Ticketmaster’s
website.”)
Finally, Defendant argues in summary fashion that to the extent Plaintiff’s claim is
predicated on automatically-made cache copies of Plaintiff’s webpages, such cache copies
constitute fair use as a matter of law under Perfect 10, Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d
701, 716 (9th Cir. 2007). This argument is unavailing for several reasons. First, “[b]ecause
the defendant in an infringement action has the burden of proving fair use, the defendant is
responsible for introducing evidence of fair use in responding to a motion for preliminary
relief.” Here, Defendant has come forward with no evidence of fair use. Nor did Defendant
attempt to explain how its use satisfies any of the four fair use factors set forth in 17 U.S.C.
§ 107. Accordingly, the fair use defense fails to defeat Plaintiff’s motion on these grounds
alone.
Second, Perfect 10 does not stand for the absolute principle of law that Defendant attributes
to it. Rather, Perfect 10 addressed, among other questions, whether users who link to
infringing websites and thus make automatic cache copies of those infringing websites
themselves commit copyright infringement. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court
that such conduct was “fair use in this context” because the caching was “noncommercial,
transformative ... and has a minimal impact on the potential market for the original work.”
Significantly, the Court also noted that “a cache copies no more than necessary to assist the
user in Internet use,” and, in the case before it, the “background copying has no more than
a minimal effect” on the plaintiff’s rights. In this context, by contrast, Defendant is not an
“innocent” third-party visitor to another person’s infringing site. Instead, the purpose of
Defendant’s viewing ticketmaster.com and the copying that necessarily entails is to engage
in conduct that violates the Terms of Use in the ways described above. In addition,
Defendant’s use of the website is to further its own commercial objectives, that is, to create
and sell ticket purchasing applications that can gain unauthorized access to
ticketmaster.com. In addition, in this case, such copying has a significant, as opposed to
minimal, effect on Plaintiff’s rights because Defendant’s conduct empowers its customers to
also violate the Terms of Use, infringe on Plaintiff’s rights, and collectively cause Plaintiff
the harm described below. For all of these reasons, Defendant’s fair use defense fails.
Because the Court finds that Plaintiff has a strong likelihood of proving that Defendant
violated ticketmaster.com’s Terms of Use by using automated devices, making excessive
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requests, and interfering with the proper working of the website when it used and/or
designed applications that access ticketmaster.com, the Court finds that Plaintiff has a
strong likelihood of succeeding on the merits of its claim for direct copyright infringement.
b. Defendant’s Indirect Liability for Copyright Infringement
Plaintiff also argues that it has a strong likelihood of success on its claim for indirect
copyright infringement. The Court agrees.
“One infringes contributorily by intentionally inducing or encouraging direct infringement,
and infringes vicariously by profiting from direct infringement while declining to exercise a
right to stop or limit it.” Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913,
930-931 (2005). Although “[t]he Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable for
infringement committed by another, these doctrines of secondary liability emerged from
common law principles and are well established in the law.” In Grokster, the Supreme
Court held that “one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to
infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster
infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.” Evidence to
support an inducement theory includes, for example “advertisement[s] or solicitation[s] that
broadcast [ ] a message designed to stimulate others to commit violations.” Here, as
described above, there is substantial evidence that Defendant designed its application for
the purpose of giving its clients unauthorized access to ticketmaster.com; Defendant even
advertises its product as “stealth technology [that] lets you hide your IP address, so you
never get blocked by Ticketmaster” (original emphasis.) Designing and marketing a
device whose purpose is to allow unauthorized access to, and thus to infringe on, a
copyrighted website is sufficient to trigger contributory liability for infringement committed
by the device’s immediate users. See, e.g., Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d
259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that providing the site and facilities for known infringing
activity is sufficient to establish contributory liability, and quoting with approval 2 William
F. Patry, Copyright Law & Practice 1147, “Merely providing the means for infringement
may be sufficient” to incur contributory copyright liability.)
As discussed in the Background section, Plaintiff has presented examples of Defendant’s
clients making numerous ticket purchases and ticket requests using Defendant’s
applications and resources, including the examples of Bonner making more than 425,000
requests in a single day, and Prior making more than 600,000 requests in a single day, both
through IP addresses registered to Defendant. Requests so numerous cannot be made other
than with automated devices. Kovach testified how he used Defendant’s applications to
make automated ticket requests, and that Defendant made representatives available to
help him use its applications, circumvent Plaintiff’s security measures, and set up his
hardware for optimal use. Such uses infringe on Plaintiff’s copyrights for the reasons stated
above with regard to Defendant’s direct infringement.
Based on this evidence, the Court finds that Plaintiff is highly likely to prove that
Defendant induced or encouraged its clients’ direct infringement by providing them with
devices that gain them unauthorized access to and use of ticketmaster.com. Plaintiff is
therefore highly likely to succeed in its claim against Defendant for contributory
infringement.
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2. Plaintiff’s Claim Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has violated the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(“DMCA”), 17 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq., by trafficking in technological products, services,
devices, or components that are primarily designed to circumvent Plaintiff’s access control
and copy protection systems. Plaintiff’s Motion relies on two provisions of the DMCA.
First, Plaintiff claims Defendant is liable under section 1201(a)(2), which prohibits
trafficking in devices designed to circumvent “technological measure[s] that effectively
control[ ] access to a work protected under this title.” “A plaintiff alleging a violation of §
1201(a)(2) must prove: (1) ownership of a valid copyright on a work, (2) effectively
controlled by a technological measure, which has been circumvented, (3) that third parties
can now access (4) without authorization, in a manner that (5) infringes or facilitates
infringing a right protected by the Copyright Act, because of a product that (6) the
defendant either (i) designed or produced primarily for circumvention; (ii) made available
despite only limited commercial significance other than circumvention; or (iii) marketed for
use in circumvention of the controlling technological measure.”
The Court finds that Plaintiff is likely to prevail on its section 1201(a)(2) claim. Specifically,
as stated above, Plaintiff is likely to prove that (1) Plaintiff owns copyrights to
ticketmaster.com and specific portions thereof; (2) Plaintiff employs “technological
measures” such as CAPTCHA to block automated access to its copyrighted ticket purchase
pages; (3) Defendant’s customers are third parties who can now access those copyrighted
pages; (4) these parties access those pages without Plaintiff’s authorization; and (5) that
this access infringes Plaintiff’s rights because it entails copying those pages in excess of the
third parties’ license to do so; and (6)(i), (iii) these third parties have such access because of
Defendant’s products designed primarily for circumvention, and marketed for use in
circumvention of the controlling technological measure.
The majority of Defendant’s challenges to Plaintiff’s Motion on the DMCA claim are
repetitive of its arguments with regard to the copyright claim, and are unavailing for the
same reasons. The only unique arguments as to the DMCA claim are that CAPTCHA is not
a system or a program, but is simply an image, and that CAPTCHA is designed to regulate
ticket sales, not to regulate access to a copyrighted work.
First, the Court notes that the DMCA does not equate its use of the term “technological
measure” with Defendant’s terms “system” or “program.” In any case, Plaintiff has
submitted evidence that CAPTCHA is a technological measure that regulates access to a
copyrighted work. Although the DMCA does not appear to include a definition of the term,
it states that “a technological measure ‘effectively controls access to a work’ if the measure,
in the ordinary course of its operation, requires the application of information, or a process
or a treatment, with the authority of the copyright owner, to gain access to the work.” When
the user makes a ticket request on ticketmaster.com, CAPTCHA presents “a box with
stylized random characters partially obscured behind hash marks.” The user is required to
type the characters into an entry on the screen in order to proceed with the request. Most
automated devices cannot decipher and type the random characters and thus cannot
proceed to the copyrighted ticket purchase pages. Thus, because CAPTCHA “in the ordinary
course of its operation, requires the application of information ... to gain access to the
work,” it is a technological measure that regulates access to a copyrighted work. Plaintiff is
therefore likely to prevail on its DMCA § 1201(a)(2) claim.
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Section 1201(b)(1) similarly prohibits the trafficking of devices primarily designed or
produced for the purpose of circumventing “protection afforded by a technological measure
that effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under this title in a work or a portion
thereof.” Sections 1201(a)(2) and 1201(b)(1) differ only in that 1201(a)(2), by its terms,
makes it wrongful to traffic in devices that circumvent technological measures that control
access to protected works, while 1201(b)(1) makes it wrongful to traffic in devices that
circumvent technological measures that protect rights of a copyright owner in a work. Here,
CAPTCHA both controls access to a protected work because a user cannot proceed to
copyright protected webpages without solving CAPTCHA, and protects rights of a copyright
owner because, by preventing automated access to the ticket purchase webpage, CAPTCHA
prevents users from copying those pages. For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that
Plaintiff is likely to prevail on its DMCA §§ 1201(a)(2) and 1201(b)(1) claims.
3. Plaintiff’s Breach of Contract Claim
Plaintiff argues that Defendant is breaching the ticketmaster.com Terms of Use in
numerous ways, and is therefore liable for breach of contract. The facts and issues that this
claim raises are the same as those raised by Plaintiff’s contention, in connection with its
copyright claims, that Defendant breached the Terms of Use. The Court addressed the
merits of that claim in its discussion of Plaintiff’s claim for copyright infringement, and
concluded that Plaintiff is highly likely to prove that use of ticketmaster.com is governed by
the Terms of Use; that Defendant was on notice of, and assented to, the Terms of Use; and
that Defendant violated the Terms of Use by using automated devices to access the website,
using an application that makes several requests per second (in violation of the provision
limiting the frequency of requests to no more than one every three seconds), and by using
an application designed to thwart Plaintiff’s access controls (which breaches the user’s
agreement to “not use any device, software or routine that interferes with the proper
working of the Site nor shall you attempt to interfere with the proper working of the Site.”).
The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff is therefore likely to prevail on its breach of
contract claim.
4. Plaintiff’s Computer Fraud and Abuse Act Claim
Plaintiff also argues that it is likely to prevail on its claim under the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act (“CFAA”), 18 U.S.C. § 1030. Although the CFAA is a criminal statute, it permits
“any person who suffers damage or loss” through a violation of its provisions “to maintain a
civil action ... to obtain compensatory damages and injunctive relief or other equitable
relief.” To prevail on its CFAA claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate that Defendant
“intentionally accesse[d] a computer without authorization or exceed[ed] authorized access,
and thereby obtain[ed] information from any protected computer,” or that Defendant
“knowingly cause[d] the transmission of a program ... and ... cause [d] damage without
authorization to a protected computer.” Plaintiff must also demonstrate that Defendant’s
unauthorized access caused $5,000 in loss or damage during a one year period.
It appears likely that Plaintiff will be able to prove that Defendant gained unauthorized
access to, and/or exceeded authorized access to, Plaintiff’s protected computers, and caused
damage thereby. Based on the statute and the cases Plaintiff cites, the Court also agrees
that the required $5,000 of harm may consist of harm to a computer system, and need not
be suffered by just one computer during one particular intrusion. However, because
Plaintiff has not quantified its harm as required by the statute or even attempted to show
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what portion of the harm is attributable to Defendant, the Court cannot find that Plaintiff
has affirmatively shown that its harm caused by Defendant exceeds the $5,000 minimum.
Thus, the CFAA claim does not provide a basis for a preliminary injunction.
In light of the Court’s rulings on Plaintiff’s copyright, DMCA, and breach of contract claims,
the Court need not address whether Plaintiff is likely to succeed on its claims under
California Penal Code § 502, the fifth basis asserted for the preliminary injunction.
B. Irreparable Harm
Having determined that Plaintiff has a strong likelihood of success on the merits of its
copyright, DMCA, and breach of contract claims, the Court now addresses whether Plaintiff
has shown “the possibility of irreparable injury.”
For Plaintiff’s copyright claim, “a showing of a reasonable likelihood of success on the
merits raises a presumption of irreparable harm.” “A copyright holder seeking a
preliminary injunction is therefore not required to make an independent demonstration of
irreparable harm.” Here, because Plaintiff has shown a strong likelihood of success on the
merits of its copyright claim, the Court presumes irreparable harm. Defendant has done
nothing to rebut that presumption.
The Court also finds that Plaintiff has otherwise shown the possibility of irreparable harm
required to support the issuance of a preliminary injunction on its DMCA and breach of
contract claims. Specifically, Plaintiff has submitted extensive evidence demonstrating that
it is suffering a loss of goodwill with the buying public in that there is a growing public
perception that Plaintiff does not provide the public with a fair opportunity to buy tickets
due to automated purchases. Such evidence includes numerous complaints from consumers
about the unavailability of tickets, some of which demonstrate extreme dissatisfaction with
Plaintiff and indicate suspicions that Plaintiff is colluding with ticket brokers to deny
consumers tickets.5 Plaintiff has also submitted copies of consumer comments posted on
blogs expressing similar extreme dissatisfaction6 and evidence of numerous news stories
discussing the unavailability of tickets. For example, many of the news stories concern the
unavailability of tickets to concerts in Hannah Montana’s “Best of Both Worlds” tour. Based
on the reports, many parents expressed disappointed and outrage at Plaintiff because
tickets to many Hannah Montana concerts throughout the nation (Bossier City, Louisiana;
Miami, Florida; Atlanta, Georgia; and Kansas City, Missouri, for example) were snapped up
within several hours—and sometimes within minutes—of their release for sale. It also
appears that the public’s difficulty obtaining tickets to the Hannah Montana concerts was
so severe and created such an outcry that the Attorneys General of Missouri and Arkansas
initiated investigations into Plaintiff’s ticket selling practices….
Plaintiff’s brief quotes several of the complaints compiled in Exhibit 19. One such complaint states: “I would
like to know how within 20 seconds of a show going on sale I could not find ANY seats together at ANY price at
this event. However, there are gobs of them for sale on many different scalper sites. How is this possible and
why is this tolerated. The only explanation for this is that people inside TM are in cahoots with these criminals.
I would just like to know if there are any plans whatsoever to address this situation.”
6 For example, the following is a comment posted by someone who could not obtain tickets to a performance of
the rock group “Rush”: “I am absolutely irate about TicketBxxxxxd and its practices. As has been mentioned on
this site already, the whole process of getting tickets to concerts has gotten completely out of control with
scalpers, brokers, and God-knows-who-else trying to make a buck at the expense of fans.”
5
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Although the extent of Defendant’s culpability for this harm to Plaintiff’s goodwill cannot
yet be determined, it is likely that some of Defendant’s customers were able to obtain
tickets to such concerts by using Defendant’s applications. Given the alleged extent of
Defendant’s participation in the hundreds of thousands of automated ticket requests
wrongfully made of Plaintiff’s website, it is likely that Defendant’s conduct has caused, and
will continue to cause, some portion of Plaintiff’s loss of goodwill unless Defendant’s conduct
is enjoined. As a consequence of Plaintiff’s loss of consumer goodwill, Plaintiff also faces the
possibility of loss of goodwill and loss of business from its clients.
In this Circuit, intangible injuries, such as damage to goodwill, can constitute irreparable
harm. Plaintiff has also submitted evidence that it has attempted to use technological
countermeasures to prevent automated ticket requests, but that these efforts have had only
limited success. Thus, the Court is not persuaded by Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff’s
self-help measures (such as “blacklisting” IP addresses) are enough to prevent irreparable
harm and thus obviate the need for injunctive relief. In addition, the cost to Plaintiff of
developing and implementing such countermeasures is not easily calculable. For the
foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated the possibility of
irreparable harm….
NOTES AND QUESTIONS
What exactly was the prima facie case of copyright infringement? And why did the fair use
defense fail?
Why wasn’t there sufficient damage to support the Computer Fraud & Abuse Act claim?
You probably aren’t sympathetic to RMG. But are you sympathetic to Ticketmaster?
Denouement. RMG ultimately defaulted, so Ticketmaster got a default judgment of $18.2M
in damages plus $350,000 in attorneys’ fees. Also, several states have enacted “anti-RMG”
laws making it illegal to use software to electronically jump a ticket-buying queue.
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VI.

Trademarks and Domain Names

Trademark FAQs Excerpts (from http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/tac/tmfaq.htm)
(accessed August 5, 2007) (omitted questions aren’t indicated)
What is a trademark?
A trademark includes any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination, used, or
intended to be used, in commerce to identify and distinguish the goods of one manufacturer
or seller from goods manufactured or sold by others, and to indicate the source of the goods.
In short, a trademark is a brand name.
What is a service mark?
A service mark is any word, name, symbol, device, or any combination, used, or intended to
be used, in commerce, to identify and distinguish the services of one provider from services
provided by others, and to indicate the source of the services.
What is a certification mark?
A certification mark is any word, name, symbol, device, or any combination, used, or
intended to be used, in commerce with the owner’s permission by someone other than its
owner, to certify regional or other geographic origin, material, mode of manufacture,
quality, accuracy, or other characteristics of someone’s goods or services, or that the work or
labor on the goods or services was performed by members of a union or other organization.
What is a collective mark?
A collective mark is a trademark or service mark used, or intended to be used, in commerce,
by the members of a cooperative, an association, or other collective group or organization,
including a mark which indicates membership in a union, an association, or other
organization.
Do I have to register my trademark?
No, but federal registration has several advantages, including notice to the public of the
registrant’s claim of ownership of the mark, a legal presumption of ownership nationwide,
and the exclusive right to use the mark on or in connection with the goods or services set
forth in the registration.
What are the benefits of federal trademark registration?
1. Constructive notice nationwide of the trademark owner’s claim.
2. Evidence of ownership of the trademark.
3. Jurisdiction of federal courts may be invoked.
4. Registration can be used as a basis for obtaining registration in foreign countries.
5. Registration may be filed with U.S. Customs Service to prevent importation of infringing
foreign goods.
Are there federal regulations governing the use of the designations “TM” or “SM” with
trademarks?
No. Use of the symbols “TM” or “SM” (for trademark and service mark, respectively) may,
however, be governed by local, state, or foreign laws and the laws of the pertinent
jurisdiction must be consulted. These designations usually indicate that a party claims
rights in the mark and are often used before a federal registration is issued.
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When is it proper to use the federal registration symbol (the letter R enclosed within a circle
— ® — with the mark.
The federal registration symbol may be used once the mark is actually registered in the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. Even though an application is pending, the registration
symbol may not be used before the mark has actually become registered. The federal
registration symbol should only be used on goods or services that are the subject of the
federal trademark registration. [Note: Several foreign countries use the letter R enclosed
within a circle to indicate that a mark is registered in that country. Use of the symbol by
the holder of a foreign registration may be proper.]
What constitutes interstate commerce?
For goods, “Interstate commerce” involves sending the goods across state lines with the
mark displayed on the goods or the packaging for the goods. With services, “interstate
commerce” involves offering a service to those in another state or rendering a service which
affects interstate commerce (e.g. restaurants, gas stations, hotels, etc.).
Is a federal registration valid outside the United States?
No. However, if you are a qualified owner of a trademark application pending before the
USPTO, or of a registration issued by the USPTO, you may seek registration in any of the
countries that have joined the Madrid Protocol by filing a single application, called an
“international application,” with the he International Bureau of the World Property
Intellectual Organization, through the USPTO. For more information about the Madrid
Protocol, click here.
Also, certain countries recognize a United States registration as a basis for filing an
application to register a mark in those countries under international treaties….
What are common law rights?
Federal registration is not required to establish rights in a trademark. Common law rights
arise from actual use of a mark. Generally, the first to either use a mark in commerce or file
an intent to use application with the Patent and Trademark Office has the ultimate right to
use and registration. However, there are many benefits of federal trademark registration.
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Trademark Glossary
Likelihood of Confusion
Ninth Circuit “Sleekcraft” Factors (from the Ninth Circuit Model Civil Jury Instructions
18.15)
1. STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OF THE PLAINTIFF’S MARK. The more
the consuming public recognizes the plaintiff’s trademark as an indication of
origin of the plaintiff’s goods, the more likely it is that consumers would be
confused about the source of the defendant’s goods if the defendant uses a
similar mark.
2.DEFENDANT’S USE OF THE MARK. If the defendant and plaintiff use
their trademarks on the same, related, or complementary kinds of goods
there may be a greater likelihood of confusion about the source of the goods
than otherwise.
3. SIMILARITY OF PLAINTIFF’S AND DEFENDANT’S MARKS. If the
overall impression created by the plaintiff’s trademark in the marketplace is
similar to that created by the defendant’s trademark in [appearance] [sound]
or [meaning], there is a greater chance [that consumers are likely to be
confused by defendant’s use of a mark] [of likelihood of confusion].
[Similarities in appearance, sound or meaning weigh more heavily than
differences in finding the marks are similar].
4. ACTUAL CONFUSION. If use by the defendant of the plaintiff’s
trademark has led to instances of actual confusion, this strongly suggests a
likelihood of confusion. However actual confusion is not required for a finding
of likelihood of confusion. Even if actual confusion did not occur, the
defendant’s use of the trademark may still be likely to cause confusion, you
may conclude that the amount of actual confusion was not substantial. As
you consider whether the trademark used by the defendant creates for
consumers a likelihood of confusion with the plaintiff’s trademark, you should
weigh any instances of actual confusion against the opportunities for such
confusion. If the instances of actual confusion have been relatively frequent,
you may find that there has been substantial actual confusion. If, by contrast,
there is a very large volume of sales, but only a few isolated instances of
actual confusion you may find that there has not been substantial actual
confusion.
5. DEFENDANT’S INTENT. Knowing use by defendant of the plaintiff’s
trademark to identify similar goods may strongly show an intent to derive
benefit from the reputation of the plaintiff’s mark, suggesting an intent to
cause a likelihood of confusion. On the other hand, even in the absence of
proof that the defendant acted knowingly, the use of plaintiff’s trademark to
identify similar goods may indicate a likelihood of confusion.
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6. MARKETING/ADVERTISING CHANNELS. If the plaintiff’s and
defendant’s (goods) (services) are likely to be sold in the same or similar
stores or outlets, or advertised in similar media, this may increase the
likelihood of confusion.
7. PURCHASER’S DEGREE OF CARE. The more sophisticated the potential
buyers of the goods or the more costly the goods, the more careful and
discriminating the reasonably prudent purchaser exercising ordinary caution
may be. They may be less likely to be confused by similarities in the
plaintiff’s and defendant’s trademarks
8. PRODUCT LINE EXPANSION. When the parties’ products differ, you may
consider how likely the plaintiff is to begin selling the products for which the
defendant is using the plaintiff’s trademark. If there is a strong possibility of
expanding into the other party’s market, there is a greater likelihood of
confusion.
Dilution
(1) mark is “famous” = “widely recognized by the general consuming public of the United
States”
- advertising/publicity duration/extent/geographic reach
- amount/volume/geographic extent of sales
- actual recognition
- registration?
(2) defendant used in commerce
(3) defendant’s use began after the mark became famous
(4) dilution
- blurring = impairs distinctiveness (factors: mark similarity; level of distinctiveness;
degree of exclusivity; level of recognition)
- tarnishment = harms reputation
Nominative Use (from New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing, 971 F.2d 302
(9th Cir. 1992))
(1) “the product or service in question must be one not readily identifiable without use of
the trademark”
(2) “only so much of the mark or marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to identify
the product or service”
(3) “the user must do nothing that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest
sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder”
Uniform Dispute Resolution Procedure
(1)
(2)

the domain name is confusing similar (or identical) to a third party’s mark
the registrant has no legitimate interests in the name

But registrant can show legitimate rights by:
- actual or planned bona fide offering of goods/services;
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- it is commonly known by the domain name; or
- making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use without intent for commercial gain,
misleading diversion of traffic, or dilution.
(3)

the name is being used in bad faith:
- acquired the name for profitable resale;
- registered the name to block the legitimate TM owner if a pattern can be shown;
- acquired name to disrupt a competitor; or
- name is intended to attract attention to site by creating a likelihood of confusion.

Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
(1) Domain name registrant registers a domain name containing a third party trademark
(2) has a bad faith intent to profit from the domain name
- the registrant’s IP rights in the domain name
- if the domain name contains the registrant’s real name
- the use of the domain name in a bona fide offering of goods/services
- a bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the domain name
- an intent to divert consumers in a way that harms the trademark owner’s goodwill
- an offer to sell the domain name without having used it for a bona fide offering of
goods/services
- providing false contact info
- multiple bogus registrations
- distinctiveness/famousness of the mark
(3) registers, traffics in or uses a domain name that is identical or confusingly similar to the
mark or, in the case of a famous mark, dilutes it.
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Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 2005).
Motz, Circuit Judge.
Christopher Lamparello appeals the district court’s order enjoining him from maintaining a
gripe website critical of Reverend Jerry Falwell. For the reasons stated below, we reverse.
I.
Reverend Falwell is “a nationally known minister who has been active as a commentator on
politics and public affairs.” He holds the common law trademarks “Jerry Falwell” and
“Falwell,” and the registered trademark “Listen America with Jerry Falwell.” Jerry Falwell
Ministries can be found online at “www.falwell.com,” a website which receives 9,000 hits (or
visits) per day.
Lamparello registered the domain name “www.fallwell.com” on February 11, 1999, after
hearing Reverend Falwell give an interview “in which he expressed opinions about gay
people and homosexuality that [Lamparello] considered ... offensive.” Lamparello created a
website at that domain name to respond to what he believed were “untruths about gay
people.” Lamparello’s website included headlines such as “Bible verses that Dr. Falwell
chooses to ignore” and “Jerry Falwell has been bearing false witness (Exodus 20:16) against
his gay and lesbian neighbors for a long time.” The site also contained in-depth criticism of
Reverend Falwell’s views. For example, the website stated:
Dr. Falwell says that he is on the side of truth. He says that he will preach
that homosexuality is a sin until the day he dies. But we believe that if the
reverend were to take another thoughtful look at the scriptures, he would
discover that they have been twisted around to support an anti-gay political
agenda ... at the expense of the gospel.
Although the interior pages of Lamparello’s website did not contain a disclaimer, the
homepage prominently stated, “This website is NOT affiliated with Jerry Falwell or his
ministry”; advised, “If you would like to visit Rev. Falwell’s website, you may click here”;
and provided a hyperlink to Reverend Falwell’s website.
At one point, Lamparello’s website included a link to the Amazon.com webpage for a book
that offered interpretations of the Bible that Lamparello favored, but the parties agree that
Lamparello has never sold goods or services on his website. The parties also agree that
“Lamparello’s domain name and web site at www.fallwell.com,” which received only 200
hits per day, “had no measurable impact on the quantity of visits to [Reverend Falwell’s]
web site at www.falwell.com.”
Nonetheless, Reverend Falwell sent Lamparello letters in October 2001 and June 2003
demanding that he cease and desist from using www.fallwell.com or any variation of
Reverend Falwell’s name as a domain name. Ultimately, Lamparello filed this action
against Reverend Falwell and his ministries (collectively referred to hereinafter as
“Reverend Falwell”), seeking a declaratory judgment of noninfringement. Reverend Falwell
counter-claimed, alleging trademark infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2000), false

176.

designation of origin under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), unfair competition under 15 U.S.C. § 1126
and the common law of Virginia,1 and cybersquatting under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d).
The parties stipulated to all relevant facts and filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
The district court granted summary judgment to Reverend Falwell, enjoined Lamparello
from using Reverend Falwell’s mark at www.fallwell.com, and required Lamparello to
transfer the domain name to Reverend Falwell. However, the court denied Reverend
Falwell’s request for statutory damages or attorney fees, reasoning that the “primary
motive” of Lamparello’s website was “to put forth opinions on issues that were contrary to
those of [Reverend Falwell]” and “not to take away monies or to profit.”
Lamparello appeals the district court’s order; Reverend Falwell cross-appeals the denial of
statutory damages and attorney fees. We review de novo a district court’s ruling on crossmotions for summary judgment. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v.
Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 364 (4th Cir. 2001) [hereinafter “PETA”].
II.
We first consider Reverend Falwell’s claims of trademark infringement and false
designation of origin.
A….
Both infringement and false designation of origin have five elements. To prevail under
either cause of action, the trademark holder must prove:
(1) that it possesses a mark; (2) that the [opposing party] used the mark; (3)
that the [opposing party’s] use of the mark occurred “in commerce”; (4) that
the [opposing party] used the mark “in connection with the sale, offering for
sale, distribution, or advertising” of goods or services; and (5) that the
[opposing party] used the mark in a manner likely to confuse consumers.
Trademark law serves the important functions of protecting product identification,
providing consumer information, and encouraging the production of quality goods and
services. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995). But protections
“‘against unfair competition’” cannot be transformed into “‘rights to control language.’”
“Such a transformation” would raise serious First Amendment concerns because it would
limit the
ability to discuss the products or criticize the conduct of companies that may
be of widespread public concern and importance. Much useful social and
commercial discourse would be all but impossible if speakers were under

…because “[t]he test for trademark infringement and unfair competition under the Lanham Act is essentially
the same as that for common law unfair competition under Virginia law because both address the likelihood of
confusion as to the source of the goods or services involved,” Reverend Falwell’s state-law unfair competition
claim rises or falls with his federal claims of infringement and false designation of origin. Therefore, we will not
analyze his state-law claim separately.
1
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threat of an infringement lawsuit every time they made reference to a person,
company or product by using its trademark.
Lamparello and his amici argue at length that application of the Lanham Act must be
restricted to “commercial speech” to assure that trademark law does not become a tool for
unconstitutional censorship. The Sixth Circuit has endorsed this view, see Taubman Co. v.
Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 774 (6th Cir. 2003), and the Ninth Circuit recently has done so as
well, see Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 674 (9th Cir. 2005).
In its two most significant recent amendments to the Lanham Act, the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act of 1995 (“FTDA”) and the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1999
(“ACPA”), Congress left little doubt that it did not intend for trademark laws to impinge the
First Amendment rights of critics and commentators. The dilution statute applies to only a
“commercial use in commerce of a mark,” and explicitly states that the “[n]oncommercial
use of a mark” is not actionable. Congress explained that this language was added to
“adequately address [ ] legitimate First Amendment concerns,” and “incorporate[d] the
concept of ‘commercial’ speech from the ‘commercial speech’ doctrine.” Similarly, Congress
directed that in determining whether an individual has engaged in cybersquatting, the
courts may consider whether the person’s use of the mark is a “bona fide noncommercial or
fair use.” The legislature believed this provision necessary to “protect[ ] the rights of
Internet users and the interests of all Americans in free speech and protected uses of
trademarked names for such things as parody, comment, criticism, comparative
advertising, news reporting, etc.”
In contrast, the trademark infringement and false designation of origin provisions of the
Lanham Act (Sections 32 and 43(a), respectively) do not employ the term “noncommercial.”
They do state, however, that they pertain only to the use of a mark “in connection with the
sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services,” or “in connection
with any goods or services.” But courts have been reluctant to define those terms narrowly.2
Rather, as the Second Circuit has explained, “[t]he term ‘services’ has been interpreted
broadly” and so “[t]he Lanham Act has ... been applied to defendants furnishing a wide
variety of non-commercial public and civic benefits.” Similarly, in PETA we noted that a
website need not actually sell goods or services for the use of a mark in that site’s domain
name to constitute a use “‘in connection with’ goods or services.” PETA, 263 F.3d at 365; see
also Taubman Co., 319 F.3d at 775 (concluding that website with two links to websites of
for-profit entities violated the Lanham Act).
Thus, even if we accepted Lamparello’s contention that Sections 32 and 43(a) of the
Lanham Act apply only to commercial speech, we would still face the difficult question of
what constitutes such speech under those provisions. In the case at hand, we need not
resolve that question or determine whether Sections 32 and 43(a) apply exclusively to
commercial speech because Reverend Falwell’s claims of trademark infringement and false
designation fail for a more obvious reason. The hallmark of such claims is a likelihood of
confusion—and there is no likelihood of confusion here.

2 Indeed, Lamparello agreed at oral argument that the Lanham Act’s prohibitions on infringement and false
designation apply to more than just commercial speech as defined by the Supreme Court.
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B.
1.
“[T]he use of a competitor’s mark that does not cause confusion as to source is permissible.”
Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., Accordingly, Lamparello can only be liable for
infringement and false designation if his use of Reverend Falwell’s mark would be likely to
cause confusion as to the source of the website found at www.fallwell.com. This likelihoodof-confusion test “generally strikes a comfortable balance” between the First Amendment
and the rights of markholders.
We have identified seven factors helpful in determining whether a likelihood of confusion
exists as to the source of a work, but “not all these factors are always relevant or equally
emphasized in each case.” The factors are: “(a) the strength or distinctiveness of the mark;
(b) the similarity of the two marks; (c) the similarity of the goods/services the marks
identify; (d) the similarity of the facilities the two parties use in their businesses; (e) the
similarity of the advertising used by the two parties; (f) the defendant’s intent; (g) actual
confusion.”
Reverend Falwell’s mark is distinctive, and the domain name of Lamparello’s website,
www.fallwell.com, closely resembles it. But, although Lamparello and Reverend Falwell
employ similar marks online, Lamparello’s website looks nothing like Reverend Falwell’s;
indeed, Lamparello has made no attempt to imitate Reverend Falwell’s website. Moreover,
Reverend Falwell does not even argue that Lamparello’s website constitutes advertising or
a facility for business, let alone a facility or advertising similar to that of Reverend Falwell.
Furthermore, Lamparello clearly created his website intending only to provide a forum to
criticize ideas, not to steal customers.
Most importantly, Reverend Falwell and Lamparello do not offer similar goods or services.
Rather they offer opposing ideas and commentary. Reverend Falwell’s mark identifies his
spiritual and political views; the website at www.fallwell.com criticizes those very views.
After even a quick glance at the content of the website at www.fallwell.com, no one seeking
Reverend Falwell’s guidance would be misled by the domain name—www.fallwell.com—
into believing Reverend Falwell authorized the content of that website. No one would
believe that Reverend Falwell sponsored a site criticizing himself, his positions, and his
interpretations of the Bible.3
Finally, the fact that people contacted Reverend Falwell’s ministry to report that they
found the content at www.fallwell.com antithetical to Reverend Falwell’s views does not
illustrate, as Reverend Falwell claims, that the website engendered actual confusion. To the
contrary, the anecdotal evidence Reverend Falwell submitted shows that those searching
for Reverend Falwell’s site and arriving instead at Lamparello’s site quickly realized that
Reverend Falwell was not the source of the content therein.

If Lamparello had neither criticized Reverend Falwell by name nor expressly rejected Reverend Falwell’s
teachings, but instead simply had quoted Bible passages and offered interpretations of them subtly different
from those of Reverend Falwell, this would be a different case. For, while a gripe site, or a website dedicated to
criticism of the markholder, will seldom create a likelihood of confusion, a website purporting to be the official
site of the markholder and, for example, articulating positions that could plausibly have come from the
markholder may well create a likelihood of confusion.
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For all of these reasons, it is clear that the undisputed record evidences no likelihood of
confusion. In fact, Reverend Falwell even conceded at oral argument that those viewing the
content of Lamparello’s website probably were unlikely to confuse Reverend Falwell with
the source of that material.
2.
Nevertheless, Reverend Falwell argues that he is entitled to prevail under the “initial
interest confusion” doctrine. This relatively new and sporadically applied doctrine holds
that “the Lanham Act forbids a competitor from luring potential customers away from a
producer by initially passing off its goods as those of the producer’s, even if confusion as to
the source of the goods is dispelled by the time any sales are consummated.” According to
Reverend Falwell, this doctrine requires us to compare his mark with Lamparello’s website
domain name, www.fallwell.com, without considering the content of Lamparello’s website.
Reverend Falwell argues that some people who misspell his name may go to
www.fallwell.com assuming it is his site, thus giving Lamparello an unearned audience—
albeit one that quickly disappears when it realizes it has not reached Reverend Falwell’s
site. This argument fails for two reasons.
First, we have never adopted the initial interest confusion theory; rather, we have followed
a very different mode of analysis, requiring courts to determine whether a likelihood of
confusion exists by “examin[ing] the allegedly infringing use in the context in which it is
seen by the ordinary consumer.”
Contrary to Reverend Falwell’s arguments, we did not abandon this approach in PETA. Our
inquiry in PETA was limited to whether Doughney’s use of the domain name
“www.peta.org” constituted a successful enough parody of People for the Ethical Treatment
of Animals that no one was likely to believe www.peta.org was sponsored or endorsed by
that organization. For a parody to be successful, it “must convey two simultaneous—and
contradictory—messages: that it is the original, but also that it is not the original and is
instead a parody.” Doughney argued that his domain name conveyed the first message (that
it was PETA’s website) and that the content of his website conveyed the requisite second
message (that it was not PETA’s site). Although “[t]he website’s content ma[de] it clear that
it [wa]s not related to PETA,” we concluded that the website’s content could not convey the
requisite second message because the site’s content “[wa]s not conveyed simultaneously
with the first message, [i.e., the domain name itself,] as required to be considered a parody.”
Accordingly, we found the “district court properly rejected Doughney’s parody defense.”
PETA simply outlines the parameters of the parody defense; it does not adopt the initial
interest confusion theory or otherwise diminish the necessity of examining context when
determining whether a likelihood of confusion exists. Indeed, in PETA itself, rather than
embracing a new approach, we reiterated that “[t]o determine whether a likelihood of
confusion exists, a court should not consider how closely a fragment of a given use
duplicates the trademark, but must instead consider whether the use in its entirety creates a
likelihood of confusion.” (emphasis added). When dealing with domain names, this means a
court must evaluate an allegedly infringing domain name in conjunction with the content of
the website identified by the domain name.4
Contrary to Reverend Falwell’s suggestions, this rule does not change depending on how similar the domain
name or title is to the mark. Hence, Reverend Falwell’s assertion that he objects only to Lamparello using the
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Moreover, even if we did endorse the initial interest confusion theory, that theory would not
assist Reverend Falwell here because it provides no basis for liability in circumstances such
as these. The few appellate courts that have followed the Ninth Circuit and imposed
liability under this theory for using marks on the Internet have done so only in cases
involving a factor utterly absent here—one business’s use of another’s mark for its own
financial gain.
Profiting financially from initial interest confusion is thus a key element for imposition of
liability under this theory.5 When an alleged infringer does not compete with the
markholder for sales, “some initial confusion will not likely facilitate free riding on the
goodwill of another mark, or otherwise harm the user claiming infringement. Where
confusion has little or no meaningful effect in the marketplace, it is of little or no
consequence in our analysis.” For this reason, even the Ninth Circuit has stated that a firm
is not liable for using another’s mark in its domain name if it “could not financially
capitalize on [a] misdirected consumer [looking for the markholder’s site] even if it so
desired.”
This critical element—use of another firm’s mark to capture the markholder’s customers
and profits—simply does not exist when the alleged infringer establishes a gripe site that
criticizes the markholder. See Hannibal Travis, The Battle For Mindshare: The Emerging
Consensus that the First Amendment Protects Corporate Criticism and Parody on the
Internet, 10 VA. J.L. & TECH. 3, 85 (Winter 2005) (“The premise of the ‘initial interest’
confusion cases is that by using the plaintiff’s trademark to divert its customers, the
defendant is engaging in the old ‘bait and switch.’ But because ... Internet users who find
[gripe sites] are not sold anything, the mark may be the ‘bait,’ but there is simply no
‘switch.’”) (citations omitted).6 Applying the initial interest confusion theory to gripe sites
like Lamparello’s would enable the markholder to insulate himself from criticism—or at
least to minimize access to it. We have already condemned such uses of the Lanham Act,
stating that a markholder cannot “‘shield itself from criticism by forbidding the use of its
name in commentaries critical of its conduct.’” “[J]ust because speech is critical of a
corporation and its business practices is not a sufficient reason to enjoin the speech.”
domain name www.fallwell.com and has no objection to Lamparello posting his criticisms at
“www.falwelliswrong.com,” or a similar domain name, does not entitle him to a different evaluation rule. Rather
it has long been established that even when alleged infringers use the very marks at issue in titles, courts look
to the underlying content to determine whether the titles create a likelihood of confusion as to source.
5 Offline uses of marks found to cause actionable initial interest confusion also have involved financial gain. And
even those courts recognizing the initial interest confusion theory of liability but finding no actionable initial
confusion involved one business’s use of another’s mark for profit.
6 Although the appellate courts that have adopted the initial interest confusion theory have only applied it to
profit-seeking uses of another’s mark, the district courts have not so limited the application of the theory.
Without expressly referring to this theory, two frequently-discussed district court cases have held that using
another’s domain name to post content antithetical to the markholder constitutes infringement. See Planned
Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 1997 WL 133313 (S.D.N.Y. March 24, 1997), aff’d, 152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir.
1998) (table) (finding use of domain name “www.plannedparenthood.com” to provide links to passages of antiabortion book constituted infringement); Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282 (D. N.J. 1998), aff’d, 159
F.3d 1351 (3d Cir. 1998) (table) (finding use of “www.jewsforjesus.org” to criticize religious group constituted
infringement). We think both cases were wrongly decided to the extent that in determining whether the domain
names were confusing, the courts did not consider whether the websites’ content would dispel any confusion. In
expanding the initial interest confusion theory of liability, these cases cut it off from its moorings to the
detriment of the First Amendment.
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In sum, even if we were to accept the initial interest confusion theory, that theory would
not apply in the case at hand. Rather, to determine whether a likelihood of confusion exists
as to the source of a gripe site like that at issue in this case, a court must look not only to
the allegedly infringing domain name, but also to the underlying content of the website.
When we do so here, it is clear, as explained above, that no likelihood of confusion exists.
Therefore, the district court erred in granting Reverend Falwell summary judgment on his
infringement, false designation, and unfair competition claims.
III.
We evaluate Reverend Falwell’s cybersquatting claim separately because the elements of a
cybersquatting violation differ from those of traditional Lanham Act violations. To prevail
on a cybersquatting claim, Reverend Falwell must show that Lamparello: (1) “had a bad
faith intent to profit from using the [www.fallwell.com] domain name,” and (2) the domain
name www.fallwell.com “is identical or confusingly similar to, or dilutive of, the distinctive
and famous [Falwell] mark.”
“The paradigmatic harm that the ACPA was enacted to eradicate” is “the practice of
cybersquatters registering several hundred domain names in an effort to sell them to the
legitimate owners of the mark.” Lucas Nursery & Landscaping, Inc. v. Grosse, 359 F.3d
806, 810 (6th Cir. 2004). The Act was also intended to stop the registration of multiple
marks with the hope of selling them to the highest bidder, “distinctive marks to defraud
consumers” or “to engage in counterfeiting activities,” and “well-known marks to prey on
consumer confusion by misusing the domain name to divert customers from the mark
owner’s site to the cybersquatter’s own site, many of which are pornography sites that
derive advertising revenue based on the number of visits, or ‘hits,’ the site receives.” S.Rep.
No. 106-140. The Act was not intended to prevent “noncommercial uses of a mark, such as
for comment, criticism, parody, news reporting, etc.,” and thus they “are beyond the scope”
of the ACPA.
To distinguish abusive domain name registrations from legitimate ones, the ACPA directs
courts to consider nine nonexhaustive factors [the court then quotes the statute]….
These factors attempt “to balance the property interests of trademark owners with the
legitimate interests of Internet users and others who seek to make lawful uses of others’
marks, including for purposes such as comparative advertising, comment, criticism, parody,
news reporting, fair use, etc.” H.R. Rep. No. 106-412 (emphasis added). “The first four
[factors] suggest circumstances that may tend to indicate an absence of bad-faith intent to
profit from the goodwill of a mark, and the others suggest circumstances that may tend to
indicate that such bad-faith intent exists.” Id. However, “[t]here is no simple formula for
evaluating and weighing these factors. For example, courts do not simply count up which
party has more factors in its favor after the evidence is in.” In fact, because use of these
listed factors is permissive, “[w]e need not ... march through” them all in every case. “The
factors are given to courts as a guide, not as a substitute for careful thinking about whether
the conduct at issue is motivated by a bad faith intent to profit.”
After close examination of the undisputed facts involved in this case, we can only conclude
that Reverend Falwell cannot demonstrate that Lamparello “had a bad faith intent to profit
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from using the [www.fallwell.com] domain name.” Lamparello clearly employed
www.fallwell.com simply to criticize Reverend Falwell’s views. Factor IV of the ACPA
counsels against finding a bad faith intent to profit in such circumstances because “use of a
domain name for purposes of ... comment, [and] criticism,” constitutes a “bona fide
noncommercial or fair use” under the statute.7 That Lamparello provided a link to an
Amazon.com webpage selling a book he favored does not diminish the communicative
function of his website. The use of a domain name to engage in criticism or commentary
“even where done for profit” does not alone evidence a bad faith intent to profit, H.R. Rep.
No. 106-412, and Lamparello did not even stand to gain financially from sales of the book at
Amazon.com. Thus factor IV weighs heavily in favor of finding Lamparello lacked a bad
faith intent to profit from the use of the domain name.
Equally important, Lamparello has not engaged in the type of conduct described in the
statutory factors as typifying the bad faith intent to profit essential to a successful
cybersquatting claim. First, we have already held that Lamparello’s domain name does not
create a likelihood of confusion as to source or affiliation. Accordingly, Lamparello has not
engaged in the type of conduct—”creating a likelihood of confusion as to the source,
sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the site”—described as an indicator of a bad faith
intent to profit in factor V of the statute.
Factors VI and VIII also counsel against finding a bad faith intent to profit here.
Lamparello has made no attempt—or even indicated a willingness—”to transfer, sell, or
otherwise assign the domain name to [Reverend Falwell] or any third party for financial
gain.” Similarly, Lamparello has not registered “multiple domain names”; rather, the record
indicates he has registered only one. Thus, Lamparello’s conduct is not of the suspect
variety described in factors VI and VIII of the Act.
Notably, the case at hand differs markedly from those in which the courts have found a bad
faith intent to profit from domain names used for websites engaged in political commentary
or parody. For example, in PETA we found the registrant of www.peta.org engaged in
cybersquatting because www.peta.org was one of fifty to sixty domain names Doughney had
registered and because Doughney had evidenced a clear intent to sell www.peta.org to
PETA, stating that PETA should try to “‘settle’ with him and ‘make him an offer.’”
Similarly, in Coca-Cola Co. v. Purdy, 382 F.3d 774 (8th Cir. 2004), the Eighth Circuit found
an anti-abortion activist who had registered domain names incorporating famous marks
such as “Washington Post” liable for cybersquatting because he had registered almost
seventy domain names, had offered to stop using the Washington Post mark if the
newspaper published an opinion piece by him on its editorial page, and posted content that
created a likelihood of confusion as to whether the famous markholders sponsored the antiabortion sites and “ha[d] taken positions on hotly contested issues.” In contrast, Lamparello
did not register multiple domain names, he did not offer to transfer them for valuable
consideration, and he did not create a likelihood of confusion.
We note that factor IV does not protect a faux noncommercial site, that is, a noncommercial site created by the
registrant for the sole purpose of avoiding liability under the FTDA, which exempts noncommercial uses of
marks, or under the ACPA. As explained by the Senate Report discussing the ACPA, an individual cannot avoid
liability for registering and attempting to sell a hundred domain names incorporating famous marks by posting
noncommercial content at those domain names. But Lamparello’s sole purpose for registering www.fallwell.com
was to criticize Reverend Falwell, and this noncommercial use was not a ruse to avoid liability. Therefore, factor
IV indicates that Lamparello did not have a bad faith intent to profit.
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Instead, Lamparello, like the plaintiffs in two cases recently decided by the Fifth and Sixth
Circuits, created a gripe site. Both courts expressly refused to find that gripe sites located
at domain names nearly identical to the marks at issue violated the ACPA. In TMI, Inc. v.
Maxwell, 368 F.3d 433, 434-35 (5th Cir. 2004), Joseph Maxwell, a customer of homebuilder
TMI, registered the domain name “www.trendmakerhome.com,” which differed by only one
letter from TMI’s mark, TrendMaker Homes, and its domain name,
“www.trendmakerhomes.com.” Maxwell used the site to complain about his experience with
TMI and to list the name of a contractor whose work pleased him. After his registration
expired, Maxwell registered “www.trendmakerhome.info.” TMI then sued, alleging
cybersquatting. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s finding that Maxwell violated
the ACPA, reasoning that his site was noncommercial and designed only “to inform
potential customers about a negative experience with the company.”
Similarly, in Lucas Nursery & Landscaping, a customer of Lucas Nursery registered the
domain name “www.lucasnursery.com” and posted her dissatisfaction with the company’s
landscaping services. Because the registrant, Grosse, like Lamparello, registered a single
domain name, the Sixth Circuit concluded that her conduct did not constitute that which
Congress intended to proscribe—i.e., the registration of multiple domain names. Noting
that Grosse’s gripe site did not create any confusion as to sponsorship and that she had
never attempted to sell the domain name to the markholder, the court found that Grosse’s
conduct was not actionable under the ACPA. The court explained: “One of the ACPA’s main
objectives is the protection of consumers from slick internet peddlers who trade on the
names and reputations of established brands. The practice of informing fellow consumers of
one’s experience with a particular service provider is surely not inconsistent with this
ideal.”
Like Maxwell and Grosse before him, Lamparello has not evidenced a bad faith intent to
profit under the ACPA. To the contrary, he has used www.fallwell.com to engage in the type
of “comment[ ][and] criticism” that Congress specifically stated militates against a finding
of bad faith intent to profit. And he has neither registered multiple domain names nor
attempted to transfer www.fallwell.com for valuable consideration. We agree with the Fifth
and Sixth Circuits that, given these circumstances, the use of a mark in a domain name for
a gripe site criticizing the markholder does not constitute cybersquatting.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, Lamparello, rather than Reverend Falwell, is entitled to
summary judgment on all counts. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is reversed
and the case is remanded for entry of judgment for Lamparello.
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NOTES AND QUESTIONS
Website Evolution. Lamparello’s website evolved substantially over the years. Screen shot
from October 1999:

185.

Screen shot from October 2002:
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Screen shot from July 2003:

For a moment, put aside your legal hat. Which (if any) of these screenshots would you find
confusing if you visited it for the first time?
Other Questions. Why were the parties fighting over the domain name? Why did Rev.
Falwell want the domain name enough to fight for it to the Fourth Circuit? Why did
Lamparello care so much about this domain name that it was worth fighting back?
How did Lamparello make a trademark “use in commerce”?
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Promatek Industries, Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2002).
Williams, Circuit Judge.
This appeal concerns the propriety of a preliminary injunction in which one competitor,
Promatek, prevailed against another, Equitrac. The preliminary injunction was issued
without a hearing and Equitrac had to place language on its web page to remedy violations
of the Lanham Act. Equitrac now appeals that order and because the district court did not
abuse its discretion, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Promatek and Equitrac are competitors in selling cost-recovery equipment. Equitrac’s
marketing department advised its web designer that certain words and phrases should be
used as metatags for Equitrac’s website.1 In response, the web designer placed the term
“Copitrack” in the contents of Equitrac’s website as a metatag.* Equitrac used the term as a
metatag because it provides maintenance and service on Copitrak equipment, a product
used in the cost-recovery business.2 Promatek holds the trademark for Copitrak, and once it
learned of Equitrac’s use of the term Copitrack in the metatag, it brought suit. After
learning of Promatek’s suit, Equitrac contacted all of the search engines known to it and
requested that they remove any link between the term Copitrack and Equitrac’s website.
Equitrac also removed the Copitrack metatag from its
website.
Not satisfied with Equitrac’s remedial measures, Promatek sought a preliminary injunction
preventing Equitrac from using the term Copitrack in its website. After receiving materials
submitted by both parties, the district court granted Promatek’s motion for preliminary
injunction. Under the terms of the injunction, Equitrac was directed to place language on
its web page informing consumers that any link between its website and Copitrack was in
error:
1 [Quoting Brookfield for this definition:] Metatags are HTML [HyperText Markup Language] code intended to
describe the contents of the web site. There are different types of metatags, but those of principal concern to us
are the “description” and “keyword” metatags. The description metatags are intended to describe the web site;
the keyword metatags, at least in theory, contain keywords relating to the contents of the web site. The more
often a term appears in the metatags and in the text of the web page, the more likely it is that the web page will
be “hit” in a search for that keyword and the higher on the list of “hits” the web page will appear.
* Editor’s note: the site’s metatags from May 11, 2000:
<head>
<BASE HREF=“http://www.equitrac.com/”>
<meta NAME=“description” CONTENT=“Equitrac Corporation is the global leader in
automated cost recovery and expense management solutions. The company’s System 4,
OfficeTrac, DebitLog, PAS and PrintLog software and Alpha hardware track, record and report
on print, copy, fax, postage and phone usage of office equipment.”>
<meta NAME=“keywords” CONTENT=“PrintLog, printing, tracking, copying, cost recovery,
billback, disbursements, clients, projects, printers, copiers, networking, hardcopy, vending,
accounting, reporting, billing, Equitrac, System 4, Copitrack, PAS, pcounter, xcounter,
uniprint, ocs, plotting, software, transactions, DebitLog, Telemetrac, Telemate, Officetrac,
Disbursemate, copy centers, HP, Xerox, Canon, Ricoh, Savin, Mita, Toshiba, Pitney, Metrics,
document, copies”>
<title>Equitrac Corporation</title>
<meta name=“Microsoft Border” content=“none”>
</head>
2 The parties agree that Equitrac meant to use the term “Copitrak” as its metatag rather than “Copitrack.”
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If you were directed to this site through the term “Copitrack,” that is in error
as there is no affiliation between Equitrac and that term. The mark
“Copitrak” is a registered trademark of Promatek Industries, Ltd., which can
be found at www.promatek.com or www.copitrak.com.
Equitrac appeals the issuance of the injunction, arguing that the ordered language will not
only inform consumers of its competitor, Promatek, but will encourage people to go to
Promatek’s website. Promatek counters that without this language, Equitrac will continue
to benefit, to Promatek’s detriment, from consumer internet searches containing the word
Copitrack. We conclude that the district court was correct in finding Promatek would suffer
a greater harm than Equitrac if corrective measures were not taken, and we affirm the
grant of the preliminary injunction.
II. ANALYSIS…
A. The District Court Was Correct in Granting the Injunction
1. Likelihood of success on the merits
Equitrac argues that because there was no likelihood of success on the merits of Promatek’s
Lanham Act claim, the district court erred in granting the preliminary injunction. In order
to prevail under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), Promatek must establish that
Copitrak is a protectable trademark and that Equitrac’s use of the term is likely to cause
confusion among consumers. Preregistration of Promatek’s Copitrak trademark is prima
facie evidence of the mark’s validity, which Equitrac does not dispute. Therefore, we turn to
the issue of whether consumers would be confused by Equitrac’s use of Copitrak as a
metatag.
In assessing the likelihood of consumer confusion, we consider: (1) the similarity between
the marks in appearance and suggestion, (2) the similarity of the products, (3) the area and
manner of concurrent use of the products, (4) the degree of care likely to be exercised by
consumers, (5) the strength of the plaintiff’s marks, (6) any evidence of actual confusion,
and (7) the defendant’s intent to palm off its goods as those of the plaintiff’s. None of these
factors are dispositive and the proper weight given to each will vary in each case. However,
the similarity of the marks, the defendant’s intent, and evidence of actual confusion are of
particular importance.
Given these factors, it is clear that Promatek has a fair likelihood of succeeding on the
merits of its Lanham Act claim. Although Promatek has not provided us with evidence
regarding the strength of its Copitrak mark or evidence of any actual consumer confusion,
the other factors weigh in its favor. First, not only are the marks Copitrack and Copitrak
similar, Equitrac admits that it meant to use the correct spelling of Copitrak in its metatag.
Second, Equitrac’s use of Copitrack refers to Promatek’s registered trademark, Copitrak.
Additionally, Equitrac and Promatek are direct competitors in the cost-recovery and costcontrol equipment and services market. Most importantly, for purposes of this case,
however, is the degree of care to be exercised by consumers.
Although Equitrac claims that it did not intend to mislead consumers with respect to
Copitrak, the fact remains that there is a strong likelihood of consumer confusion as a
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result of its use of the Copitrack metatag. The degree of care exercised by consumers could
lead to initial interest confusion. Initial interest confusion, which is actionable under the
Lanham Act, occurs when a customer is lured to a product by the similarity of the mark,
even if the customer realizes the true source of the goods before the sale is consummated.
The Ninth Circuit has dealt with initial interest confusion for websites and metatags and
held that placing a competitor’s trademark in a metatag creates a likelihood of confusion. In
Brookfield Communications, the court found that although consumers are not confused
when they reach a competitor’s website, there is nevertheless initial interest confusion.
This is true in this case, because by Equitrac’s placing the term Copitrack in its metatag,
consumers are diverted to its website and Equitrac reaps the goodwill Promatek developed
in the Copitrak mark. That consumers who are misled to Equitrac’s website are only briefly
confused is of little or no consequence. In fact, “that confusion as to the source of a product
or service is eventually dispelled does not eliminate the trademark infringement which has
already occurred.” What is important is not the duration of the confusion, it is the
misappropriation of Promatek’s goodwill. Equitrac cannot unring the bell. As the court in
Brookfield explained, “[u]sing another’s trademark in one’s metatags is much like posting a
sign with another’s trademark in front of one’s store.” Customers believing they are
entering the first store rather than the second are still likely to mill around before they
leave. The same theory is true for websites. Consumers who are directed to Equitrac’s
webpage are likely to learn more about Equitrac and its products before beginning a new
search for Promatek and Copitrak. Therefore, given the likelihood of initial consumer
confusion, the district court was correct in finding Promatek could succeed on the merits.
2. No adequate remedy at law
A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must also prove that it has no adequate remedy
at law and as a result, will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not issued.
Furthermore, it is well settled that injuries arising from Lanham Act violations are
presumed to be irreparable, even if the plaintiff fails to demonstrate a business loss.
As has been discussed, Promatek has suffered injury to its consumer goodwill through
Equitrac’s use of Copitrack as a metatag and would have continued to suffer in the absence
of an injunction. This damage would have constituted irreparable harm for which Promatek
had no adequate remedy. Because of the difficulty in assessing the damages associated with
a loss of goodwill, the district court was correct in finding that Promatek lacked an
adequate remedy at law.
3. Balancing of the harms
The final factor we must consider is the balance of harms—the irreparable harm Equitrac
will suffer if the injunction is enforced weighed against the irreparable harm Promatek will
suffer if it is not. We must also consider the effect the injunction will have on the public. We
review a district court’s balancing of the harms for an abuse of discretion.
In finding that the harm to Promatek as a result of denying the injunction outweighed the
harm to Equitrac in granting it, the district court found, and we agree, that without the
injunction, Equitrac would continue to attract consumers browsing the web by using
Promatek’s trademark, thereby acquiring goodwill that belongs to Promatek. In response,
Equitrac points out that even though it offers products for sale on its website, it has yet to
consummate a sale by this means. Furthermore, Equitrac claims that “consumers of
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products and services provided by Equitrac and Promatek are sophisticated business people
who are not likely to be confused between Equitrac and Copitrak and are not likely to buy
based on a visit to a website.”
Although Equitrac claims that the language on its website is harmful because it alerts
consumers to Promatek’s website, it has not provided any evidence of customers it has lost
as a result of the remedial language. Indeed the remedial language on the website is more
informative than it is harmful. Equitrac’s speculative argument that Promatek may gain a
competitive advantage by inclusion of the remedial language is rejected. As to the public
interest, because the injunction prevents consumer confusion in the marketplace, the public
interest will be served as well. Accordingly, the strong likelihood of consumer confusion
weighs strongly in favor of issuing the injunction, and the district court did not abuse its
discretion in finding this to be the case.
B. No evidentiary hearing was needed….
Equitrac claims that the court should not have issued the preliminary injunction without a
hearing. Specifically, Equitrac argues that because the court failed to find, and did not
receive evidence to contradict, Equitrac’s position that it was entitled to advertise that it
was capable of servicing Copitrak equipment, Promatek’s motion for a preliminary
injunction should have been denied. Equitrac’s argument misses the point. What is
relevant to the preliminary injunction is not that Equitrac may advertise that it is capable
of servicing Copitrak. Equitrac is free to do so; it is also free to place comparison claims on
its website, or include press releases involving the litigation between Equitrac and
Promatek. It is Equitrac’s use of the term Copitrack in its metatag that is a prohibited
practice because of its potential for customer confusion. [Editor’s note: regarding this
italicized language, see below] Because Equitrac failed to demonstrate that its evidence
would weaken Promatek’s case, an evidentiary hearing was not necessary….
Promatek Industries, Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., October 18, 2002 Amendment
The slip opinion of this Court issued on 8/13/02 is hereby amended as follows: On page 9,
the second-to-last sentence of the first paragraph (beginning “It is Equitrac’s use of the
term...”) should be removed and replaced with the following: “The problem here is not that
Equitrac, which repairs Promatek products, used Promatek’s trademark in its metatag, but
that it used that trademark in a way calculated to deceive consumers into thinking that
Equitrac was Promatek. Id.” Immediately following the sentence to be inserted above, the
following footnote should be inserted: “It is not the case that trademarks can never appear
in metatags, but that they may only do so where a legitimate use of the trademark is being
made.”
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NOTES AND QUESTIONS
Screen Shots. The Equitrac home page from May 2002—missing a few graphical elements,
but showing the disclaimer:
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Google’s 2001 search results for “Copitrak”:

Google’s 2001 search results for “Copitrack”:
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Who Won This Case? Think carefully about the parties’ stated objectives. We know
Promatek won the appeal, but which party do you think better fulfilled its objectives?
Non-deceptive Metatag Usage? The court says that Equitrac loses because “it used that
trademark in a way calculated to deceive consumers into thinking that Equitrac was
Promatek.” How, exactly, did Equitrac’s use of the keyword metatags satisfy this standard?
For many years, courts adopted a de facto rule that including a third party trademark in
the website’s metatags was per se infringing. In addition to the Promatek case, other cases
supporting this proposition include Venture Tape Corp. v. McGills Glass Warehouse. 540
F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2008) and North American Medical Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc. 522
F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 2008). Recently, some courts have shown signs of rethinking this de
facto rule. See, e.g., Southern Snow Mfg. Inc. v. Sno Wizards Holdings, Inc., 2011 WL
601639 (E.D. La. 2011).
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Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced System Concepts, Inc., 2011 WL 815806
(9th Cir. March 8, 2011)
Wardlaw, Circuit Judge.
“We must be acutely aware of excessive rigidity when applying the law in the
Internet context; emerging technologies require a flexible approach.”
Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999).
Network Automation (“Network”) and Advanced Systems Concepts (“Systems”) are both in
the business of selling job scheduling and management software, and both advertise on the
Internet. Network sells its software under the mark AutoMate, while Systems’ product is
sold under the registered trademark ActiveBatch. Network decided to advertise its product
by purchasing certain keywords, such as “ActiveBatch,” which when keyed into various
search engines, most prominently Google and Microsoft Bing, produce a results page
showing “www.NetworkAutomation.com” as a sponsored link. Systems’ objection to
Network’s use of its trademark to interest viewers in Network’s website gave rise to this
trademark infringement action.
The district court was confronted with the question whether Network’s use of ActiveBatch
to advertise its products was a clever and legitimate use of readily available technology,
such as Google’s AdWords, or a likely violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114. The
court found a likelihood of initial interest confusion by applying the eight factors we
established more than three decades ago in AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th
Cir. 1979), and reasoning that the three most important factors in “cases involving the
Internet” are (1) the similarity of the marks; (2) the relatedness of the goods; and (3) the
marketing channel used. The court therefore issued a preliminary injunction against
Network’s use of the mark ActiveBatch.
Mindful that the sine qua non of trademark infringement is consumer confusion, and that
the Sleekcraft factors are but a nonexhaustive list of factors relevant to determining the
likelihood of consumer confusion, we conclude that Systems’ showing of a likelihood of
confusion was insufficient to support injunctive relief. Therefore, we vacate the injunction
and reverse and remand.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Systems is a software engineering and consulting firm founded in 1981. It has used the
ActiveBatch trademark since 2000, and it procured federal registration of the mark in 2001.
Systems markets ActiveBatch software to businesses, which use the product to centralize
and manage disparate tasks. Network is a software company founded in 1997 under the
name Unisyn. Its signature product, AutoMate, also provides businesses with job
scheduling, event monitoring, and related services. Network has approximately 15,000
total customers, and between 4,000 and 5,000 active customers, including Fortune 500
companies and mid-sized and small firms. The cost of a license to use AutoMate typically
ranges from $995 to $10,995. There is no dispute that Network and Systems are direct
competitors, or that ActiveBatch and AutoMate are directly competing products.

195.

Google AdWords is a program through which the search engine sells “keywords,” or search
terms that trigger the display of a sponsor’s advertisement. When a user enters a keyword,
Google displays the links generated by its own algorithm in the main part of the page, along
with the advertisements in a separate “sponsored links” section next to or above the
objective results. Multiple advertisers can purchase the same keyword, and Google charges
sponsors based on the number of times users click on an ad to travel from the search results
page to the advertiser’s own website. Network purchased “ActiveBatch” as a keyword from
Google AdWords and a comparable program offered by Microsoft’s Bing search engine.
As a result, consumers searching for business software who enter “ActiveBatch” as a search
term would locate a results page where the top objective results are links to Systems’ own
website and various articles about the product. In the “Sponsored Links” or “Sponsored
Sites” section of the page, above or to the right of the regular results, users see Network’s
advertisement, either alone or alongside Systems’ own sponsored link. The text of
Network’s advertisements begin with phrases such as “Job Scheduler,” “Intuitive Job
Scheduler,” or “Batch Job Scheduling,” and end with the company’s web site address,
www.NetworkAutomation.com. The middle line reads: “Windows Job Scheduling + Much
More. Easy to Deploy, Scalable. D/L Trial.”

Screenshot from the court’s opinion
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Screenshot taken March 17, 2011
On November 16, 2009, Systems demanded that Network cease and desist from using the
ActiveBatch mark in its search engine advertising, as it was not “authorized to use these
marks in commerce.” In a second letter, Systems explained that Network’s use of
ActiveBatch in its Google AdWords keyword advertising infringed Systems’ trademark
rights by deceiving customers into believing that Network’s software products were
affiliated with Systems’ products. Systems threatened litigation unless Network
immediately ceased all use of Systems’ mark, including removing the mark from the Google
AdWords Program. Network responded that its use of the ActiveBatch mark was noninfringing as a matter of law, and filed this lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment of noninfringement. Systems counterclaimed on February 22, 2010, alleging trademark
infringement under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1), and moved for a preliminary
injunction against Network’s use of the ActiveBatch mark pending trial.
The district court granted injunctive relief on April 30, 2010. Noting that the parties did
not dispute the validity or ownership of the ActiveBatch mark, the district court ruled that
Systems was likely to succeed in satisfying the Lanham Act’s “use in commerce”
requirement by showing that Network “used” the mark when it purchased advertisements
from search engines triggered by the term “ActiveBatch.” Applying the eight-factor
Sleekcraft test for source confusion, the district court emphasized three factors it viewed as
significant for “cases involving the Internet”: the similarity of the marks, relatedness of the
goods or services, and simultaneous use of the Web as a marketing channel. The district
court concluded that all three factors favored Systems: Network used the identical mark to
sell a directly competing product, and both advertised on the Internet.
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The district court also concluded that Systems’ mark was strong because, as a federally
registered trademark, ActiveBatch is presumptively distinctive. It concluded that the
degree of consumer care suggested likely confusion because “there is generally a low degree
of care exercised by Internet consumers.” Moreover, Network intentionally used Systems’
mark to advertise its own product. Finally, the district court noted that neither party
introduced evidence of actual confusion, and that the likelihood of product expansion was
not relevant.
The district court also analyzed whether Network infringed Systems’ mark by creating
initial interest confusion—as opposed to source confusion—which “occurs when the
defendant uses the plaintiff’s trademark in a manner calculated to capture initial consumer
attention, even though no actual sale is finally completed as a result of the confusion.”
Because the district court found that Network’s advertisements did not clearly divulge their
source, it concluded that consumers might be confused into unwittingly visiting Network’s
website, allowing the company to “impermissibly capitalize[ ] on [Systems’] goodwill.”
Based on its analysis of the Sleekcraft factors and its finding of likely initial interest
confusion, the district court concluded that Systems had a strong likelihood of success on
the merits of its trademark infringement claim. It then presumed a likelihood of
irreparable harm, and concluded that the balance of hardships and the public interest
favored Systems. Following entry of the preliminary injunction, Network timely
appealed….
III. DISCUSSION…
To prevail on a claim of trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114, a
party “must prove: (1) that it has a protectible ownership interest in the mark; and (2) that
the defendant’s use of the mark is likely to cause consumer confusion.”
Network does not contest the ownership or its use of the mark. We note that the district
court correctly found the prerequisite “use in commerce” in Network’s use of the mark to
purchase keywords to advertise its products for sale on the Internet. Previously we have
assumed, without expressly deciding, that the use of a trademark as a search engine
keyword that triggers the display of a competitor’s advertisement is a “use in commerce”
under the Lanham Act. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d
1020, 1024 (9th Cir. 2004); Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1053. We now agree with the Second
Circuit that such use is a “use in commerce” under the Lanham Act. See Rescuecom Corp.
v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that Google’s sale of trademarks as
search engine keywords is a use in commerce); see also J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY
ON TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITIon §§ 23:11.50, 25:70:25 (4th ed. 2010) (suggesting
that cases taking a more restrictive view of “use” in this context are based on an erroneous
interpretation of the Lanham Act).
This case, therefore, turns on whether Network’s use of Systems’ trademark is likely to
cause consumer confusion. Network argues that its use of Systems’ mark is legitimate
“comparative, contextual advertising” which presents sophisticated consumers with clear
choices. Systems characterizes Network’s behavior differently, accusing it of misleading
consumers by hijacking their attention with intentionally unclear advertisements. To
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resolve this dispute we must apply the Sleekcraft test in a flexible manner, keeping in mind
that the eight factors it recited are not exhaustive, and that only some of them are relevant
to determining whether confusion is likely in the case at hand.
A.
In Sleekcraft, we…identified eight “relevant” factors for determining whether consumers
would likely be confused by related goods: “[1] strength of the mark; [2] proximity of the
goods; [3] similarity of the marks; [4] evidence of actual confusion; [5] marketing channels
used; [6] type of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser;[7]
defendant’s intent in selecting the mark; and [8] likelihood of expansion of the product
lines.” We also noted that “the list is not exhaustive,” and that “[o]ther variables may come
into play depending on the particular facts presented.”
The Sleekcraft factors are intended as an adaptable proxy for consumer confusion, not a
rote checklist. See, e.g., Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand Mgmt.,
Inc., 618 F.3d 1025, 1030 (9th Cir. 2010) (“This eight-factor analysis is ‘pliant,’ illustrative
rather than exhaustive, and best understood as simply providing helpful guideposts.”);
Dreamwerks Prod. Grp., Inc. v. SKG Studio, 142 F.3d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The
factors should not be rigidly weighed; we do not count beans.”); Eclipse Assoc. Ltd. v. Data
Gen. Corp., 894 F.2d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 1990) (“These tests were not meant to be
requirements or hoops that a district court need jump through to make the
determination.”).
When we first confronted issues of trademark infringement and consumer confusion in the
Internet context over a decade ago in Brookfield, we noted that “[w]e must be acutely aware
of excessive rigidity when applying the law in the Internet context; emerging technologies
require a flexible approach.”… There, Brookfield, a software company, marketed an
entertainment database program under the mark MovieBuff. It sold the software, and
offered access to the database, on its website, moviebuffonline.com. West Coast, a video
retailer, had registered the mark The Movie Buff’s Movie Store. West Coast operated a
website using the domain name moviebuff.com, which included a film database that
competed with Brookfield’s product.
We held that Brookfield was likely to succeed in its claim to be the senior user of
MovieBuff, and that there was a likelihood of source confusion stemming from West Coast’s
use of the mark in its domain name. “Heeding our repeated warnings against simply
launching into a mechanical application of the eight-factor Sleekcraft test,” we determined
that three of the eight factors were the most important in analyzing source confusion in the
context of Internet domain names: (1) the similarity of the marks; (2) the relatedness of the
goods and services offered; and (3) the simultaneous use of the Internet as a marketing
channel. Reasoning that the two marks were virtually identical in terms of sight, sound
and meaning, that West Coast and Brookfield both offered products and services relating to
movies, and that they both used the Web as a marketing and advertising device, we
concluded that consumer confusion was likely, particularly given the nature of the
consumers at issue, who included casual movie watchers unlikely to realize that they had
mistakenly clicked on to West Coast’s site when they had intended to reach Brookfield’s.
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Brookfield also asserted that West Coast infringed its mark by causing initial interest
confusion because it had included MovieBuff in its “metatags,” code not visible to web users
embedded in a website to attract search engines seeking a corresponding keyword.3
Although were we to apply the same analysis in the metatags context as we did in the
domain name context, we would easily reach the same conclusion as to each of the factors
(with the possible exception of purchaser care), we declined to do so, reasoning that the
“question in the metatags context is quite different.” In the metatags context, the question
was whether West Coast could use the mark MovieBuff in the metatags of its website to
attract search engines to locate its site when the keyword “MovieBuff” was entered, a
question analogous to the issue presented here. As in the domain name context, the degree
of care and sophistication of the consumer was a key factor, although the outcome differed.
We did not find a likelihood of source confusion because the results list from a search for
“MovieBuff” would result in a list that included both Brookfield’s and West Coast’s
websites, and if the consumer clicked on West Coast’s site its own name was “prominently
display[ed].” Thus a consumer was much less likely to be confused about which site he was
viewing.
Finding no source confusion, we nonetheless concluded that West Coast’s use of MovieBuff
in its metatags was likely to cause initial interest confusion. That is, by using Brookfield’s
mark MovieBuff to direct persons searching for Brookfield’s product to the West Coast site,
West Coast derived an improper benefit from the goodwill Brookfield developed in its mark.
Five years later in Playboy, we considered the practice of “keying”—another situation
analogous to that here. Netscape operated a search engine that offered an early version of
a keyword advertising program. It sold lists of terms to sponsors, and when users searched
for the keywords on the list, the sponsor’s advertisement would be displayed on the results
page. Netscape required its advertisers from the adult entertainment industry to link their
ads to one such list that contained more than 400 terms, including trademarks held by
Playboy. Playboy sued, contending that this practice infringed its trademarks in violation
of the Lanham Act. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Netscape.
We reversed, holding that summary judgment was inappropriate because genuine issues of
material fact existed as to whether Netscape’s keying practices constituted actionable
infringement. Following Brookfield, we analyzed the keying issue in terms of initial
interest confusion, “find[ing] insufficient evidence to defeat summary judgment on any
other theory.” Playboy claimed that Netscape “misappropriated the goodwill of [its] marks
by leading Internet users to competitors’ websites just as West Coast ... misappropriated
the goodwill of Brookfield’s mark.” In framing the initial interest confusion inquiry, we
stressed that Playboy’s infringement claim relied on the fact that the linked banner
advertisements were “unlabeled,” and were, therefore, more likely to mislead consumers
into believing they had followed a link to Playboy’s own website.
In Playboy, as in Brookfield, we applied the Sleekcraft test flexibly, determining that
evidence of actual confusion was the most important factor. Playboy had introduced an
expert study showing that a “statistically significant number” of Internet users searching
for the terms “playboy” and “playmate” would think that Playboy itself sponsored the
Modern search engines such as Google no longer use metatags. Instead they rely on their own algorithms to
find websites.
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banner advertisements which appeared on the search results page. We noted that this
study “alone probably suffices to reverse the grant of summary judgment,” but we
nonetheless analyzed other relevant Sleekcraft factors. As to the strength of the mark, we
credited Playboy’s expert reports showing it had created strong secondary meanings for
“playboy” and “playmate.” This suggested that consumers who entered these terms were
likely searching for Playboy’s products in particular. Analyzing the nature of the goods and
consumer, we “presume[d] that the average searcher seeking adult-oriented materials on
the Internet is easily diverted from a specific product he or she is seeking if other options,
particularly graphic ones, appear more quickly.” We concluded that there were genuine
issues of material fact with respect to whether consumers were likely to be confused by
Netscape’s keying practices.
Concurring, Judge Berzon was struck by how analytically similar the keyed advertisements
in Playboy were to the infringing metatags in Brookfield. We agree, and also find similarity
to the use of the keyword “ActiveBatch” in this case. Judge Berzon cautioned that a broad
reading of Brookfield’s metatags holding could result in a finding of initial interest
confusion “when a consumer is never confused as to source or affiliation, but instead knows,
or should know, from the outset that a product or web link is not related to that of the
trademark holder because the list produced by the search engine so informs him.” She
clarified that the Playboy panel’s holding was limited to “situations in which the banner
advertisements are not labeled or identified.”
Judge Berzon analogized the experience of browsing clearly labeled keyword
advertisements to shopping at Macy’s, explaining that if a shopper en route to the Calvin
Klein section is diverted by a prominently displayed Charter Club (Macy’s own brand)
collection and never reaches the Calvin Klein collection, it could not be said that Macy’s had
infringed on Calvin Klein’s trademark by diverting the customer to it with a clearly labeled,
but more prominent display. Therefore, it would be wrong to expand the initial interest
confusion theory of infringement beyond the realm of the misleading and deceptive to the
context of legitimate comparative and contextual advertising.
B.
Here we consider whether the use of another’s trademark as a search engine keyword to
trigger one’s own product advertisement violates the Lanham Act. We begin by examining
the Sleekcraft factors that are most relevant to the determination whether the use is likely
to cause initial interest confusion.4 While the district court analyzed each of the Sleekcraft
factors, it identified the three most important factors as (1) the similarity of the marks, (2)
the relatedness of the goods or services, and (3) the simultaneous use of the Web as a
marketing channel, for any case addressing trademark infringement on the Internet….
However, we did not intend Brookfield to be read so expansively as to forever enshrine
these three factors—now often referred to as the “Internet trinity” or “Internet troika”—as
the test for trademark infringement on the Internet. Brookfield was the first to present a
claim of initial interest confusion on the Internet; we recognized at the time it would not be
the last, and so emphasized flexibility over rigidity. Depending on the facts of each specific
case arising on the Internet, other factors may emerge as more illuminating on the question
4
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of consumer confusion. In Brookfield, we used the “troika” factors to analyze the risk of
source confusion generated by similar domain names, but we did not wholesale adopt them
in the metatag analysis. Subsequent courts similarly have found the “troika” helpful to
resolve disputes involving websites with similar names or appearances. The leading
trademark treatise correctly explains that the “troika” analysis “is appropriate for domain
name disputes.”
Given the multifaceted nature of the Internet and the ever-expanding ways in which we all
use the technology, however, it makes no sense to prioritize the same three factors for every
type of potential online commercial activity. The “troika” is a particularly poor fit for the
question presented here. The potential infringement in this context arises from the risk
that while using Systems’ mark to search for information about its product, a consumer
might be confused by a results page that shows a competitor’s advertisement on the same
screen, when that advertisement does not clearly identify the source or its product.
In determining the proper inquiry for this particular trademark infringement claim, we
adhere to two long stated principles: the Sleekcraft factors (1) are non-exhaustive, and (2)
should be applied flexibly, particularly in the context of Internet commerce. Finally,
because the sine qua non of trademark infringement is consumer confusion, when we
examine initial interest confusion, the owner of the mark must demonstrate likely
confusion, not mere diversion.
We turn to an examination of each Sleekcraft factor to analyze whether there is a likelihood
of consumer confusion in this case, assigning each factor appropriate weight in accordance
with its relevance to the factual circumstances presented here.
1. Strength of the Mark
“The stronger a mark—meaning the more likely it is to be remembered and associated in
the public mind with the mark’s owner—the greater the protection it is accorded by the
trademark laws.” Two relevant measurements are conceptual strength and commercial
strength. Conceptual strength involves classification of a mark “along a spectrum of
generally increasing inherent distinctiveness as generic, descriptive, suggestive, arbitrary,
or fanciful.” “A mark’s conceptual strength depends largely on the obviousness of its
connection to the good or service to which it refers.” Federal trademark “[r]egistration
alone may be sufficient in an appropriate case to satisfy a determination of distinctiveness.”
However, “while the registration adds something on the scales, we must come to grips with
an assessment of the mark itself.” Commercial strength is based on “actual marketplace
recognition,” and thus “advertising expenditures can transform a suggestive mark into a
strong mark.”
This factor is probative of confusion here because a consumer searching for a generic term
is more likely to be searching for a product category. See [Brookfield] at 1058 n. 19
(“Generic terms are those used by the public to refer generally to the product rather than a
particular brand of the product.”). That consumer is more likely to expect to encounter
links and advertisements from a variety of sources. By contrast, a user searching for a
distinctive term is more likely to be looking for a particular product, and therefore could be
more susceptible to confusion when sponsored links appear that advertise a similar product
from a different source. On the other hand, if the ordinary consumers of this particular
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product are particularly sophisticated and knowledgeable, they might also be aware that
Systems is the source of ActiveBatch software and not be confused at all.
The district court acknowledged that the parties failed to address the strength of the mark,
but it concluded that the factor favors Systems. It reasoned that ActiveBatch is a
suggestive mark because it “requires a mental leap from the mark to the product,” and as a
registered trademark it is “inherently distinctive.” We agree. Because the mark is both
Systems’ product name and a suggestive federally registered trademark, consumers
searching for the term are presumably looking for its specific product, and not a category of
goods. Nonetheless, that may not be the end of the inquiry about this factor, as the
sophistication of the consumers of the product may also play a role. The district court
properly declined to consider commercial strength, which, as an evidence-intensive inquiry,
is unnecessary at the preliminary injunction stage.
2. Proximity of the Goods
“Related goods are generally more likely than unrelated goods to confuse the public as to
the producers of the goods.” “[T]he danger presented is that the public will mistakenly
assume there is an association between the producers of the related goods, though no such
association exists.” The proximity of goods is measured by whether the products are: (1)
complementary; (2) sold to the same class of purchasers; and (3) similar in use and function.
The proximity of the goods was relevant in Playboy, where unsophisticated consumers were
confronted with unlabeled banner advertisements that touted adult-oriented material very
similar to Playboy’s own products. There, we concluded that under the circumstances, the
relatedness of the goods bolstered the likelihood of confusion, and therefore favored
Playboy. However, the proximity of the goods would become less important if
advertisements are clearly labeled or consumers exercise a high degree of care, because
rather than being misled, the consumer would merely be confronted with choices among
similar products. Id. at 1035 (Berzon, J., concurring) (“[S]uch choices do not constitute
trademark infringement off the internet, and I cannot understand why they should on the
internet.”).
Because the products at issue here are virtually interchangeable, this factor may be helpful,
but it must be considered in conjunction with the labeling and appearance of the
advertisements and the degree of care exercised by the consumers of the ActiveBatch
software. By weighing this factor in isolation and failing to consider whether the parties’
status as direct competitors would actually lead to a likelihood of confusion, the district
court allowed this factor to weigh too heavily in the analysis.
3. Similarity of the Marks
“[T]he more similar the marks in terms of appearance, sound, and meaning, the greater the
likelihood of confusion.” “Where the two marks are entirely dissimilar, there is no
likelihood of confusion.” “Similarity of the marks is tested on three levels: sight, sound, and
meaning. Each must be considered as they are encountered in the marketplace.”
In Sleekcraft, we concluded that the marks “Sleekcraft” and “Slickcraft” were similar in
terms of sight, sound, and meaning by examining the actual situations in which consumers
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were likely to read, hear, and consider the meaning of the terms. Such an inquiry is
impossible here where the consumer does not confront two distinct trademarks. Rather,
after entering one company’s mark as a search term, the consumer sees a competitor’s
sponsored link that displays neither company’s trademarks. The district court erroneously
treated “ActiveBatch,” the keyword purchased by Network, as conceptually separate from
ActiveBatch the trademark owned by Systems. This is an artificial distinction that does
not reflect what consumers “encountered in the marketplace.” Again, however, because the
consumer keys in Systems’ trademark, which results in Network’s sponsored link,
depending on the labeling and appearance of the advertisement, including whether it
identifies Network’s own mark, and the degree of care and sophistication of the consumer,
it could be helpful in determining initial interest confusion.
4. Evidence of Actual Confusion
“[A] showing of actual confusion among significant numbers of consumers provides strong
support for the likelihood of confusion.” However, “actual confusion is not necessary to a
finding of likelihood of confusion under the Lanham Act.” Indeed, “[p]roving actual
confusion is difficult ... and the courts have often discounted such evidence because it was
unclear or insubstantial.”
In Playboy, the expert report showing a significant number of users were confused by the
keying practice at issue was strong evidence that Playboy’s infringement claim should be
allowed to proceed. Playboy, however, was decided at the summary judgment stage,
whereas here we examine a sparse record supporting preliminary injunctive relief. As the
district court noted, neither Network nor Systems provided evidence regarding actual
confusion, which is not surprising given the procedural posture. Therefore, while this is a
relevant factor for determining the likelihood of confusion in keyword advertising cases, its
importance is diminished at the preliminary injunction stage of the proceedings. The
district court correctly concluded that this factor should be accorded no weight.
5. Marketing Channels
“Convergent marketing channels increase the likelihood of confusion.” In Sleekcraft, the
two products were sold in niche marketplaces, including boat shows, specialty retail outlets,
and trade magazines. However, this factor becomes less important when the marketing
channel is less obscure. Today, it would be the rare commercial retailer that did not
advertise online, and the shared use of a ubiquitous marketing channel does not shed much
light on the likelihood of consumer confusion. See Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1028 (“Given the
broad use of the Internet today, the same could be said for countless companies. Thus, this
factor merits little weight.”).
Therefore, the district court’s determination that because both parties advertise on the
Internet this factor weighed in favor of Systems was incorrect.
6. Type of Goods and Degree of Care
“Low consumer care ... increases the likelihood of confusion.” “In assessing the likelihood of
confusion to the public, the standard used by the courts is the typical buyer exercising
ordinary caution.... When the buyer has expertise in the field, a higher standard is proper
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though it will not preclude a finding that confusion is likely. Similarly, when the goods are
expensive, the buyer can be expected to exercise greater care in his purchases; again,
though, confusion may still be likely.”
The nature of the goods and the type of consumer is highly relevant to determining the
likelihood of confusion in the keyword advertising context. A sophisticated consumer of
business software exercising a high degree of care is more likely to understand the
mechanics of Internet search engines and the nature of sponsored links, whereas an unsavvy consumer exercising less care is more likely to be confused. The district court
determined that this factor weighed in Systems’ favor because “there is generally a low
degree of care exercised by Internet consumers.” However, the degree of care analysis
cannot begin and end at the marketing channel. We still must consider the nature and cost
of the goods, and whether “the products being sold are marketed primarily to expert
buyers.”
In Brookfield, the websites were visited by both sophisticated entertainment industry
professionals and amateur film fans, which supported the conclusion that at least some of
the consumers were likely to exercise a low degree of care. In Playboy, the relevant
consumer was looking for cheap, interchangeable adult-oriented material, which similarly
led to our court’s finding that the consumers at issue would exercise a low degree of care.
In both cases, we looked beyond the medium itself and to the nature of the particular goods
and the relevant consumers.
We have recently acknowledged that the default degree of consumer care is becoming more
heightened as the novelty of the Internet evaporates and online commerce becomes
commonplace. In Toyota Motor Sales v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2010), we vacated a
preliminary injunction that prohibited a pair of automobile brokers from using Toyota’s
“Lexus” mark in their domain names. We determined that it was unlikely that a
reasonably prudent consumer would be confused into believing that a domain name that
included a product name would necessarily have a formal affiliation with the maker of the
product, as “[c]onsumers who use the internet for shopping are generally quite
sophisticated about such matters.” The Tabari panel reasoned,
[I]n the age of FIOS, cable modems, DSL and T1 lines, reasonable, prudent
and experienced internet consumers are accustomed to such exploration by
trial and error. They skip from site to site, ready to hit the back button
whenever they’re not satisfied with a site’s contents. They fully expect to find
some sites that aren’t what they imagine based on a glance at the domain
name or search engine summary. Outside the special case of ... domains that
actively claim affiliation with the trademark holder, consumers don’t form
any firm expectations about the sponsorship of a website until they’ve seen
the landing page—if then.
We further explained that we expect consumers searching for expensive products online to
be even more sophisticated. Id. at 1176 (“Unreasonable, imprudent and inexperienced webshoppers are not relevant.”).
Therefore the district court improperly concluded that this factor weighed in Systems’ favor
based on a conclusion reached by our court more than a decade ago in Brookfield and
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GoTo.com that Internet users on the whole exercise a low degree of care. While the
statement may have been accurate then, we suspect that there are many contexts in which
it no longer holds true.
7. Defendant’s Intent
“When the alleged infringer knowingly adopts a mark similar to another’s, reviewing courts
presume that the defendant can accomplish his purpose: that is, that the public will be
deceived.” Nevertheless, we have also “recognized that liability for infringement may not
be imposed for using a registered trademark in connection with truthful comparative
advertising.”
Therefore, much like the proximity of the goods, the defendant’s intent may be relevant
here, but only insofar as it bolsters a finding that the use of the trademark serves to
mislead consumers rather than truthfully inform them of their choice of products. The
district court incorrectly considered the intent factor in isolation, and concluded that it
weighed in Systems’ favor without first determining that Network intended to deceive
consumers rather than compare its product to ActiveBatch.
8. Likelihood of Expansion of the Product Lines
“Inasmuch as a trademark owner is afforded greater protection against competing goods, a
‘strong possibility’ that either party may expand his business to compete with the other will
weigh in favor of finding that the present use is infringing. When goods are closely related,
any expansion is likely to result in direct competition.” Where two companies are direct
competitors, this factor is unimportant. Therefore, the district court correctly declined to
consider the likelihood of expansion.
9. Other Relevant Factors
The eight Sleekcraft factors are “not exhaustive. Other variables may come into play
depending on the particular facts presented.” In the keyword advertising context the
“likelihood of confusion will ultimately turn on what the consumer saw on the screen and
reasonably believed, given the context.” Hearts on Fire Co. v. Blue Nile, Inc., 603 F. Supp.
2d 274, 289 (D. Mass. 2009).6 In Playboy, we found it important that the consumers saw
banner advertisements that were “confusingly labeled or not labeled at all.” We noted that
clear labeling “might eliminate the likelihood of initial interest confusion that exists in this
case.”
The appearance of the advertisements and their surrounding context on the user’s screen
are similarly important here. The district court correctly examined the text of Network’s
sponsored links, concluding that the advertisements did not clearly identify their source.
However, the district court did not consider the surrounding context. In Playboy, we also
The Hearts on Fire court identified a new seven-factor test to determine whether there is a likelihood of
consumer confusion arising from a firm’s use of a competitor’s trademark as a search engine keyword triggering
its own sponsored links. Network urges us to adopt the Hearts on Fire factors. While we agree that the
decision’s reasoning is useful, we decline to add another multi-factor test to the extant eight-factor Sleekcraft
test.
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found it important that Netscape’s search engine did not clearly segregate the sponsored
advertisements from the objective results. Here, even if Network has not clearly identified
itself in the text of its ads, Google and Bing have partitioned their search results pages so
that the advertisements appear in separately labeled sections for “sponsored” links. The
labeling and appearance of the advertisements as they appear on the results page includes
more than the text of the advertisement, and must be considered as a whole.
C.
Given the nature of the alleged infringement here, the most relevant factors to the analysis
of the likelihood of confusion are: (1) the strength of the mark; (2) the evidence of actual
confusion; (3) the type of goods and degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser;
and (4) the labeling and appearance of the advertisements and the surrounding context on
the screen displaying the results page.
The district court did not weigh the Sleekcraft factors flexibly to match the specific facts of
this case. It relied on the Internet “troika,” which is highly illuminating in the context of
domain names, but which fails to discern whether there is a likelihood of confusion in a
keywords case. Because the linchpin of trademark infringement is consumer confusion, the
district court abused its discretion in issuing the injunction….
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Tiffany Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2010).
Sack, Circuit Judge.
eBay, Inc. (“eBay”), through its eponymous online marketplace, has revolutionized the
online sale of goods, especially used goods. It has facilitated the buying and selling by
hundreds of millions of people and entities, to their benefit and eBay’s profit. But that
marketplace is sometimes employed by users as a means to perpetrate fraud by selling
counterfeit goods.
Plaintiffs Tiffany (NJ) Inc. and Tiffany and Company (together, “Tiffany”) have created and
cultivated a brand of jewelry bespeaking high-end quality and style. Based on Tiffany’s
concern that some use eBay’s website to sell counterfeit Tiffany merchandise, Tiffany has
instituted this action against eBay, asserting various causes of action—sounding in
trademark infringement, trademark dilution and false advertising—arising from eBay’s
advertising and listing practices. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the district
court’s judgment with respect to Tiffany’s claims of trademark infringement and dilution
but remand for further proceedings with respect to Tiffany’s false advertising claim.
BACKGROUND…
eBay
eBay is the proprietor of www.ebay.com, an Internet-based marketplace that allows those
who register with it to purchase goods from and sell goods to one another. It “connect[s]
buyers and sellers and [ ] enable[s] transactions, which are carried out directly between
eBay members.” In its auction and listing services, it “provides the venue for the sale [of
goods] and support for the transaction[s], [but] it does not itself sell the items” listed for
sale on the site, nor does it ever take physical possession of them. Thus, “eBay generally
does not know whether or when an item is delivered to the buyer.”
eBay has been enormously successful. More than six million new listings are posted on its
site daily. At any given time it contains some 100 million listings.
eBay generates revenue by charging sellers to use its listing services. For any listing, it
charges an “insertion fee” based on the auction’s starting price for the goods being sold and
ranges from $0.20 to $4.80. For any completed sale, it charges a “final value fee” that
ranges from 5.25% to 10% of the final sale price of the item. Sellers have the option of
purchasing, at additional cost, features “to differentiate their listings, such as a border or
bold-faced type.”
eBay also generates revenue through a company named PayPal, which it owns and which
allows users to process their purchases. PayPal deducts, as a fee for each transaction that it
processes, 1.9% to 2.9% of the transaction amount, plus $0.30. This gives eBay an added
incentive to increase both the volume and the price of the goods sold on its website.
Tiffany
Tiffany is a world-famous purveyor of, among other things, branded jewelry. Since 2000, all
new Tiffany jewelry sold in the United States has been available exclusively through
Tiffany’s retail stores, catalogs, and website, and through its Corporate Sales Department.
It does not use liquidators, sell overstock merchandise, or put its goods on sale at
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discounted prices. It does not—nor can it, for that matter—control the “legitimate
secondary market in authentic Tiffany silvery jewelry,” i.e., the market for second-hand
Tiffany wares. The record developed at trial “offere[d] little basis from which to discern the
actual availability of authentic Tiffany silver jewelry in the secondary market.”
Sometime before 2004, Tiffany became aware that counterfeit Tiffany merchandise was
being sold on eBay’s site. Prior to and during the course of this litigation, Tiffany conducted
two surveys known as “Buying Programs,” one in 2004 and another in 2005, in an attempt
to assess the extent of this practice. Under those programs, Tiffany bought various items on
eBay and then inspected and evaluated them to determine how many were counterfeit.
Tiffany found that 73.1% of the purported Tiffany goods purchased in the 2004 Buying
Program and 75.5% of those purchased in the 2005 Buying Program were counterfeit. The
district court concluded, however, that the Buying Programs were “methodologically flawed
and of questionable value,” and “provide[d] limited evidence as to the total percentage of
counterfeit goods available on eBay at any given time.” The court nonetheless decided that
during the period in which the Buying Programs were in effect, a “significant portion of the
‘Tiffany’ sterling silver jewelry listed on the eBay website ... was counterfeit,” and that eBay
knew “that some portion of the Tiffany goods sold on its website might be counterfeit.” The
court found, however, that “a substantial number of authentic Tiffany goods are [also] sold
on eBay.”
Reducing or eliminating the sale of all second-hand Tiffany goods, including genuine
Tiffany pieces, through eBay’s website would benefit Tiffany in at least one sense: It would
diminish the competition in the market for genuine Tiffany merchandise. See id. at 510 n.
36 (noting that “there is at least some basis in the record for eBay’s assertion that one of
Tiffany’s goals in pursuing this litigation is to shut down the legitimate secondary market
in authentic Tiffany goods”). The immediate effect would be loss of revenue to eBay, even
though there might be a countervailing gain by eBay resulting from increased consumer
confidence about the bona fides of other goods sold through its website.
Anti-Counterfeiting Measures
Because eBay facilitates many sales of Tiffany goods, genuine and otherwise, and obtains
revenue on every transaction, it generates substantial revenues from the sale of purported
Tiffany goods, some of which are counterfeit. “eBay’s Jewelry & Watches category manager
estimated that, between April 2000 and June 2004, eBay earned $4.1 million in revenue
from completed listings with ‘Tiffany’ in the listing title in the Jewelry & Watches
category.” Although eBay was generating revenue from all sales of goods on its site,
including counterfeit goods, the district court found eBay to have “an interest in eliminating
counterfeit Tiffany merchandise from eBay ... to preserve the reputation of its website as a
safe place to do business.” The buyer of fake Tiffany goods might, if and when the forgery
was detected, fault eBay. Indeed, the district court found that “buyers ... complain[ed] to
eBay” about the sale of counterfeit Tiffany goods. “[D]uring the last six weeks of 2004, 125
consumers complained to eBay about purchasing ‘Tiffany’ items through the eBay website
that they believed to be counterfeit.”
Because eBay “never saw or inspected the merchandise in the listings,” its ability to
determine whether a particular listing was for counterfeit goods was limited. Even had it
been able to inspect the goods, moreover, in many instances it likely would not have had the
expertise to determine whether they were counterfeit.
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Notwithstanding these limitations, eBay spent “as much as $20 million each year on tools
to promote trust and safety on its website.” For example, eBay and PayPal set up “buyer
protection programs,” under which, in certain circumstances, the buyer would be
reimbursed for the cost of items purchased on eBay that were discovered not to be genuine.
eBay also established a “Trust and Safety” department, with some 4,000 employees
“devoted to trust and safety” issues, including over 200 who “focus exclusively on combating
infringement” and 70 who “work exclusively with law enforcement.”
By May 2002, eBay had implemented a “fraud engine,” “which is principally dedicated to
ferreting out illegal listings, including counterfeit listings.” eBay had theretofore employed
manual searches for keywords in listings in an effort to “identify blatant instances of
potentially infringing ... activity.” “The fraud engine uses rules and complex models that
automatically search for activity that violates eBay policies.” In addition to identifying
items actually advertised as counterfeit, the engine also incorporates various filters
designed to screen out less-obvious instances of counterfeiting using “data elements
designed to evaluate listings based on, for example, the seller’s Internet protocol address,
any issues associated with the seller’s account on eBay, and the feedback the seller has
received from other eBay users.” In addition to general filters, the fraud engine
incorporates “Tiffany-specific filters,” including “approximately 90 different keywords”
designed to help distinguish between genuine and counterfeit Tiffany goods. During the
period in dispute, eBay also “periodically conducted [manual] reviews of listings in an effort
to remove those that might be selling counterfeit goods, including Tiffany goods.”
For nearly a decade, including the period at issue, eBay has also maintained and
administered the “Verified Rights Owner (‘VeRO’) Program”—a “‘notice-and-takedown’
system” allowing owners of intellectual property rights, including Tiffany, to “report to
eBay any listing offering potentially infringing items, so that eBay could remove such
reported listings.” Any such rights-holder with a “good-faith belief that [a particular listed]
item infringed on a copyright or a trademark” could report the item to eBay, using a “Notice
Of Claimed Infringement form or NOCI form.” During the period under consideration,
eBay’s practice was to remove reported listings within twenty-four hours of receiving a
NOCI, but eBay in fact deleted seventy to eighty percent of them within twelve hours of
notification.
On receipt of a NOCI, if the auction or sale had not ended, eBay would, in addition to
removing the listing, cancel the bids and inform the seller of the reason for the cancellation.
If bidding had ended, eBay would retroactively cancel the transaction. In the event of a
cancelled auction, eBay would refund the fees it had been paid in connection with the
auction.
In some circumstances, eBay would reimburse the buyer for the cost of a purchased item,
provided the buyer presented evidence that the purchased item was counterfeit. During the
relevant time period, the district court found, eBay “never refused to remove a reported
Tiffany listing, acted in good faith in responding to Tiffany’s NOCIs, and always provided
Tiffany with the seller’s contact information.”
In addition, eBay has allowed rights owners such as Tiffany to create an “About Me”
webpage on eBay’s website “to inform eBay users about their products, intellectual property
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rights, and legal positions.” eBay does not exercise control over the content of those pages in
a manner material to the issues before us.
Tiffany, not eBay, maintains the Tiffany “About Me” page. With the headline “BUYER
BEWARE,” the page begins: “Most of the purported TIFFANY & CO. silver jewelry
and packaging available on eBay is counterfeit.” It also says, inter alia:
The only way you can be certain that you are purchasing a genuine TIFFANY
& CO. product is to purchase it from a Tiffany & Co. retail store, via our
website (www.tiffany.com) or through a Tiffany & Co. catalogue. Tiffany &
Co. stores do not authenticate merchandise. A good jeweler or appraiser may
be able to do this for you.
In 2003 or early 2004, eBay began to use “special warning messages when a seller
attempted to list a Tiffany item.” These messages “instructed the seller to make sure that
the item was authentic Tiffany merchandise and informed the seller that eBay ‘does not
tolerate the listing of replica, counterfeit, or otherwise unauthorized items’ and that
violation of this policy ‘could result in suspension of [the seller’s] account.’” The messages
also provided a link to Tiffany’s “About Me” page with its “buyer beware” disclaimer. If the
seller “continued to list an item despite the warning, the listing was flagged for review.”
In addition to cancelling particular suspicious transactions, eBay has also suspended from
its website “‘hundreds of thousands of sellers every year,’ tens of thousands of whom were
suspected [of] having engaged in infringing conduct.” eBay primarily employed a “‘three
strikes rule’” for suspensions, but would suspend sellers after the first violation if it was
clear that “the seller ‘listed a number of infringing items,’ and ‘[selling counterfeit
merchandise] appears to be the only thing they’ve come to eBay to do.’” But if “a seller
listed a potentially infringing item but appeared overall to be a legitimate seller, the
‘infringing items [were] taken down, and the seller [would] be sent a warning on the first
offense and given the educational information, [and] told that ... if they do this again, they
will be suspended from eBay.’”5
By late 2006, eBay had implemented additional anti-fraud measures: delaying the ability of
buyers to view listings of certain brand names, including Tiffany’s, for 6 to 12 hours so as to
give rights-holders such as Tiffany more time to review those listings; developing the ability
to assess the number of items listed in a given listing; and restricting one-day and threeday auctions and cross-border trading for some brand-name items.
The district court concluded that “eBay consistently took steps to improve its technology
and develop anti-fraud measures as such measures became technologically feasible and
reasonably available.”

5 According to the district court, “eBay took appropriate steps to warn and then to suspend sellers when eBay
learned of potential trademark infringement under that seller’s account.” The district court concluded that it
was understandable that eBay did not have a “hard-and-fast, one-strike rule” of suspending sellers because a
NOCI “did not constitute a definitive finding that the listed item was counterfeit” and because “suspension was
a very serious matter, particularly to those sellers who relied on eBay for their livelihoods.” The district court
ultimately found eBay’s policy to be “appropriate and effective in preventing sellers from returning to eBay and
re-listing potentially counterfeit merchandise.”
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eBay’s Advertising
At the same time that eBay was attempting to reduce the sale of counterfeit items on its
website, it actively sought to promote sales of premium and branded jewelry, including
Tiffany merchandise, on its site. Among other things,
eBay “advised its sellers to take advantage of the demand for Tiffany
merchandise as part of a broader effort to grow the Jewelry & Watches
category.” And prior to 2003, eBay advertised the availability of Tiffany
merchandise on its site. eBay’s advertisements trumpeted “Mother’s Day
Gifts!,” a “Fall FASHION BRAND BLOWOUT,” “Jewelry Best Sellers,”
“GREAT BRANDS, GREAT PRICES,” or “Top Valentine’s Deals,” among
other promotions. It encouraged the viewer to “GET THE FINER THINGS.”
These advertisements provided the reader with hyperlinks, at least one of
each of which was related to Tiffany merchandise—”Tiffany,” “Tiffany & Co.
under $150,” “Tiffany & Co,” “Tiffany Rings,” or “Tiffany & Co. under $50.”
eBay also purchased sponsored-link advertisements on various search engines to promote
the availability of Tiffany items on its website. In one such case, in the form of a printout of
the results list from a search on Yahoo! for “tiffany,” the second sponsored link read
“Tiffany on eBay. Find tiffany items at low prices. With over 5 million items for sale every
day, you’ll find all kinds of unique [unreadable] Marketplace. www.ebay.com.” Tiffany
complained to eBay of the practice in 2003, and eBay told Tiffany that it had ceased buying
sponsored links. The district court found, however, that eBay continued to do so indirectly
through a third party….
DISCUSSION…
I. Direct Trademark Infringement
Tiffany alleges that eBay infringed its trademark in violation of section 32 of the Lanham
Act. The district court described this as a claim of “direct trademark infringement,” and we
adopt that terminology. Under section 32, “the owner of a mark registered with the Patent
and Trademark Office can bring a civil action against a person alleged to have used the
mark without the owner’s consent.” We analyze such a claim “under a familiar two-prong
test. The test looks first to whether the plaintiff’s mark is entitled to protection, and second
to whether the defendant’s use of the mark is likely to cause consumers confusion as to the
origin or sponsorship of the defendant’s goods.”
In the district court, Tiffany argued that eBay had directly infringed its mark by using it on
eBay’s website and by purchasing sponsored links containing the mark on Google and
Yahoo! Tiffany also argued that eBay and the sellers of the counterfeit goods using its site
were jointly and severally liable. The district court rejected these arguments on the ground
that eBay’s use of Tiffany’s mark was protected by the doctrine of nominative fair use.
The doctrine of nominative fair use allows “[a] defendant [to] use a plaintiff’s trademark to
identify the plaintiff’s goods so long as there is no likelihood of confusion about the source of
[the] defendant’s product or the mark-holder’s sponsorship or affiliation.” The doctrine
apparently originated in the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. To fall within the
protection, according to that court: “First, the product or service in question must be one
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not readily identifiable without use of the trademark; second, only so much of the mark or
marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to identify the product or service; and third,
the user must do nothing that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or
endorsement by the trademark holder.”
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has endorsed these principles. We have referred
to the doctrine, albeit without adopting or rejecting it. Other circuits have done similarly.
We need not address the viability of the doctrine to resolve Tiffany’s claim, however. We
have recognized that a defendant may lawfully use a plaintiff’s trademark where doing so is
necessary to describe the plaintiff’s product and does not imply a false affiliation or
endorsement by the plaintiff of the defendant. “While a trademark conveys an exclusive
right to the use of a mark in commerce in the area reserved, that right generally does not
prevent one who trades a branded product from accurately describing it by its brand name,
so long as the trader does not create confusion by implying an affiliation with the owner of
the product.”
We agree with the district court that eBay’s use of Tiffany’s mark on its website and in
sponsored links was lawful. eBay used the mark to describe accurately the genuine Tiffany
goods offered for sale on its website. And none of eBay’s uses of the mark suggested that
Tiffany affiliated itself with eBay or endorsed the sale of its products through eBay’s
website.
In addition, the “About Me” page that Tiffany has maintained on eBay’s website since 2004
states that “[m]ost of the purported ‘TIFFANY & CO.’ silver jewelry and packaging
available on eBay is counterfeit.” The page further explained that Tiffany itself sells its
products only through its own stores, catalogues, and website.
Tiffany argues, however, that even if eBay had the right to use its mark with respect to the
resale of genuine Tiffany merchandise, eBay infringed the mark because it knew or had
reason to know that there was “a substantial problem with the sale of counterfeit [Tiffany]
silver jewelry” on the eBay website. As we discuss below, eBay’s knowledge vel non that
counterfeit Tiffany wares were offered through its website is relevant to the issue of
whether eBay contributed to the direct infringement of Tiffany’s mark by the counterfeiting
vendors themselves, or whether eBay bears liability for false advertising. But it is not a
basis for a claim of direct trademark infringement against eBay, especially inasmuch as it
is undisputed that eBay promptly removed all listings that Tiffany challenged as
counterfeit and took affirmative steps to identify and remove illegitimate Tiffany goods. To
impose liability because eBay cannot guarantee the genuineness of all of the purported
Tiffany products offered on its website would unduly inhibit the lawful resale of genuine
Tiffany goods.
We conclude that eBay’s use of Tiffany’s mark in the described manner did not constitute
direct trademark infringement.
II. Contributory Trademark Infringement
The more difficult issue, and the one that the parties have properly focused our attention
on, is whether eBay is liable for contributory trademark infringement—i.e., for culpably
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facilitating the infringing conduct of the counterfeiting vendors. Acknowledging the paucity
of case law to guide us, we conclude that the district court correctly granted judgment on
this issue in favor of eBay.
A. Principles
Contributory trademark infringement is a judicially created doctrine that derives from the
common law of torts. The Supreme Court most recently dealt with the subject in Inwood
Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982). There, the plaintiff, Ives,
asserted that several drug manufacturers had induced pharmacists to mislabel a drug the
defendants produced to pass it off as Ives’. According to the Court, “if a manufacturer or
distributor intentionally induces another to infringe a trademark, or if it continues to
supply its product to one whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark
infringement, the manufacturer or distributor is contributorially responsible for any harm
done as a result of the deceit.” The Court ultimately decided to remand the case to the
Court of Appeals after concluding it had improperly rejected factual findings of the district
court favoring the defendant manufacturers.
Inwood’s test for contributory trademark infringement applies on its face to manufacturers
and distributors of goods. Courts have, however, extended the test to providers of services.
The Seventh Circuit applied Inwood to a lawsuit against the owner of a swap meet, or “flea
market,” whose vendors were alleged to have sold infringing Hard Rock Café T-shirts. The
court “treated trademark infringement as a species of tort,” and analogized the swap meet
owner to a landlord or licensor, on whom the common law “imposes the same duty ... [as
Inwood] impose[s] on manufacturers and distributors.”
Speaking more generally, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Inwood’s test for contributory
trademark infringement applies to a service provider if he or she exercises sufficient control
over the infringing conduct. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d
980, 984 (9th Cir. 1999); see also id. (“Direct control and monitoring of the instrumentality
used by a third party to infringe the plaintiff’s mark permits the expansion of Inwood Lab.’s
‘supplies a product’ requirement for contributory infringement.”).
We have apparently addressed contributory trademark infringement in only two related
decisions, and even then in little detail. Citing Inwood, we said that “[a] distributor who
intentionally induces another to infringe a trademark, or continues to supply its product to
one whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement, is
contributorially liable for any injury.”
The limited case law leaves the law of contributory trademark infringement ill-defined.
Although we are not the first court to consider the application of Inwood to the Internet, we
are apparently the first to consider its application to an online marketplace.9

9 European courts have done so. A Belgian court declined to hold eBay liable for counterfeit cosmetic products
sold through its website. French courts, by contrast, have concluded that eBay violated applicable trademark
laws.
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B. Discussion
1. Does Inwood Apply?
In the district court, the parties disputed whether eBay was subject to the Inwood test.
eBay argued that it was not because it supplies a service while Inwood governs only
manufacturers and distributors of products. The district court rejected that distinction. It
adopted instead the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in Lockheed to conclude that Inwood
applies to a service provider who exercises sufficient control over the means of the
infringing conduct. Looking “to the extent of the control exercised by eBay over its sellers’
means of infringement,” the district court concluded that Inwood applied in light of the
“significant control” eBay retained over the transactions and listings facilitated by and
conducted through its website.
On appeal, eBay no longer maintains that it is not subject to Inwood. We therefore assume
without deciding that Inwood’s test for contributory trademark infringement governs.
2. Is eBay Liable Under Inwood?
The question that remains, then, is whether eBay is liable under the Inwood test on the
basis of the services it provided to those who used its website to sell counterfeit Tiffany
products. As noted, when applying Inwood to service providers, there are two ways in which
a defendant may become contributorially liable for the infringing conduct of another: first,
if the service provider “intentionally induces another to infringe a trademark,” and second,
if the service provider “continues to supply its [service] to one whom it knows or has reason
to know is engaging in trademark infringement.” Inwood, 456 U.S. at 854. Tiffany does not
argue that eBay induced the sale of counterfeit Tiffany goods on its website-the
circumstances addressed by the first part of the Inwood test. It argues instead, under the
second part of the Inwood test, that eBay continued to supply its services to the sellers of
counterfeit Tiffany goods while knowing or having reason to know that such sellers were
infringing Tiffany’s mark.
The district court rejected this argument. First, it concluded that to the extent the NOCIs
that Tiffany submitted gave eBay reason to know that particular listings were for
counterfeit goods, eBay did not continue to carry those listings once it learned that they
were specious. The court found that eBay’s practice was promptly to remove the challenged
listing from its website, warn sellers and buyers, cancel fees it earned from that listing, and
direct buyers not to consummate the sale of the disputed item. The court therefore declined
to hold eBay contributorially liable for the infringing conduct of those sellers. On appeal,
Tiffany does not appear to challenge this conclusion. In any event, we agree with the
district court that no liability arises with respect to those terminated listings.
Tiffany disagrees vigorously, however, with the district court’s further determination that
eBay lacked sufficient knowledge of trademark infringement by sellers behind other, nonterminated listings to provide a basis for Inwood liability. Tiffany argued in the district
court that eBay knew, or at least had reason to know, that counterfeit Tiffany goods were
being sold ubiquitously on its website. As evidence, it pointed to, inter alia, the demand
letters it sent to eBay in 2003 and 2004, the results of its Buying Programs that it shared
with eBay, the thousands of NOCIs it filed with eBay alleging its good faith belief that
certain listings were counterfeit, and the various complaints eBay received from buyers
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claiming that they had purchased one or more counterfeit Tiffany items through eBay’s
website. Tiffany argued that taken together, this evidence established eBay’s knowledge of
the widespread sale of counterfeit Tiffany products on its website. Tiffany urged that eBay
be held contributorially liable on the basis that despite that knowledge, it continued to
make its services available to infringing sellers.
The district court rejected this argument. It acknowledged that “[t]he evidence produced at
trial demonstrated that eBay had generalized notice that some portion of the Tiffany goods
sold on its website might be counterfeit.” The court characterized the issue before it as
“whether eBay’s generalized knowledge of trademark infringement on its website was
sufficient to meet the ‘knowledge or reason to know’ prong of the Inwood test.” eBay had
argued that “such generalized knowledge is insufficient, and that the law demands more
specific knowledge of individual instances of infringement and infringing sellers before
imposing a burden upon eBay to remedy the problem.”
The district court concluded that “while eBay clearly possessed general knowledge as to
counterfeiting on its website, such generalized knowledge is insufficient under the Inwood
test to impose upon eBay an affirmative duty to remedy the problem.” The court reasoned
that Inwood’s language explicitly imposes contributory liability on a defendant who
“continues to supply its product [—in eBay’s case, its service—] to one whom it knows or
has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement.” The court also noted that
plaintiffs “bear a high burden in establishing ‘knowledge’ of contributory infringement,” and
that courts have
been reluctant to extend contributory trademark liability to defendants
where there is some uncertainty as to the extent or the nature of the
infringement. In Inwood, Justice White emphasized in his concurring opinion
that a defendant is not “require[d] ... to refuse to sell to dealers who merely
might pass off its goods.”
Accordingly, the district court concluded that for Tiffany to establish eBay’s contributory
liability, Tiffany would have to show that eBay “knew or had reason to know of specific
instances of actual infringement” beyond those that it addressed upon learning of them.
Tiffany failed to make such a showing.
On appeal, Tiffany argues that the distinction drawn by the district court between eBay’s
general knowledge of the sale of counterfeit Tiffany goods through its website, and its
specific knowledge as to which particular sellers were making such sales, is a “false” one
not required by the law. Tiffany posits that the only relevant question is “whether all of the
knowledge, when taken together, puts [eBay] on notice that there is a substantial problem
of trademark infringement. If so and if it fails to act, [eBay] is liable for contributory
trademark infringement.”
We agree with the district court. For contributory trademark infringement liability to lie, a
service provider must have more than a general knowledge or reason to know that its
service is being used to sell counterfeit goods. Some contemporary knowledge of which
particular listings are infringing or will infringe in the future is necessary.

216.

We are not persuaded by Tiffany’s proposed interpretation of Inwood. Tiffany understands
the “lesson of Inwood” to be that an action for contributory trademark infringement lies
where “the evidence [of infringing activity]—direct or circumstantial, taken as a whole—...
provide[s] a basis for finding that the defendant knew or should have known that its
product or service was being used to further illegal counterfeiting activity.” We think that
Tiffany reads Inwood too broadly. Although the Inwood Court articulated a “knows or has
reason to know” prong in setting out its contributory liability test, the Court explicitly
declined to apply that prong to the facts then before it. The Court applied only the
inducement prong of the test.
We therefore do not think that Inwood establishes the contours of the “knows or has reason
to know” prong. Insofar as it speaks to the issue, though, the particular phrasing that the
Court used—that a defendant will be liable if it “continues to supply its product to one
whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement” (emphasis
added)—supports the district court’s interpretation of Inwood, not Tiffany’s.
We find helpful the Supreme Court’s discussion of Inwood in a subsequent copyright case,
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). There,
defendant Sony manufactured and sold home video tape recorders. Plaintiffs Universal
Studios and Walt Disney Productions held copyrights on various television programs that
individual television-viewers had taped using the defendant’s recorders. The plaintiffs
contended that this use of the recorders constituted copyright infringement for which the
defendants should be held contributorily liable. In ruling for the defendants, the Court
discussed Inwood and the differences between contributory liability in trademark versus
copyright law.
If Inwood’s narrow standard for contributory trademark infringement
governed here, [the plaintiffs’] claim of contributory infringement would
merit little discussion. Sony certainly does not ‘intentionally induce[ ]’ its
customers to make infringing uses of [the plaintiffs’] copyrights, nor does it
supply its products to identified individuals known by it to be engaging in
continuing infringement of [the plaintiffs’] copyrights.
(emphases added).
Thus, the Court suggested, had the Inwood standard applied in Sony, the fact that Sony
might have known that some portion of the purchasers of its product used it to violate the
copyrights of others would not have provided a sufficient basis for contributory liability.
Inwood’s “narrow standard” would have required knowledge by Sony of “identified
individuals” engaging in infringing conduct. Tiffany’s reading of Inwood is therefore
contrary to the interpretation of that case set forth in Sony.
Although the Supreme Court’s observations in Sony, a copyright case, about the “knows or
has reason to know” prong of the contributory trademark infringement test set forth in
Inwood were dicta, they constitute the only discussion of that prong by the Supreme Court
of which we are aware. We think them to be persuasive authority here.
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Applying Sony’s interpretation of Inwood, we agree with the district court that “Tiffany’s
general allegations of counterfeiting failed to provide eBay with the knowledge required
under Inwood.” Tiffany’s demand letters and Buying Programs did not identify particular
sellers who Tiffany thought were then offering or would offer counterfeit goods.13 And
although the NOCIs and buyer complaints gave eBay reason to know that certain sellers
had been selling counterfeits, those sellers’ listings were removed and repeat offenders were
suspended from the eBay site. Thus Tiffany failed to demonstrate that eBay was supplying
its service to individuals who it knew or had reason to know were selling counterfeit Tiffany
goods.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court insofar as it holds that eBay is not
contributorially liable for trademark infringement.
3. Willful Blindness.
Tiffany and its amici express their concern that if eBay is not held liable except when
specific counterfeit listings are brought to its attention, eBay will have no incentive to root
out such listings from its website. They argue that this will effectively require Tiffany and
similarly situated retailers to police eBay’s website—and many others like it—”24 hours a
day, and 365 days a year.” They urge that this is a burden that most mark holders cannot
afford to bear.
First, and most obviously, we are interpreting the law and applying it to the facts of this
case. We could not, even if we thought it wise, revise the existing law in order to better
serve one party’s interests at the expense of the other’s.
But we are also disposed to think, and the record suggests, that private market forces give
eBay and those operating similar businesses a strong incentive to minimize the counterfeit
goods sold on their websites. eBay received many complaints from users claiming to have
been duped into buying counterfeit Tiffany products sold on eBay. The risk of alienating
these users gives eBay a reason to identify and remove counterfeit listings.14 Indeed, it has
spent millions of dollars in that effort.
Moreover, we agree with the district court that if eBay had reason to suspect that
counterfeit Tiffany goods were being sold through its website, and intentionally shielded
itself from discovering the offending listings or the identity of the sellers behind them, eBay
might very well have been charged with knowledge of those sales sufficient to satisfy
Inwood’s “knows or has reason to know” prong. A service provider is not, we think,
permitted willful blindness. When it has reason to suspect that users of its service are
infringing a protected mark, it may not shield itself from learning of the particular
infringing transactions by looking the other way.15 In the words of the Seventh Circuit,
“willful blindness is equivalent to actual knowledge for purposes of the Lanham Act.”

The demand letters did say that eBay should presume that sellers offering five or more Tiffany goods were
selling counterfeits, but we agree with the district court that this presumption was factually unfounded.
14 At the same time, we appreciate the argument that insofar as eBay receives revenue from undetected
counterfeit listings and sales through the fees it charges, it has an incentive to permit such listings and sales to
continue.
15 To be clear, a service provider is not contributorially liable under Inwood merely for failing to anticipate that
others would use its service to infringe a protected mark. But contributory liability may arise where a defendant
13
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eBay appears to concede that it knew as a general matter that counterfeit Tiffany products
were listed and sold through its website. Without more, however, this knowledge is
insufficient to trigger liability under Inwood. The district court found, after careful
consideration, that eBay was not willfully blind to the counterfeit sales. That finding is not
clearly erroneous.17 eBay did not ignore the information it was given about counterfeit sales
on its website.
III. Trademark Dilution…
The district court rejected Tiffany’s dilution by blurring claim on the ground that “eBay
never used the TIFFANY Marks in an effort to create an association with its own product,
but instead, used the marks directly to advertise and identify the availability of authentic
Tiffany merchandise on the eBay website.” The court concluded that “just as the dilution by
blurring claim fails because eBay has never used the [Tiffany] Marks to refer to eBay’s own
product, the dilution by tarnishment claim also fails.”
We agree. There is no second mark or product at issue here to blur with or to tarnish
“Tiffany.”
Tiffany argues that counterfeiting dilutes the value of its product. Perhaps. But insofar as
eBay did not itself sell the goods at issue, it did not itself engage in dilution….
IV. False Advertising
Finally, Tiffany claims that eBay engaged in false advertising in violation of federal law.
A. Principles
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act prohibits any person from, “in commercial advertising or
promotion, misrepresent[ing] the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of
his or her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities.” A claim of false
advertising may be based on at least one of two theories: “that the challenged
advertisement is literally false, i.e., false on its face,” or “that the advertisement, while not
literally false, is nevertheless likely to mislead or confuse consumers.”

is (as was eBay here) made aware that there was infringement on its site but (unlike eBay here) ignored that
fact.
17 Tiffany’s reliance on the “flea market” cases, Hard Rock Café and Fonovisa, is unavailing. eBay’s efforts to
combat counterfeiting far exceeded the efforts made by the defendants in those cases. See Hard Rock Café, 955
F.2d at 1146 (defendant did not investigate any of the seizures of counterfeit products at its swap meet, even
though it knew they had occurred); Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 265 (concluding that plaintiff stated a claim for
contributory trademark infringement based on allegation that swap meet “disregard[ed] its vendors’ blatant
trademark infringements with impunity”). Moreover, neither case concluded that the defendant was willfully
blind. The court in Hard Rock Café remanded so that the district court could apply the correct definition of
“willful blindness,” and the court in Fonovisa merely sustained the plaintiff’s complaint against a motion to
dismiss.
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In either case, the “injuries redressed in false advertising cases are the result of public
deception.” And “[u]nder either theory, the plaintiff must also demonstrate that the false or
misleading representation involved an inherent or material quality of the product.”
Where an advertising claim is literally false, “the court may enjoin the use of the claim
without reference to the advertisement’s impact on the buying public.” To succeed in a
likelihood-of-confusion case where the statement at issue is not literally false, however, a
plaintiff “must demonstrate, by extrinsic evidence, that the challenged commercials tend to
mislead or confuse consumers,” and must “demonstrate that a statistically significant part
of the commercial audience holds the false belief allegedly communicated by the challenged
advertisement.”
B. Discussion
eBay advertised the sale of Tiffany goods on its website in various ways. Among other
things, eBay provided hyperlinks to “Tiffany,” “Tiffany & Co. under $150,” “Tiffany & Co.,”
“Tiffany Rings,” and “Tiffany & Co. under $50.” eBay also purchased advertising space on
search engines, in some instances providing a link to eBay’s site and exhorting the reader
to “Find tiffany items at low prices.” Yet the district court found, and eBay does not deny,
that “eBay certainly had generalized knowledge that Tiffany products sold on eBay were
often counterfeit.” Tiffany argues that because eBay advertised the sale of Tiffany goods on
its website, and because many of those goods were in fact counterfeit, eBay should be liable
for false advertising.
The district court rejected this argument. The court first concluded that the advertisements
at issue were not literally false “[b]ecause authentic Tiffany merchandise is sold on eBay’s
website,” even if counterfeit Tiffany products are sold there, too.
The court then considered whether the advertisements, though not literally false, were
nonetheless misleading. It concluded they were not for three reasons. First, the court found
that eBay’s use of Tiffany’s mark in its advertising was “protected, nominative fair use.”
Second, the court found that “Tiffany has not proven that eBay had specific knowledge as to
the illicit nature of individual listings,” implying that such knowledge would be necessary
to sustain a false advertising claim. Finally, the court reasoned that “to the extent that the
advertising was false, the falsity was the responsibility of third party sellers, not eBay.”
We agree with the district court that eBay’s advertisements were not literally false
inasmuch as genuine Tiffany merchandise was offered for sale through eBay’s website. But
we are unable to affirm on the record before us the district court’s further conclusion that
eBay’s advertisements were not “likely to mislead or confuse consumers.”
As noted, to evaluate Tiffany’s claim that eBay’s advertisements misled consumers, a court
must determine whether extrinsic evidence indicates that the challenged advertisements
were misleading or confusing. The reasons the district court gave for rejecting Tiffany’s
claim do not seem to reflect this determination, though. The court’s first rationale was that
eBay’s advertisements were nominative fair use of Tiffany’s mark.
But, even if that is so, it does not follow that eBay did not use the mark in a misleading
advertisement. It may, after all, constitute fair use for Brand X Coffee to use the trademark
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of its competitor, Brand Y Coffee, in an advertisement stating that “In a blind taste test, 9
out of 10 New Yorkers said they preferred Brand X Coffee to Brand Y Coffee.” But if 9 out of
10 New Yorkers in a statistically significant sample did not say they preferred X to Y, or if
they were paid to say that they did, then the advertisement would nonetheless be literally
false in the first example, or misleading in the second.
There is a similar difficulty with the district court’s reliance on the fact that eBay did not
know which particular listings on its website offered counterfeit Tiffany goods. That is
relevant, as we have said, to whether eBay committed contributory trademark
infringement. But it sheds little light on whether the advertisements were misleading
insofar as they implied the genuineness of Tiffany goods on eBay’s site.
Finally, the district court reasoned that if eBay’s advertisements were misleading, that was
only because the sellers of counterfeits made them so by offering inauthentic Tiffany goods.
Again, this consideration is relevant to Tiffany’s direct infringement claim, but less
relevant, if relevant at all, here. It is true that eBay did not itself sell counterfeit Tiffany
goods; only the fraudulent vendors did, and that is in part why we conclude that eBay did
not infringe Tiffany’s mark. But eBay did affirmatively advertise the goods sold through its
site as Tiffany merchandise. The law requires us to hold eBay accountable for the words
that it chose insofar as they misled or confused consumers.
eBay and its amici warn of the deterrent effect that will grip online advertisers who are
unable to confirm the authenticity of all of the goods they advertise for sale. We rather
doubt that the consequences will be so dire. An online advertiser such as eBay need not
cease its advertisements for a kind of goods only because it knows that not all of those
goods are authentic. A disclaimer might suffice. But the law prohibits an advertisement
that implies that all of the goods offered on a defendant’s website are genuine when in fact,
as here, a sizeable proportion of them are not.
Rather than vacate the judgment of the district court as to Tiffany’s false advertising claim,
we think it prudent to remand the cause so that the district court, with its greater
familiarity with the evidence, can reconsider the claim in light of what we have said. The
case is therefore remanded…for further proceedings for the limited purpose of the district
court’s re-examination of the false advertising claim in accordance with this opinion….
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VII.

Pornography

Pornography Glossary
Obscenity is: “(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.” [Miller]
Indecency is: “language that describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory
activities and organs, at times of the day when there is a reasonable risk that children may
be in the audience.” [FCC definition, quoted in Pacifica]
Compare the CDA: “any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image or other
communication that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as
measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or
organs.”
Harmful to minor is: “(a) patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult
community as a whole with respect to what is suitable for minors; (b) appeals to the
prurient interests of minors; and (c) is utterly without redeeming social importance for
minors.” [Ginsberg]
Compare COPA: “any communication, picture, image, graphic image file, article,
recording, writing, or other matter of any kind that is obscene or that (A) the
average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find, taking
the material as a whole and with respect to minors, is designed to appeal to, or is
designed to pander to, the prurient interest; (B) depicts, describes, or represents, in
a manner patently offensive with respect to minors, an actual or simulated sexual
act or sexual contact, an actual or simulated normal or perverted sexual act, or a
lewd exhibition of the genitals or post-pubescent female breast; and (C) taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors.”
Child pornography is: “works that visually depict sexual conduct by children below a
specified age, where the category of “sexual conduct” proscribed is suitably limited and
described.” [Ferber] In the New York statute’s case, “sexual conduct” was defined as
“actual or simulated sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse, sexual bestiality,
masturbation, sado-masochistic abuse, or lewd exhibition of the genitals.”
Pornography is: ?????
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Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
Stevens, Justice.
At issue is the constitutionality of two statutory provisions enacted to protect minors from
“indecent” and “patently offensive” communications on the Internet. Notwithstanding the
legitimacy and importance of the congressional goal of protecting children from harmful
materials, we agree with the three-judge District Court that the statute abridges “the
freedom of speech” protected by the First Amendment.
I
The District Court made extensive findings of fact, most of which were based on a detailed
stipulation prepared by the parties. The findings describe the character and the dimensions
of the Internet, the availability of sexually explicit material in that medium, and the
problems confronting age verification for recipients of Internet communications. Because
those findings provide the underpinnings for the legal issues, we begin with a summary of
the undisputed facts.
The Internet
The Internet is an international network of interconnected computers. It is the outgrowth of
what began in 1969 as a military program called “ARPANET,” which was designed to
enable computers operated by the military, defense contractors, and universities conducting
defense-related research to communicate with one another by redundant channels even if
some portions of the network were damaged in a war. While the ARPANET no longer
exists, it provided an example for the development of a number of civilian networks that,
eventually linking with each other, now enable tens of millions of people to communicate
with one another and to access vast amounts of information from around the world. The
Internet is “a unique and wholly new medium of worldwide human communication.”
The Internet has experienced “extraordinary growth.” The number of “host” computers—
those that store information and relay communications—increased from about 300 in 1981
to approximately 9,400,000 by the time of the trial in 1996. Roughly 60% of these hosts are
located in the United States. About 40 million people used the Internet at the time of trial,
a number that is expected to mushroom to 200 million by 1999.
Individuals can obtain access to the Internet from many different sources, generally hosts
themselves or entities with a host affiliation. Most colleges and universities provide access
for their students and faculty; many corporations provide their employees with access
through an office network; many communities and local libraries provide free access; and
an increasing number of storefront “computer coffee shops” provide access for a small
hourly fee. Several major national “online services” such as America Online, CompuServe,
the Microsoft Network, and Prodigy offer access to their own extensive proprietary
networks as well as a link to the much larger resources of the Internet. These commercial
online services had almost 12 million individual subscribers at the time of trial.
Anyone with access to the Internet may take advantage of a wide variety of communication
and information retrieval methods. These methods are constantly evolving and difficult to
categorize precisely. But, as presently constituted, those most relevant to this case are
electronic mail (e-mail), automatic mailing list services (“mail exploders,” sometimes
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referred to as “listservs”), “newsgroups,” “chat rooms,” and the “World Wide Web.” All of
these methods can be used to transmit text; most can transmit sound, pictures, and moving
video images. Taken together, these tools constitute a unique medium—known to its users
as “cyberspace”—located in no particular geographical location but available to anyone,
anywhere in the world, with access to the Internet.
E-mail enables an individual to send an electronic message—generally akin to a note or
letter—to another individual or to a group of addressees. The message is generally stored
electronically, sometimes waiting for the recipient to check her “mailbox” and sometimes
making its receipt known through some type of prompt. A mail exploder is a sort of e-mail
group. Subscribers can send messages to a common e-mail address, which then forwards
the message to the group’s other subscribers. Newsgroups also serve groups of regular
participants, but these postings may be read by others as well. There are thousands of such
groups, each serving to foster an exchange of information or opinion on a particular topic
running the gamut from, say, the music of Wagner to Balkan politics to AIDS prevention to
the Chicago Bulls. About 100,000 new messages are posted every day. In most newsgroups,
postings are automatically purged at regular intervals. In addition to posting a message
that can be read later, two or more individuals wishing to communicate more immediately
can enter a chat room to engage in real-time dialogue—in other words, by typing messages
to one another that appear almost immediately on the others’ computer screens. The
District Court found that at any given time “tens of thousands of users are engaging in
conversations on a huge range of subjects.” It is “no exaggeration to conclude that the
content on the Internet is as diverse as human thought.”
The best known category of communication over the Internet is the World Wide Web, which
allows users to search for and retrieve information stored in remote computers, as well as,
in some cases, to communicate back to designated sites. In concrete terms, the Web consists
of a vast number of documents stored in different computers all over the world. Some of
these documents are simply files containing information. However, more elaborate
documents, commonly known as Web “pages,” are also prevalent. Each has its own
address—”rather like a telephone number.” Web pages frequently contain information and
sometimes allow the viewer to communicate with the page’s (or “site’s”) author. They
generally also contain “links” to other documents created by that site’s author or to other
(generally) related sites. Typically, the links are either blue or underlined text—sometimes
images.
Navigating the Web is relatively straightforward. A user may either type the address of a
known page or enter one or more keywords into a commercial “search engine” in an effort to
locate sites on a subject of interest. A particular Web page may contain the information
sought by the “surfer,” or, through its links, it may be an avenue to other documents located
anywhere on the Internet. Users generally explore a given Web page, or move to another,
by clicking a computer “mouse” on one of the page’s icons or links. Access to most Web
pages is freely available, but some allow access only to those who have purchased the right
from a commercial provider. The Web is thus comparable, from the readers’ viewpoint, to
both a vast library including millions of readily available and indexed publications and a
sprawling mall offering goods and services.
From the publishers’ point of view, it constitutes a vast platform from which to address and
hear from a worldwide audience of millions of readers, viewers, researchers, and buyers.
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Any person or organization with a computer connected to the Internet can “publish”
information. Publishers include government agencies, educational institutions, commercial
entities, advocacy groups, and individuals. Publishers may either make their material
available to the entire pool of Internet users, or confine access to a selected group, such as
those willing to pay for the privilege. “No single organization controls any membership in
the Web, nor is there any single centralized point from which individual Web sites or
services can be blocked from the Web.”
Sexually Explicit Material
Sexually explicit material on the Internet includes text, pictures, and chat and “extends
from the modestly titillating to the hardest-core.” These files are created, named, and
posted in the same manner as material that is not sexually explicit, and may be accessed
either deliberately or unintentionally during the course of an imprecise search. “Once a
provider posts its content on the Internet, it cannot prevent that content from entering any
community.” Thus, for example,
“when the UCR/California Museum of Photography posts to its Web site
nudes by Edward Weston and Robert Mapplethorpe to announce that its new
exhibit will travel to Baltimore and New York City, those images are
available not only in Los Angeles, Baltimore, and New York City, but also in
Cincinnati, Mobile, or Beijing—wherever Internet users live. Similarly, the
safer sex instructions that Critical Path posts to its Web site, written in
street language so that the teenage receiver can understand them, are
available not just in Philadelphia, but also in Provo and Prague.”
Some of the communications over the Internet that originate in foreign countries are also
sexually explicit.
Though such material is widely available, users seldom encounter such content
accidentally. “A document’s title or a description of the document will usually appear before
the document itself ... and in many cases the user will receive detailed information about a
site’s content before he or she need take the step to access the document. Almost all
sexually explicit images are preceded by warnings as to the content.” For that reason, the
“odds are slim” that a user would enter a sexually explicit site by accident. Unlike
communications received by radio or television, “the receipt of information on the Internet
requires a series of affirmative steps more deliberate and directed than merely turning a
dial. A child requires some sophistication and some ability to read to retrieve material and
thereby to use the Internet unattended.”
Systems have been developed to help parents control the material that may be available on
a home computer with Internet access. A system may either limit a computer’s access to an
approved list of sources that have been identified as containing no adult material, it may
block designated inappropriate sites, or it may attempt to block messages containing
identifiable objectionable features. “Although parental control software currently can
screen for certain suggestive words or for known sexually explicit sites, it cannot now
screen for sexually explicit images.” Nevertheless, the evidence indicates that “a reasonably
effective method by which parents can prevent their children from accessing sexually
explicit and other material which parents may believe is inappropriate for their children
will soon be widely available.”
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Age Verification
The problem of age verification differs for different uses of the Internet. The District Court
categorically determined that there “is no effective way to determine the identity or the age
of a user who is accessing material through e-mail, mail exploders, newsgroups or chat
rooms.” The Government offered no evidence that there was a reliable way to screen
recipients and participants in such forums for age. Moreover, even if it were technologically
feasible to block minors’ access to newsgroups and chat rooms containing discussions of art,
politics, or other subjects that potentially elicit “indecent” or “patently offensive”
contributions, it would not be possible to block their access to that material and “still allow
them access to the remaining content, even if the overwhelming majority of that content
was not indecent.”
Technology exists by which an operator of a Web site may condition access on the
verification of requested information such as a credit card number or an adult password.
Credit card verification is only feasible, however, either in connection with a commercial
transaction in which the card is used, or by payment to a verification agency. Using credit
card possession as a surrogate for proof of age would impose costs on non-commercial Web
sites that would require many of them to shut down. For that reason, at the time of the
trial, credit card verification was “effectively unavailable to a substantial number of
Internet content providers.” Moreover, the imposition of such a requirement “would
completely bar adults who do not have a credit card and lack the resources to obtain one
from accessing any blocked material.”
Commercial pornographic sites that charge their users for access have assigned them
passwords as a method of age verification. The record does not contain any evidence
concerning the reliability of these technologies. Even if passwords are effective for
commercial purveyors of indecent material, the District Court found that an adult password
requirement would impose significant burdens on noncommercial sites, both because they
would discourage users from accessing their sites and because the cost of creating and
maintaining such screening systems would be “beyond their reach.”
In sum, the District Court found:
“Even if credit card verification or adult password verification were
implemented, the Government presented no testimony as to how such
systems could ensure that the user of the password or credit card is in fact
over 18. The burdens imposed by credit card verification and adult password
verification systems make them effectively unavailable to a substantial
number of Internet content providers.”
II
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 was an unusually important legislative enactment. As
stated on the first of its 103 pages, its primary purpose was to reduce regulation and
encourage “the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies.” The major
components of the statute have nothing to do with the Internet; they were designed to
promote competition in the local telephone service market, the multichannel video market,
and the market for over-the-air broadcasting. The Act includes seven Titles, six of which
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are the product of extensive committee hearings and the subject of discussion in Reports
prepared by Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives. By contrast, Title
V—known as the “Communications Decency Act of 1996” (CDA)—contains provisions that
were either added in executive committee after the hearings were concluded or as
amendments offered during floor debate on the legislation. An amendment offered in the
Senate was the source of the two statutory provisions challenged in this case. They are
informally described as the “indecent transmission” provision and the “patently offensive
display” provision.
The first, 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (1994 ed., Supp. II), prohibits the knowing transmission of
obscene or indecent messages to any recipient under 18 years of age. It provides in
pertinent part:
“(a) Whoever“(1) in interstate or foreign communications.....
“(B) by means of a telecommunications device knowingly“(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and
“(ii) initiates the transmission of,
“any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication
which is obscene or indecent, knowing that the recipient of the
communication is under 18 years of age, regardless of whether the maker of
such communication placed the call or initiated the communication;
.....
“(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under his control to
be used for any activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent that it be
used for such activity,
“shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two years, or
both.”
The second provision, § 223(d), prohibits the knowing sending or displaying of patently
offensive messages in a manner that is available to a person under 18 years of age. It
provides:
“(d) Whoever“(1) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly“(A) uses an interactive computer service to send to a specific person or
persons under 18 years of age, or
“(B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a manner available to
a person under 18 years of age,
“any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication
that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured
by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or
organs, regardless of whether the user of such service placed the call or
initiated the communication; or
“(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under such person’s
control to be used for an activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent
that it be used for such activity,
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“shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two years, or
both.”
The breadth of these prohibitions is qualified by two affirmative defenses. One covers those
who take “good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions” to restrict access by
minors to the prohibited communications. § 223(e)(5)(A). The other covers those who
restrict access to covered material by requiring certain designated forms of age proof, such
as a verified credit card or an adult identification number or code. § 223(e)(5)(B)….
IV
In arguing for reversal, the Government contends that the CDA is plainly constitutional
under three of our prior decisions: (1) Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); (2) FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, (1978); and (3) Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475
U.S. 41 (1986). A close look at these cases, however, raises—rather than relieves—doubts
concerning the constitutionality of the CDA.
In Ginsberg, we upheld the constitutionality of a New York statute that prohibited selling
to minors under 17 years of age material that was considered obscene as to them even if not
obscene as to adults. We rejected the defendant’s broad submission that “the scope of the
constitutional freedom of expression secured to a citizen to read or see material concerned
with sex cannot be made to depend on whether the citizen is an adult or a minor.” In
rejecting that contention, we relied not only on the State’s independent interest in the wellbeing of its youth, but also on our consistent recognition of the principle that “the parents’
claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in
the structure of our society.”
In four important respects, the statute upheld in Ginsberg was narrower than the CDA.
First, we noted in Ginsberg that “the prohibition against sales to minors does not bar
parents who so desire from purchasing the magazines for their children.” Under the CDA,
by contrast, neither the parents’ consent—nor even their participation—in the
communication would avoid the application of the statute. Second, the New York statute
applied only to commercial transactions, whereas the CDA contains no such limitation.
Third, the New York statute cabined its definition of material that is harmful to minors
with the requirement that it be “utterly without redeeming social importance for minors.”
The CDA fails to provide us with any definition of the term “indecent” as used in § 223(a)(1)
and, importantly, omits any requirement that the “patently offensive” material covered by §
223(d) lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. Fourth, the New York
statute defined a minor as a person under the age of 17, whereas the CDA, in applying to
all those under 18 years, includes an additional year of those nearest majority.
In Pacifica, we upheld a declaratory order of the Federal Communications Commission,
holding that the broadcast of a recording of a 12-minute monologue entitled “Filthy Words”
that had previously been delivered to a live audience “could have been the subject of
administrative sanctions.” The Commission had found that the repetitive use of certain
words referring to excretory or sexual activities or organs “in an afternoon broadcast when
children are in the audience was patently offensive” and concluded that the monologue was
indecent “as broadcast.” The respondent did not quarrel with the finding that the afternoon
broadcast was patently offensive, but contended that it was not “indecent” within the
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meaning of the relevant statutes because it contained no prurient appeal. After rejecting
respondent’s statutory arguments, we confronted its two constitutional arguments: (1) that
the Commission’s construction of its authority to ban indecent speech was so broad that its
order had to be set aside even if the broadcast at issue was unprotected; and (2) that since
the recording was not obscene, the First Amendment forbade any abridgment of the right to
broadcast it on the radio.
In the portion of the lead opinion not joined by Justices Powell and Blackmun, the plurality
stated that the First Amendment does not prohibit all governmental regulation that
depends on the content of speech. Accordingly, the availability of constitutional protection
for a vulgar and offensive monologue that was not obscene depended on the context of the
broadcast. Relying on the premise that “of all forms of communication” broadcasting had
received the most limited First Amendment protection, the Court concluded that the ease
with which children may obtain access to broadcasts, “coupled with the concerns recognized
in Ginsberg,” justified special treatment of indecent broadcasting.
As with the New York statute at issue in Ginsberg, there are significant differences
between the order upheld in Pacifica and the CDA. First, the order in Pacifica, issued by an
agency that had been regulating radio stations for decades, targeted a specific broadcast
that represented a rather dramatic departure from traditional program content in order to
designate when—rather than whether—it would be permissible to air such a program in
that particular medium. The CDA’s broad categorical prohibitions are not limited to
particular times and are not dependent on any evaluation by an agency familiar with the
unique characteristics of the Internet. Second, unlike the CDA, the Commission’s
declaratory order was not punitive; we expressly refused to decide whether the indecent
broadcast “would justify a criminal prosecution.” Finally, the Commission’s order applied to
a medium which as a matter of history had “received the most limited First Amendment
protection,” in large part because warnings could not adequately protect the listener from
unexpected program content. The Internet, however, has no comparable history. Moreover,
the District Court found that the risk of encountering indecent material by accident is
remote because a series of affirmative steps is required to access specific material.
In Renton, we upheld a zoning ordinance that kept adult movie theaters out of residential
neighborhoods. The ordinance was aimed, not at the content of the films shown in the
theaters, but rather at the “secondary effects”—such as crime and deteriorating property
values—that these theaters fostered: “‘It is th[e] secondary effect which these zoning
ordinances attempt to avoid, not the dissemination of “offensive” speech.’” According to the
Government, the CDA is constitutional because it constitutes a sort of “cyberzoning” on the
Internet. But the CDA applies broadly to the entire universe of cyberspace. And the
purpose of the CDA is to protect children from the primary effects of “indecent” and
“patently offensive” speech, rather than any “secondary” effect of such speech. Thus, the
CDA is a content-based blanket restriction on speech, and, as such, cannot be “properly
analyzed as a form of time, place, and manner regulation.”
These precedents, then, surely do not require us to uphold the CDA and are fully consistent
with the application of the most stringent review of its provisions.
V
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In Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975), we observed that
“[e]ach medium of expression ... may present its own problems.” Thus, some of our cases
have recognized special justifications for regulation of the broadcast media that are not
applicable to other speakers. In these cases, the Court relied on the history of extensive
Government regulation of the broadcast medium; the scarcity of available frequencies at its
inception; and its “invasive” nature.
Those factors are not present in cyberspace. Neither before nor after the enactment of the
CDA have the vast democratic forums of the Internet been subject to the type of
government supervision and regulation that has attended the broadcast industry.
Moreover, the Internet is not as “invasive” as radio or television. The District Court
specifically found that “[c]ommunications over the Internet do not ‘invade’ an individual’s
home or appear on one’s computer screen unbidden. Users seldom encounter content ‘by
accident.’” It also found that “[a]lmost all sexually explicit images are preceded by warnings
as to the content,” and cited testimony that “‘odds are slim’ that a user would come across a
sexually explicit sight by accident.”
We distinguished Pacifica in Sable, 492 U.S., at 128, on just this basis. In Sable, a company
engaged in the business of offering sexually oriented prerecorded telephone messages
(popularly known as “dial-a-porn”) challenged the constitutionality of an amendment to the
Communications Act of 1934 that imposed a blanket prohibition on indecent as well as
obscene interstate commercial telephone messages. We held that the statute was
constitutional insofar as it applied to obscene messages but invalid as applied to indecent
messages. In attempting to justify the complete ban and criminalization of indecent
commercial telephone messages, the Government relied on Pacifica, arguing that the ban
was necessary to prevent children from gaining access to such messages. We agreed that
“there is a compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of
minors” which extended to shielding them from indecent messages that are not obscene by
adult standards, but distinguished our “emphatically narrow holding” in Pacifica because it
did not involve a complete ban and because it involved a different medium of
communication. We explained that “the dial-it medium requires the listener to take
affirmative steps to receive the communication.” “Placing a telephone call,” we continued,
“is not the same as turning on a radio and being taken by surprise by an indecent message.”
Finally, unlike the conditions that prevailed when Congress first authorized regulation of
the broadcast spectrum, the Internet can hardly be considered a “scarce” expressive
commodity. It provides relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for communication of all
kinds. The Government estimates that “[a]s many as 40 million people use the Internet
today, and that figure is expected to grow to 200 million by 1999.” This dynamic,
multifaceted category of communication includes not only traditional print and news
services, but also audio, video, and still images, as well as interactive, real-time dialogue.
Through the use of chat rooms, any person with a phone line can become a town crier with
a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox. Through the use of Web
pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups, the same individual can become a pamphleteer. As
the District Court found, “the content on the Internet is as diverse as human thought.” We
agree with its conclusion that our cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of First
Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this medium.
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VI
Regardless of whether the CDA is so vague that it violates the Fifth Amendment, the many
ambiguities concerning the scope of its coverage render it problematic for purposes of the
First Amendment. For instance, each of the two parts of the CDA uses a different linguistic
form. The first uses the word “indecent,” while the second speaks of material that “in
context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary
community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs.” Given the absence of a
definition of either term, this difference in language will provoke uncertainty among
speakers about how the two standards relate to each other and just what they mean. Could
a speaker confidently assume that a serious discussion about birth control practices,
homosexuality, the First Amendment issues raised by the Appendix to our Pacifica opinion,
or the consequences of prison rape would not violate the CDA? This uncertainty
undermines the likelihood that the CDA has been carefully tailored to the congressional
goal of protecting minors from potentially harmful materials.
The vagueness of the CDA is a matter of special concern for two reasons. First, the CDA is a
content-based regulation of speech. The vagueness of such a regulation raises special First
Amendment concerns because of its obvious chilling effect on free speech. Second, the CDA
is a criminal statute. In addition to the opprobrium and stigma of a criminal conviction, the
CDA threatens violators with penalties including up to two years in prison for each act of
violation. The severity of criminal sanctions may well cause speakers to remain silent
rather than communicate even arguably unlawful words, ideas, and images. As a practical
matter, this increased deterrent effect, coupled with the “risk of discriminatory
enforcement” of vague regulations, poses greater First Amendment concerns than those
implicated by the civil regulation reviewed in Denver Area Ed. Telecommunications
Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
The Government argues that the statute is no more vague than the obscenity standard this
Court established in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). But that is not so. In Miller,
this Court reviewed a criminal conviction against a commercial vendor who mailed
brochures containing pictures of sexually explicit activities to individuals who had not
requested such materials. Having struggled for some time to establish a definition of
obscenity, we set forth in Miller the test for obscenity that controls to this day:
“(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community
standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c)
whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value.”
Because the CDA’s “patently offensive” standard (and, we assume, arguendo, its
synonymous “indecent” standard) is one part of the three-prong Miller test, the Government
reasons, it cannot be unconstitutionally vague.
The Government’s assertion is incorrect as a matter of fact. The second prong of the Miller
test—the purportedly analogous standard—contains a critical requirement that is omitted
from the CDA: that the proscribed material be “specifically defined by the applicable state
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law.” This requirement reduces the vagueness inherent in the open-ended term “patently
offensive” as used in the CDA. Moreover, the Miller definition is limited to “sexual conduct,”
whereas the CDA extends also to include (1) “excretory activities” as well as (2) “organs” of
both a sexual and excretory nature.
The Government’s reasoning is also flawed. Just because a definition including three
limitations is not vague, it does not follow that one of those limitations, standing by itself, is
not vague. Each of Miller’s additional two prongs—(1) that, taken as a whole, the material
appeal to the “prurient” interest, and (2) that it “lac[k] serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value”—critically limits the uncertain sweep of the obscenity definition. The
second requirement is particularly important because, unlike the “patently offensive” and
“prurient interest” criteria, it is not judged by contemporary community standards. This
“societal value” requirement, absent in the CDA, allows appellate courts to impose some
limitations and regularity on the definition by setting, as a matter of law, a national floor
for socially redeeming value. The Government’s contention that courts will be able to give
such legal limitations to the CDA’s standards is belied by Miller’s own rationale for having
juries determine whether material is “patently offensive” according to community
standards: that such questions are essentially ones of fact.
In contrast to Miller and our other previous cases, the CDA thus presents a greater threat
of censoring speech that, in fact, falls outside the statute’s scope. Given the vague contours
of the coverage of the statute, it unquestionably silences some speakers whose messages
would be entitled to constitutional protection. That danger provides further reason for
insisting that the statute not be overly broad. The CDA’s burden on protected speech cannot
be justified if it could be avoided by a more carefully drafted statute.
VII
We are persuaded that the CDA lacks the precision that the First Amendment requires
when a statute regulates the content of speech. In order to deny minors access to
potentially harmful speech, the CDA effectively suppresses a large amount of speech that
adults have a constitutional right to receive and to address to one another. That burden on
adult speech is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would be at least as effective in
achieving the legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted to serve.
In evaluating the free speech rights of adults, we have made it perfectly clear that “[s]exual
expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment.” Indeed,
Pacifica itself admonished that “the fact that society may find speech offensive is not a
sufficient reason for suppressing it.”
It is true that we have repeatedly recognized the governmental interest in protecting
children from harmful materials. But that interest does not justify an unnecessarily broad
suppression of speech addressed to adults. As we have explained, the Government may not
“reduc[e] the adult population ... to ... only what is fit for children.” “[R]egardless of the
strength of the government’s interest” in protecting children, “[t]he level of discourse
reaching a mailbox simply cannot be limited to that which would be suitable for a sandbox.”
The District Court was correct to conclude that the CDA effectively resembles the ban on
“dial-a-porn” invalidated in Sable. In Sable, this Court rejected the argument that we
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should defer to the congressional judgment that nothing less than a total ban would be
effective in preventing enterprising youngsters from gaining access to indecent
communications. Sable thus made clear that the mere fact that a statutory regulation of
speech was enacted for the important purpose of protecting children from exposure to
sexually explicit material does not foreclose inquiry into its validity. As we pointed out last
Term, that inquiry embodies an “overarching commitment” to make sure that Congress has
designed its statute to accomplish its purpose “without imposing an unnecessarily great
restriction on speech.”
In arguing that the CDA does not so diminish adult communication, the Government relies
on the incorrect factual premise that prohibiting a transmission whenever it is known that
one of its recipients is a minor would not interfere with adult-to-adult communication. The
findings of the District Court make clear that this premise is untenable. Given the size of
the potential audience for most messages, in the absence of a viable age verification
process, the sender must be charged with knowing that one or more minors will likely view
it. Knowledge that, for instance, one or more members of a 100-person chat group will be a
minor—and therefore that it would be a crime to send the group an indecent message—
would surely burden communication among adults.
The District Court found that at the time of trial existing technology did not include any
effective method for a sender to prevent minors from obtaining access to its communications
on the Internet without also denying access to adults. The Court found no effective way to
determine the age of a user who is accessing material through e-mail, mail exploders,
newsgroups, or chat rooms. As a practical matter, the Court also found that it would be
prohibitively expensive for noncommercial—as well as some commercial—speakers who
have Web sites to verify that their users are adults. These limitations must inevitably
curtail a significant amount of adult communication on the Internet. By contrast, the
District Court found that “[d]espite its limitations, currently available user-based software
suggests that a reasonably effective method by which parents can prevent their children
from accessing sexually explicit and other material which parents may believe is
inappropriate for their children will soon be widely available.” (emphases added).
The breadth of the CDA’s coverage is wholly unprecedented. Unlike the regulations upheld
in Ginsberg and Pacifica, the scope of the CDA is not limited to commercial speech or
commercial entities. Its open-ended prohibitions embrace all nonprofit entities and
individuals posting indecent messages or displaying them on their own computers in the
presence of minors. The general, undefined terms “indecent” and “patently offensive” cover
large amounts of nonpornographic material with serious educational or other value.
Moreover, the “community standards” criterion as applied to the Internet means that any
communication available to a nation wide audience will be judged by the standards of the
community most likely to be offended by the message. The regulated subject matter
includes any of the seven “dirty words” used in the Pacifica monologue, the use of which the
Government’s expert acknowledged could constitute a felony. It may also extend to
discussions about prison rape or safe sexual practices, artistic images that include nude
subjects, and arguably the card catalog of the Carnegie Library.
For the purposes of our decision, we need neither accept nor reject the Government’s
submission that the First Amendment does not forbid a blanket prohibition on all
“indecent” and “patently offensive” messages communicated to a 17-year-old-no matter how
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much value the message may contain and regardless of parental approval. It is at least
clear that the strength of the Government’s interest in protecting minors is not equally
strong throughout the coverage of this broad statute. Under the CDA, a parent allowing her
17-year-old to use the family computer to obtain information on the Internet that she, in
her parental judgment, deems appropriate could face a lengthy prison term. Similarly, a
parent who sent his 17-year-old college freshman information on birth control via e-mail
could be incarcerated even though neither he, his child, nor anyone in their home
community found the material “indecent” or “patently offensive,” if the college town’s
community thought otherwise.
The breadth of this content-based restriction of speech imposes an especially heavy burden
on the Government to explain why a less restrictive provision would not be as effective as
the CDA. It has not done so. The arguments in this Court have referred to possible
alternatives such as requiring that indecent material be “tagged” in a way that facilitates
parental control of material coming into their homes, making exceptions for messages with
artistic or educational value, providing some tolerance for parental choice, and regulating
some portions of the Internet—such as commercial Web sites—differently from others, such
as chat rooms. Particularly in the light of the absence of any detailed findings by the
Congress, or even hearings addressing the special problems of the CDA, we are persuaded
that the CDA is not narrowly tailored if that requirement has any meaning at all.
VIII
In an attempt to curtail the CDA’s facial overbreadth, the Government advances three
additional arguments for sustaining the Act’s affirmative prohibitions: (1) that the CDA is
constitutional because it leaves open ample “alternative channels” of communication; (2)
that the plain meaning of the CDA’s “knowledge” and “specific person” requirement
significantly restricts its permissible applications; and (3) that the CDA’s prohibitions are
“almost always” limited to material lacking redeeming social value.
The Government first contends that, even though the CDA effectively censors discourse on
many of the Internet’s modalities—such as chat groups, newsgroups, and mail exploders—
it is nonetheless constitutional because it provides a “reasonable opportunity” for speakers
to engage in the restricted speech on the World Wide Web. This argument is unpersuasive
because the CDA regulates speech on the basis of its content. A “time, place, and manner”
analysis is therefore inapplicable. It is thus immaterial whether such speech would be
feasible on the Web (which, as the Government’s own expert acknowledged, would cost up
to $10,000 if the speaker’s interests were not accommodated by an existing Web site, not
including costs for data base management and age verification). The Government’s position
is equivalent to arguing that a statute could ban leaflets on certain subjects as long as
individuals are free to publish books. In invalidating a number of laws that banned
leafletting on the streets regardless of their content, we explained that “one is not to have
the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it
may be exercised in some other place.”
The Government also asserts that the “knowledge” requirement of both §§ 223(a) and (d),
especially when coupled with the “specific child” element found in § 223(d), saves the CDA
from overbreadth. Because both sections prohibit the dissemination of indecent messages
only to persons known to be under 18, the Government argues, it does not require
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transmitters to “refrain from communicating indecent material to adults; they need only
refrain from disseminating such materials to persons they know to be under 18.” This
argument ignores the fact that most Internet forums—including chat rooms, newsgroups,
mail exploders, and the Web—are open to all comers. The Government’s assertion that the
knowledge requirement somehow protects the communications of adults is therefore
untenable. Even the strongest reading of the “specific person” requirement of § 223(d)
cannot save the statute. It would confer broad powers of censorship, in the form of a
“heckler’s veto,” upon any opponent of indecent speech who might simply log on and inform
the would-be discoursers that his 17-year-old child—a “specific person ... under 18 years of
age”—would be present.
Finally, we find no textual support for the Government’s submission that material having
scientific, educational, or other redeeming social value will necessarily fall outside the
CDA’s “patently offensive” and “indecent” prohibitions.
IX
The Government’s three remaining arguments focus on the defenses provided in § 223(e)(5).
First, relying on the “good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions” provision,
the Government suggests that “tagging” provides a defense that saves the constitutionality
of the CDA. The suggestion assumes that transmitters may encode their indecent
communications in a way that would indicate their contents, thus permitting recipients to
block their reception with appropriate software. It is the requirement that the good-faith
action must be “effective” that makes this defense illusory. The Government recognizes that
its proposed screening software does not currently exist. Even if it did, there is no way to
know whether a potential recipient will actually block the encoded material. Without the
impossible knowledge that every guardian in America is screening for the “tag,” the
transmitter could not reasonably rely on its action to be “effective.”
For its second and third arguments concerning defenses—which we can consider together—
the Government relies on the latter half of § 223(e)(5), which applies when the transmitter
has restricted access by requiring use of a verified credit card or adult identification. Such
verification is not only technologically available but actually is used by commercial
providers of sexually explicit material. These providers, therefore, would be protected by
the defense. Under the findings of the District Court, however, it is not economically
feasible for most noncommercial speakers to employ such verification. Accordingly, this
defense would not significantly narrow the statute’s burden on noncommercial speech. Even
with respect to the commercial pornographers that would be protected by the defense, the
Government failed to adduce any evidence that these verification techniques actually
preclude minors from posing as adults. Given that the risk of criminal sanctions “hovers
over each content provider, like the proverbial sword of Damocles,” the District Court
correctly refused to rely on unproven future technology to save the statute. The
Government thus failed to prove that the proffered defense would significantly reduce the
heavy burden on adult speech produced by the prohibition on offensive displays.
We agree with the District Court’s conclusion that the CDA places an unacceptably heavy
burden on protected speech, and that the defenses do not constitute the sort of “narrow
tailoring” that will save an otherwise patently invalid unconstitutional provision. In Sable,
492 U.S., at 127, we remarked that the speech restriction at issue there amounted to
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“‘burn[ing] the house to roast the pig.’” The CDA, casting a far darker shadow over free
speech, threatens to torch a large segment of the Internet community.
X
At oral argument, the Government relied heavily on its ultimate fall-back position: If this
Court should conclude that the CDA is insufficiently tailored, it urged, we should save the
statute’s constitutionality by honoring the severability clause, and construing nonseverable
terms narrowly. In only one respect is this argument acceptable.
A severability clause requires textual provisions that can be severed. We will follow § 608’s
guidance by leaving constitutional textual elements of the statute intact in the one place
where they are, in fact, severable. The “indecency” provision, applies to “any comment,
request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication which is obscene or indecent.”
(Emphasis added.) Appellees do not challenge the application of the statute to obscene
speech, which, they acknowledge, can be banned totally because it enjoys no First
Amendment protection. As set forth by the statute, the restriction of “obscene” material
enjoys a textual manifestation separate from that for “indecent” material, which we have
held unconstitutional. Therefore, we will sever the term “or indecent” from the statute,
leaving the rest of § 223(a) standing. In no other respect, however, can § 223(a) or § 223(d)
be saved by such a textual surgery.
The Government also draws on an additional, less traditional aspect of the CDA’s
severability clause, which asks any reviewing court that holds the statute facially
unconstitutional not to invalidate the CDA in application to “other persons or
circumstances” that might be constitutionally permissible. It further invokes this Court’s
admonition that, absent “countervailing considerations,” a statute should “be declared
invalid to the extent it reaches too far, but otherwise left intact.” There are two flaws in this
argument.
First, the statute that grants our jurisdiction for this expedited review, limits that
jurisdictional grant to actions challenging the CDA “on its face.” Consistent with § 561, the
plaintiffs who brought this suit and the three-judge panel that decided it treated it as a
facial challenge. We have no authority, in this particular posture, to convert this litigation
into an “as-applied” challenge. Nor, given the vast array of plaintiffs, the range of their
expressive activities, and the vagueness of the statute, would it be practicable to limit our
holding to a judicially defined set of specific applications.
Second, one of the “countervailing considerations” mentioned in Brockett is present here. In
considering a facial challenge, this Court may impose a limiting construction on a statute
only if it is “readily susceptible” to such a construction. The open-ended character of the
CDA provides no guidance what ever for limiting its coverage….
XI
In this Court, though not in the District Court, the Government asserts that—in addition to
its interest in protecting children—its “[e]qually significant” interest in fostering the
growth of the Internet provides an independent basis for upholding the constitutionality of
the CDA. The Government apparently assumes that the unregulated availability of
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“indecent” and “patently offensive” material on the Internet is driving countless citizens
away from the medium because of the risk of exposing themselves or their children to
harmful material.
We find this argument singularly unpersuasive. The dramatic expansion of this new
marketplace of ideas contradicts the factual basis of this contention. The record
demonstrates that the growth of the Internet has been and continues to be phenomenal. As
a matter of constitutional tradition, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume
that governmental regulation of the content of speech is more likely to interfere with the
free exchange of ideas than to encourage it. The interest in encouraging freedom of
expression in a democratic society outweighs any theoretical but unproven benefit of
censorship.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
Justice O’CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins, concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part.
I write separately to explain why I view the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA) as
little more than an attempt by Congress to create “adult zones” on the Internet. Our
precedent indicates that the creation of such zones can be constitutionally sound. Despite
the soundness of its purpose, however, portions of the CDA are unconstitutional because
they stray from the blueprint our prior cases have developed for constructing a “zoning law”
that passes constitutional muster.
Appellees bring a facial challenge to three provisions of the CDA. The first, which the Court
describes as the “indecency transmission” provision, makes it a crime to knowingly
transmit an obscene or indecent message or image to a person the sender knows is under 18
years old. What the Court classifies as a single “‘patently offensive display’” provision is in
reality two separate provisions. The first of these makes it a crime to knowingly send a
patently offensive message or image to a specific person under the age of 18 (“specific
person” provision). The second criminalizes the display of patently offensive messages or
images “in a[ny] manner available” to minors (“display” provision). None of these provisions
purports to keep indecent (or patently offensive) material away from adults, who have a
First Amendment right to obtain this speech. Thus, the undeniable purpose of the CDA is
to segregate indecent material on the Internet into certain areas that minors cannot access.
See S. Conf. Rep. No. 104-230, p. 189 (1996) (CDA imposes “access restrictions ... to protect
minors from exposure to indecent material”).
The creation of “adult zones” is by no means a novel concept. States have long denied
minors access to certain establishments frequented by adults. States have also denied
minors access to speech deemed to be “harmful to minors.” The Court has previously
sustained such zoning laws, but only if they respect the First Amendment rights of adults
and minors. That is to say, a zoning law is valid if (i) it does not unduly restrict adult access
to the material; and (ii) minors have no First Amendment right to read or view the banned
material. As applied to the Internet as it exists in 1997, the “display” provision and some
applications of the “indecency transmission” and “specific person” provisions fail to adhere
to the first of these limiting principles by restricting adults’ access to protected materials in
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certain circumstances. Unlike the Court, however, I would invalidate the provisions only in
those circumstances.
I
Our cases make clear that a “zoning” law is valid only if adults are still able to obtain the
regulated speech. If they cannot, the law does more than simply keep children away from
speech they have no right to obtain-it interferes with the rights of adults to obtain
constitutionally protected speech and effectively “reduce[s] the adult population ... to
reading only what is fit for children.” The First Amendment does not tolerate such
interference. If the law does not unduly restrict adults’ access to constitutionally protected
speech, however, it may be valid. In Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 634 (1968), for
example, the Court sustained a New York law that barred store owners from selling
pornographic magazines to minors in part because adults could still buy those magazines.
The Court in Ginsberg concluded that the New York law created a constitutionally
adequate adult zone simply because, on its face, it denied access only to minors. The Court
did not question—and therefore necessarily assumed—that an adult zone, once created,
would succeed in preserving adults’ access while denying minors’ access to the regulated
speech. Before today, there was no reason to question this assumption, for the Court has
previously only considered laws that operated in the physical world, a world that with two
characteristics that make it possible to create “adult zones”: geography and identity. A
minor can see an adult dance show only if he enters an establishment that provides such
entertainment. And should he attempt to do so, the minor will not be able to conceal
completely his identity (or, consequently, his age). Thus, the twin characteristics of
geography and identity enable the establishment’s proprietor to prevent children from
entering the establishment, but to let adults inside.
The electronic world is fundamentally different. Because it is no more than the
interconnection of electronic pathways, cyberspace allows speakers and listeners to mask
their identities. Cyberspace undeniably reflects some form of geography; chat rooms and
Web sites, for example, exist at fixed “locations” on the Internet. Since users can transmit
and receive messages on the Internet without revealing anything about their identities or
ages, however, it is not currently possible to exclude persons from accessing certain
messages on the basis of their identity.
Cyberspace differs from the physical world in another basic way: Cyberspace is malleable.
Thus, it is possible to construct barriers in cyberspace and use them to screen for identity,
making cyberspace more like the physical world and, consequently, more amenable to
zoning laws. This transformation of cyberspace is already underway. Internet speakers
(users who post material on the Internet) have begun to zone cyberspace itself through the
use of “gateway” technology. Such technology requires Internet users to enter information
about themselves—perhaps an adult identification number or a credit card number—before
they can access certain areas of cyberspace, much like a bouncer checks a person’s driver’s
license before admitting him to a nightclub. Internet users who access information have not
attempted to zone cyberspace itself, but have tried to limit their own power to access
information in cyberspace, much as a parent controls what her children watch on television
by installing a lock box. This user-based zoning is accomplished through the use of
screening software (such as Cyber Patrol or SurfWatch) or browsers with screening
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capabilities, both of which search addresses and text for keywords that are associated with
“adult” sites and, if the user wishes, blocks access to such sites. The Platform for Internet
Content Selection project is designed to facilitate user-based zoning by encouraging
Internet speakers to rate the content of their speech using codes recognized by all screening
programs.
Despite this progress, the transformation of cyberspace is not complete. Although gateway
technology has been available on the World Wide Web for some time now, it is not available
to all Web speakers, and is just now becoming technologically feasible for chat rooms and
USENET newsgroups. Gateway technology is not ubiquitous in cyberspace, and because
without it “there is no means of age verification,” cyberspace still remains largely
unzoned—and unzoneable. User-based zoning is also in its infancy. For it to be effective, (i)
an agreed-upon code (or “tag”) would have to exist; (ii) screening software or browsers with
screening capabilities would have to be able to recognize the “tag”; and (iii) those programs
would have to be widely available—and widely used—by Internet users. At present, none of
these conditions is true. Screening software “is not in wide use today” and “only a handful
of browsers have screening capabilities.” There is, moreover, no agreed-upon “tag” for those
programs to recognize.
Although the prospects for the eventual zoning of the Internet appear promising, I agree
with the Court that we must evaluate the constitutionality of the CDA as it applies to the
Internet as it exists today. Given the present state of cyberspace, I agree with the Court
that the “display” provision cannot pass muster. Until gateway technology is available
throughout cyberspace, and it is not in 1997, a speaker cannot be reasonably assured that
the speech he displays will reach only adults because it is impossible to confine speech to an
“adult zone.” Thus, the only way for a speaker to avoid liability under the CDA is to refrain
completely from using indecent speech. But this forced silence impinges on the First
Amendment right of adults to make and obtain this speech and, for all intents and
purposes, “reduce[s] the adult population [on the Internet] to reading only what is fit for
children.” As a result, the “display” provision cannot withstand scrutiny.
The “indecency transmission” and “specific person” provisions present a closer issue, for
they are not unconstitutional in all of their applications. As discussed above, the “indecency
transmission” provision makes it a crime to transmit knowingly an indecent message to a
person the sender knows is under 18 years of age. The “specific person” provision proscribes
the same conduct, although it does not as explicitly require the sender to know that the
intended recipient of his indecent message is a minor. The Government urges the Court to
construe the provision to impose such a knowledge requirement, and I would do so.
So construed, both provisions are constitutional as applied to a conversation involving only
an adult and one or more minors—e.g., when an adult speaker sends an e-mail knowing the
addressee is a minor, or when an adult and minor converse by themselves or with other
minors in a chat room. In this context, these provisions are no different from the law we
sustained in Ginsberg. Restricting what the adult may say to the minors in no way restricts
the adult’s ability to communicate with other adults. He is not prevented from speaking
indecently to other adults in a chat room (because there are no other adults participating in
the conversation) and he remains free to send indecent e-mails to other adults. The relevant
universe contains only one adult, and the adult in that universe has the power to refrain
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from using indecent speech and consequently to keep all such speech within the room in an
“adult” zone.
The analogy to Ginsberg breaks down, however, when more than one adult is a party to the
conversation. If a minor enters a chat room otherwise occupied by adults, the CDA
effectively requires the adults in the room to stop using indecent speech. If they did not,
they could be prosecuted under the “indecency transmission” and “specific person”
provisions for any indecent statements they make to the group, since they would be
transmitting an indecent message to specific persons, one of whom is a minor. The CDA is
therefore akin to a law that makes it a crime for a bookstore owner to sell pornographic
magazines to anyone once a minor enters his store. Even assuming such a law might be
constitutional in the physical world as a reasonable alternative to excluding minors
completely from the store, the absence of any means of excluding minors from chat rooms in
cyberspace restricts the rights of adults to engage in indecent speech in those rooms. The
“indecency transmission” and “specific person” provisions share this defect.
But these two provisions do not infringe on adults’ speech in all situations. And as
discussed below, I do not find that the provisions are overbroad in the sense that they
restrict minors’ access to a substantial amount of speech that minors have the right to read
and view. Accordingly, the CDA can be applied constitutionally in some situations.
Normally, this fact would require the Court to reject a direct facial challenge. Appellees’
claim arises under the First Amendment, however, and they argue that the CDA is facially
invalid because it is “substantially overbroad”—that is, it “sweeps too broadly ... [and]
penaliz[es] a substantial amount of speech that is constitutionally protected.” I agree with
the Court that the provisions are overbroad in that they cover any and all communications
between adults and minors, regardless of how many adults might be part of the audience to
the communication.
This conclusion does not end the matter, however. Where, as here, “the parties challenging
the statute are those who desire to engage in protected speech that the overbroad statute
purports to punish, ... [t]he statute may forthwith be declared invalid to the extent that it
reaches too far, but otherwise left intact.” There is no question that Congress intended to
prohibit certain communications between one adult and one or more minors. There is also
no question that Congress would have enacted a narrower version of these provisions had it
known a broader version would be declared unconstitutional. I would therefore sustain the
“indecency transmission” and “specific person” provisions to the extent they apply to the
transmission of Internet communications where the party initiating the communication
knows that all of the recipients are minors.
II
Whether the CDA substantially interferes with the First Amendment rights of minors, and
thereby runs afoul of the second characteristic of valid zoning laws, presents a closer
question. In Ginsberg, the New York law we sustained prohibited the sale to minors of
magazines that were “harmful to minors.” Under that law, a magazine was “harmful to
minors” only if it was obscene as to minors. Noting that obscene speech is not protected by
the First Amendment, and that New York was constitutionally free to adjust the definition
of obscenity for minors, the Court concluded that the law did not “invad[e] the area of
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freedom of expression constitutionally secured to minors.” New York therefore did not
infringe upon the First Amendment rights of minors.
The Court neither “accept[s] nor reject[s]” the argument that the CDA is facially overbroad
because it substantially interferes with the First Amendment rights of minors. I would
reject it. Ginsberg established that minors may constitutionally be denied access to material
that is obscene as to minors. As Ginsberg explained, material is obscene as to minors if it (i)
is “patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with
respect to what is suitable ... for minors”; (ii) appeals to the prurient interest of minors; and
(iii) is “utterly without redeeming social importance for minors.” Because the CDA denies
minors the right to obtain material that is “patently offensive”—even if it has some
redeeming value for minors and even if it does not appeal to their prurient interests—
Congress’ rejection of the Ginsberg “harmful to minors” standard means that the CDA could
ban some speech that is “indecent” (i.e., “patently offensive”) but that is not obscene as to
minors.
I do not deny this possibility, but to prevail in a facial challenge, it is not enough for a
plaintiff to show “some” overbreadth. Our cases require a proof of “real” and “substantial”
overbreadth, and appellees have not carried their burden in this case. In my view, the
universe of speech constitutionally protected as to minors but banned by the CDA—i.e., the
universe of material that is “patently offensive,” but which nonetheless has some redeeming
value for minors or does not appeal to their prurient interest—is a very small one.
Appellees cite no examples of speech falling within this universe and do not attempt to
explain why that universe is substantial “in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate
sweep.” That the CDA might deny minors the right to obtain material that has some
“value” is largely beside the point. While discussions about prison rape or nude art may
have some redeeming educational value for adults, they do not necessarily have any such
value for minors, and under Ginsberg, minors only have a First Amendment right to obtain
patently offensive material that has “redeeming social importance for minors.” There is also
no evidence in the record to support the contention that “many e-mail transmissions from
an adult to a minor are conversations between family members,” and no support for the
legal proposition that such speech is absolutely immune from regulation. Accordingly, in my
view, the CDA does not burden a substantial amount of minors’ constitutionally protected
speech.
Thus, the constitutionality of the CDA as a zoning law hinges on the extent to which it
substantially interferes with the First Amendment rights of adults. Because the rights of
adults are infringed only by the “display” provision and by the “indecency transmission”
and “specific person” provisions as applied to communications involving more than one
adult, I would invalidate the CDA only to that extent. Insofar as the “indecency
transmission” and “specific person” provisions prohibit the use of indecent speech in
communications between an adult and one or more minors, however, they can and should
be sustained. The Court reaches a contrary conclusion, and from that holding that I
respectfully dissent.
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Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656 (2004).
Kennedy, Justice.
This case presents a challenge to a statute enacted by Congress to protect minors from
exposure to sexually explicit materials on the Internet, the Child Online Protection Act
(COPA). We must decide whether the Court of Appeals was correct to affirm a ruling by the
District Court that enforcement of COPA should be enjoined because the statute likely
violates the First Amendment.
In enacting COPA, Congress gave consideration to our earlier decisions on this subject, in
particular the decision in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). For
that reason, “the Judiciary must proceed with caution and ... with care before invalidating
the Act.” The imperative of according respect to the Congress, however, does not permit us
to depart from well-established First Amendment principles. Instead, we must hold the
Government to its constitutional burden of proof.
Content-based prohibitions, enforced by severe criminal penalties, have the constant
potential to be a repressive force in the lives and thoughts of a free people. To guard against
that threat the Constitution demands that content-based restrictions on speech be
presumed invalid, Rand that the Government bear the burden of showing their
constitutionality. This is true even when Congress twice has attempted to find a
constitutional means to restrict, and punish, the speech in question….
I
A
COPA is the second attempt by Congress to make the Internet safe for minors by
criminalizing certain Internet speech. The first attempt was the Communications Decency
Act of 1996. The Court held the CDA unconstitutional because it was not narrowly tailored
to serve a compelling governmental interest and because less restrictive alternatives were
available.
In response to the Court’s decision in Reno, Congress passed COPA. COPA imposes
criminal penalties of a $50,000 fine and six months in prison for the knowing posting, for
“commercial purposes,” of World Wide Web content that is “harmful to minors.” Material
that is “harmful to minors” is defined as:
“any communication, picture, image, graphic image file, article, recording,
writing, or other matter of any kind that is obscene or that“(A) the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would
find, taking the material as a whole and with respect to minors, is designed
to appeal to, or is designed to pander to, the prurient interest;
“(B) depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner patently offensive with
respect to minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact, an
actual or simulated normal or perverted sexual act, or a lewd exhibition of
the genitals or post-pubescent female breast; and
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“(C) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value for minors.”
“Minor[s]” are defined as “any person under 17 years of age.” A person acts for “commercial
purposes only if such person is engaged in the business of making such communications.”
“Engaged in the business,” in turn,
“means that the person who makes a communication, or offers to make a
communication, by means of the World Wide Web, that includes any material
that is harmful to minors, devotes time, attention, or labor to such activities,
as a regular course of such person’s trade or business, with the objective of
earning a profit as a result of such activities (although it is not necessary that
the person make a profit or that the making or offering to make such
communications be the person’s sole or principal business or source of
income).”
While the statute labels all speech that falls within these definitions as criminal speech, it
also provides an affirmative defense to those who employ specified means to prevent minors
from gaining access to the prohibited materials on their Web site. A person may escape
conviction under the statute by demonstrating that he
“has restricted access by minors to material that is harmful to minors“(A) by requiring use of a credit card, debit account, adult access code, or
adult personal identification number;
“(B) by accepting a digital certificate that verifies age; or
“(C) by any other reasonable measures that are feasible under available
technology.”
Since the passage of COPA, Congress has enacted additional laws regulating the Internet
in an attempt to protect minors. For example, it has enacted a prohibition on misleading
Internet domain names, 18 U.S.C. § 2252B, in order to prevent Web site owners from
disguising pornographic Web sites in a way likely to cause uninterested persons to visit
them. It has also passed a statute creating a “Dot Kids” second-level Internet domain, the
content of which is restricted to that which is fit for minors under the age of 13.
B
Respondents, Internet content providers and others concerned with protecting the freedom
of speech, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. They sought a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the statute.
After considering testimony from witnesses presented by both respondents and the
Government, the District Court issued an order granting the preliminary injunction….
The Government appealed the District Court’s decision to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit. The Court of Appeals affirmed the preliminary injunction,
but on a different ground. The court concluded that the “community standards” language in
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COPA by itself rendered the statute unconstitutionally overbroad. We granted certiorari
and reversed, holding that the community-standards language did not, standing alone,
make the statute unconstitutionally overbroad. We emphasized, however, that our decision
was limited to that narrow issue. We remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to
reconsider whether the District Court had been correct to grant the preliminary injunction.
On remand, the Court of Appeals again affirmed the District Court….
II
A…
The District Court, in deciding to grant the preliminary injunction, concentrated primarily
on the argument that there are plausible, less restrictive alternatives to COPA. A statute
that “effectively suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right
to receive and to address to one another ... is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives
would be at least as effective in achieving the legitimate purpose that the statute was
enacted to serve.” When plaintiffs challenge a content-based speech restriction, the burden
is on the Government to prove that the proposed alternatives will not be as effective as the
challenged statute.
In considering this question, a court assumes that certain protected speech may be
regulated, and then asks what is the least restrictive alternative that can be used to
achieve that goal. The purpose of the test is not to consider whether the challenged
restriction has some effect in achieving Congress’ goal, regardless of the restriction it
imposes. The purpose of the test is to ensure that speech is restricted no further than
necessary to achieve the goal, for it is important to ensure that legitimate speech is not
chilled or punished. For that reason, the test does not begin with the status quo of existing
regulations, then ask whether the challenged restriction has some additional ability to
achieve Congress’ legitimate interest. Any restriction on speech could be justified under
that analysis. Instead, the court should ask whether the challenged regulation is the least
restrictive means among available, effective alternatives.
…As the Government bears the burden of proof on the ultimate question of COPA’s
constitutionality, respondents must be deemed likely to prevail unless the Government has
shown that respondents’ proposed less restrictive alternatives are less effective than COPA.
Applying that analysis, the District Court concluded that respondents were likely to
prevail. That conclusion was not an abuse of discretion, because on this record there are a
number of plausible, less restrictive alternatives to the statute.
The primary alternative considered by the District Court was blocking and filtering
software. Blocking and filtering software is an alternative that is less restrictive than
COPA, and, in addition, likely more effective as a means of restricting children’s access to
materials harmful to them. The District Court, in granting the preliminary injunction, did
so primarily because the plaintiffs had proposed that filters are a less restrictive alternative
to COPA and the Government had not shown it would be likely to disprove the plaintiffs’
contention at trial.
Filters are less restrictive than COPA. They impose selective restrictions on speech at the
receiving end, not universal restrictions at the source. Under a filtering regime, adults
without children may gain access to speech they have a right to see without having to
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identify themselves or provide their credit card information. Even adults with children may
obtain access to the same speech on the same terms simply by turning off the filter on their
home computers. Above all, promoting the use of filters does not condemn as criminal any
category of speech, and so the potential chilling effect is eliminated, or at least much
diminished. All of these things are true, moreover, regardless of how broadly or narrowly
the definitions in COPA are construed.
Filters also may well be more effective than COPA. First, a filter can prevent minors from
seeing all pornography, not just pornography posted to the Web from America. The District
Court noted in its factfindings that one witness estimated that 40% of harmful-to-minors
content comes from overseas. COPA does not prevent minors from having access to those
foreign harmful materials. That alone makes it possible that filtering software might be
more effective in serving Congress’ goals. Effectiveness is likely to diminish even further if
COPA is upheld, because the providers of the materials that would be covered by the
statute simply can move their operations overseas. It is not an answer to say that COPA
reaches some amount of materials that are harmful to minors; the question is whether it
would reach more of them than less restrictive alternatives. In addition, the District Court
found that verification systems may be subject to evasion and circumvention, for example,
by minors who have their own credit cards. Finally, filters also may be more effective
because they can be applied to all forms of Internet communication, including e-mail, not
just communications available via the World Wide Web.
That filtering software may well be more effective than COPA is confirmed by the findings
of the Commission on Child Online Protection, a blue-ribbon Commission created by
Congress in COPA itself. Congress directed the Commission to evaluate the relative merits
of different means of restricting minors’ ability to gain access to harmful materials on the
Internet. It unambiguously found that filters are more effective than age-verification
requirements. See Commission on Child Online Protection (COPA), Report to Congress, 1921, 23-25, 27 (Oct. 20, 2000) (assigning a score for “Effectiveness” of 7.4 for server-based
filters and 6.5 for client-based filters, as compared to 5.9 for independent adult-ID
verification, and 5.5 for credit card verification). Thus, not only has the Government failed
to carry its burden of showing the District Court that the proposed alternative is less
effective, but also a Government Commission appointed to consider the question has
concluded just the opposite. That finding supports our conclusion that the District Court
did not abuse its discretion in enjoining the statute.
Filtering software, of course, is not a perfect solution to the problem of children gaining
access to harmful-to-minors materials. It may block some materials that are not harmful to
minors and fail to catch some that are. Whatever the deficiencies of filters, however, the
Government failed to introduce specific evidence proving that existing technologies are less
effective than the restrictions in COPA. The District Court made a specific factfinding that
“[n]o evidence was presented to the Court as to the percentage of time that blocking and
filtering technology is over- or underinclusive.” In the absence of a showing as to the
relative effectiveness of COPA and the alternatives proposed by respondents, it was not an
abuse of discretion for the District Court to grant the preliminary injunction. The
Government’s burden is not merely to show that a proposed less restrictive alternative has
some flaws; its burden is to show that it is less effective. It is not enough for the
Government to show that COPA has some effect. Nor do respondents bear a burden to
introduce, or offer to introduce, evidence that their proposed alternatives are more effective.
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The Government has the burden to show they are less so. The Government having failed to
carry its burden, it was not an abuse of discretion for the District Court to grant the
preliminary injunction.
One argument to the contrary is worth mentioning—the argument that filtering software is
not an available alternative because Congress may not require it to be used. That argument
carries little weight, because Congress undoubtedly may act to encourage the use of filters.
We have held that Congress can give strong incentives to schools and libraries to use them.
United States v. American Library Assn., Inc., 539 U.S. 194 (2003). It could also take steps
to promote their development by industry, and their use by parents. It is incorrect, for that
reason, to say that filters are part of the current regulatory status quo. The need for
parental cooperation does not automatically disqualify a proposed less restrictive
alternative. In enacting COPA, Congress said its goal was to prevent the “widespread
availability of the Internet” from providing “opportunities for minors to access materials
through the World Wide Web in a manner that can frustrate parental supervision or
control.” COPA presumes that parents lack the ability, not the will, to monitor what their
children see. By enacting programs to promote use of filtering software, Congress could give
parents that ability without subjecting protected speech to severe penalties….
B
There are also important practical reasons to let the injunction stand pending a full trial on
the merits. First, the potential harms from reversing the injunction outweigh those of
leaving it in place by mistake. Where a prosecution is a likely possibility, yet only an
affirmative defense is available, speakers may self-censor rather than risk the perils of
trial. There is a potential for extraordinary harm and a serious chill upon protected speech.
The harm done from letting the injunction stand pending a trial on the merits, in contrast,
will not be extensive. No prosecutions have yet been undertaken under the law, so none will
be disrupted if the injunction stands. Further, if the injunction is upheld, the Government
in the interim can enforce obscenity laws already on the books.
Second, there are substantial factual disputes remaining in the case. As mentioned above,
there is a serious gap in the evidence as to the effectiveness of filtering software. For us to
assume, without proof, that filters are less effective than COPA would usurp the District
Court’s factfinding role. By allowing the preliminary injunction to stand and remanding for
trial, we require the Government to shoulder its full constitutional burden of proof
respecting the less restrictive alternative argument, rather than excuse it from doing so.
Third, and on a related point, the factual record does not reflect current technological
reality—a serious flaw in any case involving the Internet. The technology of the Internet
evolves at a rapid pace. Yet the factfindings of the District Court were entered in February
1999, over five years ago. Since then, certain facts about the Internet are known to have
changed. It is reasonable to assume that other technological developments important to the
First Amendment analysis have also occurred during that time. More and better filtering
alternatives may exist than when the District Court entered its findings. Indeed, we know
that after the District Court entered its factfindings, a congressionally appointed
commission issued a report that found that filters are more effective than verification
screens.
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Delay between the time that a district court makes factfindings and the time that a case
reaches this Court is inevitable, with the necessary consequence that there will be some
discrepancy between the facts as found and the facts at the time the appellate court takes
up the question. We do not mean, therefore, to set up an insuperable obstacle to fair review.
Here, however, the usual gap has doubled because the case has been through the Court of
Appeals twice. The additional two years might make a difference. By affirming the
preliminary injunction and remanding for trial, we allow the parties to update and
supplement the factual record to reflect current technological realities.
Remand will also permit the District Court to take account of a changed legal landscape.
Since the District Court made its factfindings, Congress has passed at least two further
statutes that might qualify as less restrictive alternatives to COPA—a prohibition on
misleading domain names, and a statute creating a minors-safe “Dot Kids” domain.
Remanding for trial will allow the District Court to take into account those additional
potential alternatives.
On a final point, it is important to note that this opinion does not hold that Congress is
incapable of enacting any regulation of the Internet designed to prevent minors from
gaining access to harmful materials. The parties, because of the conclusion of the Court of
Appeals that the statute’s definitions rendered it unconstitutional, did not devote their
attention to the question whether further evidence might be introduced on the relative
restrictiveness and effectiveness of alternatives to the statute. On remand, however, the
parties will be able to introduce further evidence on this point. This opinion does not
foreclose the District Court from concluding, upon a proper showing by the Government
that meets the Government’s constitutional burden as defined in this opinion, that COPA is
the least restrictive alternative available to accomplish Congress’ goal….
[Justice Stevens’ concurrence and Justice Scalia’s dissent omitted].
Justice BREYER, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and Justice O’CONNOR join,
dissenting.
The Child Online Protection Act (Act) seeks to protect children from exposure to commercial
pornography placed on the Internet. It does so by requiring commercial providers to place
pornographic material behind Internet “screens” readily accessible to adults who produce
age verification. The Court recognizes that we should “‘proceed ... with care before
invalidating the Act,’” while pointing out that the “imperative of according respect to the
Congress ... does not permit us to depart from well-established First Amendment
principles.” I agree with these generalities. Like the Court, I would subject the Act to “the
most exacting scrutiny,” requiring the Government to show that any restriction of
nonobscene expression is “narrowly drawn” to further a “compelling interest” and that the
restriction amounts to the “least restrictive means” available to further that interest.
Nonetheless, my examination of (1) the burdens the Act imposes on protected expression,
(2) the Act’s ability to further a compelling interest, and (3) the proposed “less restrictive
alternatives” convinces me that the Court is wrong. I cannot accept its conclusion that
Congress could have accomplished its statutory objective—protecting children from
commercial pornography on the Internet—in other, less restrictive ways.
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I
Although the Court rests its conclusion upon the existence of less restrictive alternatives, I
must first examine the burdens that the Act imposes upon protected speech. That is
because the term “less restrictive alternative” is a comparative term. An “alternative” is
“less restrictive” only if it will work less First Amendment harm than the statute itself,
while at the same time similarly furthering the “compelling” interest that prompted
Congress to enact the statute. Unlike the majority, I do not see how it is possible to make
this comparative determination without examining both the extent to which the Act
regulates protected expression and the nature of the burdens it imposes on that expression.
That examination suggests that the Act, properly interpreted, imposes a burden on
protected speech that is no more than modest.
A
The Act’s definitions limit the material it regulates to material that does not enjoy First
Amendment protection, namely, legally obscene material, and very little more. A
comparison of this Court’s definition of unprotected, “legally obscene,” material with the
Act’s definitions makes this clear.
Material is legally obscene if
“(a) ... ‘the average person, applying contemporary community standards’
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest
...; (b) ... the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) ... the work,
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”
The present statute defines the material that it regulates as material that meets all of the
following criteria:
“(A) the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would
find, taking the material as a whole and with respect to minors, [that the
material] is designed to appeal to, or is designed to pander to, the prurient
interest;
“(B) [the material] depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner patently
offensive with respect to minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual
contact, an actual or simulated normal or perverted sexual act, or a lewd
exhibition of the genitals or post-pubescent female breast; and
“(C) [the material] taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value for minors.” (emphasis added).
Both definitions define the relevant material through use of the critical terms “prurient
interest” and “lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” Insofar as
material appeals to, or panders to, “the prurient interest,” it simply seeks a sexual
response. Insofar as “patently offensive” material with “no serious value” simply seeks that
response, it does not seek to educate, it does not seek to elucidate views about sex, it is not
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artistic, and it is not literary. That is why this Court, in Miller, held that the First
Amendment did not protect material that fit its definition.
The only significant difference between the present statute and Miller’s definition consists
of the addition of the words “with respect to minors” and “for minors.” But the addition of
these words to a definition that would otherwise cover only obscenity expands the statute’s
scope only slightly. That is because the material in question (while potentially harmful to
young children) must, first, appeal to the “prurient interest” of, i.e., seek a sexual response
from, some group of adolescents or postadolescents (since young children normally do not so
respond). And material that appeals to the “prurient interest[s]” of some group of
adolescents or postadolescents will almost inevitably appeal to the “prurient interest[s]” of
some group of adults as well.
The “lack of serious value” requirement narrows the statute yet further—despite the
presence of the qualification “for minors.” That is because one cannot easily imagine
material that has serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for a significant
group of adults, but lacks such value for any significant group of minors. Thus, the statute,
read literally, insofar as it extends beyond the legally obscene, could reach only borderline
cases. And to take the words of the statute literally is consistent with Congress’ avowed
objective in enacting this law; namely, putting material produced by professional
pornographers behind screens that will verify the age of the viewer. See S.Rep. No. 105-225,
p. 3 (1998) (hereinafter S. Rep.) (“The bill seeks to restrict access to commercial
pornography on the Web by requiring those engaged in the business of the commercial
distribution of material that is harmful to minors to take certain prescribed steps to restrict
access to such material by minors ...”); H.R.Rep. No. 105-775, pp. 5, 14 (1998) (hereinafter
H.R. Rep.) (explaining that the bill is aimed at the sale of pornographic materials and
provides a defense for the “commercial purveyors of pornography” that the bill seeks to
regulate).
These limitations on the statute’s scope answer many of the concerns raised by those who
attack its constitutionality. Respondents fear prosecution for the Internet posting of
material that does not fall within the statute’s ambit as limited by the “prurient interest”
and “no serious value” requirements; for example: an essay about a young man’s experience
with masturbation and sexual shame; “a serious discussion about birth control practices,
homosexuality, ... or the consequences of prison rape”; an account by a 15-year-old, written
for therapeutic purposes, of being raped when she was 13; a guide to self-examination for
testicular cancer; a graphic illustration of how to use a condom; or any of the other postings
of modern literary or artistic works or discussions of sexual identity, homosexuality,
sexually transmitted diseases, sex education, or safe sex, let alone Aldous Huxley’s Brave
New World, J.D. Salinger’s Catcher in the Rye, or, as the complaint would have it, “Ken
Starr’s report on the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal.”
These materials are not both (1) “designed to appeal to, or ... pander to, the prurient
interest” of significant groups of minors and (2) lacking in “serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value” for significant groups of minors. Thus, they fall outside the
statute’s definition of the material that it restricts, a fact the Government acknowledged at
oral argument.
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I have found nothing elsewhere in the statute’s language that broadens its scope. Other
qualifying phrases, such as “taking the material as a whole,” and “for commercial
purposes,” limit the statute’s scope still more, requiring, for example, that individual
images be considered in context. In sum, the Act’s definitions limit the statute’s scope to
commercial pornography. It affects unprotected obscene material. Given the inevitable
uncertainty about how to characterize close-to-obscene material, it could apply to (or chill
the production of) a limited class of borderline material that courts might ultimately find is
protected. But the examples I have just given fall outside that class.
B
The Act does not censor the material it covers. Rather, it requires providers of the “harmful
to minors” material to restrict minors’ access to it by verifying age. They can do so by
inserting screens that verify age using a credit card, adult personal identification number,
or other similar technology. In this way, the Act requires creation of an Internet screen that
minors, but not adults, will find difficult to bypass.
I recognize that the screening requirement imposes some burden on adults who seek access
to the regulated material, as well as on its providers. The cost is, in part, monetary. The
parties agreed that a Web site could store card numbers or passwords at between 15 and 20
cents per number. And verification services provide free verification to Web site operators,
while charging users less than $20 per year. According to the trade association for the
commercial pornographers who are the statute’s target, use of such verification procedures
is “standard practice” in their online operations.
In addition to the monetary cost, and despite strict requirements that identifying
information be kept confidential, the identification requirements inherent in age screening
may lead some users to fear embarrassment. Both monetary costs and potential
embarrassment can deter potential viewers and, in that sense, the statute’s requirements
may restrict access to a site. But this Court has held that in the context of congressional
efforts to protect children, restrictions of this kind do not automatically violate the
Constitution. And the Court has approved their use.
In sum, the Act at most imposes a modest additional burden on adult access to legally
obscene material, perhaps imposing a similar burden on access to some protected borderline
obscene material as well.
II
I turn next to the question of “compelling interest,” that of protecting minors from exposure
to commercial pornography. No one denies that such an interest is “compelling.” Rather, the
question here is whether the Act, given its restrictions on adult access, significantly
advances that interest. In other words, is the game worth the candle?
The majority argues that it is not, because of the existence of “blocking and filtering
software.” The majority refers to the presence of that software as a “less restrictive
alternative.” But that is a misnomer—a misnomer that may lead the reader to believe that
all we need do is look to see if the blocking and filtering software is less restrictive; and to

250.

believe that, because in one sense it is (one can turn off the software), that is the end of the
constitutional matter.
But such reasoning has no place here. Conceptually speaking, the presence of filtering
software is not an alternative legislative approach to the problem of protecting children
from exposure to commercial pornography. Rather, it is part of the status quo, i.e., the
backdrop against which Congress enacted the present statute. It is always true, by
definition, that the status quo is less restrictive than a new regulatory law. It is always less
restrictive to do nothing than to do something. But “doing nothing” does not address the
problem Congress sought to address—namely, that, despite the availability of filtering
software, children were still being exposed to harmful material on the Internet.
Thus, the relevant constitutional question is not the question the Court asks: Would it be
less restrictive to do nothing? Of course it would be. Rather, the relevant question posits a
comparison of (a) a status quo that includes filtering software with (b) a change in that
status quo that adds to it an age-verification screen requirement. Given the existence of
filtering software, does the problem Congress identified remain significant? Does the Act
help to address it? These are questions about the relation of the Act to the compelling
interest. Does the Act, compared to the status quo, significantly advance the ball? (An
affirmative answer to these questions will not justify “[a]ny restriction on speech,” as the
Court claims, for a final answer in respect to constitutionality must take account of burdens
and alternatives as well.)
The answers to these intermediate questions are clear: Filtering software, as presently
available, does not solve the “child protection” problem. It suffers from four serious
inadequacies that prompted Congress to pass legislation instead of relying on its voluntary
use. First, its filtering is faulty, allowing some pornographic material to pass through
without hindrance. Just last year, in American Library Assn., Justice STEVENS described
“fundamental defects in the filtering software that is now available or that will be available
in the foreseeable future.” He pointed to the problem of underblocking: “Because the
software relies on key words or phrases to block undesirable sites, it does not have the
capacity to exclude a precisely defined category of images.” That is to say, in the absence of
words, the software alone cannot distinguish between the most obscene pictorial image and
the Venus de Milo. No Member of this Court disagreed.
Second, filtering software costs money. Not every family has the $40 or so necessary to
install it. By way of contrast, age screening costs less. See supra, at 2800 (citing costs of up
to 20 cents per password or $20 per user for an identification number).
Third, filtering software depends upon parents willing to decide where their children will
surf the Web and able to enforce that decision. As to millions of American families, that is
not a reasonable possibility. More than 28 million school age children have both parents or
their sole parent in the work force, at least 5 million children are left alone at home without
supervision each week, and many of those children will spend afternoons and evenings with
friends who may well have access to computers and more lenient parents.
Fourth, software blocking lacks precision, with the result that those who wish to use it to
screen out pornography find that it blocks a great deal of material that is valuable. As
Justice STEVENS pointed out, “the software’s reliance on words to identify undesirable
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sites necessarily results in the blocking of thousands of pages that contain content that is
completely innocuous for both adults and minors, and that no rational person could
conclude matches the filtering companies’ category definitions, such as pornography or sex.”
Indeed, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), one of the respondents here, told
Congress that filtering software “block[s] out valuable and protected information, such as
information about the Quaker religion, and web sites including those of the American
Association of University Women, the AIDS Quilt, the Town Hall Political Site (run by the
Family Resource Center, Christian Coalition and other conservative groups).” The software
“is simply incapable of discerning between constitutionally protected and unprotected
speech.” It “inappropriately blocks valuable, protected speech, and does not effectively block
the sites [it is] intended to block.”
Nothing in the District Court record suggests the contrary. No respondent has offered to
produce evidence at trial to the contrary. No party has suggested, for example, that
technology allowing filters to interpret and discern among images has suddenly become, or
is about to become, widely available. Indeed, the Court concedes that “[f]iltering software, of
course, is not a perfect solution to the problem.”
In sum, a “filtering software status quo” means filtering that underblocks, imposes a cost
upon each family that uses it, fails to screen outside the home, and lacks precision. Thus,
Congress could reasonably conclude that a system that relies entirely upon the use of such
software is not an effective system. And a law that adds to that system an age-verification
screen requirement significantly increases the system’s efficacy. That is to say, at a modest
additional cost to those adults who wish to obtain access to a screened program, that law
will bring about better, more precise blocking, both inside and outside the home.
The Court’s response—that 40% of all pornographic material may be of foreign origin—is
beside the point. Even assuming (I believe unrealistically) that all foreign originators will
refuse to use screening, the Act would make a difference in respect to 60% of the Internet’s
commercial pornography. I cannot call that difference insignificant.
The upshot is that Congress could reasonably conclude that, despite the current availability
of filtering software, a child protection problem exists. It also could conclude that a
precisely targeted regulatory statute, adding an age-verification requirement for a narrow
range of material, would more effectively shield children from commercial pornography.
Is this justification sufficient? The lower courts thought not. But that is because those
courts interpreted the Act as imposing far more than a modest burden. They assumed an
interpretation of the statute in which it reached far beyond legally obscene and borderline
obscene material, affecting material that, given the interpretation set forth above, would
fall well outside the Act’s scope. But we must interpret the Act to save it, not to destroy it.
So interpreted, the Act imposes a far lesser burden on access to protected material. Given
the modest nature of that burden and the likelihood that the Act will significantly further
Congress’ compelling objective, the Act may well satisfy the First Amendment’s stringent
tests. Indeed, it does satisfy the First Amendment unless, of course, there is a genuine
alternative, “less restrictive” way similarly to further that objective.
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III
I turn, then, to the actual “less restrictive alternatives” that the Court proposes. The Court
proposes two real alternatives, i.e., two potentially less restrictive ways in which Congress
might alter the status quo in order to achieve its “compelling” objective.
First, the Government might “act to encourage” the use of blocking and filtering software.
The problem is that any argument that rests upon this alternative proves too much. If one
imagines enough Government resources devoted to the problem and perhaps additional
scientific advances, then, of course, the use of software might become as effective and less
restrictive. Obviously, the Government could give all parents, schools, and Internet cafes
free computers with filtering programs already installed, hire federal employees to train
parents and teachers on their use, and devote millions of dollars to the development of
better software. The result might be an alternative that is extremely effective.
But the Constitution does not, because it cannot, require the Government to disprove the
existence of magic solutions, i.e., solutions that, put in general terms, will solve any
problem less restrictively but with equal effectiveness. Otherwise, “the undoubted ability of
lawyers and judges,” who are not constrained by the budgetary worries and other practical
parameters within which Congress must operate, “to imagine some kind of slightly less
drastic or restrictive an approach would make it impossible to write laws that deal with the
harm that called the statute into being.” As Justice Blackmun recognized, a “judge would be
unimaginative indeed if he could not come up with something a little less ‘drastic’ or a little
less ‘restrictive’ in almost any situation, and thereby enable himself to vote to strike
legislation down.” Perhaps that is why no party has argued seriously that additional
expenditure of government funds to encourage the use of screening is a “less restrictive
alternative.”
Second, the majority suggests decriminalizing the statute, noting the “chilling effect” of
criminalizing a category of speech. To remove a major sanction, however, would make the
statute less effective, virtually by definition.
IV
My conclusion is that the Act, as properly interpreted, risks imposition of minor burdens on
some protected material—burdens that adults wishing to view the material may overcome
at modest cost. At the same time, it significantly helps to achieve a compelling
congressional goal, protecting children from exposure to commercial pornography. There is
no serious, practically available “less restrictive” way similarly to further this compelling
interest. Hence the Act is constitutional.
V
The Court’s holding raises two more general questions. First, what has happened to the
“constructive discourse between our courts and our legislatures” that “is an integral and
admirable part of the constitutional design”? After eight years of legislative effort, two
statutes, and three Supreme Court cases the Court sends this case back to the District
Court for further proceedings. What proceedings? I have found no offer by either party to
present more relevant evidence. What remains to be litigated? I know the Court says that
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the parties may “introduce further evidence” as to the “relative restrictiveness and
effectiveness of alternatives to the statute.” But I do not understand what that new
evidence might consist of.
Moreover, Congress passed the current statute “[i]n response to the Court’s decision in
Reno “ striking down an earlier statutory effort to deal with the same problem. Congress
read Reno with care. It dedicated itself to the task of drafting a statute that would meet
each and every criticism of the predecessor statute that this Court set forth in Reno. It
incorporated language from the Court’s precedents, particularly the Miller standard,
virtually verbatim. And it created what it believed was a statute that would protect
children from exposure to obscene professional pornography without obstructing adult
access to material that the First Amendment protects. See H.R. Rep., at 5 (explaining that
the bill was “carefully drafted to respond to the Supreme Court’s decision in Reno”); S. Rep.,
at 2 (same). What else was Congress supposed to do?
I recognize that some Members of the Court, now or in the past, have taken the view that
the First Amendment simply does not permit Congress to legislate in this area. Others
believe that the Amendment does not permit Congress to legislate in certain ways, e.g.,
through the imposition of criminal penalties for obscenity. There are strong constitutional
arguments favoring these views. But the Court itself does not adopt those views. Instead, it
finds that the Government has not proved the nonexistence of “less restrictive alternatives.”
That finding, if appropriate here, is universally appropriate. And if universally appropriate,
it denies to Congress, in practice, the legislative leeway that the Court’s language seems to
promise. If this statute does not pass the Court’s “less restrictive alternative” test, what
does? If nothing does, then the Court should say so clearly.
As I have explained, I believe the First Amendment permits an alternative holding. We
could construe the statute narrowly—as I have tried to do—removing nearly all protected
material from its scope. By doing so, we could reconcile its language with the First
Amendment’s demands. We would “save” the statute, “not ... destroy” it. And in the process,
we would permit Congress to achieve its basic child-protecting objectives.
Second, will the majority’s holding in practice mean greater or lesser protection for
expression? I do not find the answer to this question obvious. The Court’s decision removes
an important weapon from the prosecutorial arsenal. That weapon would have given the
Government a choice—a choice other than “ban totally or do nothing at all.” The Act tells
the Government that, instead of prosecuting bans on obscenity to the maximum extent
possible (as respondents have urged as yet another “alternative”), it can insist that those
who make available material that is obscene or close to obscene keep that material under
wraps, making it readily available to adults who wish to see it, while restricting access to
children. By providing this third option—a “middle way”—the Act avoids the need for
potentially speech-suppressing prosecutions.
That matters in a world where the obscene and the nonobscene do not come tied neatly into
separate, easily distinguishable, packages. In that real world, this middle way might well
have furthered First Amendment interests by tempering the prosecutorial instinct in
borderline cases. At least, Congress might have so believed. And this likelihood, from a
First Amendment perspective, might ultimately have proved more protective of the rights
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of viewers to retain access to expression than the all-or-nothing choice available to
prosecutors in the wake of the majority’s opinion.
For these reasons, I dissent.
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VIII. Defamation and Information Torts
47 U.S.C. § 230. Protection for private blocking and screening of offensive
material.
(a) Findings
The Congress finds the following:
(1) The rapidly developing array of Internet and other interactive computer
services available to individual Americans represent an extraordinary
advance in the availability of educational and informational resources to our
citizens.
(2) These services offer users a great degree of control over the information
that they receive, as well as the potential for even greater control in the
future as technology develops.
(3) The Internet and other interactive computer services offer a forum for a
true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural
development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity.
(4) The Internet and other interactive computer services have flourished, to
the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government regulation.
(5) Increasingly Americans are relying on interactive media for a variety of
political, educational, cultural, and entertainment services.
(b) Policy
It is the policy of the United States—
(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and other
interactive computer services and other interactive media;
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists
for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by
Federal or State regulation;
(3) to encourage the development of technologies which maximize user control
over what information is received by individuals, families, and schools who
use the Internet and other interactive computer services;
(4) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking
and filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict their children’s
access to objectionable or inappropriate online material; and
(5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and
punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of
computer.
(c) Protection for “Good Samaritan” blocking and screening of offensive material
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider.
(2) Civil liability
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on
account of—
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access
to or availability of material that the provider or user considers
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to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent,
harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such
material is constitutionally protected; or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information
content providers or others the technical means to restrict
access to material described in paragraph (A).
(d) Obligations of interactive computer service
A provider of interactive computer service shall, at the time of entering an agreement with
a customer for the provision of interactive computer service and in a manner deemed
appropriate by the provider, notify such customer that parental control protections (such as
computer hardware, software, or filtering services) are commercially available that may
assist the customer in limiting access to material that is harmful to minors. Such notice
shall identify, or provide the customer with access to information identifying, current
providers of such protections.
(e) Effect on other laws
(1) No effect on criminal law
Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair the enforcement of
section 223 or 231 of this title, chapter 71 (relating to obscenity) or 110
(relating to sexual exploitation of children) of title 18, or any other Federal
criminal statute.
(2) No effect on intellectual property law
Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or expand any law
pertaining to intellectual property.
(3) State law
Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent any State from enforcing
any State law that is consistent with this section. No cause of action may be
brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is
inconsistent with this section.
(4) No effect on communications privacy law
Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the application of the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 or any of the amendments
made by such Act, or any similar State law.
(f) Definitions
As used in this section:
(1) Internet
The term “Internet” means the international computer network of both
Federal and non-Federal interoperable packet switched data networks.
(2) Interactive computer service
The term “interactive computer service” means any information service,
system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access
by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or
system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or
services offered by libraries or educational institutions.
(3) Information content provider
The term “information content provider” means any person or entity that is
responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of
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information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer
service.
(4) Access software provider
The term “access software provider” means a provider of software (including
client or server software), or enabling tools that do any one or more of the
following:
(A) filter, screen, allow, or disallow content;
(B) pick, choose, analyze, or digest content; or
(C) transmit, receive, display, forward, cache, search, subset,
organize, reorganize, or translate content.
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Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
Wilkinson, Chief Judge.
Kenneth Zeran brought this action against America Online, Inc. (“AOL”), arguing that AOL
unreasonably delayed in removing defamatory messages posted by an unidentified third
party, refused to post retractions of those messages, and failed to screen for similar postings
thereafter. The district court granted judgment for AOL on the grounds that the
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (“CDA”)—47 U.S.C. § 230—bars Zeran’s claims.
Zeran appeals, arguing that § 230 leaves intact liability for interactive computer service
providers who possess notice of defamatory material posted through their services. He also
contends that § 230 does not apply here because his claims arise from AOL’s alleged
negligence prior to the CDA’s enactment. Section 230, however, plainly immunizes
computer service providers like AOL from liability for information that originates with
third parties. Furthermore, Congress clearly expressed its intent that § 230 apply to
lawsuits, like Zeran’s, instituted after the CDA’s enactment. Accordingly, we affirm the
judgment of the district court.
I.
“The Internet is an international network of interconnected computers,” currently used by
approximately 40 million people worldwide. One of the many means by which individuals
access the Internet is through an interactive computer service. These services offer not only
a connection to the Internet as a whole, but also allow their subscribers to access
information communicated and stored only on each computer service’s individual
proprietary network. AOL is just such an interactive computer service. Much of the
information transmitted over its network originates with the company’s millions of
subscribers. They may transmit information privately via electronic mail, or they may
communicate publicly by posting messages on AOL bulletin boards, where the messages
may be read by any AOL subscriber.
The instant case comes before us on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, so we accept
the facts alleged in the complaint as true. On April 25, 1995, an unidentified person posted
a message on an AOL bulletin board advertising “Naughty Oklahoma T-Shirts.” The
posting described the sale of shirts featuring offensive and tasteless slogans related to the
April 19, 1995, bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. Those
interested in purchasing the shirts were instructed to call “Ken” at Zeran’s home phone
number in Seattle, Washington. As a result of this anonymously perpetrated prank, Zeran
received a high volume of calls, comprised primarily of angry and derogatory messages, but
also including death threats. Zeran could not change his phone number because he relied on
its availability to the public in running his business out of his home. Later that day, Zeran
called AOL and informed a company representative of his predicament. The employee
assured Zeran that the posting would be removed from AOL’s bulletin board but explained
that as a matter of policy AOL would not post a retraction. The parties dispute the date
that AOL removed this original posting from its bulletin board.
On April 26, the next day, an unknown person posted another message advertising
additional shirts with new tasteless slogans related to the Oklahoma City bombing. Again,
interested buyers were told to call Zeran’s phone number, to ask for “Ken,” and to “please
call back if busy” due to high demand. The angry, threatening phone calls intensified. Over
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the next four days, an unidentified party continued to post messages on AOL’s bulletin
board, advertising additional items including bumper stickers and key chains with still
more offensive slogans. During this time period, Zeran called AOL repeatedly and was told
by company representatives that the individual account from which the messages were
posted would soon be closed. Zeran also reported his case to Seattle FBI agents. By April
30, Zeran was receiving an abusive phone call approximately every two minutes.
Meanwhile, an announcer for Oklahoma City radio station KRXO received a copy of the
first AOL posting. On May 1, the announcer related the message’s contents on the air,
attributed them to “Ken” at Zeran’s phone number, and urged the listening audience to call
the number. After this radio broadcast, Zeran was inundated with death threats and other
violent calls from Oklahoma City residents. Over the next few days, Zeran talked to both
KRXO and AOL representatives. He also spoke to his local police, who subsequently
surveilled his home to protect his safety. By May 14, after an Oklahoma City newspaper
published a story exposing the shirt advertisements as a hoax and after KRXO made an onair apology, the number of calls to Zeran’s residence finally subsided to fifteen per day.
Zeran first filed suit on January 4, 1996, against radio station KRXO in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. On April 23, 1996, he filed this
separate suit against AOL in the same court. Zeran did not bring any action against the
party who posted the offensive messages.1 After Zeran’s suit against AOL was transferred
to the Eastern District of Virginia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), AOL answered Zeran’s
complaint and interposed 47 U.S.C. § 230 as an affirmative defense. AOL then moved for
judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). The district court granted AOL’s
motion, and Zeran filed this appeal.
II.
A.
Because § 230 was successfully advanced by AOL in the district court as a defense to
Zeran’s claims, we shall briefly examine its operation here. Zeran seeks to hold AOL liable
for defamatory speech initiated by a third party. He argued to the district court that once
he notified AOL of the unidentified third party’s hoax, AOL had a duty to remove the
defamatory posting promptly, to notify its subscribers of the message’s false nature, and to
effectively screen future defamatory material. Section 230 entered this litigation as an
affirmative defense pled by AOL. The company claimed that Congress immunized
interactive computer service providers from claims based on information posted by a third
party.
The relevant portion of § 230 states: “No provider or user of an interactive computer service
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider.”2 By its plain language, § 230 creates a federal immunity to
any cause of action that would make service providers liable for information originating
Zeran maintains that AOL made it impossible to identify the original party by failing to maintain adequate
records of its users. The issue of AOL’s record keeping practices, however, is not presented by this appeal.
2 …The parties do not dispute that AOL falls within the CDA’s “interactive computer service” definition and
that the unidentified third party who posted the offensive messages here fits the definition of an “information
content provider.”
1
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with a third-party user of the service. Specifically, § 230 precludes courts from entertaining
claims that would place a computer service provider in a publisher’s role. Thus, lawsuits
seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial
functions—such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content—are
barred.
The purpose of this statutory immunity is not difficult to discern. Congress recognized the
threat that tort-based lawsuits pose to freedom of speech in the new and burgeoning
Internet medium. The imposition of tort liability on service providers for the
communications of others represented, for Congress, simply another form of intrusive
government regulation of speech. Section 230 was enacted, in part, to maintain the robust
nature of Internet communication and, accordingly, to keep government interference in the
medium to a minimum. In specific statutory findings, Congress recognized the Internet and
interactive computer services as offering “a forum for a true diversity of political discourse,
unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual
activity.” It also found that the Internet and interactive computer services “have flourished,
to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government regulation.” (emphasis
added). Congress further stated that it is “the policy of the United States ... to preserve the
vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other
interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation.” (emphasis added).
None of this means, of course, that the original culpable party who posts defamatory
messages would escape accountability. While Congress acted to keep government
regulation of the Internet to a minimum, it also found it to be the policy of the United
States “to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish
trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of computer.” Congress made a
policy choice, however, not to deter harmful online speech through the separate route of
imposing tort liability on companies that serve as intermediaries for other parties’
potentially injurious messages.
Congress’ purpose in providing the § 230 immunity was thus evident. Interactive computer
services have millions of users. The amount of information communicated via interactive
computer services is therefore staggering. The specter of tort liability in an area of such
prolific speech would have an obvious chilling effect. It would be impossible for service
providers to screen each of their millions of postings for possible problems. Faced with
potential liability for each message republished by their services, interactive computer
service providers might choose to severely restrict the number and type of messages posted.
Congress considered the weight of the speech interests implicated and chose to immunize
service providers to avoid any such restrictive effect.
Another important purpose of § 230 was to encourage service providers to self-regulate the
dissemination of offensive material over their services. In this respect, § 230 responded to a
New York state court decision, Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL
323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995). There, the plaintiffs sued Prodigy—an interactive
computer service like AOL—for defamatory comments made by an unidentified party on
one of Prodigy’s bulletin boards. The court held Prodigy to the strict liability standard
normally applied to original publishers of defamatory statements, rejecting Prodigy’s claims
that it should be held only to the lower “knowledge” standard usually reserved for
distributors. The court reasoned that Prodigy acted more like an original publisher than a
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distributor both because it advertised its practice of controlling content on its service and
because it actively screened and edited messages posted on its bulletin boards.
Congress enacted § 230 to remove the disincentives to self-regulation created by the
Stratton Oakmont decision. Under that court’s holding, computer service providers who
regulated the dissemination of offensive material on their services risked subjecting
themselves to liability, because such regulation cast the service provider in the role of a
publisher. Fearing that the specter of liability would therefore deter service providers from
blocking and screening offensive material, Congress enacted § 230’s broad immunity “to
remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering
technologies that empower parents to restrict their children’s access to objectionable or
inappropriate online material.” In line with this purpose, § 230 forbids the imposition of
publisher liability on a service provider for the exercise of its editorial and self-regulatory
functions.
B.
Zeran argues, however, that the § 230 immunity eliminates only publisher liability, leaving
distributor liability intact. Publishers can be held liable for defamatory statements
contained in their works even absent proof that they had specific knowledge of the
statement’s inclusion. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 113,
at 810 (5th ed. 1984). According to Zeran, interactive computer service providers like AOL
are normally considered instead to be distributors, like traditional news vendors or book
sellers. Distributors cannot be held liable for defamatory statements contained in the
materials they distribute unless it is proven at a minimum that they have actual knowledge
of the defamatory statements upon which liability is predicated. Id. at 811 (explaining that
distributors are not liable “in the absence of proof that they knew or had reason to know of
the existence of defamatory matter contained in matter published”). Zeran contends that he
provided AOL with sufficient notice of the defamatory statements appearing on the
company’s bulletin board. This notice is significant, says Zeran, because AOL could be held
liable as a distributor only if it acquired knowledge of the defamatory statements’ existence.
Because of the difference between these two forms of liability, Zeran contends that the term
“distributor” carries a legally distinct meaning from the term “publisher.” Accordingly, he
asserts that Congress’ use of only the term “publisher” in § 230 indicates a purpose to
immunize service providers only from publisher liability. He argues that distributors are
left unprotected by § 230 and, therefore, his suit should be permitted to proceed against
AOL. We disagree. Assuming arguendo that Zeran has satisfied the requirements for
imposition of distributor liability, this theory of liability is merely a subset, or a species, of
publisher liability, and is therefore also foreclosed by § 230.
The terms “publisher” and “distributor” derive their legal significance from the context of
defamation law. Although Zeran attempts to artfully plead his claims as ones of negligence,
they are indistinguishable from a garden variety defamation action. Because the
publication of a statement is a necessary element in a defamation action, only one who
publishes can be subject to this form of tort liability. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558(b)
(1977); Keeton et al., supra, § 113, at 802. Publication does not only describe the choice by
an author to include certain information. In addition, both the negligent communication of
a defamatory statement and the failure to remove such a statement when first
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communicated by another party—each alleged by Zeran here under a negligence label—
constitute publication. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 577. In fact, every repetition of a
defamatory statement is considered a publication. Keeton et al., supra, § 113, at 799.
In this case, AOL is legally considered to be a publisher. “[E]very one who takes part in the
publication ... is charged with publication.” Id. Even distributors are considered to be
publishers for purposes of defamation law:
Those who are in the business of making their facilities available to
disseminate the writings composed, the speeches made, and the information
gathered by others may also be regarded as participating to such an extent in
making the books, newspapers, magazines, and information available to
others as to be regarded as publishers. They are intentionally making the
contents available to others, sometimes without knowing all of the contents—
including the defamatory content—and sometimes without any opportunity
to ascertain, in advance, that any defamatory matter was to be included in
the matter published.
Id. at 803. AOL falls squarely within this traditional definition of a publisher and,
therefore, is clearly protected by § 230’s immunity.
Zeran contends that decisions like Stratton Oakmont and Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc.,
776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), recognize a legal distinction between publishers and
distributors. He misapprehends, however, the significance of that distinction for the legal
issue we consider here. It is undoubtedly true that mere conduits, or distributors, are
subject to a different standard of liability. As explained above, distributors must at a
minimum have knowledge of the existence of a defamatory statement as a prerequisite to
liability. But this distinction signifies only that different standards of liability may be
applied within the larger publisher category, depending on the specific type of publisher
concerned. See Keeton et al., supra, § 113, at 799-800 (explaining that every party involved
is charged with publication, although degrees of legal responsibility differ). To the extent
that decisions like Stratton and Cubby utilize the terms “publisher” and “distributor”
separately, the decisions correctly describe two different standards of liability. Stratton and
Cubby do not, however, suggest that distributors are not also a type of publisher for
purposes of defamation law.
Zeran simply attaches too much importance to the presence of the distinct notice element in
distributor liability. The simple fact of notice surely cannot transform one from an original
publisher to a distributor in the eyes of the law. To the contrary, once a computer service
provider receives notice of a potentially defamatory posting, it is thrust into the role of a
traditional publisher. The computer service provider must decide whether to publish, edit,
or withdraw the posting. In this respect, Zeran seeks to impose liability on AOL for
assuming the role for which § 230 specifically proscribes liability—the publisher role.
Our view that Zeran’s complaint treats AOL as a publisher is reinforced because AOL is
cast in the same position as the party who originally posted the offensive messages.
According to Zeran’s logic, AOL is legally at fault because it communicated to third parties
an allegedly defamatory statement. This is precisely the theory under which the original
poster of the offensive messages would be found liable. If the original party is considered a
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publisher of the offensive messages, Zeran certainly cannot attach liability to AOL under
the same theory without conceding that AOL too must be treated as a publisher of the
statements.
Zeran next contends that interpreting § 230 to impose liability on service providers with
knowledge of defamatory content on their services is consistent with the statutory purposes
outlined in Part IIA. Zeran fails, however, to understand the practical implications of notice
liability in the interactive computer service context. Liability upon notice would defeat the
dual purposes advanced by § 230 of the CDA. Like the strict liability imposed by the
Stratton Oakmont court, liability upon notice reinforces service providers’ incentives to
restrict speech and abstain from self-regulation.
If computer service providers were subject to distributor liability, they would face potential
liability each time they receive notice of a potentially defamatory statement—from any
party, concerning any message. Each notification would require a careful yet rapid
investigation of the circumstances surrounding the posted information, a legal judgment
concerning the information’s defamatory character, and an on-the-spot editorial decision
whether to risk liability by allowing the continued publication of that information.
Although this might be feasible for the traditional print publisher, the sheer number of
postings on interactive computer services would create an impossible burden in the
Internet context. Cf. Auvil v. CBS 60 Minutes, 800 F. Supp. 928, 931 (E.D. Wash. 1992)
(recognizing that it is unrealistic for network affiliates to “monitor incoming transmissions
and exercise on-the-spot discretionary calls”). Because service providers would be subject to
liability only for the publication of information, and not for its removal, they would have a
natural incentive simply to remove messages upon notification, whether the contents were
defamatory or not. Thus, like strict liability, liability upon notice has a chilling effect on the
freedom of Internet speech.
Similarly, notice-based liability would deter service providers from regulating the
dissemination of offensive material over their own services. Any efforts by a service
provider to investigate and screen material posted on its service would only lead to notice of
potentially defamatory material more frequently and thereby create a stronger basis for
liability. Instead of subjecting themselves to further possible lawsuits, service providers
would likely eschew any attempts at self-regulation.
More generally, notice-based liability for interactive computer service providers would
provide third parties with a no-cost means to create the basis for future lawsuits. Whenever
one was displeased with the speech of another party conducted over an interactive
computer service, the offended party could simply “notify” the relevant service provider,
claiming the information to be legally defamatory. In light of the vast amount of speech
communicated through interactive computer services, these notices could produce an
impossible burden for service providers, who would be faced with ceaseless choices of
suppressing controversial speech or sustaining prohibitive liability. Because the probable
effects of distributor liability on the vigor of Internet speech and on service provider selfregulation are directly contrary to § 230’s statutory purposes, we will not assume that
Congress intended to leave liability upon notice intact….
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Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d
1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)
Kozinski, Chief Judge.
We plumb the depths of the immunity provided by section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act of 1996 (“CDA”).
Facts1
Defendant Roommate.com, LLC (“Roommate”) operates a website designed to match people
renting out spare rooms with people looking for a place to live.2 At the time of the district
court’s disposition, Roommate’s website featured approximately 150,000 active listings and
received around a million page views a day. Roommate seeks to profit by collecting revenue
from advertisers and subscribers.
Before subscribers can search listings or post housing opportunities on Roommate’s
website, they must create profiles, a process that requires them to answer a series of
questions. In addition to requesting basic information—such as name, location and email
address—Roommate requires each subscriber to disclose his sex, sexual orientation and
whether he would bring children to a household. Each subscriber must also describe his
preferences in roommates with respect to the same three criteria: sex, sexual orientation
and whether they will bring children to the household. The site also encourages subscribers
to provide “Additional Comments” describing themselves and their desired roommate in an
open-ended essay. After a new subscriber completes the application, Roommate assembles
his answers into a “profile page.” The profile page displays the subscriber’s pseudonym, his
description and his preferences, as divulged through answers to Roommate’s questions.

This appeal is taken from the district court’s order granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment, so we
view contested facts in the light most favorable to plaintiffs.
2 For unknown reasons, the company goes by the singular name “Roommate.com, LLC” but pluralizes its
website’s URL, www.roommates.com.
1
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[Editor’s note: three screenshots from the Roommates.com website in 2008:]
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Subscribers can choose between two levels of service: Those using the site’s free service
level can create their own personal profile page, search the profiles of others and send
personal email messages. They can also receive periodic emails from Roommate, informing
them of available housing opportunities matching their preferences. Subscribers who pay a
monthly fee also gain the ability to read emails from other users, and to view other
subscribers’ “Additional Comments.”
The Fair Housing Councils of the San Fernando Valley and San Diego (“Councils”) sued
Roommate in federal court, alleging that Roommate’s business violates the federal Fair
Housing Act (“FHA”) and California housing discrimination laws. Councils claim that
Roommate is effectively a housing broker doing online what it may not lawfully do off-line.
The district court held that Roommate is immune under section 230 of the CDA and
dismissed the federal claims without considering whether Roommate’s actions violated the
FHA. The court then declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law
claims. Councils appeal the dismissal of the FHA claim and Roommate cross-appeals the
denial of attorneys’ fees.
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Analysis
Section 230 of the CDA immunizes providers of interactive computer services6 against
liability arising from content created by third parties: “No provider ... of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided
by another information content provider.” This grant of immunity applies only if the
interactive computer service provider is not also an “information content provider,” which is
defined as someone who is “responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development
of” the offending content.
A website operator can be both a service provider and a content provider: If it passively
displays content that is created entirely by third parties, then it is only a service provider
with respect to that content. But as to content that it creates itself, or is “responsible, in
whole or in part” for creating or developing, the website is also a content provider. Thus, a
website may be immune from liability for some of the content it displays to the public but
be subject to liability for other content.
Section 230 was prompted by a state court case holding Prodigy responsible for a libelous
message posted on one of its financial message boards. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v.
Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (unpublished). The court
there found that Prodigy had become a “publisher” under state law because it voluntarily
deleted some messages from its message boards “on the basis of offensiveness and ‘bad
taste,’” and was therefore legally responsible for the content of defamatory messages that it
failed to delete. The Stratton Oakmont court reasoned that Prodigy’s decision to perform
some voluntary self-policing made it akin to a newspaper publisher, and thus responsible
for messages on its bulletin board that defamed third parties. The court distinguished
Prodigy from CompuServe, which had been released from liability in a similar defamation
case because CompuServe “had no opportunity to review the contents of the publication at
issue before it was uploaded into CompuServe’s computer banks.” Id.; see Cubby, Inc. v.
CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). Under the reasoning of Stratton
Oakmont, online service providers that voluntarily filter some messages become liable for
all messages transmitted, whereas providers that bury their heads in the sand and ignore
problematic posts altogether escape liability. Prodigy claimed that the “sheer volume” of
message board postings it received—at the time, over 60,000 a day—made manual review
of every message impossible; thus, if it were forced to choose between taking responsibility
for all messages and deleting no messages at all, it would have to choose the latter course.
In passing section 230, Congress sought to spare interactive computer services this grim
choice by allowing them to perform some editing on user-generated content without thereby
becoming liable for all defamatory or otherwise unlawful messages that they didn’t edit or
delete. In other words, Congress sought to immunize the removal of user-generated content,
not the creation of content: “[S]ection [230] provides ‘Good Samaritan’ protections from civil
liability for providers ... of an interactive computer service for actions to restrict ... access to
objectionable online material. One of the specific purposes of this section is to overrule
Stratton-Oakmont [sic] v. Prodigy and any other similar decisions which have treated such
6 … Today, the most common interactive computer services are websites. Councils do not dispute that
Roommate’s website is an interactive computer service.
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providers ... as publishers or speakers of content that is not their own because they have
restricted access to objectionable material.” H.R.Rep. No. 104-458 (1996) (emphasis added).
Indeed, the section is titled “Protection for ‘good samaritan’ blocking and screening of
offensive material” and, as the Seventh Circuit recently held, the substance of section
230(c) can and should be interpreted consistent with its caption. Chicago Lawyers’
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008).
With this backdrop in mind, we examine three specific functions performed by Roommate
that are alleged to violate the Fair Housing Act and California law.
1. Councils first argue that the questions Roommate poses to prospective subscribers during
the registration process violate the Fair Housing Act and the analogous California law.
Councils allege that requiring subscribers to disclose their sex, family status and sexual
orientation “indicates” an intent to discriminate against them, and thus runs afoul of both
the FHA and state law.13
Roommate created the questions and choice of answers, and designed its website
registration process around them. Therefore, Roommate is undoubtedly the “information
content provider” as to the questions and can claim no immunity for posting them on its
website, or for forcing subscribers to answer them as a condition of using its services.
Here, we must determine whether Roommate has immunity under the CDA because
Councils have at least a plausible claim that Roommate violated state and federal law by
merely posing the questions. We need not decide whether any of Roommate’s questions
actually violate the Fair Housing Act or California law, or whether they are protected by
the First Amendment or other constitutional guarantees; we leave those issues for the
district court on remand. Rather, we examine the scope of plaintiffs’ substantive claims only
insofar as necessary to determine whether section 230 immunity applies. However, we note
that asking questions certainly can violate the Fair Housing Act and analogous laws in the
physical world. For example, a real estate broker may not inquire as to the race of a
prospective buyer, and an employer may not inquire as to the religion of a prospective
employee. If such questions are unlawful when posed face-to-face or by telephone, they
don’t magically become lawful when asked electronically online. The Communications
Decency Act was not meant to create a lawless no-man’s-land on the Internet.15
Councils also claim that requiring subscribers to answer the questions as a condition of
using Roommate’s services unlawfully “cause[s]” subscribers to make a “statement ... with
respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates [a] preference, limitation, or
The Fair Housing Act prohibits any “statement ... with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that
indicates ... an intention to make [a] preference, limitation, or discrimination” on the basis of a protected
category. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (emphasis added). California law prohibits “any written or oral inquiry concerning
the” protected status of a housing seeker. Cal. Gov. Code § 12955(b).
15 The dissent stresses the importance of the Internet to modern life and commerce, and we, of course, agree:
The Internet is no longer a fragile new means of communication that could easily be smothered in the cradle by
overzealous enforcement of laws and regulations applicable to brick-and-mortar businesses. Rather, it has
become a dominant—perhaps the preeminent—means through which commerce is conducted. And its vast reach
into the lives of millions is exactly why we must be careful not to exceed the scope of the immunity provided by
Congress and thus give online businesses an unfair advantage over their real-world counterparts, which must
comply with laws of general applicability.
13
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discrimination,” in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c). The CDA does not grant immunity for
inducing third parties to express illegal preferences. Roommate’s own acts—posting the
questionnaire and requiring answers to it—are entirely its doing and thus section 230 of
the CDA does not apply to them. Roommate is entitled to no immunity.
2. Councils also charge that Roommate’s development and display of subscribers’
discriminatory preferences is unlawful. Roommate publishes a “profile page” for each
subscriber on its website. The page describes the client’s personal information—such as his
sex, sexual orientation and whether he has children—as well as the attributes of the
housing situation he seeks. The content of these pages is drawn directly from the
registration process: For example, Roommate requires subscribers to specify, using a dropdown menu provided by Roommate, whether they are “Male” or “Female” and then displays
that information on the profile page. Roommate also requires subscribers who are listing
available housing to disclose whether there are currently “Straight male(s),” “Gay male(s),”
“Straight female(s)” or “Lesbian(s)” living in the dwelling. Subscribers who are seeking
housing must make a selection from a drop-down menu, again provided by Roommate, to
indicate whether they are willing to live with “Straight or gay” males, only with “Straight”
males, only with “Gay” males or with “No males.” Similarly, Roommate requires subscribers
listing housing to disclose whether there are “Children present” or “Children not present”
and requires housing seekers to say “I will live with children” or “I will not live with
children.” Roommate then displays these answers, along with other information, on the
subscriber’s profile page. This information is obviously included to help subscribers decide
which housing opportunities to pursue and which to bypass. In addition, Roommate itself
uses this information to channel subscribers away from listings where the individual
offering housing has expressed preferences that aren’t compatible with the subscriber’s
answers.
The dissent tilts at windmills when it shows, quite convincingly, that Roommate’s
subscribers are information content providers who create the profiles by picking among
options and providing their own answers. There is no disagreement on this point. But, the
fact that users are information content providers does not preclude Roommate from also
being an information content provider by helping “develop” at least “in part” the
information in the profiles. As we explained in Batzel, the party responsible for putting
information online may be subject to liability, even if the information originated with a
user. See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1033 (9th Cir. 2003).
Here, the part of the profile that is alleged to offend the Fair Housing Act and state housing
discrimination laws—the information about sex, family status and sexual orientation—is
provided by subscribers in response to Roommate’s questions, which they cannot refuse to
answer if they want to use defendant’s services. By requiring subscribers to provide the
information as a condition of accessing its service, and by providing a limited set of prepopulated answers, Roommate becomes much more than a passive transmitter of
information provided by others; it becomes the developer, at least in part, of that
information. And section 230 provides immunity only if the interactive computer service
does not “creat[e] or develop[ ]” the information “in whole or in part.”
Our dissenting colleague takes a much narrower view of what it means to “develop”
information online, and concludes that Roommate does not develop the information because
“[a]ll Roommate does is to provide a form with options for standardized answers.” But
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Roommate does much more than provide options. To begin with, it asks discriminatory
questions that even the dissent grudgingly admits are not entitled to CDA immunity. The
FHA makes it unlawful to ask certain discriminatory questions for a very good reason:
Unlawful questions solicit (a.k.a. “develop”) unlawful answers. Not only does Roommate ask
these questions, Roommate makes answering the discriminatory questions a condition of
doing business. This is no different from a real estate broker in real life saying, “Tell me
whether you’re Jewish or you can find yourself another broker.” When a business enterprise
extracts such information from potential customers as a condition of accepting them as
clients, it is no stretch to say that the enterprise is responsible, at least in part, for
developing that information. For the dissent to claim that the information in such
circumstances is “created solely by” the customer, and that the business has not helped in
the least to develop it, strains both credulity and English.19
Roommate also argues that it is not responsible for the information on the profile page
because it is each subscriber’s action that leads to publication of his particular profile—in
other words, the user pushes the last button or takes the last act before publication. We are
not convinced that this is even true, but don’t see why it matters anyway. The projectionist
in the theater may push the last button before a film is displayed on the screen, but surely
this doesn’t make him the sole producer of the movie. By any reasonable use of the English
language, Roommate is “responsible” at least “in part” for each subscriber’s profile page,
because every such page is a collaborative effort between Roommate and the subscriber.
Similarly, Roommate is not entitled to CDA immunity for the operation of its search
system, which filters listings, or of its email notification system, which directs emails to
subscribers according to discriminatory criteria. Roommate designed its search system so it
would steer users based on the preferences and personal characteristics that Roommate
itself forces subscribers to disclose. If Roommate has no immunity for asking the
discriminatory questions, as we concluded above, it can certainly have no immunity for
using the answers to the unlawful questions to limit who has access to housing.
For example, a subscriber who self-identifies as a “Gay male” will not receive email
notifications of new housing opportunities supplied by owners who limit the universe of
acceptable tenants to “Straight male(s),” “Straight female(s)” and “Lesbian(s).” Similarly,
subscribers with children will not be notified of new listings where the owner specifies “no
children.” Councils charge that limiting the information a subscriber can access based on
that subscriber’s protected status violates the Fair Housing Act and state housing
discrimination laws. It is, Councils allege, no different from a real estate broker saying to a
client: “Sorry, sir, but I can’t show you any listings on this block because you are
[gay/female/black/a parent].” If such screening is prohibited when practiced in person or by
telephone, we see no reason why Congress would have wanted to make it lawful to profit
from it online.
The dissent may be laboring under a misapprehension as to how the Roommate website is alleged to operate.
For example, the dissent spends some time explaining that certain portions of the user profile application are
voluntary. We do not discuss these because plaintiffs do not base their claims on the voluntary portions of the
application, except the “Additional Comments” portion, discussed below. The dissent also soft-pedals
Roommate’s influence on the mandatory portions of the applications by referring to it with such words as
“encourage” or “encouragement” or “solicitation.” Roommate, of course, does much more than encourage or
solicit; it forces users to answer certain questions and thereby provide information that other clients can use to
discriminate unlawfully.
19
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Roommate’s search function is similarly designed to steer users based on discriminatory
criteria. Roommate’s search engine thus differs materially from generic search engines such
as Google, Yahoo! and MSN Live Search, in that Roommate designed its system to use
allegedly unlawful criteria so as to limit the results of each search, and to force users to
participate in its discriminatory process. In other words, Councils allege that Roommate’s
search is designed to make it more difficult or impossible for individuals with certain
protected characteristics to find housing-something the law prohibits. By contrast, ordinary
search engines do not use unlawful criteria to limit the scope of searches conducted on
them, nor are they designed to achieve illegal ends-as Roommate’s search function is
alleged to do here. Therefore, such search engines play no part in the “development” of any
unlawful searches.
It’s true that the broadest sense of the term “develop” could include the functions of an
ordinary search engine—indeed, just about any function performed by a website. But to
read the term so broadly would defeat the purposes of section 230 by swallowing up every
bit of the immunity that the section otherwise provides. At the same time, reading the
exception for co-developers as applying only to content that originates entirely with the
website—as the dissent would seem to suggest—ignores the words “development ... in part”
in the statutory passage “creation or development in whole or in part.” (emphasis added).
We believe that both the immunity for passive conduits and the exception for co-developers
must be given their proper scope and, to that end, we interpret the term “development” as
referring not merely to augmenting the content generally, but to materially contributing to
its alleged unlawfulness. In other words, a website helps to develop unlawful content, and
thus falls within the exception to section 230, if it contributes materially to the alleged
illegality of the conduct.
The dissent accuses us of “rac[ing] past the plain language of the statute,” but we clearly do
pay close attention to the statutory language, particularly the word “develop,” which we
spend many pages exploring. The dissent may disagree with our definition of the term,
which is entirely fair, but surely our dissenting colleague is mistaken in suggesting we
ignore the term. Nor is the statutory language quite as plain as the dissent would have it.
Quoting selectively from the dictionary, the dissent comes up with an exceedingly narrow
definition of this rather complex and multi faceted term.22 Dissent at 1184 (defining
development as “gradual advance or growth through progressive changes”) (quoting
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 618 (2002)). The dissent does not pause to
consider how such a definition could apply to website content at all, as it excludes the kinds
of swift and disorderly changes that are the hallmark of growth on the Internet. Had our
dissenting colleague looked just a few lines lower on the same page of the same edition of
the same dictionary, she would have found another definition of “development” that is far
more suitable to the context in which we operate: “making usable or available.” The dissent
does not explain why the definition it has chosen reflects the statute’s “plain meaning,”
while the ones it bypasses do not.

Development, it will be recalled, has many meanings, which differ materially depending on context. Thus,
“development” when used as part of the phrase “research and development” means something quite different
than when referring to “mental development,” and something else again when referring to “real estate
development,” “musical development” or “economic development.”
22
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More fundamentally, the dissent does nothing at all to grapple with the difficult statutory
problem posed by the fact that section 230(c) uses both “create” and “develop” as separate
bases for loss of immunity. Everything that the dissent includes within its cramped
definition of “development” fits just as easily within the definition of “creation”—which
renders the term “development” superfluous. The dissent makes no attempt to explain or
offer examples as to how its interpretation of the statute leaves room for “development” as a
separate basis for a website to lose its immunity, yet we are advised by the Supreme Court
that we must give meaning to all statutory terms, avoiding redundancy or duplication
wherever possible.
While content to pluck the “plain meaning” of the statute from a dictionary definition that
predates the Internet by decades, compare Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
618 (1963) with Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 618 (2002) (both containing
“gradual advance or growth through progressive changes”), the dissent overlooks the far
more relevant definition of “[web] content development” in Wikipedia: “the process of
researching, writing, gathering, organizing and editing information for publication on web
sites.” Our interpretation of “development” is entirely in line with the context-appropriate
meaning of the term, and easily fits the activities Roommate engages in.
In an abundance of caution, and to avoid the kind of misunderstanding the dissent seems to
encourage, we offer a few examples to elucidate what does and does not amount to
“development” under section 230 of the Communications Decency Act: If an individual uses
an ordinary search engine to query for a “white roommate,” the search engine has not
contributed to any alleged unlawfulness in the individual’s conduct; providing neutral tools
to carry out what may be unlawful or illicit searches does not amount to “development” for
purposes of the immunity exception. A dating website that requires users to enter their sex,
race, religion and marital status through drop-down menus, and that provides means for
users to search along the same lines, retains its CDA immunity insofar as it does not
contribute to any alleged illegality;23 this immunity is retained even if the website is sued
for libel based on these characteristics because the website would not have contributed
materially to any alleged defamation. Similarly, a housing website that allows users to
specify whether they will or will not receive emails by means of user-defined criteria might
help some users exclude email from other users of a particular race or sex. However, that
website would be immune, so long as it does not require the use of discriminatory criteria. A
website operator who edits user-created content—such as by correcting spelling, removing
obscenity or trimming for length—retains his immunity for any illegality in the usercreated content, provided that the edits are unrelated to the illegality. However, a website
operator who edits in a manner that contributes to the alleged illegality—such as by
removing the word “not” from a user’s message reading “[Name] did not steal the artwork”
in order to transform an innocent message into a libelous one—is directly involved in the
alleged illegality and thus not immune.24
It is perfectly legal to discriminate along those lines in dating, and thus there can be no claim based solely on
the content of these questions.
24 Requiring website owners to refrain from taking affirmative acts that are unlawful does not strike us as an
undue burden. These are, after all, businesses that are being held responsible only for their own conduct; there
is no vicarious liability for the misconduct of their customers. Compliance with laws of general applicability
seems like an entirely justified burden for all businesses, whether they operate online or through quaint brickand-mortar facilities. Insofar, however, as a plaintiff would bring a claim under state or federal law based on a
website operator’s passive acquiescence in the misconduct of its users, the website operator would likely be
23
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Here, Roommate’s connection to the discriminatory filtering process is direct and palpable:
Roommate designed its search and email systems to limit the listings available to
subscribers based on sex, sexual orientation and presence of children.25 Roommate selected
the criteria used to hide listings, and Councils allege that the act of hiding certain listings
is itself unlawful under the Fair Housing Act, which prohibits brokers from steering clients
in accordance with discriminatory preferences.26 We need not decide the merits of Councils’
claim to hold that Roommate is sufficiently involved with the design and operation of the
search and email systems—which are engineered to limit access to housing on the basis of
the protected characteristics elicited by the registration process—so as to forfeit any
immunity to which it was otherwise entitled under section 230.
Roommate’s situation stands in stark contrast to Stratton Oakmont, the case Congress
sought to reverse through passage of section 230. There, defendant Prodigy was held liable
for a user’s unsolicited message because it attempted to remove some problematic content
from its website, but didn’t remove enough. Here, Roommate is not being sued for removing
some harmful messages while failing to remove others; instead, it is being sued for the
predictable consequences of creating a website designed to solicit and enforce housing
preferences that are alleged to be illegal.
We take this opportunity to clarify two of our previous rulings regarding the scope of
section 230 immunity. Today’s holding sheds additional light on Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d
1018 (9th Cir. 2003). There, the editor of an email newsletter received a tip about some
artwork, which the tipster falsely alleged to be stolen. The newsletter editor incorporated
the tipster’s email into the next issue of his newsletter and added a short headnote, which
he then emailed to his subscribers.27 The art owner sued for libel and a split panel held the
newsletter editor to be immune under section 230 of the CDA.28
Our opinion is entirely consistent with that part of Batzel which holds that an editor’s
minor changes to the spelling, grammar and length of third-party content do not strip him
of section 230 immunity. None of those changes contributed to the libelousness of the
message, so they do not add up to “development” as we interpret the term. Batzel went on
to hold that the editor could be liable for selecting the tipster’s email for inclusion in the
entitled to CDA immunity. This is true even if the users committed their misconduct using electronic tools of
general applicability provided by the website operator.
25 Of course, the logic of Roommate’s argument is not limited to discrimination based on these particular
criteria. If Roommate were free to discriminate in providing housing services based on sex, there is no reason
another website could not discriminate based on race, religion or national origin. Nor is its logic limited to
housing; it would apply equally to websites providing employment or educational opportunities—or anything
else, for that matter.
26 The dissent argues that Roommate is not liable because the decision to discriminate on these grounds does
not originate with Roommate; instead, “users have chosen to select characteristics that they find desirable.”
But, it is Roommate that forces users to express a preference and Roommate that forces users to disclose the
information that can form the basis of discrimination by others. Thus, Roommate makes discrimination both
possible and respectable.
27 Apparently, it was common practice for this editor to receive and forward tips from his subscribers. In effect,
the newsletter served as a heavily moderated discussion list.
28 As an initial matter, the Batzel panel held that the defendant newsletter editor was a “user” of an interactive
computer service within the definition provided by section 230. While we have our doubts, we express no view
on this issue because it is not presented to us. Thus, we assume that the editor fell within the scope of section
230’s coverage without endorsing Batzel’s analysis on this point.
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newsletter, depending on whether or not the tipster had tendered the piece to the editor for
posting online, and remanded for a determination of that issue.
The distinction drawn by Batzel anticipated the approach we take today. As Batzel
explained, if the tipster tendered the material for posting online, then the editor’s job was,
essentially, to determine whether or not to prevent its posting—precisely the kind of
activity for which section 230 was meant to provide immunity.29 And any activity that can
be boiled down to deciding whether to exclude material that third parties seek to post
online is perforce immune under section 230. But if the editor publishes material that he
does not believe was tendered to him for posting online, then he is the one making the
affirmative decision to publish, and so he contributes materially to its allegedly unlawful
dissemination. He is thus properly deemed a developer and not entitled to CDA immunity.30
We must also clarify the reasoning undergirding our holding in Carafano v.
Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003), as we used language there that was
unduly broad. In Carafano, an unknown prankster impersonating actress Christianne
Carafano created a profile for her on an online dating site. The profile included Carafano’s
home address and suggested that she was looking for an unconventional liaison. When
Carafano received threatening phone calls, she sued the dating site for publishing the
unauthorized profile. The site asserted immunity under section 230. We correctly held that
the website was immune, but incorrectly suggested that it could never be liable because “no
[dating] profile has any content until a user actively creates it.” As we explain above, even if
the data are supplied by third parties, a website operator may still contribute to the
content’s illegality and thus be liable as a developer.31 Providing immunity every time a
website uses data initially obtained from third parties would eviscerate the exception to
section 230 for “develop[ing]” unlawful content “in whole or in part.”
We believe a more plausible rationale for the unquestionably correct result in Carafano is
this: The allegedly libelous content there—the false implication that Carafano was
unchaste—was created and developed entirely by the malevolent user, without prompting
or help from the website operator. To be sure, the website provided neutral tools, which the
anonymous dastard used to publish the libel, but the website did absolutely nothing to
encourage the posting of defamatory content—indeed, the defamatory posting was contrary
As Batzel pointed out, there can be no meaningful difference between an editor starting with a default rule of
publishing all submissions and then manually selecting material to be removed from publication, and a default
rule of publishing no submissions and manually selecting material to be published—they are flip sides of
precisely the same coin. Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1032 (“The scope of [section 230] immunity cannot turn on whether
the publisher approaches the selection process as one of inclusion or removal, as the difference is one of method
or degree, not substance.”).
30 The dissent scores a debater’s point by noting that the same activity might amount to “development” or not,
depending on whether it contributes materially to the illegality of the content. But we are not defining
“development” for all purposes; we are defining the term only for purposes of determining whether the
defendant is entitled to immunity for a particular act. This definition does not depend on finding substantive
liability, but merely requires analyzing the context in which a claim is brought. A finding that a defendant is
not immune is quite distinct from finding liability: On remand, Roommate may still assert other defenses to
liability under the Fair Housing Act, or argue that its actions do not violate the Fair Housing Act at all. Our
holding is limited to a determination that the CDA provides no immunity to Roommate’s actions in soliciting
and developing the content of its website; whether that content is in fact illegal is a question we leave to the
district court.
31 We disavow any suggestion that Carafano holds an information content provider automatically immune so
long as the content originated with another information content provider.
29
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to the website’s express policies. The claim against the website was, in effect, that it failed
to review each user-created profile to ensure that it wasn’t defamatory. That is precisely the
kind of activity for which Congress intended to grant absolution with the passage of section
230. With respect to the defamatory content, the website operator was merely a passive
conduit and thus could not be held liable for failing to detect and remove it.32
By contrast, Roommate both elicits the allegedly illegal content and makes aggressive use
of it in conducting its business. Roommate does not merely provide a framework that could
be utilized for proper or improper purposes; rather, Roommate’s work in developing the
discriminatory questions, discriminatory answers and discriminatory search mechanism is
directly related to the alleged illegality of the site. Unlike Carafano, where the website
operator had nothing to do with the user’s decision to enter a celebrity’s name and personal
information in an otherwise licit dating service, here, Roommate is directly involved with
developing and enforcing a system that subjects subscribers to allegedly discriminatory
housing practices.
Our ruling today also dovetails with another facet of Carafano: The mere fact that an
interactive computer service “classifies user characteristics ... does not transform [it] into a
‘developer’ of the ‘underlying misinformation.’” Carafano, like Batzel, correctly anticipated
our common-sense interpretation of the term “develop[ ]” in section 230. Of course, any
classification of information, like the sorting of dating profiles by the type of relationship
sought in Carafano, could be construed as “develop[ment]” under an unduly broad reading
of the term. But, once again, such a broad reading would sap section 230 of all meaning.
The salient fact in Carafano was that the website’s classifications of user characteristics did
absolutely nothing to enhance the defamatory sting of the message, to encourage
defamation or to make defamation easier: The site provided neutral tools specifically
designed to match romantic partners depending on their voluntary inputs. By sharp
contrast, Roommate’s website is designed to force subscribers to divulge protected
characteristics and discriminatory preferences, and to match those who have rooms with
those who are looking for rooms based on criteria that appear to be prohibited by the
FHA.33
32 Section 230 requires us to scrutinize particularly closely any claim that can be boiled down to the failure of an
interactive computer service to edit or block user-generated content that it believes was tendered for posting
online, as that is the very activity Congress sought to immunize by passing the section.
The dissent coyly suggests that our opinion “sets us apart from” other circuits, carefully avoiding the
phrase “inter-circuit conflict.” And with good reason: No other circuit has considered a case like ours and none
has a case that even arguably conflicts with our holding today. No case cited by the dissent involves active
participation by the defendant in the creation or development of the allegedly unlawful content; in each, the
interactive computer service provider passively relayed content generated by third parties, just as in Stratton
Oakmont, and did not design its system around the dissemination of unlawful content.
In Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666 (7th
Cir. 2008), the Seventh Circuit held the online classified website craigslist immune from liability for
discriminatory housing advertisements submitted by users. Craigslist’s service works very much like the
“Additional Comments” section of Roommate’s website, in that users are given an open text prompt in which to
enter any description of the rental property without any structure imposed on their content or any requirement
to enter discriminatory information: “Nothing in the service craigslist offers induces anyone to post any
particular listing or express a preference for discrimination....” We similarly hold the “Additional Comments”
section of Roommate’s site immune. Consistent with our opinion, the Seventh Circuit explained the limited
scope of section 230(c) immunity. More directly, the Seventh Circuit noted in dicta that “causing a particular
statement to be made, or perhaps [causing] the discriminatory content of a statement “ might be sufficient to
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3. Councils finally argue that Roommate should be held liable for the discriminatory
statements displayed in the “Additional Comments” section of profile pages. At the end of
the registration process, on a separate page from the other registration steps, Roommate
prompts subscribers to “tak[e] a moment to personalize your profile by writing a paragraph
or two describing yourself and what you are looking for in a roommate.” The subscriber is
presented with a blank text box, in which he can type as much or as little about himself as
he wishes. Such essays are visible only to paying subscribers.
Subscribers provide a variety of provocative, and often very revealing, answers. The
contents range from subscribers who “[p]ref[er] white Male roommates” or require that
“[t]he person applying for the room MUST be a BLACK GAY MALE” to those who are “NOT
looking for black muslims.” Some common themes are a desire to live without “drugs, kids
or animals” or “smokers, kids or druggies,” while a few subscribers express more particular
preferences, such as preferring to live in a home free of “psychos or anyone on mental
medication.” Some subscribers are just looking for someone who will get along with their
significant other34 or with their most significant Other.35
Roommate publishes these comments as written.36 It does not provide any specific guidance
as to what the essay should contain, nor does it urge subscribers to input discriminatory
preferences. Roommate is not responsible, in whole or in part, for the development of this
content, which comes entirely from subscribers and is passively displayed by Roommate.
Without reviewing every essay, Roommate would have no way to distinguish unlawful
discriminatory preferences from perfectly legitimate statements. Nor can there be any

create liability for a website. (emphasis added). Despite the dissent’s attempt to imply the contrary, the Seventh
Circuit’s opinion is actually in line with our own.
In Universal Communication Systems v. Lycos, Inc., the First Circuit held a message board owner
immune under the CDA for defamatory comments posted on a message board. The allegedly defamatory
comments were made without any prompting or encouragement by defendant: “[T]here is not even a colorable
argument that any misinformation was prompted by Lycos’s registration process or its link structure.”
Green v. America Online, 318 F.3d 465 (3d Cir. 2003), falls yet farther from the mark. There, AOL was
held immune for derogatory comments and malicious software transmitted by other defendants through AOL’s
“Romance over 30” “chat room.” There was no allegation that AOL solicited the content, encouraged users to
post harmful content or otherwise had any involvement whatsoever with the harmful content, other than
through providing “chat rooms” for general use.
In Ben Ezra, Weinstein, and Co. v. America Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 2000), the Tenth
Circuit held AOL immune for relaying inaccurate stock price information it received from other vendors. While
AOL undoubtedly participated in the decision to make stock quotations available to members, it did not cause
the errors in the stock data, nor did it encourage or solicit others to provide inaccurate data. AOL was immune
because “Plaintiff could not identify any evidence indicating Defendant [AOL] developed or created the stock
quotation information.”
And, finally, in Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997), the Fourth Circuit held
AOL immune for yet another set of defamatory and harassing message board postings. Again, AOL did not
solicit the harassing content, did not encourage others to post it, and had nothing to do with its creation other
than through AOL’s role as the provider of a generic message board for general discussions.
34 “The female we are looking for hopefully wont [sic] mind having a little sexual incounter [sic] with my
boyfriend and I [very sic].”
35 “We are 3 Christian females who Love our Lord Jesus Christ.... We have weekly bible studies and bi-weekly
times of fellowship.”
36 It is unclear whether Roommate performs any filtering for obscenity or “spam,” but even if it were to perform
this kind of minor editing and selection, the outcome would not change.
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doubt that this information was tendered to Roommate for publication online. This is
precisely the kind of situation for which section 230 was designed to provide immunity.
The fact that Roommate encourages subscribers to provide something in response to the
prompt is not enough to make it a “develop[er]” of the information under the common-sense
interpretation of the term we adopt today. It is entirely consistent with Roommate’s
business model to have subscribers disclose as much about themselves and their
preferences as they are willing to provide. But Roommate does not tell subscribers what
kind of information they should or must include as “Additional Comments,” and certainly
does not encourage or enhance any discriminatory content created by users. Its simple,
generic prompt does not make it a developer of the information posted.37
Councils argue that—given the context of the discriminatory questions presented earlier in
the registration process—the “Additional Comments” prompt impliedly suggests that
subscribers should make statements expressing a desire to discriminate on the basis of
protected classifications; in other words, Councils allege that, by encouraging some
discriminatory preferences, Roommate encourages other discriminatory preferences when it
gives subscribers a chance to describe themselves. But the encouragement that bleeds over
from one part of the registration process to another is extremely weak, if it exists at all.
Such weak encouragement cannot strip a website of its section 230 immunity, lest that
immunity be rendered meaningless as a practical matter.38
We must keep firmly in mind that this is an immunity statute we are expounding, a
provision enacted to protect websites against the evil of liability for failure to remove
offensive content. Websites are complicated enterprises, and there will always be close
cases where a clever lawyer could argue that something the website operator did
encouraged the illegality. Such close cases, we believe, must be resolved in favor of
immunity, lest we cut the heart out of section 230 by forcing websites to face death by ten
thousand duck-bites, fighting off claims that they promoted or encouraged—or at least
tacitly assented to—the illegality of third parties. Where it is very clear that the website
directly participates in developing the alleged illegality—as it is clear here with respect to
Roommate’s questions, answers and the resulting profile pages—immunity will be lost. But
in cases of enhancement by implication or development by inference—such as with respect
to the “Additional Comments” here—section 230 must be interpreted to protect websites not
merely from ultimate liability, but from having to fight costly and protracted legal battles.
The dissent prophesies doom and gloom for countless Internet services, but fails to
recognize that we hold part of Roommate’s service entirely immune from liability. The
search engines the dissent worries about closely resemble the “Additional Comments”
section of Roommate’s website. Both involve a generic text prompt with no direct
encouragement to perform illegal searches or to publish illegal content. We hold Roommate
Nor would Roommate be the developer of discriminatory content if it provided a free-text search that enabled
users to find keywords in the “Additional Comments” of others, even if users utilized it to search for
discriminatory keywords. Providing neutral tools for navigating websites is fully protected by CDA immunity,
absent substantial affirmative conduct on the part of the website creator promoting the use of such tools for
unlawful purposes.
38 It’s true that, under a pedantic interpretation of the term “develop,” any action by the website—including the
mere act of making a text box available to write in—could be seen as “develop[ing]” content. However, we have
already rejected such a broad reading of the term “develop” because it would defeat the purpose of section 230.
37
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immune and there is no reason to believe that future courts will have any difficulty
applying this principle.39 The message to website operators is clear: If you don’t encourage
illegal content, or design your website to require users to input illegal content, you will be
immune.
We believe that this distinction is consistent with the intent of Congress to preserve the
free-flowing nature of Internet speech and commerce without unduly prejudicing the
enforcement of other important state and federal laws. When Congress passed section 230
it didn’t intend to prevent the enforcement of all laws online; rather, it sought to encourage
interactive computer services that provide users neutral tools to post content online to
police that content without fear that through their “good samaritan ... screening of offensive
material,” they would become liable for every single message posted by third parties on
their website.
***
In light of our determination that the CDA does not provide immunity to Roommate for all
of the content of its website and email newsletters, we remand for the district court to
determine in the first instance whether the alleged actions for which Roommate is not
immune violate the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c).40 We vacate the dismissal of the
state law claims so that the district court may reconsider whether to exercise its
supplemental jurisdiction in light of our ruling on the federal claims. We deny Roommate’s
cross-appeal of the denial of attorneys’ fees and costs; Councils prevail on some of their
arguments before us so their case is perforce not frivolous.
REVERSED in part, VACATED in part, AFFIRMED in part and REMANDED. NO COSTS.
McKEOWN, Circuit Judge, with whom RYMER and BEA, Circuit Judges, join, concurring
in part and dissenting in part:
The ubiquity of the Internet is undisputed. With more than 1.3 billion Internet users and
over 158 million websites in existence, a vast number of them interactive like Google,
Yahoo!, Craigslist, MySpace, YouTube, and Facebook, the question of webhost liability is a
significant one. On a daily basis, we rely on the tools of cyberspace to help us make,
The dissent also accuses us of creating uncertainty that will chill the continued growth of commerce on the
Internet. Even looking beyond the fact that the Internet has outgrown its swaddling clothes and no longer needs
to be so gently coddled, some degree of uncertainty is inevitable at the edge of any rule of law. Any immunity
provision, including section 230, has its limits and there will always be close cases. Our opinion extensively
clarifies where that edge lies, and gives far more guidance than our previous cases. While the dissent disagrees
about the scope of the immunity, there can be little doubt that website operators today know more about how to
conform their conduct to the law than they did yesterday.
However, a larger point remains about the scope of immunity provisions. It’s no surprise that
defendants want to extend immunity as broadly as possible. We have long dealt with immunity in different, and
arguably far more important, contexts—such as qualified immunity for police officers in the line of duty—and
observed many defendants argue that the risk of getting a close case wrong is a justification for broader
immunity. Accepting such an argument would inevitably lead to an endless broadening of immunity, as every
new holding creates its own borderline cases.
40 We do not address Roommate’s claim that its activities are protected by the First Amendment. The district
court based its decision entirely on the CDA and we refrain from deciding an issue that the district court has not
had the opportunity to evaluate.
39
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maintain, and rekindle friendships; find places to live, work, eat, and travel; exchange
views on topics ranging from terrorism to patriotism; and enlighten ourselves on subjects
from “aardvarks to Zoroastrianism.”
The majority’s unprecedented expansion of liability for Internet service providers threatens
to chill the robust development of the Internet that Congress envisioned. The majority
condemns Roommate’s “search system,” a function that is the heart of interactive service
providers. My concern is not an empty Chicken Little “sky is falling” alert. By exposing
every interactive service provider to liability for sorting, searching, and utilizing the all too
familiar drop-down menus, the majority has dramatically altered the landscape of Internet
liability. Instead of the “robust” immunity envisioned by Congress, interactive service
providers are left scratching their heads and wondering where immunity ends and liability
begins.
To promote the unfettered development of the Internet, Congress adopted the
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (“CDA”), which provides that interactive computer
service providers will not be held legally responsible for publishing information provided by
third parties. Even though traditional publishers retain liability for performing essentially
equivalent acts in the “non-virtual world,” Congress chose to treat interactive service
providers differently by immunizing them from liability stemming from sorting, searching,
and publishing third-party information. As we explained in Batzel v. Smith:
[Section] 230(c)(1)[ ] overrides the traditional treatment of publishers,
distributors, and speakers under statutory and common law. As a matter of
policy, “Congress decided not to treat providers of interactive computer
services like other information providers such as newspapers, magazines or
television and radio stations....” Congress ... has chosen to treat cyberspace
differently.
Now, with the stroke of a pen or, more accurately, a few strokes of the keyboard, the
majority upends the settled view that interactive service providers enjoy broad immunity
when publishing information provided by third parties. Instead, interactive service
providers are now joined at the hip with third-party users, and they rise and fall together in
liability for Internet sortings and postings.
To be sure, the statute, which was adopted just as the Internet was beginning a surge of
popular currency, is not a perfect match against today’s technology. The Web 2.0 version is
a far cry from web technology in the mid-1990s. Nonetheless, the basic message from
Congress has retained its traction, and there should be a high bar to liability for organizing
and searching third-party information. The bipartisan view in Congress was that the
Internet, as a new form of communication, should not be impeded by the transference of
regulations and principles developed from traditional modes of communication. The
majority repeatedly harps that if something is prohibited in the physical world, Congress
could not have intended it to be legal in cyberspace. Yet that is precisely the path Congress
took with the CDA: the anomaly that a webhost may be immunized for conducting activities
in cyberspace that would traditionally be cause for liability is exactly what Congress
intended by enacting the CDA.
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In the end, the majority offers interactive computer service providers no bright lines and
little comfort in finding a home within § 230(c)(1). The result in this case is driven by the
distaste for housing discrimination, a laudable endgame were housing the real focus of this
appeal. But it is not. I share the majority’s view that housing discrimination is a troubling
issue. Nevertheless, we should be looking at the housing issue through the lens of the
Internet, not from the perspective of traditional publisher liability. Whether § 230(c)(1)
trumps the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) is a policy decision for Congress, not us. Congress has
spoken: third-party content on the Internet should not be burdened with the traditional
legal framework.
I respectfully part company with the majority as to Part 2 of the opinion because the
majority has misconstrued the statutory protection under the CDA for Roommate’s
publishing and sorting of user profiles. The plain language and structure of the CDA
unambiguously demonstrate that Congress intended these activities—the collection,
organizing, analyzing, searching, and transmitting of third-party content—to be beyond the
scope of traditional publisher liability. The majority’s decision, which sets us apart from
five circuits, contravenes congressional intent and violates the spirit and serendipity of the
Internet.
Specifically, the majority’s analysis is flawed for three reasons: (1) the opinion conflates the
questions of liability under the FHA and immunity under the CDA; (2) the majority
rewrites the statute with its definition of “information content provider,” labels the search
function “information development,” and strips interactive service providers of immunity;
and (3) the majority’s approach undermines the purpose of § 230(c)(1) and has far-reaching
practical consequences in the Internet world.
To begin, it is important to recognize what this appeal is not about. At this stage, there has
been no determination of liability under the FHA, nor has there been any determination
that the questions, answers or even the existence of Roommate’s website violate the FHA.
The FHA is a complicated statute and there may well be room for potential roommates to
select who they want to live with, e.g., a tidy accountant wanting a tidy professional
roommate, a collegiate male requesting a male roommate, an observant Jew needing a
house with a kosher kitchen, or a devout, single, religious female preferring not to have a
male housemate. It also bears noting that even if Roommate is immune under the CDA, the
issue of user liability for allegedly discriminatory preferences is a separate question.
By offering up inflammatory examples, the majority’s opinion screams “discrimination.”
The hazard is, of course, that the question of discrimination has not yet been litigated. In
dissenting, I do not condone housing discrimination or endorse unlawful discriminatory
roommate selection practices; I simply underscore that the merits of the FHA claim are not
before us. However, one would not divine this posture from the majority’s opinion, which is
infused with condemnation of Roommate’s users’ practices. To mix and match, as does the
majority, the alleged unlawfulness of the information with the question of webhost
immunity is to rewrite the statute….
The entire opinion links Roommate’s ostensibly reprehensible conduct (and that of its
users) with an unprecedented interpretation of the CDA’s immunity provision. The majority
condemns Roommate for soliciting illegal content, but there has been no determination that
Roommate’s questions or standardized answers are illegal. Instead of foreshadowing a
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ruling on the FHA, the opinion should be confined to the issue before us—application of §
230(c)(1) to Roommate. The district court has not yet ruled on the merits of the FHA claim
and neither should we.
The Statute
With this background in mind, I first turn to the text of the statute. Section 230 begins with
a detailed recitation of findings and policy reasons for the statute. Congress expressly found
that the “Internet and other interactive computer services offer a forum for a true diversity
of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues
for intellectual activity,” and that “[i]ncreasingly Americans are relying on interactive
media for a variety of political, educational, cultural, and entertainment services.” Congress
declared that “[i]t is the policy of the United States to ... promote the continued
development of the Internet and other interactive computer services and other interactive
media.”
Unlike some statutes, subsections (a) and (b) set out in clear terms the congressional
findings and policies underlying the statute. For this reason, it strikes me as odd that the
majority begins, not with the statute and these express findings, but with legislative
history. Granted, Congress was prompted by several cases, particularly the Prodigy case, to
take action to protect interactive service providers. But that case does not cabin the scope of
the statute, and the background leading up to enactment of the CDA is no substitute for the
language of the statute itself.
Section 230(c), the heart of this case, is entitled “Protection for ‘good samaritan’ blocking
and screening of offensive material[.]” The substantive language of the statute itself is not
so limited….
Since it was first addressed in 1997 in Zeran, this section has been interpreted by the
courts as providing webhost “immunity,” although to be more precise, it provides a safe
haven for interactive computer service providers by removing them from the traditional
liabilities attached to speakers and publishers.
We have characterized this immunity under § 230(c)(1) as “quite robust.” Five of our sister
circuits have similarly embraced this robust view of immunity by providing differential
treatment to interactive service providers….
Courts deciding the question of § 230(c)(1) immunity “do not write on a blank slate.” Even
though rapid developments in technology have made webhosts increasingly adept at
searching and displaying third-party information, reviewing courts have, in the twelve
years since the CDA’s enactment, “adopt[ed] a relatively expansive definition of ‘interactive
computer service’ and a relatively restrictive definition of ‘information content provider.’”
As long as information is provided by a third party, webhosts are immune from liability for
publishing “ads for housing, auctions of paintings that may have been stolen by Nazis,
biting comments about steroids in baseball, efforts to verify the truth of politicians’
promises, and everything else that third parties may post on a web site.” We have
underscored that this broad grant of webhost immunity gives effect to Congress’s stated
goals “to promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer
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services” and “to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for
the Internet and other interactive computer services.”
Application of § 230(c)(1) to Roommate’s Website
Because our focus is on the term “information content provider,” and what it means to
create or develop information, it is worth detailing exactly how the website operates, what
information is at issue and who provides it. The roommate matching process involves three
categories of data: About Me or Household Description; Roommate Preferences; and
Comments.
To become a member of Roommates.com, a user must complete a personal profile by
selecting answers from drop-down menus or checking off boxes on the screen. The profile
includes “location” information (e.g., city and state, region of the city, and data about the
surrounding neighborhood); details about the residence (e.g., the total number of bedrooms
and bathrooms in the home, and amenities such as air conditioning, wheelchair access,
high-speed Internet, or parking), and the “rental details” (e.g., monthly rent charged, lease
period, and availability). The last section of the profile is the “Household Description”
section, which includes the total number of occupants in the home, their age range, gender,
occupation, level of cleanliness, whether they are smokers, and whether children or pets are
present.
The remaining sections of the registration process are completely optional; a user who skips
them has created a profile based on the information already provided. At his option, the
user may select an emoticon to describe the “household character,” and may upload images
of the room or residence. Next, users may, at their option, specify characteristics desired in
a potential roommate, such as a preferred age range, gender, and level of cleanliness. If
nothing is selected, all options are included. The final step in the registration process,
which is also optional, is the “Comments” section, in which users are presented with a
blank text box in which they may write whatever they like, to be published with their
member profiles.
Users may choose an optional “custom search” of user profiles based on criteria that they
specify, like the amount of monthly rent or distance from a preferred city. Based on the
information provided by users during the registration process, Roommate’s automated
system then searches and matches potential roommates. Roommate’s Terms of Service
provide in part, “You understand that we do not provide the information on the site and
that all publicly posted or privately transmitted information, data, text, photographs,
graphics, messages, or other materials (‘Content’) are the sole responsibility of the person
from which such Content originated.”
Roommate’s users are “information content providers” because they are responsible for
creating the information in their user profiles and, at their option—not the website’s
choice—in expressing preferences as to roommate characteristics. The critical question is
whether Roommate is itself an “information content provider,” such that it cannot claim
that the information at issue was “provided by another information content provider.” A
close reading of the statute leads to the conclusion that Roommate is not an information
content provider for two reasons: (1) providing a drop-down menu does not constitute
“creating” or “developing” information; and (2) the structure and text of the statute make
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plain that Congress intended to immunize Roommate’s sorting, displaying, and
transmitting of third-party information.
Roommate neither “creates” nor “develops” the information that is challenged by the
Councils, i.e., the information provided by the users as to their protected characteristics
and the preferences expressed as to roommate characteristics. All Roommate does is to
provide a form with options for standardized answers. Listing categories such as geographic
location, cleanliness, gender and number of occupants, and transmitting to users profiles of
other users whose expressed information matches their expressed preferences, can hardly
be said to be creating or developing information. Even adding standardized options does not
“develop” information. Roommate, with its prompts, is merely “selecting material for
publication,” which we have stated does not constitute the “development” of information.
The profile is created solely by the user, not the provider of the interactive website. Indeed,
without user participation, there is no information at all. The drop-down menu is simply a
precategorization of user information before the electronic sorting and displaying that takes
place via an algorithm. If a user has identified herself as a non-smoker and another has
expressed a preference for a non-smoking roommate, Roommate’s sorting and matching of
user information are no different than that performed by a generic search engine.
Displaying the prompt “Gender” and offering the list of choices, “Straight male; Gay male;
Straight female; Gay female” does not develop the information, “I am a Gay male.” The user
has identified himself as such and provided that information to Roommate to publish. Thus,
the user is the sole creator of that information; no “development” has occurred. In the same
vein, presenting the user with a “Preferences” section and drop-down menus of options does
not “develop” a user’s preference for a non-smoking roommate. As we stated in Carafano,
the “actual profile ‘information’ consist[s] of the particular options chosen” by the user, such
that Roommate is not “responsible, even in part, for associating certain multiple choice
responses with a set of [ ] characteristics.”
The thrust of the majority’s proclamation that Roommate is “developing” the information
that it publishes, sorts, and transmits is as follows: “[W]e interpret the term ‘development’
as referring not merely to augmenting the content generally, but to materially contributing
to its unlawfulness.” This definition is original to say the least and springs forth untethered
to anything in the statute.
The majority’s definition of “development” epitomizes its consistent collapse of substantive
liability with the issue of immunity. Where in the statute does Congress say anything about
unlawfulness? Whether Roommate is entitled to immunity for publishing and sorting
profiles is wholly distinct from whether Roommate may be liable for violations of the FHA.
Immunity has meaning only when there is something to be immune from, whether a
disease or the violation of a law. It would be nonsense to claim to be immune only from the
innocuous. But the majority’s immunity analysis is built on substantive liability: to the
majority, CDA immunity depends on whether a webhost materially contributed to the
unlawfulness of the information. Whether the information at issue is unlawful and whether
the webhost has contributed to its unlawfulness are issues analytically independent of the
determination of immunity. Grasping at straws to distinguish Roommate from other
interactive websites such as Google and Yahoo!, the majority repeatedly gestures to
Roommate’s potential substantive liability as sufficient reason to disturb its immunity. But
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our task is to determine whether the question of substantive liability may be reached in the
first place.
Keep in mind that “unlawfulness” would include not only purported statutory violations but
also potential defamatory statements. The irony is that the majority would have us
determine “guilt” or liability in order to decide whether immunity is available. This upsidedown approach would knock out even the narrowest immunity offered under § 230(c)—
immunity for defamation as a publisher or speaker.
Another flaw in the majority’s approach is that it fails to account for all of the other
information allegedly developed by the webhost. For purposes of determining whether
Roommate is an information content provider vis-a-vis the profiles, the inquiry about
geography and the inquiry about gender should stand on the same footing. Both are single
word prompts followed by a drop-down menu of options. If a prompt about gender
constitutes development, then so too does the prompt about geography. And therein lies the
rub.
Millions of websites use prompts and drop-down menus. Inquiries range from what credit
card you want to use and consumer satisfaction surveys asking about age, sex and
household income, to dating sites, e.g., match.com, sites lambasting corporate practices,
e.g., ripoffreports.com, and sites that allow truckers to link up with available loads, e.g.,
getloaded.com. Some of these sites are innocuous while others may not be. Some may solicit
illegal information; others may not. But that is not the point. The majority’s definition of
“development” would transform every interactive site into an information content provider
and the result would render illusory any immunity under § 230(c). Virtually every site
could be responsible in part for developing content.
For example, the majority purports to carve out a place for Google and other search
engines. But the modern Google is more than a match engine: it ranks search results,
provides prompts beyond what the user enters, and answers questions. In contrast,
Roommate is a straight match service that searches information and criteria provided by
the user, not Roommate. It should be afforded no less protection than Google, Yahoo!, or
other search engines.
The majority then argues that “providing neutral tools to carry out what may be unlawful
or illicit searches does not amount to ‘development.’” But this effort to distinguish Google,
Yahoo!, and other search engines from Roommate is unavailing. Under the majority’s
definition of “development,” these search engines are equivalent to Roommate. Google
“encourages” or “contributes” (the majority’s catch phrases) to the unlawfulness by offering
search tools that allow the user to perform an allegedly unlawful match. If a user types into
Google’s search box, “looking for a single, Christian, female roommate,” and Google displays
responsive listings, Google is surely “materially contributing to the alleged unlawfulness” of
information created by third parties, by publishing their intention to discriminate on the
basis of protected characteristics. In the defamation arena, a webhost’s publication of a
defamatory statement “materially contributes” to its unlawfulness, as publication to third
parties is an element of the offense. At bottom, the majority’s definition of “development”
can be tucked in, let out, or hemmed up to fit almost any search engine, creating
tremendous uncertainty in an area where Congress expected predictability.
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“Development” is not without meaning. In Batzel, we hinted that the “development of
information” that transforms one into an “information content provider” is “something more
substantial than merely editing portions of an email and selecting material for publication.”
We did not flesh out further the meaning of “development” because the editor’s alterations
of an email message and decision to publish it did not constitute “development.”
Because the statute does not define “development,” we should give the term its ordinary
meaning. “Development” is defined in Webster’s Dictionary as a “gradual advance or growth
through progressive changes.” The multiple uses of “development” and “develop” in other
provisions of § 230 give texture to the definition of “development,” and further expose the
folly of the majority’s ungrounded definition. Defining “development” in this way keeps
intact the settled rule that the CDA immunizes a webhost who exercises a publisher’s
“traditional editorial functions—such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone,
or alter content.”11
Applying the plain meaning of “development” to Roommate’s sorting and transmitting of
third-party information demonstrates that it was not transformed into an “information
content provider.” In searching, sorting, and transmitting information, Roommate made no
changes to the information provided to it by users. Even having notice that users may be
using its site to make discriminatory statements is not sufficient to invade Roommate’s
immunity.
The majority blusters that Roommate develops information, because it “requir[es]
subscribers to provide the information as a condition of accessing its services,” and
“designed its search system so it would steer users based on the preferences and personal
characteristics that Roommate itself forces subscribers to disclose.” But the majority,
without looking back, races past the plain language of the statute. That Roommate requires
users to answer a set of prompts to identify characteristics about themselves does not
change the fact that the users have furnished this information to Roommate for Roommate
to publish in their profiles. Nor do Roommate’s prompts alter the fact that users have
chosen to select characteristics that they find desirable in potential roommates, and have
directed Roommate to search and compile results responsive to their requests. Moreover,
tagging Roommate with liability for the design of its search system is dangerous precedent
for analyzing future Internet cases.

The majority’s notion of using a different definition of “development” digs the majority into a deeper hole. For
example, adopting the Wikipedia definition of “content development”—”the process of researching, writing,
gathering, organizing and editing information for publication on web sites”—would run us smack into the
sphere of Congressionally conferred immunity. Both our circuit and others have steadfastly maintained that
activities such as organizing or editing information are traditional editorial functions that fall within the scope
of CDA immunity. Likewise, an alternative definition of “development” from Webster’s such as “a making usable
or available” sweeps too broadly, as “making usable or available” is precisely what Google and Craigslist do. In
an effort to cabin the reach of the opinion, the majority again goes back to whether the content is legal, i.e., a
dating website that requires sex, race, religion, or marital status is legal because it is legal to discriminate in
dating. Of course this approach ignores whether the claim may be one in tort, such as defamation, rather than a
statutory discrimination claim. And, this circularity also circumvents the plain language of the statute.
Interestingly, the majority has no problem offering up potentially suitable definitions of “development” by
turning to dictionaries, but it fails to explain why, and from where, it plucked its definition of “development” as
“materially contributing to [the] alleged unlawfulness” of content.

11
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Even if Roommate’s prompts and drop-down menus could be construed to seek out, or
encourage, information from users, the CDA does not withhold immunity for the
encouragement or solicitation of information. The CDA does not countenance an exception
for the solicitation or encouragement of information provided by users.
A number of district courts have recently encountered the claim that an interactive
website’s solicitation of information, by requiring user selection of content from drop-down
menus, transformed it into an information content provider. Unsurprisingly, these courts
reached the same commonsense solution that I reach here: § 230(c)(1) immunizes the
interactive service provider. Simply supplying a list of options from which a user must
select options “is minor and passive participation” that does not defeat CDA immunity.
Carafano presented circumstances virtually indistinguishable from those before us, yet the
majority comes to the exact opposite conclusion here in denying immunity for sorting and
matching third-party information provided in response to webhost prompts. The website in
Carafano, an online dating service named Matchmaker.com, asked its users sixty-two
detailed questions and matched users according to their responses. We held that § 230(c)(1)
immunized the dating service, and flatly rejected the proposition that matching, sorting,
and publishing user information in response to webhost prompts abrogated CDA immunity.
A provider’s “decision to structure the information provided by users,” which enables the
provider to “offer additional features, such as ‘matching’ profiles with similar
characteristics or highly structured searches based on combinations of multiple choice
questions,” ultimately “promotes the expressed Congressional policy ‘to promote the
continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer services.’” Now the
majority narrows Carafano on the basis that Matchmaker did not prompt the allegedly
libelous information that was provided by a third party. But the majority makes this
distinction without any language in the statute supporting the consideration of the
webhost’s prompting or solicitation.
The structure of the statute also supports my view that Congress intended to immunize
Roommate’s sorting and publishing of user profiles. An “interactive computer service” is
defined to include an “access software provider.” The statute defines an “access software
provider” as one that provides “enabling tools” to “filter,” “screen,” “pick,” “choose,”
“analyze,” “digest,” “search,” “forward,” “organize,” and “reorganize” content.
By providing a definition for “access software provider” that is distinct from the definition of
an “information content provider,” and withholding immunity for “information content
providers,” the statute makes resoundingly clear that packaging, sorting, or publishing
third-party information are not the kind of activities that Congress associated with
“information content providers.” Yet these activities describe exactly what Roommate does
through the publication and distribution of user profiles: Roommate “receives,” “filters,”
“digests,” and “analyzes” the information provided by users in response to its registration
prompts, and then “transmits,” “organizes,” and “forwards” that information to users in the
form of uniformly organized profiles. Roommate is performing tasks that Congress
recognized as typical of entities that it intended to immunize.
Finally, consider the logical disconnect of the majority’s opinion. The majority writes—and I
agree—that the open-ended Comments section contains only third-party content. But if
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Roommate’s search function permits sorting by key words such as children or gender, the
majority would label Roommate’s use of such criteria as a “discriminatory filtering process.”
At a minimum, the CDA protects the search criteria employed by websites and does not
equate tools that “filter,” “screen,” “pick,” “choose,” “analyze,” “digest,” “search,” “forward,”
“organize,” and “reorganize” with the “creation or development” of information.
Ramifications of the Majority Opinion
I am troubled by the consequences that the majority’s conclusion poses for the everexpanding Internet community. The unwise narrowing of our precedent, coupled with the
mixing and matching of CDA immunity with substantive liability, make it exceedingly
difficult for website providers to know whether their activities will be considered immune
under the CDA. We got it right in Carafano, that “[u]nder § 230(c) ... so long as a third
party willingly provides the essential published content, the interactive service provider
receives full immunity regardless of the specific editing or selection process.”
Significantly, § 230(e) expressly exempts from its scope certain areas of law, such as
intellectual property law and federal criminal laws. Thus, for example, a webhost may still
be liable as a publisher or speaker of third-party information that is alleged to infringe a
copyright. Notably, the CDA does not exempt the FHA and a host of other federal statutes
from its scope. The FHA existed at the time of the CDA’s enactment, yet Congress did not
add it to the list of specifically enumerated laws for which publisher and speaker liability
was left intact. The absence of a statutory exemption suggests that Congress did not intend
to provide special case status to the FHA in connection with immunity under the CDA.
Anticipating the morphing of the Internet and the limits of creative genius and
entrepreneurship that fuel its development is virtually impossible. However, Congress
explicitly drafted the law to permit this unfettered development of the Internet. Had
Congress discovered that, over time, courts across the country have created more expansive
immunity than it originally envisioned under the CDA, Congress could have amended the
law. But it has not. In fact, just six years ago, Congress approved of the broad immunity
that courts have uniformly accorded interactive webhosts under § 230(c).
In 2002, Congress passed the “Dot Kids Implementation and Efficiency Act,” which
established a new “kids.us” domain for material that is safe for children. Congress stated
that the statutory protections of § 230(c) were extended to certain entities that operated
within the new domain. The Committee Report that accompanied the statute declared:
The Committee notes that ISPs have successfully defended many lawsuits
using section 230(c). The courts have correctly interpreted section 230(c),
which was aimed at protecting against liability for such claims as negligence
(See, e.g., Doe v. America Online, 783 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 2001)) and defamation
(Ben Ezra, Weinstein, and Co. v. America Online, 206 F.3d 980 (2000); Zeran
v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327 (1997)). The Committee intends these
interpretations of section 230(c) to be equally applicable to those entities
covered by H.R. 3833.
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H.R. REP. No. 107-449 (emphasis added). These statements “reflect the Committee’s intent
that the existing statutory construction,” i.e., broad immunity for interactive webhosts, “be
maintained in a new legislative context.” This express Congressional approval of the courts’
interpretation of § 230(c)(1), six years after its enactment, advises us to stay the course of
“robust” webhost immunity.
The consequences of the majority’s interpretation are far-reaching. Its position will chill
speech on the Internet and impede “the continued development of the Internet and other
interactive computer services and other interactive media.” To the extent the majority
strips immunity because of sorting, channeling, and categorizing functions, it guts the
heart of § 230(c)(1) immunity. Countless websites operate just like Roommate: they
organize information provided by their users into a standardized format, and provide
structured searches to help users find information. These sites, and their attendant display,
search, and inquiry tools, are an indispensable part of the Internet tool box. Putting a lid on
the sorting and searching functions of interactive websites stifles the core of their services.
To the extent the majority strips immunity because the information or query may be illegal
under some statute or federal law, this circumstance puts the webhost in the role of a
policeman for the laws of the fifty states and the federal system. There are not enough Net
Nannies in cyberspace to implement this restriction, and the burden of filtering content
would be unfathomable.
To the extent the majority strips immunity because a site solicits or actively encourages
content, the result is a direct restriction on the free exchange of ideas and information on
the Internet. As noted in the amici curiae brief of the news organizations, online news
organization routinely solicit third-party information. Were the websites to face host
liability for this content, they “would have no choice but to severely limit its use” and
“[s]heer economics would dictate that vast quantities of valuable information be eliminated
from websites.”
To the extent the majority strips immunity because a website “materially contributed” to
the content or output of a website by “specialization” of content, this approach would
essentially swallow the immunity provision. The combination of solicitation, sorting, and
potential for liability would put virtually every interactive website in this category. Having
a website directed to Christians, Muslims, gays, disabled veterans, or childless couples
could land the website provider in hot water.14
Because the statute itself is cumbersome to interpret in light of today’s Internet
architecture, and because the decision today will ripple through the billions of web pages
already online, and the countless pages to come in the future, I would take a cautious,
careful, and precise approach to the restriction of immunity, not the broad swath cut by the
majority. I respectfully dissent and would affirm the district court’s judgment that
Roommate is entitled to immunity under § 230(c)(1) of the CDA, subject to examination of
whether the bare inquiry itself is unlawful.

14 It is no surprise that there are countless specialized roommate sites. See, e.g.,
http://islam.tc/housing/index.php, http://christian-roommates.com, and http://prideroommates.com.
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NOTES AND QUESTIONS
Compare the operation and coverage of 47 USC 230 and 17 USC 512:

47 USC §230

17 USC §512(c)

Who

ICS provider/user

Online service provider

Claims covered

Everything but [federal]
IP, federal crimes,
ECPA

Copyright

Duty upon notice None

Expeditious take down

Effect of
Scienter

None

No safe harbor

Prerequisites

None

Registration + other
formalities

Denouement. In 2012, nine years after the case started, the Ninth Circuit (in Judge
Kozinski’s third opinion about the case) ruled that Roommates.com hadn’t violated the Fair
Housing Act because the law didn’t apply to shared dwellings. Fair Housing Council of San
Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC, 666 F.3d 1216 (9th Cir. 2012). So even though
Roommates.com lost some of the Section 230 battle, it won the war.
Did Judge Kozinski fall into the trap predicted by Judge McKeown? Recall Judge
Kozinski’s pronouncement:
If you don’t encourage illegal content, or design your website to require users
to input illegal content, you will be immune.
The Ninth Circuit partially denied Roommates.com the Section 230 immunity presumably
because it violated this standard; but as Judge Kozinski himself ultimately concluded,
Roommates.com neither encouraged illegal content nor designed its website to require
users to input illegal content. So it seems like Roommates.com should have qualified for
the immunity all along. Note that if we have to adjudicate the defendant’s substantive
liability to determine if the immunity applies, and it only applies if there’s no substantive
immunity, the immunity is effectively worthless.
Section 230 can make a difference by expediting the dismissal of immunized cases, e.g.,
enabling cases to be terminated on a motion to dismiss rather than getting to summary
judgment or trial. In fact, many Section 230 cases end on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
The Roommates.com case was a good candidate for early dismissal, because the litigants
spent a lot of time and money litigating over nine years and two trips to the Ninth Circuit
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(which produced three Ninth Circuit opinions)—only to conclude that Roommates.com was
in the clear all along. Judge Kozinski himself hints at the virtue of early dismissal of
immunized cases when he frets about “death by ten thousand duck-bites.” Did he let
Roommates.com get duck-bitten here?
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IX.

Privacy

In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2003).
Lynch, Circuit Judge.
This case raises important questions about the scope of privacy protection afforded internet
users under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511,
2520.
In sum, pharmaceutical companies invited users to visit their websites to learn about their
drugs and to obtain rebates. An enterprising company, Pharmatrak, sold a service, called
“NETcompare,” to these pharmaceutical companies. That service accessed information
about the internet users and collected certain information meant to permit the
pharmaceutical companies to do intra-industry comparisons of website traffic and usage.
Most of the pharmaceutical companies were emphatic that they did not want personal or
identifying data about their web site users to be collected. In connection with their
contracting to use NETcompare, they sought and received assurances from Pharmatrak
that such data collection would not occur. As it turned out, some such personal and
identifying data was found, using easily customized search programs, on Pharmatrak’s
computers. Plaintiffs, on behalf of the purported class of internet users whose data
Pharmatrak collected, sued both Pharmatrak and the pharmaceutical companies asserting,
inter alia, that they intercepted electronic communications without consent, in violation of
the ECPA.
The district court entered summary judgment for defendants on the basis that
Pharmatrak’s activities fell within an exception to the statute where one party consents to
an interception. The court found the client pharmaceutical companies had consented by
contracting with Pharmatrak and so this protected Pharmatrak. The plaintiffs dismissed
all ECPA claims as to the pharmaceutical companies. This appeal concerns only the claim
that Pharmatrak violated Title I of the ECPA.
We hold that the district court incorrectly interpreted the “consent” exception to the ECPA;
we also hold that Pharmatrak “intercepted” the communication under the statute. We
reverse and remand for further proceedings. This does not mean that plaintiffs’ case will
prevail: there remain issues which should be addressed on remand, particularly as to
whether defendant’s conduct was intentional within the meaning of the ECPA.
I.
Pharmatrak provided its NETcompare service to pharmaceutical companies including
American Home Products, Pharmacia, SmithKline Beecham, Pfizer, and Novartis from
approximately June 1998 to November 2000. The pharmaceutical clients terminated their
contracts with Pharmatrak shortly after this lawsuit was filed in August 2000. As a result,
Pharmatrak was forced to cease its operations by December 1, 2000.
NETcompare was marketed as a tool that would allow a company to compare traffic on and
usage of different parts of its website with the same information from its competitors’
websites. The key advantage of NETcompare over off-the-shelf software was its capacity to
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allow each client to compare its performance with that of other clients from the same
industry.
NETcompare was designed to record the webpages a user viewed at clients’ websites; how
long the user spent on each webpage; the visitor’s path through the site (including her
points of entry and exit); the visitor’s IP address; and, for later versions, the webpage the
user viewed immediately before arriving at the client’s site (i.e., the “referrer URL”). This
information-gathering was not visible to users of the pharmaceutical clients’ websites.
According to Wes Sonnenreich, former Chief Technology Officer of Pharmatrak, and
Timothy W. Macinta, former Managing Director for Technology of Pharmatrak,
NETcompare was not designed to collect any personal information whatsoever.
NETcompare operated as follows. A pharmaceutical client installed NETcompare by adding
five to ten lines of HTML code to each webpage it wished to track and configuring the pages
to interface with Pharmatrak’s technology. When a user visited the website of a
Pharmatrak client, Pharmatrak’s HTML code instructed the user’s computer to contact
Pharmatrak’s web server and retrieve from it a tiny, invisible graphic image known as a
“clear GIF” (or a “web bug”). The purpose of the clear GIF was to cause the user’s computer
to communicate directly with Pharmatrak’s web server. When the user’s computer
requested the clear GIF, Pharmatrak’s web servers responded by either placing or accessing
a “persistent cookie” on the user’s computer. On a user’s first visit to a webpage monitored
by NETcompare, Pharmatrak’s servers would plant a cookie on the user’s computer. If the
user had already visited a NETcompare webpage, then Pharmatrak’s servers would access
the information on the existing cookie.
A cookie is a piece of information sent by a web server to a web browser that the browser
software is expected to save and to send back whenever the browser makes additional
requests of the server (such as when the user visits additional webpages at the same or
related sites). A persistent cookie is one that does not expire at the end of an online session.
Cookies are widely used on the internet by reputable websites to promote convenience and
customization. Cookies often store user preferences, login and registration information, or
information related to an online “shopping cart.” Cookies may also contain unique
identifiers that allow a website to differentiate among users.
Each Pharmatrak cookie contained a unique alphanumeric identifier that allowed
Pharmatrak to track a user as she navigated through a client’s site and to identify a repeat
user each time she visited clients’ sites. If a person visited www.pfizer.com in June 2000
and www.pharmacia.com in July 2000, for example, then the persistent cookie on her
computer would indicate to Pharmatrak that the same computer had been used to visit both
sites.5 As NETcompare tracked a user through a website, it used JavaScript and a
JavaApplet to record information such as the URLs the user visited. This data was recorded
on the access logs of Pharmatrak’s web servers.

5

Pharmatrak’s cookies expired after ninety days.
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[Editor’s note: consider if the following diagram helps you visualize the interactions:]

HTML code

Customers

Pharmatrak

Data
HTML/
Content

First
Access

Clear GIF
Cookie
Javascript

Data

Web users
Pharmatrak sent monthly reports to its clients juxtaposing the data collected by
NETcompare about all pharmaceutical clients. These reports covered topics such as the
most heavily used parts of a particular site; which site was receiving the most hits in
particular areas such as investor or media relations; and the most important links to a site.
The monthly reports did not contain any personally identifiable information about users.
The only information provided by Pharmatrak to clients about their users and traffic was
contained in the reports (and executive summaries thereof). Slides from a Pharmatrak
marketing presentation did say the company would break data out into categories and
provide “user profiles.” In practice, the aggregate demographic information in the reports
was limited to the percentages of users from different countries; the percentages of users
with different domain extensions (i.e., the percentages of users originating from for-profit,
government, academic, or other not-for-profit organizations); and the percentages of firsttime versus repeat users. An example of a NETcompare “user profile” is: “The average
Novartis visitor is a first-time visitor from the U.S., visiting from a .com domain.”
While it was marketing NETcompare to prospective pharmaceutical clients, Pharmatrak
repeatedly told them that NETcompare did not collect personally identifiable information.
It said its technology could not collect personal information, and specifically provided that
the information it gathered could not be used to identify particular users by name. In their
affidavits and depositions, executives of Pharmatrak clients consistently said that they
believed NETcompare did not collect personal information, and that they did not learn
otherwise until the onset of litigation. Some, if not all, pharmaceutical clients explicitly
conditioned their purchase of NETcompare on Pharmatrak’s guarantees that it would not
collect users’ personal information. For example, Pharmacia’s April 2000 contract with
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Pharmatrak provided that NETcompare would not collect personally identifiable
information from users. Michael Sonnenreich, Chief Executive Officer of Pharmatrak,
stated unequivocally at his deposition that none of his company’s clients consented to the
collection of personally identifiable information.
Pharmatrak nevertheless collected some personal information on a small number of users.
Pharmatrak distributed approximately 18.7 million persistent cookies through
NETcompare. The number of unique cookies provides a rough estimate of the number of
users Pharmatrak monitored.9 Plaintiffs’ expert was able to develop individual profiles for
just 232 users.
The following personal information was found on Pharmatrak servers: names, addresses,
telephone numbers, email addresses, dates of birth, genders, insurance statuses, education
levels, occupations, medical conditions, medications, and reasons for visiting the particular
website. Pharmatrak also occasionally recorded the subject, sender, and date of the webbased email message a user was reading immediately prior to visiting the website of a
Pharmatrak client. Most of the individual profiles assembled by plaintiffs’ expert contain
some but not all of this information.
The personal information in 197 of the 232 user profiles was recorded due to an interaction
between NETcompare and computer code written by one pharmaceutical client, Pharmacia,
for one of its webpages. Starting on or before August 18, 2000 and ending sometime
between December 2, 2000 and February 6, 2001, the client Pharmacia used the “get”
method to transmit information from a rebate form on its Detrol website; the webpage was
subsequently modified to use the “post” method of transmission. This was the source of the
personal information collected by Pharmatrak from users of the Detrol website.
Web servers use two methods to transmit information entered into online forms: the get
method and the post method. The get method is generally used for short forms such as the
“Search” box at Yahoo! and other online search engines. The post method is normally used
for longer forms and forms soliciting private information. When a server uses the get
method, the information entered into the online form becomes appended to the next URL.
For example, if a user enters “respiratory problems” into the query box at a search engine,
and the search engine transmits this information using the get method, then the words
“respiratory” and “problems” will be appended to the query string at the end of the URL of
the webpage showing the search results. By contrast, if a website transmits information via
the post method, then that information does not appear in the URL. Since NETcompare
was designed to record the full URLs of the webpages a user viewed immediately before and
during a visit to a client’s site, Pharmatrak recorded personal information transmitted
using the get method.
There is no evidence Pharmatrak instructed its clients not to use the get method. The
detailed installation instructions Pharmatrak provided to pharmaceutical clients ignore
entirely the issue of the different transmission methods.

Different users might have the same cookie (if, say, family members shared a computer and browser) or one
user might have multiple cookies (if, for example, he used separate work and home computers to visit sites
employing NETcompare, or if he revisited a NETcompare site after his first cookie expired).

9
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In addition to the problem at the Detrol website, there was also another instance in which a
pharmaceutical client used the get method to transmit personal information entered into an
online form. The other personal information on Pharmatrak’s servers was recorded as a
result of software errors. These errors were a bug in a popular email program (reported in
May 2001 and subsequently fixed) and an aberrant web browser.
II.
On June 28, 2001, plaintiffs filed an amended consolidated class action complaint13 against
Pharmatrak; its parent company, Glocal Communications, Ltd.; and five pharmaceutical
companies: American Home Products Corp., Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., Pfizer, Inc., Pharmacia
Corp., and SmithKline Beecham Corp. Plaintiffs alleged nine counts including violation of
Title I of the ECPA, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq.; violation of Title II of the ECPA, 18 U.S.C.
2701 et seq.; violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030; violation of
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, § 99; violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A; invasion of privacy;
trespass to chattels and conversion; and unjust enrichment….
The plaintiffs employed computer scientist C. Matthew Curtin and his company, Interhack,
to analyze Pharmatrak’s servers between December 17, 2001 and January 18, 2002. In
about an hour, Curtin wrote three custom computer programs, including “getneedle.pl,” to
extract and organize personal information on Pharmatrak’s web server access logs, which
he “colloquially termed ‘haystacks.’” Curtin then cross-referenced the information he
extracted with other sources such as internet telephone books….
III….
B. Elements of the ECPA Cause of Action
ECPA amended the Federal Wiretap Act by extending to data and electronic transmissions
the same protection already afforded to oral and wire communications. The paramount
objective of the Wiretap Act is to protect effectively the privacy of communications.
The post-ECPA Wiretap Act provides a private right of action against one who
“intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept
or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication.” The Wiretap Act
defines “intercept” as “the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic,
or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.”
Thus, plaintiffs must show five elements to make their claim under Title I of the ECPA:
that a defendant (1) intentionally (2) intercepted, endeavored to intercept or procured
another person to intercept or endeavor to intercept (3) the contents of (4) an electronic
communication (5) using a device. This showing is subject to certain statutory exceptions,
such as consent.

13 Originally, eight lawsuits were filed in the District of Massachusetts and the Southern District of New York.
The two lawsuits in the District of Massachusetts were filed on August 18, 2000. On April 18, 2001, the Judicial
Panel on Multi-District Litigation issued an order transferring the six New York cases to the District of
Massachusetts. The purported class, which has never been certified, consists of all persons who visited one of
the defendants’ websites “and who, as a result thereof, have had Pharmatrak ‘cookies’ placed upon their
computers and have had information about them gathered by Pharmatrak.”
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In its trial and appellate court briefs, Pharmatrak sought summary judgment on only one
element of § 2511(1)(a), interception, as well as on the statutory consent exception. We
address these issues below. Pharmatrak has not contested whether it used a device or
obtained the contents of an electronic communication. This is appropriate. The ECPA
adopts a “broad, functional” definition of an electronic communication. This definition
includes “any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any
nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectric, or
photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign commerce,” with certain exceptions
unrelated to this case. Transmissions of completed online forms, such as the one at
Pharmacia’s Detrol website, to the pharmaceutical defendants constitute electronic
communications.
The ECPA also says that “‘contents,’ when used with respect to any wire, oral, or electronic
communication, includes any information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of
that communication.” This definition encompasses personally identifiable information such
as a party’s name, date of birth, and medical condition. Finally, it is clear that Pharmatrak
relied on devices such as its web servers to capture information from users.
C. Consent Exception
There is a pertinent statutory exception to § 2511(1)(a) “where one of the parties to the
communication has given prior consent to such interception unless such communication is
intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act....” Plaintiffs, of
course, bear the burden of establishing a violation of the ECPA. Our case law is unclear as
to who has the burden of showing the statutory exception for consent….We think, at least
for the consent exception under the ECPA in civil cases, that it makes more sense to place
the burden of showing consent on the party seeking the benefit of the exception, and so
hold. That party is more likely to have evidence pertinent to the issue of consent. Plaintiffs
do not allege that Pharmatrak acted with a criminal or tortious purpose. Therefore, the
question under the exception is limited to whether the pharmaceutical defendants gave
consent to the interception. Because the district court disposed of the case on the grounds
that Pharmatrak’s conduct fell within the consent exception, we start there.
The district court adopted Pharmatrak’s argument that the only relevant inquiry is
whether the pharmaceutical companies consented to use Pharmatrak’s NETcompare
service, regardless of how the service eventually operated. In doing so, the district court did
not apply this circuit’s general standards for consent under the Wiretap Act and the ECPA
set forth in Griggs-Ryan, 904 F.2d 112. It also misread two district court opinions on which
it purported to rely.
This court addressed the issue of consent under the Wiretap Act in Griggs-Ryan. A party
may consent to the interception of only part of a communication or to the interception of
only a subset of its communications. “Thus, ‘a reviewing court must inquire into the
dimensions of the consent and then ascertain whether the interception exceeded those
boundaries.’” Consent may be explicit or implied, but it must be actual consent rather than
constructive consent. Pharmatrak argues that it had implied consent from the
pharmaceutical companies.
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Consent “should not casually be inferred.” “Without actual notice, consent can only be
implied when the surrounding circumstances convincingly show that the party knew about
and consented to the interception.”
The district court made an error of law, urged on it by Pharmatrak, as to what constitutes
consent. It did not apply the standards of this circuit. Moreover, DoubleClick and Avenue A
do not set up a rule, contrary to the district court’s reading of them, that a consent to
interception can be inferred from the mere purchase of a service, regardless of
circumstances. If these cases did so hold, they would be contrary to the rule of this circuit
established in Griggs-Ryan. DoubleClick and Avenue A, rather, were concerned with
situations in which the defendant companies’ clients purchased their services for the
precise purpose of creating individual user profiles in order to target those users for
particular advertisements. This very purpose was announced by DoubleClick and Avenue A
publicly, as well as being self-evident. These decisions found it would be unreasonable to
infer that the clients had not consented merely because they might not understand
precisely how the user demographics were collected. The facts in our case are the mirror
image of those in DoubleClick and Avenue A: the pharmaceutical clients insisted there be
no collection of personal data and the circumstances permit no reasonable inference that
they did consent.
On the undisputed facts, the client pharmaceutical companies did not give the requisite
consent. The pharmaceutical clients sought and received assurances from Pharmatrak that
its NETcompare service did not and could not collect personally identifiable information.
Far from consenting to the collection of personally identifiable information, the
pharmaceutical clients explicitly conditioned their purchase of NETcompare on the fact
that it would not collect such information.
The interpretation urged by Pharmatrak would, we think, lead to results inconsistent with
the statutory intent. It would undercut efforts by one party to a contract to require that the
privacy interests of those who electronically communicate with it be protected by the other
party to the contract. It also would lead to irrational results. Suppose Pharmatrak, for
example, had intentionally designed its software, contrary to its representations and its
clients’ expectations, to redirect all possible personal information to Pharmatrak servers,
which collected and mined the data. Under the district court’s approach, Pharmatrak would
nevertheless be insulated against liability under the ECPA on the theory that the
pharmaceutical companies had “consented” by simply buying Pharmatrak’s product. Or
suppose an internet service provider received a parent’s consent solely to monitor a child’s
internet usage for attempts to access sexually explicit sites—but the ISP installed code that
monitored, recorded and cataloged all internet usage by parent and child alike. Under the
theory we have rejected, the ISP would not be liable under the ECPA.
Nor did the users consent. On the undisputed facts, it is clear that the internet user did not
consent to Pharmatrak’s accessing his or her communication with the pharmaceutical
companies. The pharmaceutical companies’ websites gave no indication that use meant
consent to collection of personal information by a third party. Rather, Pharmatrak’s
involvement was meant to be invisible to the user, and it was. Deficient notice will almost
always defeat a claim of implied consent. Pharmatrak makes a frivolous argument that the
internet users visiting client Pharmacia’s webpage for rebates on Detrol thereby consented
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to Pharmatrak’s intercepting their personal information. On that theory, every online
communication would provide consent to interception by a third party.
D. Interception Requirement
The parties briefed to the district court the question of whether Pharmatrak had
“intercepted” electronic communications. If this question could be resolved in Pharmatrak’s
favor, that would provide a ground for affirmance of the summary judgment. It cannot be
answered in favor of Pharmatrak.
The ECPA prohibits only “interceptions” of electronic communications. “Intercept” is
defined as “the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral
communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.”
Before enactment of the ECPA, some courts had narrowed the Wiretap Act’s definition of
interception to include only acquisitions of a communication contemporaneous with
transmission. There was a resulting debate about whether the ECPA should be similarly
restricted….Other circuits have invoked the contemporaneous, or “real-time,” requirement
to exclude acquisitions apparently made a substantial amount of time after material was
put into electronic storage. These circuits have distinguished between materials acquired in
transit, which are interceptions, and those acquired from storage, which purportedly are
not.
We share the concern of the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits about the judicial interpretation
of a statute written prior to the widespread usage of the internet and the World Wide Web
in a case involving purported interceptions of online communications. In particular, the
storage-transit dichotomy adopted by earlier courts may be less than apt to address current
problems. As one court recently observed, “[T]echnology has, to some extent, overtaken
language. Traveling the internet, electronic communications are often—perhaps
constantly—both ‘in transit’ and ‘in storage’ simultaneously, a linguistic but not a
technological paradox.”
The facts here do not require us to enter the debate over the existence of a real-time
requirement. The acquisition by Pharmatrak was contemporaneous with the transmission
by the internet users to the pharmaceutical companies. Both Curtin, the plaintiffs’ expert,
and Wes Sonnenreich, Pharmatrak’s former CTO, observed that users communicated
simultaneously with the pharmaceutical client’s web server and with Pharmatrak’s web
server. After the user’s personal information was transmitted using the get method, both
the pharmaceutical client’s server and Pharmatrak’s server contributed content for the
succeeding webpage; as both Curtin and Wes Sonnenreich acknowledged, Pharmatrak’s
content (the clear GIF that enabled the interception) sometimes arrived before the content
delivered by the pharmaceutical clients.
Even those courts that narrowly read “interception” would find that Pharmatrak’s
acquisition was an interception. For example, Steiger observes:
[U]nder the narrow reading of the Wiretap Act we adopt ..., very few seizures
of electronic communications from computers will constitute ‘interceptions.’ ...
‘Therefore, unless some type of automatic routing software is used (for
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example, a duplicate of all of an employee’s messages are automatically sent
to the employee’s boss), interception of E-mail within the prohibition of [the
Wiretap Act] is virtually impossible.’
NETcompare was effectively an automatic routing program. It was code that automatically
duplicated part of the communication between a user and a pharmaceutical client and sent
this information to a third party (Pharmatrak).
Pharmatrak argues that there was no interception because “there were always two
separate communications: one between the Web user and the Pharmaceutical Client, and
the other between the Web user and Pharmatrak.” This argument fails for two reasons.
First, as a matter of law, even the circuits adopting a narrow reading of the Wiretap Act
merely require that the acquisition occur at the same time as the transmission; they do not
require that the acquisition somehow constitute the same communication as the
transmission. Second, Pharmatrak acquired the same URL query string (sometimes
containing personal information) exchanged as part of the communication between the
pharmaceutical client and the user. Separate, but simultaneous and identical,
communications satisfy even the strictest real-time requirement.
E. Intent Requirement
At oral argument this court questioned the parties about whether the “intent” requirement
under § 2511(a)(1) had been met.
We remand this issue because it was not squarely addressed by both parties before the
district court. When Pharmatrak moved for summary judgment, it did not do so on the
grounds that the statutory requirement of intent was unmet. At most, it raised the issue in
passing at the hearing on the cross-motions for summary judgment.
Plaintiffs, in their motion for summary judgment, did raise the issue and argued that any
interception was intentional; but the district court neither granted the motion nor
addressed the issue. In its opposition to plaintiffs’ motion, Pharmatrak relied on its own
motion for summary judgment, and so did not address intent. The issue has not been
briefed to us.
While it is true that we can affirm the grant of summary judgment on any ground
presented by the record, we will usually do so only when the issue has been fairly presented
to the trial court. Here it was not, and we are reluctant to determine ourselves whether
there was adequate opportunity for discovery on this issue and whether there are material
facts in dispute, and to resolve an issue without briefing.
Still, we wish to avoid uncertainty about the legal standard for intent under the ECPA on
remand, and so we address that point. Congress amended 18 U.S.C. § 2511 in 1986 to
change the state of mind requirement from “willful” to “intentional”. Since “intentional”
itself may have different glosses put on it, we refer to the legislative history, which states:
As used in the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, the term “intentional”
is narrower than the dictionary definition of “intentional.” “Intentional”
means more than that one voluntarily engaged in conduct or caused a result.
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Such conduct or the causing of the result must have been the person’s
conscious objective. An “intentional” state of mind means that one’s state of
mind is intentional as to one’s conduct or the result of one’s conduct if such
conduct or result is one’s conscious objective. The intentional state of mind is
applicable only to conduct and results. Since one has no control over the
existence of circumstances, one cannot “intend” them.
S.Rep. No. 99-541, at 23 (1986). Congress made clear that the purpose of the amendment
was to underscore that inadvertent interceptions are not a basis for criminal or civil
liability under the ECPA. An act is not intentional if it is the product of inadvertence or
mistake. There is also authority suggesting that liability for intentionally engaging in
prohibited conduct does not turn on an assessment of the merit of a party’s motive. That is
not to say motive is entirely irrelevant in assessing intent. An interception may be more
likely to be intentional when it serves a party’s self-interest to engage in such conduct.
F. Conclusion
We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
NOTES AND QUESTIONS
What should Pharmatrak and its attorneys have done differently? What should Pharmacia
and its attorneys have done differently?
How did the consumers whose data was intercepted suffer any harms?
If Pharmacia had told users that it was using Pharmatrak’s services in Pharmacia’s privacy
policy but didn’t present its privacy policy to users as a mandatory non-leaky clickthrough
agreement, would users have “consented” to Pharmatrak’s operations for ECPA purposes?
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X.

Spam

Eric Goldman, Where’s the Beef? Dissecting Spam’s Purported Harms, 22 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 13 (2003).
I. INTRODUCTION
After many failed attempts over the past six years, Congress finally enacted a law
regulating unsolicited commercial e-mails, the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited
Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003 (the “CAN-SPAM Act” or “CAN-SPAM”). CANSPAM follows significant state-based efforts to regulate spam; from 1997 to 2003, nearly
three quarters of the states adopted some spam regulation, most of which are now
preempted by CAN-SPAM.
CAN-SPAM, like the state laws preceding it, takes a multi-faceted approach to regulating
spam. Among other provisions, CAN-SPAM contains provisions that regulate the e-mail
content, restrict specific notorious spammer practices, give spam recipients the ability to
opt-out, and attack the spammer’s funding by creating advertiser liability.
The diversity of regulatory approaches inherent in CAN-SPAM (and, before that, the
superseded state statutes) prompts a fundamental question: exactly what harms are caused
by spam that these regulations attempt to redress? There is no consensus answer to this
question. Just about everyone seems to agree that spam is a problem that needs to be
addressed, but no one seems to agree on why. Without clearly understanding the targeted
harms, policy-makers cannot craft regulations designed to fix them.
This Essay examines the purported harms caused by spam in an effort to isolate bona fide
areas needing legislative intervention. However, few such needs exist. Instead, most
purported harms are illusory, already adequately addressed by existing laws or best left to
market solutions. This analysis thus undercuts many of the purported justifications for
regulating spam.
II. DEFINING THE HARMS OF SPAM
A. Defining Spam
Any attempt to intelligently discuss spam is immediately hampered by the word’s
imprecision. Simply put, the term “spam” lacks a single well-accepted definition. Usually
“spam” refers to some form of unwanted e-mail, although some users generalize the term to
describe all forms of unwanted advertising, both in e-mail and other media. CAN-SPAM
defines “commercial electronic mail message” as “any electronic mail message the primary
purpose of which is the commercial advertisement or promotion of a commercial product or
service.” Building on this definition, this Essay refers to “spam” as unsolicited “commercial
electronic mail messages.” However, this definition is both under- and over-inclusive
because the definition includes e-mails recipients want and does not include all e-mails not
wanted by recipients, and thus it may not track recipient expectations.
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B. Spam is Annoying
1. Distinguishing Wanted and Unwanted Content
Many e-mail recipients castigate spam as annoying, but the reasons why are less clear.
Some annoyance is attributable to the objectionable content in spam, a point addressed
infra in subsection II(D). Otherwise, the annoyance is based (among other factors) on the
unsolicited, high-volume, time-consuming or unpreventable nature of spam.
I believe these concerns all derive from the same source: spam is unwanted. A simple
example may illustrate this. Assume Jane is ready to purchase a Canon PowerShot S400
digital camera. An unsolicited e-mail arrives in Jane’s in-box from a trustworthy retailer
that she has never transacted with. The retailer offers to sell her the camera for $100 less
than any other retailer. Is this spam?
Some recipients would say “yes” because the e-mail is unsolicited or otherwise invades their
privacy. However, most e-mail recipients would consider this e-mail valuable instead of
annoying, in which case they would want this e-mail because it will save them time and
money.
Perhaps this example gives us an important insight on the nature of spam. E-mail
recipients want e-mail that saves money, saves time, educates on matters of interest, or is
otherwise relevant and helpful. Thus, many e-mail recipients gladly would receive
unsolicited e-mails that meet those specifications. In contrast, e-mail recipients are
annoyed to receive a high volume of irrelevant and unhelpful e-mails.
Unfortunately, frequently spam is irrelevant and unhelpful to recipients because it is
relatively untargeted. Like any other marketers, spam advertisers will pay for targeted email lists that are more likely to yield higher results. However, the negligible marginal cost
of sending spam lowers the optimal level of targeting for spammers. Thus, spammers can
profitably use low-yield and untargeted practices such as e-mail harvesting and dictionary
attacks.
Even though spammers can profitably send very-low relevance e-mails to lots of recipients,
not all spam is bad. Inevitably, some recipients will find a particular spam e-mail helpful
and relevant. More specifically, recipients’ perceptions about each spam’s relevance usually
sort into a bell curve: some will find the e-mail completely irrelevant, some will find the email very relevant, and others will find the e-mail somewhat relevant.
Some empirical data supports this analysis. Several recent surveys show that seven to eight
percent of those surveyed have purchased a product or service in response to spam and
approximately thirty percent of those surveyed have responded to spam to get more
information about the advertised product or service. While not high percentages, the
statistics seemingly contradict spam’s abysmal reputation. For recipients who responded to
spam (plus those who were educated but did not respond), the spam was relevant. For those
who purchased in response to a particular spam, that e-mail helped the consumer find a
desired product or service at an acceptable price.
We should not trivialize these consequences. Spam plays an important role in the
marketplace of ideas, perhaps filling gaps left by other media, and can contribute to
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efficiently functioning economic markets. In some cases, spam creates transaction
opportunities that otherwise would not occur due to prohibitive search costs or lack of
consumer awareness about products available to solve their needs.
Of course, these conclusions do not change the fact that most spam is unwanted by most
recipients. However, it is unclear why individuals seem less tolerant of irrelevant spam
than irrelevant ads in other media. Consumers routinely tolerate irrelevant ads in other
media with less annoyance than they feel towards spam.
Let us consider ad relevancy in a few media, starting with billboards. Billboard ads target
viewers only by geography (if that), so they are fairly low-relevancy advertising tools,
meaning that most billboard ads will be irrelevant to most viewers.
The broadcast and newspaper media use differentiated content to segment consumers.
Thus, a TV show will appeal to a certain demographic, and newspapers divide their content
into topical sections (e.g. sports, business, metro) that are read by only some readers. This
segmentation means that ads can be targeted to consumers attracted by the surrounding
content. Nevertheless, even the most targeted content will appeal to multiple
demographics, so the associated ads will be less relevant to non-majority audience
segments.
In these other media like billboards, broadcasting and newspapers, consumers do not
vociferously demand regulation to minimize the irrelevancy of ads delivered through them.
Why do consumers feel differently about spam?
2. Sorting Spam Wastes Time
Perhaps recipients penalize spam because it takes time to sort irrelevant spam from
wanted e-mails. Sorting also creates the risk of Type I and Type II errors (i.e., legitimate email gets tossed or blocked as spam, and objectionable spam gets through the sorting).
But once again, spam is not different from other media. Every medium that contains ads
requires consumers to sort ads from content and wanted ads from unwanted ads. For
example, sorting postal mail requires the recipient to evaluate the envelope’s exterior and,
in some cases, open and review the contents. Broadcast ads are even more difficult to sort,
because ads are interspersed with content and the viewer cannot reorder or skip the ads.
So while spam does require sorting time, recipients can manually sort e-mail relatively
efficiently by reviewing subject lines, and many recipients develop good skills doing so.
Spam can also be automatically blocked without any manual sorting using e-mail filters. As
a result, the amount of time “wasted” on the e-mail sorting process may very well be less
than the time wasted in other media.
All media containing ads demand sorting time and create some risk of erroneous sorting,
and no regulatory scheme—other than banning a medium altogether—can eliminate that.
Instead, time lost to sorting is unavoidable in a media-based society, and spam is just one of
many manifestations of that phenomenon. Thus, the explanation for recipients’ antipathy
towards spam must lie elsewhere.
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3. Spam Causes Recipients to Lose Control of Their In-Boxes
Evidence suggests that many recipients are bothered by their inability to stop spam and
feel that spam is a loss of privacy. This suggests that recipient frustration with spam may
be the result of a feeling that recipients have lost control over their in-boxes.
However, once again this problem arises with other media. Recipients cannot stop spam
except by eliminating their e-mail account altogether, but consumers of other media are
similarly powerless to change what ads are delivered in that medium except by
discontinuing use of that medium. For example, a newspaper or magazine reader cannot
control what ads are published; the reader’s only choices are to ignore unwanted ads or stop
reading the publication altogether. This argument holds true for broadcast media,
billboards, and junk mail as well.
Perhaps e-mail can be distinguished from other media because it delivers more important
personal content to recipients than other media. Recipients seem to develop a special and
personal relationship with their in-box, and this explanation might offer an insight about
why telemarketing is so reviled. But this explanation is not totally satisfactory because it
does not explain the seeming dichotomy between the outrage over spam and comparative
tolerance of junk mail.
A more satisfying explanation can be found by considering the relative adoption curves of
spam and other media. We have had many years to develop ways to cope with ads in other
media, but we are still developing ways to cope with e-mail ads. It seems likely that users
will improve their ability to manage e-mail with more experience, at which point user
frustration should decrease. Meanwhile, new generations who grow up using e-mail should
be more tolerant of spam because they will develop coping strategies for spam (and media
inputs generally) from an early age.
Thus, current annoyance with spam could merely reflect that user experience with e-mail is
evolving. Robust e-mail management tools also should reduce annoyance, and the current
annoyance may also reflect that those tools are not yet adequately deployed.
4. Conclusion on Annoyance
Unwanted e-mails are annoying, but minor annoyances are a fact of life, and no law can
eliminate them—from e-mail or otherwise. E-mail recipients’ annoyance at spam appears to
be an overreaction when compared to their reactions to other forms of annoying ads.
Meanwhile, regulation of spam creates significant risk that some relevant e-mails will be
blocked from recipients who want them. It is troubling to regulate content to protect the
majority from minor annoyances if the consequence is preventing minority interests from
exchanging relevant content.
C. Spammers Impose Costs on Third Parties
As it moves from sender to recipient, spam generates bandwidth and server processing
costs for the spammer’s IAP, the recipient and the recipient’s IAP. Depending on a
spammer’s practices, they can also impose some costs on unsuspecting third parties, such
as server operators with open mail relays and or whose domains are forged. We consider
each cost in turn.
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1. The Spammer’s IAP
The spammer and its IAP have contractual privity, and the IAP can technologically
constrain the spammer’s activities (i.e. capping the quantity of e-mails sent). As a result, a
spammer’s IAP has the capacity to charge spammers for any spam-related costs, and there
are no obvious market failures that require regulatory protection for the spammer’s IAP.
2. Recipients and Their IAPs
It is frequently claimed that recipients pay to receive spam, and sometimes spam is likened
to junk mail sent with postage due. With respect to individuals with a consumer IAP
account, this claim is no longer accurate. It was true prior to the mid-1990s, when many
IAPs charged customers a time-based fee for Internet connectivity. Because each e-mail
took some time to download, recipients paid a small fee for each e-mail they received.
Today, consumer IAPs almost universally charge flat-rate pricing for unlimited usage, so
consumer recipients do not pay for each e-mail received.
However, recipient IAPs bear some bandwidth and server processing costs for each e-mail
they process, plus preventative costs (like filtering) and remediation costs (like blocking or
database repair) associated with pernicious e-mail. Unlike the spammer’s IAP, the
recipient’s IAP has no contractual privity or technological relationship with the spammer.
And where corporations provide Internet connectivity to their employees, they incur these
costs as a recipient directly. As a result, recipient IAPs and corporations may benefit from
legal systems that allow them to pass those costs back to spammers or avoid the costs
altogether.
Until recently, common law trespass to chattels was an important legal mechanism to
accomplish that objective. However, in Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, the California Supreme Court
recently scaled the doctrine back, rejecting trespass to chattels when a low-volume
spammer’s e-mails did not threaten to impair (or actually impair) the functioning of Intel’s
systems. It remains unclear how subsequent courts will interpret Intel, but in all likelihood
some future spammers will avoid liability for trespass to chattels.
Irrespective of trespass to chattels, corporations and recipient IAPs can use, and have
successfully used, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) to combat spam. CANSPAM supplements the CFAA (and whatever is left of common law trespass to chattels) by
providing recipient IAPs a direct cause of action when the IAP is “adversely affected” by a
spammer who fails to comply with selected other provisions of CAN-SPAM. Depending on
how broadly courts interpret the words “adversely affected,” this provision may moot
Hamidi’s common law analysis by providing a statutory cause of action. At minimum, CANSPAM expedites recipient IAP causes of action by providing statutory damages and
attorneys’ fees and by providing another basis (in addition to the CFAA) for federal court
jurisdiction. As a result, CAN-SPAM should help recipient IAPs control some of the e-mail
processing costs that are externalized to them.
In addition to bandwidth, server, preventative and maintenance costs, some companies
have sought legal recognition for the time employees waste on spam. Indeed, analysts claim
that this lost time creates enormous costs. However, as discussed in Section II supra, time
spent sorting or reading spam is not necessarily wasted, nor is it unique compared to the
many other ways that employees waste time (e.g. personal e-mail, junk mail and personal
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telephone calls). Therefore, lost productivity due to spam is a poor policy basis for
regulating spam.
3. Open Mail Relays
Spammers can offload costs to third party computers who have open mail relays, which can
cause those server operators to incur some costs like any other recipient IAP. Of course,
operators wishing to avoid those costs can simply close their mail relays, and interestingly
these operators are often considered part of the problem, not victims. Thus, forcing them to
internalize the spam-created costs (rather than pushing those costs to a spammer) may
motivate them to close the relays.
4. Targets of Forged Headers
Spammers also can offload costs to third parties using forged headers. A forged header
occurs when a spammer manipulates an e-mail to make it look like the spam originated
from X.com when it is really being sent from Y.com. The X.com domain name operator (or
its IAP) incurs costs when undeliverable messages and recipient complaints are directed to
the operator.
The operator of a forged domain name lacks any contractual or technological way to prevent
this activity, so regulatory protection is appropriate. Indeed, thirty states prohibited forged
headers, and these state laws may not be preempted by CAN-SPAM. Meanwhile, CANSPAM criminalizes forged headers and potentially sets up a private cause of action for some
victims (“providers of Internet access services” who are “adversely affected”). The
robustness of this private cause of action remains to be seen, but this CAN-SPAM provision,
plus any coverage under non-preempted state laws and other existing doctrines like
trademark law and the CFAA, should provide substantial protection to the victims of forged
headers.
5. Conclusion on Costs
Far too much rhetoric is directed to the costs borne by individual spam recipients. These
individuals no longer bear a financial cost to receive spam, and any “costs” associated with
the consumption of their attention makes unsupportable assumptions about the e-mail’s
relevancy to the recipient. Similarly, although sending IAPs may find it desirable to obtain
regulatory protection against spam, they can control their financial exposure to spammers’
behavior through pricing and technology.
Focusing on the costs borne by individual recipients and sending IAPs detracts from the
parties who incur uncontrollable costs from spam, such as recipient IAPs, operators of open
mail relays and victims of forged headers. CAN-SPAM provides some useful legal tools to
protect these parties, although those tools may be incomplete. A crisper understanding of
the real costs borne by these parties would have likely produced a more thoughtful legal
solution.
D. Spam Contains or Promotes Objectionable Content
Many spam recipients complain about objectionable content of spam, especially
pornographic spam. Due to deep feelings towards pornographic spam, Congress specifically
targeted it in CAN-SPAM by requiring warning labels. But to understand the harms
pornographic spam causes, it is useful to consider adults and minors separately.
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For adults, pornographic spam is no different from any other form of unwanted content
discussed in Section II(B) supra. Nevertheless, Congress has tried to help adults avoid
unwanted pornographic spam by requiring special labeling of pornographic spam in the
subject line. When implemented, this requirement can help recipients who automatically
filter e-mail using the appropriate words because the spam will automatically be routed
outside the recipient’s ordinary view. Until spammers regularly comply with this law,
however, filtering will not be helpful.
The mandatory labeling law may be even less helpful to recipients who manually sort email. These recipients may still see objectionable content if the subject line contains
objectionable terms or the recipient’s e-mail software “previews” a message and the
previewed content is objectionable.
So how can regulatory intervention help recipients avoid objectionable e-mails? With widely
varying perceptions of what constitutes objectionable content, regulating objectionable ads
is no more feasible than regulating irrelevant ads. Thus, the only “solution” may be for
recipients to manage their exposures themselves, either through technological measures or
by looking elsewhere when something offends.
Putting the burden on recipients to avoid pornographic spam is less satisfactory when
recipients are minors. In that case, society may be harmed when minors view this
inappropriate material.
However, minors’ exposure to pornographic spam is a microcosm of a much greater
problem: minors with e-mail accounts. This is a major social development because
historically minors had few communication media that readily bypassed parental oversight.
Today, minors can use e-mail, instant messenger, and cell phones to communicate with
third parties without any parental oversight and knowledge. With this additional
autonomy, minors can get into inappropriate and potentially very dangerous situations,
such as interactions with sexual predators.
Because of these risks, some parents restrict minors’ access to the Internet altogether, and
other parents permit only supervised Internet use. The former prevents any risk of
exposure to pornographic spam, and the latter approach gives parents the ability to prescreen pornographic spam or counsel the minor when seeing such spam.
Otherwise, parents who let minors have unsupervised e-mail use make a huge decision, and
it is not made lightly. Because these parents accept the risk that their children will engage
in dangerous online behavior, the problem of pornographic spam seems almost trivial by
comparison. If the parents trust their children enough to give them that autonomy, perhaps
we should infer that the parents deem their children responsible enough to cope with
pornographic spam.
Regulation cannot easily solve these problems. Efforts to specifically ban pornographic
spam are likely unconstitutional and do not affect e-mails from foreign jurisdictions. Lesser
efforts, like mandatory labeling, have low efficacy. Ultimately, there can be no substitute
for parental involvement in their children’s use of e-mail.
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III. CONCLUSION
Society is still evolving ways to cope with media saturation. Spam contributes to this
problem, but so do other media. Yet, many recipients hate spam more than other ads. As
explored by this Essay, this dichotomous attitude is hard to explain. Nevertheless, the
anger has caused anti-spam rhetoric to reach hyperbolic levels. But, while many spam
opponents decry spam as a system breakdown, the breakdown has been more political than
technological. Most state-based attempts to regulate spam, a product of political
grandstanding or legislator rage instead of rational policy-making, were ineffectual,
reflecting their weak policy underpinnings. Early feedback on CAN-SPAM suggests the
federal law will not be any more effective.
Even if CAN-SPAM beneficially affects the flow of unwanted e-mails, any legislative
solution seems inherently empty. Without legislative intervention, society will find ways to
cope with spam, just as we have with other media. Meanwhile, entrepreneurs will continue
to develop better tools to sort wanted and unwanted communications. Thus, more patience
with the spam “problem” might have facilitated the development of superior results
organically.
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MySpace, Inc. v. theglobe.com, Inc., 2007 WL 1686966 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
Klausner, District Judge.
…II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following facts are alleged by the parties:
Plaintiff is an online social networking service that allows members to create personal
profiles in order to find and communicate with other people. Members of MySpace have
access to the MySpace.com website, the MySpace.com Internet Messaging service, and the
MySpace.com Mail service, where users can send and receive electronic mail messages
(“MySpace e-messages”).
To become a MySpace member, a person must set up an account on MySpace.com by
creating a profile. The profile includes the user’s name, country, zip code, birth date, and
gender. The user must also create a password and provide an alternate email address to
which confirmations and notifications will be sent. To set up an account, the user must
assent to the MySpace Terms of Service Contract (“TOS Contract”) by checking a box
agreeing to the terms of the TOS Contract, and inputting a verification code. The TOS
Contract prohibits spamming, automated use of its system, use of MySpace’s service for
commercial endeavors, and promotion of information known to be false or misleading.
A MySpace member accesses his e-message account on the internet, at the MySpace.com
website. To send a MySpace e-message, the user may either click on a link for “Mail,” or go
directly to the recipient’s unique URL assigned to each individual account.
Defendant is a public company that provides internet-based communications services
(“TGLO Products”). Defendant operates one or more websites under various domain names,
including iglochat.com, tglophone.com, glotalk.com and digitalvoiceglo.com.
Beginning January 2006, Defendant set up at least 95 identical or virtually identical
“dummy” MySpace profiles, with corresponding e-message accounts. Defendant used these
accounts to send almost 400,000 unsolicited commercial e-messages marketing TGLO
Products to MySpace users via scripts. On February 6, 2006, Plaintiff sent a cease and
desist letter to Defendant, demanding that Defendant stop sending its commercial emessages to MySpace members. Thereafter, Defendant ceased its transmission of emessages. However, the transmissions later resumed and continued through May 2006.
On June 1, 2006, Plaintiff filed the current action against Defendant. In its Complaint,
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s activities violated both federal and state statutory laws,
as well as state common laws. By way of its action, Plaintiff seeks an order enjoining
Defendants from the conduct giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff also seeks actual
damages, liquidated damages, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees and costs….
III. DISCUSSION
At issue in these cross-motions are Count 1 (Violation of CAN-SPAM), Count III (Violation
of Section 17529.5) and Count VI (Breach of Contract).
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According to Plaintiff, there is no triable issue as to the following alleged facts: Defendant
obtained 95 or more MySpace e-message accounts to circumvent MySpace’s daily mail
limitations. To obtain these accounts, Defendant set up almost 100 separate email accounts
at sites such as hotmail.com to fulfill MySpace’s requirement of providing an alternate
email address. Then, Defendant used false information to set up the MySpace accounts
with deceptive display names, and purported to use them for personal purposes. In fact, the
accounts were used to initiate (via a script) 399,481 unsolicited commercial email messages
to MySpace.com users to promote its TGLO Products. Plaintiff asserts that, as a result of
this conduct, partial summary judgment should be granted in its favor as to all three
counts.
Defendant contends that: (1) Plaintiff has no standing under CAN-SPAM because it is not
an ISP; (2) the messages sent over its private messaging system are not e-mail, and
therefore neither CAN-SPAM nor Section 17529.5 apply; and (3) the TOS Contract, in
general, is an unenforceable contract of adhesion, and the liquidated damages provision,
specifically, is unenforceable because it is disproportionate to anticipated damages.
For the following reasons, the Court denies Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, and grants in part, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Adjudication.
A. Claims Under CAN-SPAM
CAN-SPAM regulates the manner in which unsolicited commercial emails may be
transmitted. The statute also makes unlawful certain conduct relating to such
transmissions, including the transmission of false or misleading information, and obtaining
email addresses through dictionary attacks. Under CAN-SPAM, an Internet access service
provider who is harmed by violations of Section 7704(a), (b) or (d) may seek to enjoin
further violation by the defendant, or recover damages equal to the greater of: (1) actual
monetary loss incurred by the internet access service provider or (2) statutory damages as
provided by Section 7706(g)(3)….
1. Plaintiff Has Standing Under CAN-SPAM
As an initial matter, CAN-SPAM, which is primarily a criminal statute, authorizes a
private right of action only to a “provider of Internet access service.” Defendant contends
that Plaintiff is not a provider of Internet access service, and therefore, has no standing to
sue Defendant under the statute.
a. Plaintiff is an Internet Access Provider
Under Section 7702(11), “Internet access service” has the meaning given that term in 47
U.S.C. § 231(e)(4) (“Section 231”). Section 231 defines “Internet access service” as “a service
that enables users to access content, information, electronic mail, or other services offered
over the Internet, and may also include access to proprietary content, information, and
other services as part of a package of services offered to consumers.”
The Ninth Circuit assumes that the legislative purpose of a statute is expressed by the
ordinary meaning of the words used. The plain meaning of the statutory language is
unambiguous; “Internet access provider” includes traditional Internet Service Providers
(“ISPs”), any email provider, and even most website owners. Under this broad definition,
Plaintiff is an “Internet access provider.”
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b. MySpace E-Messages Are Electronic Mail
Notwithstanding the broad definition given to “Internet access provider,” CAN-SPAM
provides a private right of action to only those Internet access providers who are adversely
affected by Section 7704. Since Section 7704 regulates and prohibits conduct involving
electronic mail (“electronic mail” or “email”), a private right of action under CAN-SPAM is
confined to only those Internet access services that provide access to electronic mail.
CAN-SPAM defines “electronic mail message” as “a message sent to a unique electronic
mail address.” “Electronic mail address” is defined as “a destination, commonly expressed
as a string of characters, consisting of a unique user name or mailbox (commonly referred to
as the ‘local part’) and a reference to an Internet domain (commonly referred to as the
‘domain part’), whether or not displayed, to which an electronic mail message can be sent or
delivered.”
According to Plaintiff’s evidence, the mail of each MySpace user resides at a unique URL,
consisting of a string of characters that includes a reference to a user name or number, and
the Internet destination, www.myspace.com. This evidence shows that MySpace e-messages
fall under CAN-SPAM’s definition of electronic mail, and Defendant has failed to present
any evidence disputing Plaintiff’s evidence.
However, Defendant maintains that MySpace e-messages do not constitute CAN-SPAM
protected email because: (1) unlike email, MySpace e-messages have no real “route” because
the messages always remain within the “walled garden” of MySpace; (2) MySpace emessages are not email because they do not use simple mail transfer protocol (“SMTP”);
and (3) unlike email addresses, MySpace e-message addresses have no domain part.
Defendant’s arguments are unavailing.
First, nowhere does the statute specify the requirements set forth by Defendant. Moreover,
argument as to these requirements are part and parcel of Defendant’s position that only
traditional ISPs have a right to sue under CAN-SPAM, as these requirements are typically
associated with email service provided by traditional ISPs. As discussed above, the Court
rejects this position. Furthermore, CAN-SPAM’s Congressional findings indicates that
exclusion of electronic messages that fall outside the ambit of Defendant’s specifications
would subvert the legislative intent. Regardless of who has a private right of action under
the statute, the overarching intent of this legislation is to safeguard the convenience and
efficiency of the electronic messaging system, and to curtail overburdening of the system’s
infrastructure. Limiting protection to only electronic mail that falls within the narrows
confines set forth by Defendant does little to promote the Congress’s overarching intent in
enacting CAN-SPAM.
Nonetheless, Plaintiff has introduced evidence showing: (1) its e-message system uses both
a routing method and a domain part, and (2) some MySpace e-messages are transmitted
using STMP. First, according to Plaintiff’s evidence, every message must contain routing
information letting MySpace servers know where to send that message. While the routing
employed by MySpace may be less complex and elongated than those employed by ISPs,
any routing necessarily implicates issues regarding volume of traffic and utilization of
infrastructure—issues which CAN-SPAM seeks to address. Similar to an ISP, there is only
a finite volume of mail that MySpace can handle without further investment in
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infrastructure. Second, Plaintiff’s evidence shows that each user’s mailbox includes a
reference to, not only a user name, but also to myspace.com, the Internet domain or domain
part. Finally, Plaintiff’s evidence shows that, while most MySpace e-messages are sent
using Hypertext Transfer Protocol (“HTTP”), each time an HTTP message is sent by a
MySpace user, a companion notification message is sent via SMTP to the recipient’s
alternative email address. Additionally, MySpace users may send SMTP messages over the
Internet from myspace.com when they invite someone who is not a MySpace member to join
MySpace. Defendant has not presented any evidence to dispute the evidence set forth
above. Therefore, Defendant’s argument fails, even under its improperly narrow
interpretation of the statute.
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has standing to sue Defendant under
CAN-SPAM because, as defined under CAN-SPAM, Plaintiff is an Internet access provider
whose electronic messages qualify as electronic mail.
2. Violation of Section 7704(a)(1)
Section 7704(a)(1) prohibits the transmission of commercial email that contains false or
misleading header information. Under the statute, even if the header information is
technically accurate, it is considered materially misleading if it includes an originating
email address that was accessed through false or fraudulent pretenses, for purposes of
initiating the commercial email message.
According to Plaintiff’s evidence, Defendant’s employees created MySpace accounts using
false identifying information, including fictitious email addresses and contact information.
Defendant’s employees also set up MySpace accounts with the display names, “MySpace
Phone,” “Chick,” and “Coppermine.” As indicated by this evidence, the accounts created by
Defendant failed to identity the messages as originating from TheGlobe. Based on the plain
language of Section 7704(a)(1), Plaintiff’s evidence establishes that Defendant violated this
provision.
In opposition, Defendant argues that the accounts did, in fact, identify TheGlobe as the
originator of the e-messages. To support its argument, Defendant has introduced evidence
that a document was used to assist employees in creating MySpace accounts. According to
this evidence, the document instructed the employees to use “tglo” in the first name and
“phone” as the last name. This evidence is unavailing, as it fails to dispute Plaintiff’s
evidence or otherwise support its proposition. At most, the evidence indicates that, in
addition to the false accounts described by Plaintiff’s evidence, some of Defendant’s other
accounts may have had as their account identifiers the words “tglo” and “phone,” the
product Defendant sought to market. Even so, this fact is irrelevant because Defendant has
not offered any evidence showing that those words are readily associated with TheGlobe or
its TGLO Products. As such, the Court finds no triable issue as to Defendant’s violation of
Section 7704(a)(1).
3. Violation of Section 7704(a)(2)
Section 7704(a)(2) prohibits a person from transmitting commercial email containing a
subject heading that he or she knows would likely mislead the recipient about a material
fact regarding the content or subject matter of the message. Under Section 7706(g)(1), a
private right of action under Section 7704(a)(2) is available only when there is a pattern or
practice that violates this provision.
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It is undisputed that Defendant sent MySpace e-messages with the subject headings, “the
new MySpace phone,” “the new phone for MySpace,” and “the new tglo phone for MySpace.”
The last heading does not violate the statute, as it references “tglo” in a way that accurately
describes the content of the message and implies a product that is separate and distinct
from MySpace. In contrast, the first two headings do violate the statute because they imply
an affiliation with MySpace, likely misleading the recipient into believing that the
marketed product is related to MySpace. In fact, it is undisputed that in late January 2006,
an influential technology blogger on Zdnet.com inaccurately reported that MySpace had
partnered with TheGlobe. Although Defendant was aware of this error, it never sought to
correct the misinformation. Significantly, the undisputed evidence shows that the subject
headings described above were attached to e-messages sent after Defendant learned of the
blogger’s inaccurate report. As such, the Court finds that Defendant knew, or should have
known, that its subject headings were misleading.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to show a pattern or practice. As to this provision, the
Court agrees. The undisputed evidence shows that Defendant’s employees were provided
written instructions on how to create MySpace accounts and what content to send through
the messaging system. The instructions directed the employees to use “Call for FREE fast
and easy” as the headline. This subject heading is consistent with the email content, and
does not violate Section 7704(a)(2). As discussed above, notwithstanding the written
instructions, as least a portion of the 399,481 e-messages sent by Defendant contained
deceptive subject headings that violated the statute. However, without further evidence as
to the number of such e-messages sent by Defendant, it is impossible to determine whether
Defendant’s violation of this provision rose to the level of a pattern or practice. Therefore, a
triable issue of fact exists as to whether the number of e-messages containing deceptive
subject headings is substantial enough to constitute a pattern or practice.
4. Violation of Section 7704(a)(5)
Section 7704(a)(5) requires that unsolicited commercial emails contain: (1) clear notification
that the message is an advertisement, (2) clear notice of the opportunity to decline receipt
of further messages from the sender, and (3) a valid physical postal address for the sender.
Again, under Section 7706(g)(1), a private right of action under Section 7704(a)(5) is
available only when the defendant has a pattern or practice of violating this provision.
It is undisputed that none of Defendant’s 399,481 e-messages contained clear notice of the
opportunity to decline receipt of further messages from the sender, or a valid physical
postal address for the sender. Therefore, Defendant clearly violated this statutory
provision.
Again, Defendant argues that its activities do not constitute a pattern or practice, as
prescribed by Section 7706(g)(1). However, as stated above, the following is undisputed: (1)
Defendant’s employees were given instructions on how to create a MySpace account, what
information should be placed in the profiles, and what content to write in the messages; and
(2) through its employees, Defendant created at least 95 MySpace accounts and sent
399,481 unsolicited commercial emails over a course of five months. This evidence shows
that, rather than an isolated or accidental event, Defendant sent these e-messages in a
regular and repeated fashion, as a part of Defendant’s marketing practice. Since each one of
the 399,481 messages violated Section 7704(a)(5), Plaintiff has shown that Defendant
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engaged in a pattern or practice of violating this provision. As such, the Court finds no
triable issue of fact as to Defendant’s liability for violation of Section 7704(a)(5).
5. Violation of Section 7704(b)(1)
Section 7704(b) makes it an aggravated violation to initiate the transmission of commercial
email that is unlawful under Section 7704(a) where “the electronic mail address of the
recipient was obtained using an automated means that generates possible electronic mail
addresses by combining names, letter or numbers into numerous permutation.”
Plaintiff’s evidence shows that Defendant randomly selected a range of MySpace ID
numbers. Defendant then used a script to automatically generate a set of sequential IDs.
Once these IDs were generated, the script automatically transmitted Defendant’s messages
to those IDs. According to the evidence, some of the IDs correlated to MySpace profiles, and
some did not. A total of 399,481 messages were sent using this script. Based on the evidence
presented, Defendant violated Section 7704(1)(A)(ii).
In opposition, Defendant argues that it did not violate the statutory provision because the
script sent messages in sequence, rather than at random. Defendant further argues that
the script sent the messages to a range of MySpace profiles by using a range of user IDSs
that had already been assigned by MySpace. Defendant’s arguments are unavailing, as it is
unclear how these distinctions change the fact that Defendant used “automated means that
generates possible electronic mail addresses.” As such, the Court finds no triable issue as to
Defendant’s violation of Section 7704(b)(1)(A)(ii).
B. Section 17529.5 Claim
Section 17529.5 prohibits email transmissions to or from California email addresses
containing “falsified, misrepresented or forged header information” or a subject line that
would likely “mislead a recipient, acting reasonably under the circumstances, about a
material fact regarding the contents or subject matter of the message.” Under the statute,
an electronic mail service provider7 may bring an action against a person or entity that
violates this section.
It is undisputed that MySpace’s servers, which house all MySpace.com e-message accounts,
are located in California. Furthermore, it is undisputed that every time a user logs on to
MySpace.com to send, review or reply to an e-message, he or she is doing so by accessing
the California servers. Based on this evidence, as well as the evidence and analysis
discussed in Section III.A. above, the Court finds no triable issues as to Defendant’s liability
for Plaintiff’s Section 17529.5 claim.
C. Breach of Contract Claim
To set up a MySpace account, a person must assent to the TOS Contract by checking a box
agreeing to its terms. Plaintiff claims that, by setting up 95 accounts and sending its
marketing e-messages through those accounts, Defendant breached the terms of the TOS
7 An “electronic mail service provider” is defined as “any person, including an Internet service provider, that is
an intermediary in sending or receiving electronic mail or that provides to end users of the electronic mail
service the ability to send or receive electronic mail.”
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Contract. Furthermore, due to modified terms of the TOS Contract, Plaintiff contends that
Defendant must pay $50 for each of its e-messages that were sent after March 17, 2006.
1. Breach of the TOS Contract
It is undisputed that Defendant’s e-messages were sent between January 2006 and May
2006. During that time, the TOS Contract was modified three times. All four versions of the
TOS Contract contain the following provision: MySpace is “for the personal use of Members
only and may not be used in connection with any commercial endeavors except those that
are specifically endorsed or approved by the management of MySpace.com. Also, each
version prohibits: (1) content that involves the transmission of ‘junk mail,’ ‘chain letters,” or
unsolicited mass mailing or ‘spamming;’ and (2) “any automated use of the system, such as
using scripts to add friends.”
Based on the evidence and analysis discussed in Section III.A above, the Court finds that
Defendant used a script to transmit an unsolicited mass mailing to MySpace users for
purposes of an unapproved commercial endeavor. This activity violates the terms of the
TOS Contract.
Defendant argues that the TOS Contract, as a whole, is entirely unenforceable because
every relevant version is a contract of adhesion, such that the terms are unconscionable.
This argument is not well-taken.
The doctrine of unconscionability provides that a contract is unenforceable if it is both
procedurally and substantively unconscionable. Procedural unconscionability focuses on
oppression and surprise due to unequal bargaining power. “Oppression” arises from the
inequality of the parties’ bargaining power and an absence of real negotiation or a
meaningful choice on the weaker party’s part. “Surprise” is found when “the terms to which
the party supposedly agreed [are] hidden in a prolix printed form drafted by the party
seeking to enforce them.” A contract is substantively unconscionable when its terms are so
harsh, oppressive, or one-sided as to shock the conscience.
A review of the TOS Contract shows that it is, in fact, a standardized contract that gives
the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it. However,
the facts indicate that Defendant had a reasonable alternative or meaningful choice in the
matter, in that marketing through MySpace using the method employed was not its only
choice. In fact, Plaintiff’s evidence shows that Defendant had, in fact, considered
purchasing advertising space on the MySpace website. Moreover, the Court finds that the
contract is not written prolixly, particularly for an experienced, sophisticated business
entity whose area of expertise involves Internet related technology. Even if the TOS
contract was procedurally unconscionable, the terms, as a whole, are certainly not so harsh,
oppressive, or one-sided as to shock the conscience.
In light of the above, the Court finds that Defendant breached the TOS Contract.
2. Liquidated Damages Provision
On March 17, 2006, Plaintiff modified the TOS Contract and included the following
provision: “Prohibited activity includes ... advertising to, or solicitation of, any Member to
buy or sell any products or services through the Services. If you breach this Agreement and
send unsolicited bulk email, ... or other unsolicited communications of any kind ... As a
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reasonable estimation of such harm, you agree to pay MySpace.com $50 for each such
unsolicited email ... you send through the Services;....”
Plaintiff asserts that, under this provision, Defendant is liable for liquidated damages in
the amount of $50 per message sent after March 17, 2006. Defendant argues that the $50
liquidated damages clause is unenforceable because it is an impermissible contractual
penalty. The Court disagrees.
California law provides that liquidated damages clauses are enforceable where: (1) damages
from a breach would be impracticable or extremely difficult to determine with certainty;
and (2) the amount represents a reasonable estimation of what such damages might be. As
stated above, the Court has found that Defendant breached the TOS Agreement by bulk
transmission of unapproved, unsolicited commercial e-messages. The costs associated with
this activity include not only infrastructure costs, such as additional bandwidth, and
monitoring costs, they are also rife with large hidden costs. Such hidden costs include those
associated with deterrence (legal fees, software, etc.), depletion of customer goodwill, and
liability implications associated with the unlawfully advertised product. Therefore, the
damages related to Defendant’s breach are, in fact, impracticable or extremely difficult to
determine. As to the amount of liquidated damages, CAN-SPAM sets statutory damages for
unsolicited commercial emails at $25-$300 per message. Moreover, while the costs
associated with spamming are difficult to definitively assess, the costs listed above are
certainly large, and only the tip the iceberg. Therefore, the Court finds $50 per message a
reasonable estimation of Plaintiff’s damages.
Defendant further argues that, even if the Court finds the liquidated provision enforceable,
the provision should be applied only to those messages that were sent from accounts
created after March 17, 2006. Plaintiff contends that, because the TOS contract specifically
provides for modification of the agreement, the provision should apply to all messages sent
after March 17, 2006, regardless of when the account was created. The Court agrees with
Plaintiff.
All four versions of the TOS Contract specifically provide: “MySpace.com may modify this
Agreement from time to time and such modification shall be effective upon posting by
MySpace.com on the Website. You agree to be bound to any changes to this Agreement when
you use the Service after any such modification is posted.” (emphasis added). For the same
reasons stated above, this contractual term is neither procedurally nor substantively
unconscionable. Additionally, the Court notes that Defendant created all 95 MySpace
accounts, both before and after March 17, 2006. Therefore, at the time it created its postMarch 17 accounts, it knew, or should have known, that all messages, even those sent from
pre-March 17 accounts, were subject to the liquidated damages provision. As such, the
Court finds that the liquidated damages provision contained in the March 17, 2006 TOS
Contract applies to all messages sent by Defendant after March 17, 2006….
NOTES AND QUESTIONS
Denouement. The parties subsequently settled the case for $2.5 million—basically, all of
theglobe.com’s remaining cash. So effectively this was a bet-your-business decision by
theglobe.com.
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Blogs and Social Networking Sites

The Third Wave of Internet Exceptionalism
By Eric Goldman
Posted March 11, 2009 to http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2009/03/the_third_wave.htm
From the beginning, the Internet has been viewed as something special and “unique.” For
example, in 1996, a judge called the Internet “a unique and wholly new medium of
worldwide human communication.”
The Internet’s perceived novelty has prompted regulators to engage in “Internet
exceptionalism,” crafting Internet-specific laws that diverge from regulatory precedents in
other media. Internet exceptionalism has come in three distinct waves:
The First Wave: Internet Utopianism
In the mid-1990s, some people fantasized about an Internet “utopia” that would overcome
the problems inherent in other media. Some regulators, fearing disruption of this possible
utopia, sought to treat the Internet more favorably than other media.
47 U.S.C. §230 (a law still on the books) is a flagship example of mid-1990s efforts to
preserve Internet utopianism. The statute categorically immunizes online providers from
liability for publishing most types of third party content. It was enacted (in part) “to
preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and
other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation.” The statute
is clearly exceptionalist because it treats online providers more favorably than offline
publishers—even when they publish identical content.
The Second Wave: Internet Paranoia
Later in the 1990s, the regulatory pendulum swung in the other direction. Regulators still
embraced Internet exceptionalism, but instead of favoring the Internet, regulators treated
the Internet more harshly than analogous offline activity.
For example, in 2005, a Texas website called Live-shot.com announced that it would offer
“Internet hunting.” The website allowed paying customers to control, via the Internet, a
gun on its game farm. An employee manually monitored the gun and could override the
customer’s instructions. The website wanted to give people who could not otherwise hunt,
such as paraplegics, the opportunity to enjoy the hunting experience.
The regulatory reaction to Internet hunting was swift and severe. Over 3 dozen states
banned Internet hunting. California also banned Internet fishing for good measure.
However, regulators never explained how Internet hunting is more objectionable than
physical space hunting.
For example, California Sen. Debra Bowen criticized Internet hunting because it “isn’t
hunting; it’s an inhumane, over the top, pay-per-view video game using live animals for
target practice….Shooting live animals over the Internet takes absolutely zero hunting
skills, and it ought to be offensive to every legitimate hunter.”
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Sen. Bowen’s remarks reflect numerous unexpressed assumptions about the nature of
“hunting” and what constitutes fair play. In the end, however, hunting may just be
“hunting,” in which case the response to Internet hunting may just be a typical example of
adverse Internet exceptionalism.
The Third Wave: Exceptionalism Proliferation
The past few years have brought a new regulatory trend. Regulators are still engaged in
Internet exceptionalism, but each new advance in Internet technology has prompted
exceptionalist regulations towards that technology.
For example, the emergence of blogs and virtual worlds has helped initiate a push towards
blog-specific and virtual world-specific regulation. In effect, Internet exceptionalism has
splintered into pockets of smaller exceptionalist efforts.
Regulatory responses to social networking sites like Facebook and MySpace are a prime
example of Internet exceptionalism splintering. Rather than regulating these sites like
other websites, regulators have sought social networking site-specific laws, such as
requirements to verify users’ age, combat sexual predators and suppress content that
promotes violence. The result is that the regulation of social networking sites differs not
only from offline enterprises but from other websites as well.
Implications
Internet exceptionalism is not inherently bad. In some cases, the Internet truly is unique,
special or different and should be regulated accordingly. Unfortunately, more typically,
exceptionalism cannot be analytically justified and instead reflects regulatory panic.
In these cases, regulatory exceptionalism can be harmful, especially to Internet
entrepreneurs and their investors. It can distort the marketplace between web enterprises
and their offline competition—occasionally advantaging the website (such as 47 USC 230),
but typically hindering the web business’ ability to compete. In extreme cases, such as
Internet hunting, unjustified regulatory intervention may put companies out of business.
Accordingly, before enacting exceptionalist Internet regulation, regulators should articulate
how the Internet is unique, special or different and explain why these differences support
exceptionalism. Unfortunately, emotional overreactions to perceived Internet threats or
harms typically trump such a rational regulatory process. Knowing this tendency, perhaps
we can better resist that temptation.
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Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008).
Clement, Circuit Judge.
Jane and Julie Doe (“the Does”) appeal the district court’s dismissal of their claims for
negligence and gross negligence, and its finding that the claims were barred by the
Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C § 230, and Texas common law. For the
following reasons, we affirm the decision of the district court.
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
MySpace.com is a Web-based social network. Online social networking is the practice of
using a Web site or other interactive computer service to expand one’s business or social
network. Social networking on MySpace.com begins with a member’s creation of an online
profile that serves as a medium for personal expression, and can contain such items as
photographs, videos, and other information about the member that he or she chooses to
share with other MySpace.com users. Members have complete discretion regarding the
amount and type of information that is included in a personal profile. Members over the age
of sixteen can choose the degree of privacy they desire regarding their profile; that is, they
determine who among the MySpace.com membership is allowed to view their profile. Once
a profile has been created, the member can use it to extend “invitations” to existing friends
who are also MySpace.com users and to communicate with those friends online by linking
to their profiles, or using e-mail, instant messaging, and blogs, all of which are hosted
through the MySpace.com platform.
Members can also meet new people at MySpace.com through user groups focused on
common interests such as film, travel, music, or politics. MySpace.com has a browser
feature that allows members to search the Web site’s membership using criteria such as
geographic location or specific interests. MySpace.com members can also become online
“friends” with celebrities, musicians, or politicians who have created MySpace.com profiles
to publicize their work and to interface with fans and supporters.
MySpace.com membership is free to all who agree to the Terms of Use. To establish a
profile, users must represent that they are at least fourteen years of age. The profiles of
members who are aged fourteen and fifteen are automatically set to “private” by default, in
order to limit the amount of personal information that can be seen on the member’s profile
by MySpace.com users who are not in their existing friends network and to prevent younger
teens from being contacted by users they do not know. Although MySpace.com employs a
computer program designed to search for clues that underage members have lied about
their age to create a profile on the Web site, no current technology is foolproof. All members
are cautioned regarding the type of information they release to other users on the Web site,
including a specific prohibition against posting personal information such as telephone
numbers, street addresses, last names, or e-mail addresses. MySpace.com members are also
encouraged to report inaccurate, inappropriate, or obscene material to the Web site’s
administrators.
In the summer of 2005, at age thirteen, Julie Doe (“Julie”) lied about her age, represented
that she was eighteen years old, and created a profile on MySpace.com. This action allowed
her to circumvent all safety features of the Web site and resulted in her profile being made
public; nineteen-year-old Pete Solis (“Solis”) was able to initiate contact with Julie in April
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2006 when she was fourteen. The two communicated offline on several occasions after Julie
provided her telephone number. They met in person in May 2006, and, at this meeting,
Solis sexually assaulted Julie.2…
III. DISCUSSION
In October 1998*, Congress recognized the rapid development of the Internet and the
benefits generated by Web-based service providers to the public. In light of its findings,
Congress enacted the CDA for several policy reasons, including “to remove disincentives for
the development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents
to restrict their children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate online material.” To
achieve that policy goal, Congress provided broad immunity under the CDA to Web-based
service providers for all claims stemming from their publication of information created by
third parties, referred to as the “Good Samaritan” provision. Indeed, “[n]o cause of action
may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is
inconsistent with this section.”
Courts have construed the immunity provisions in § 230 broadly in all cases arising from
the publication of user-generated content. For example, the Ninth Circuit held that a Webbased dating-service provider was not liable when an unidentified party posted a false
online personal profile for a popular actress, causing her to receive sexually explicit phone
calls, letters, and faxes at her home. Acknowledging that the immunity provision in §
230(c)(1) of the CDA causes “Internet publishers [to be] treated differently from
corresponding publishers in print, television and radio,” the Ninth Circuit held that
“[u]nder § 230(c), ... so long as a third party willingly provides the essential published
content, the interactive service provider receives full immunity regardless of the specific
editing or selection process.”
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit dismissed a plaintiff’s claims on the pleadings, holding that
the CDA protects Web-based service providers from liability even after the provider is
notified of objectionable content on its site. The plaintiff in Zeran sued an Internet service
provider for failing to remove upon notice a false advertisement offering shirts featuring
tasteless slogans relating to the 1995 bombing of the Oklahoma City Federal Building and
instructing interested buyers to call the plaintiff to place orders. After analyzing the
immunity provision of § 230, the Fourth Circuit wrote:
If computer service providers were subject to distributor liability, they would
face potential liability each time they receive notice of a potentially
defamatory statement-from any party, concerning any message.... Because
service providers would be subject to liability only for the publication of
information, and not for its removal, they would have a natural incentive
simply to remove messages upon notification, whether the contents were
defamatory or not. Thus, like strict liability, liability upon notice has a
chilling effect on the freedom of Internet speech.... Because the probable
Julie’s mother reported the assault to Austin, Texas police, who arrested Solis and charged him with seconddegree sexual assault.
* [Editor’s note: this date appears to be an error. The DMCA was enacted in October 1998. The CDA was
enacted in February 1996.]
2
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effects of distributor liability on the vigor of Internet speech and on service
provider self-regulation are directly contrary to § 230’s statutory purposes,
we will not assume that Congress intended to leave liability upon notice
intact.
Parties complaining that they were harmed by a Web site’s publication of user-generated
content have recourse; they may sue the third-party user who generated the content, but
not the interactive computer service that enabled them to publish the content online.
The Does appear to agree with the consensus among courts regarding the liability
provisions in § 230(c)(1). They argue, however, that their claims against MySpace do not
attempt to treat it as a “publisher” of information; therefore, they argue that § 230 does not
immunize MySpace from their claims and state tort law applies in full effect. The Does
attempt to distinguish their case from Carafano, Zeran, and other contrary authority by
claiming that this case is predicated solely on MySpace’s failure to implement basic safety
measures to protect minors. The district court rejected the Does’ argument, stating:
The Court, however, finds this artful pleading to be disingenuous. It is quite
obvious the underlying basis of Plaintiffs’ claims is that, through postings on
MySpace, Pete Solis and Julie Doe met and exchanged personal information
which eventually led to an in-person meeting and the sexual assault of Julie
Doe. If MySpace had not published communications between Julie Doe and
Solis, including personal contact information, Plaintiffs assert they never
would have met and the sexual assault never would have occurred. No matter
how artfully Plaintiffs seek to plead their claims, the Court views Plaintiffs’
claims as directed toward MySpace in its publishing, editorial, and/or
screening capacities.
The Does do not present any caselaw to support their argument. In fact, they rely upon the
same line of cases listed above but point to § 230(c)(1)’s grant of immunity to publishers of
third-party content as evidence that their claims are somehow different. Other courts,
however, have examined pleadings similar to the Does’ and have reached the same
conclusion as the district court. For example, in Green, the plaintiff sued a Web-based
service provider after he received a computer virus from a third party and endured
derogatory comments directed at him by others in an online “chat room.” He made a failureto-protect argument similar to the Does’, claiming that “AOL waived its immunity under [§]
230 by the terms of its membership contract with him and because AOL’s Community
Guidelines outline standards for online speech and conduct and contain promises that AOL
would protect [him] from other subscribers.” The Third Circuit, however, dismissed the
claims as barred by § 230, after recharacterizing the plaintiff’s claims:
There is no real dispute that Green’s fundamental tort claim is that AOL was
negligent in promulgating harmful content and in failing to address certain
harmful content on its network. Green thus attempts to hold AOL liable for
decisions relating to the monitoring, screening, and deletion of content from
its network—actions quintessentially related to a publisher’s role. Section
230 “specifically proscribes liability” in such circumstances.
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Green demonstrates the fallacy of the Does’ argument. Their claims are barred by the CDA,
notwithstanding their assertion that they only seek to hold MySpace liable for its failure to
implement measures that would have prevented Julie Doe from communicating with Solis.
Their allegations are merely another way of claiming that MySpace was liable for
publishing the communications and they speak to MySpace’s role as a publisher of online
third-party-generated content.
The Does further argue for the first time on appeal that MySpace is not immune under the
CDA because it partially created the content at issue, alleging that it facilitates its
members’ creation of personal profiles and chooses the information they will share with the
public through an online questionnaire. The Does also contend that MySpace’s search
features qualify it as an “information content provider”, as defined in the CDA: “The term
‘information content provider’ means any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in
part, for the creation or development of information provided through the Internet or any
other interactive computer service.”
Nothing in the record, however, supports such a claim; indeed, Julie admitted that she lied
about her age to create the profile and exchanged personal information with Solis. In the
February 1, 2007 hearing before the district court, the Does admitted that Julie created the
content, disclosing personal information that ultimately led to the sexual assault, but
stressed that their cause of action was rooted in the fact that MySpace should have
implemented safety technologies to prevent Julie and her attacker from meeting:
THE COURT: I want to get this straight. You have a 13-year-old girl who
lies, disobeys all of the instructions, later on disobeys the warning not to give
personal information, obviously, [and] does not communicate with the parent.
More important, the parent does not exercise the parental control over the
minor. The minor gets sexually abused, and you want somebody else to pay
for it? This is the lawsuit that you filed?
MR. ITKIN [Counsel for the Does]: Yes, your Honor.
....
MR. ITKIN: The first point is we’re not complaining about any of the content
that was transmitted between Julie Doe and Pete Solis. Our complaint is
[that] the two of them never should have been able to meet because MySpace
could have implemented technology very simple and technologically—not
simple but technologically and inexpensive age verification software that has
been asked for by attorneys general before the lawsuit happened, or even
done the things they did right after the filing of the lawsuit that would have
prevented these two people from ever meeting. We wanted to keep the foxes
out of the hen house. That’s the first thing, your Honor, is that we’re not
complaining about the content.
Throughout the hearing, the Does stated they had one argument—that MySpace was
negligent for not taking more precautions:
MR. ITKIN: Pete Solis is liable for an assault. But what we’re trying to hold
MySpace liable for isn’t the publishing of a phone number but, rather, we’re
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trying to hold MySpace responsible for not putting in the safety precautions
to keep the two of them separated.
....
THE COURT: Now, I’ve heard all of your arguments on the negligence and
the duty. Now the duty is something that’s bothering me and that’s my next
question to you. But as I read your pleadings, they are just wholly
inapplicable to the Federal Rules of Procedure on fraud. You’ve got no specific
fraud here. And on your negligent misrepresentation, that’s just a rehash of
what you’re already doing. So we’re really talking about one cause of action,
and that is a negligence cause of action. You keep nodding. Do you agree with
that?
MR. ITKIN: I think that is a fair recommendation, a fair statement.
....
MR. ITKIN: Thank you. Your Honor we are not—and I want to be very clear
about this. We are not complaining about any of the content that was
exchanged between Julie Doe and Pete Solis. We understand that that is
something we cannot complain about. Our complaint is only that these two
should have never been allowed to find each other, anyways, if reasonable
safety precautions were put in place. And under congressional law and, we
believe, Texas common law, that’s enough to state a claim.
Although the Does’ complaint alleged that MySpace allowed or encouraged members to post
information after a member’s profile had been created, counsel for the Does reiterated in
the hearing time and again that they had no complaints or allegations regarding the
content of the information posted by Julie or exchanged between Julie and Solis. It appears
that the reference to MySpace’s solicitation of information was solely used to set up the
Does’ argument that MySpace failed to protect Julie by declining to implement ageverification software:
THE COURT: But your client violated every single thing that MySpace says
to do.
MR. ITKIN: Which is your Honor—and true. That is correct, your Honor. But
I will say that that’s a known risk to MySpace. And that’s not just me saying
it, that’s the Attorney General saying it.
THE COURT: Everyone knows people lie. So therefore, should you be liable?
MR. ITKIN: No, your Honor. But when you know of the risk and you know
that the people-there’s potential for lying, all you need to do is put some basic
safety mechanisms in place to prevent—or to circumvent the lying.
THE COURT: So you’ve got the Attorney General of the United States saying
... don’t put your credit card on the internet, but you want them to do it to get
a free space. That’s one of the things.
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MR. ITKIN: That’s one of the things.
THE COURT: Then a driver’s license. Do you know how many people I
sentence here every Friday that have a fake driver’s license?
MR. ITKIN: I can imagine a lot, your Honor.
....
MR. ITKIN: What we really want, your Honor, is there’s a company out
there—I’ll give you an example of one of the companies out there called
Aristotle. Aristotle through public databases if you enter your name, your zip
code, and your birth year can come back with, hey, this person’s real; or you
can enter an e-mail and have verification. So there’s some things to do that
are less intrusive as far as giving people your driver’s license or your Social
Security number.
....
MR. ITKIN: Your Honor, because if [MySpace] had the age verification
software in place, [Julie and Solis] never would have talked in the first place.
They never would have known about each other.
At no time before filing their appeal in this Court did the Does argue that the CDA should
not apply to MySpace because it was partially responsible for creating information
exchanged between Julie and Solis. Because the Does failed to present this argument to the
district court, they are barred from making this argument on appeal. We therefore hold,
without considering the Does’ content-creation argument, that their negligence and gross
negligence claims are barred by the CDA, which prohibits claims against Web-based
interactive computer services based on their publication of third-party content. Because we
affirm the district court based upon the application of § 230(c)(1), there is no need to apply §
230(c)(2), or to assess the viability of the Does’ claims under Texas common law in the
absence of the CDA….
NOTES AND QUESTIONS
What more should social networking sites do to authenticate their users’ ages? See Nicole
Perlroth, Verifying Ages Online Is a Daunting Task, Even for Experts, N.Y. TIMES, June 17,
2012.
Allocation of Responsibility. Consider all of the possible parties who might bear
responsibility for these sexual assaults:
* Pete Solis, the sexual predator. Solis pleaded guilty to criminal charges and was
sentenced to 90 days in jail. From MySpace’s perspective, Solis was an intervening
tortfeasor.
* the teenage victim, who lied to MySpace and made questionable choices.
* the victim’s parents. Arguably, they did not supervise the victim’s online or offline
activities.
* the school. Note that Solis allegedly picked the victim up from school.
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* the parking lot operator where Solis and the victim went to have sex.
* MySpace, which allowed the victim to lie, allowed Solis to find her, and enabled Solis and
the victim to communicate.
Which, if any, of these parties should be liable for the sexual assault? All of them? None of
them? Some subset? When so many parties were “but for” causal contributors to a tragedy,
how should we allocate responsibility among them?
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Zimmerman v. Weis Markets, CV-09-1535 (Penn. Ct. Common Pleas 2011)
Saylor, Judge.
…The case at bar involves an accident that occurred on April 21, 2008 while Zimmerman
was operating a forklift at Weis Markets’ warehouse located in Milton, Pennsylvania.
Zimmerman seeks damages for the injuries caused to his left leg as a result of the accident,
including lost wages, lost future earning capacity, pain and suffering, scarring and
“embarrassment.” He avers that “his health in general has been seriously and permanently
impaired and compromised” and, that “he has sustained a permanent diminution in the
ability to enjoy life and life’s pleasures.” Weis Markets, upon review of the public portion of
Zimmerman’s Facebook page, discovered that his interests included “ridin” and “bike
stunts” and his MySpace page contains more recent photographs depicting Zimmerman
with a black eye and his motorcycle before and after an accident. Additionally, there are
photographs of Zimmerman wearing shorts, and his scar from this accident is clearly
visible. Weis Markets argues that this is relevant because at his deposition, Zimmerman
claimed he never wears shorts because he is embarrassed by his scar. Based on what was
observed on the publicly available portions of Zimmerman’s Facebook and MySpace pages,
Weis Markets believes there may be other relevant information as to Zimmerman’s damage
claims on the non-public portions of his Facebook and MySpace pages.
Zimmerman argues that his privacy interests outweigh the need to obtain the discovery
material.2…
I…
[The court discussed an analogous precedent, Romano v. Steelcase, Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 650
(Suffolk Co. 2010), which said:]
Thus, it is reasonable to infer from the limited postings on Plaintiff’s public
Facebook and MySpace profile pages, that her private pages may contain
materials and information that are relevant to her claims or that may lead to
the disclosure of admissible evidence. To deny Defendant an opportunity [to]
access to these sites not only would go against the liberal discovery policies of
New York favoring pre-trial disclosure, but would condone Plaintiff’s attempt
to hide relevant information behind self-regulated privacy settings.
II
The plaintiff in Romano contended that production of her entries on Facebook and MySpace
would violate her right to privacy, which outweighed the defendant’s need for the
information. However, as Romano aptly noted, “[t]he Fourth Amendment’s right to privacy,
protects people, not places” citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) and the
reasonableness standard imposed thereunder (i.e. a reasonable expectation of privacy). As
In the alternative, Zimmerman also argued that the Court should conduct an in-camera review and decide
what materials should be provided to Weis Markets. This argument is flatly rejected as an unfair burden to
place on the Court, which would not only require the time and resources necessary to complete a thorough
search of these sites, but also would require the Court to guess as to what is germane to defenses which may be
raised at trial.

2
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noted by Romano, it was stated by the United States District Court of New Jersey in Beye
v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of New Jersey, 06-5337 (D.N.J. December 14, 2007):
“[t]he privacy concerns are far less where the beneficiary herself chose to disclose the
information.” Further, Romano found both California and Ohio courts that rejected the
notion of a reasonable expectation of privacy as to MySpace postings. See Moreno v.
Hanford Sentinel Inc., 172 Cal. App. 4th 1125 (Cal. App. 5 Dist. 2009) and Dexter v. Dexter,
2007 WL 1532084 (Ohio App. 11 Dist. 2007). All the authorities recognize that Facebook
and MySpace do not guarantee complete privacy. Facebook’s privacy policy explains that
users post any content on the site at their own risk and informs users that this information
may become publicly available.6 The Romano court therefore concluded:
Thus, when Plaintiff created her Facebook and MySpace accounts, she
consented to the fact that her personal information would be shared with
others, notwithstanding her privacy settings…Since Plaintiff knew that her
information may become publicly available, she cannot now claim that she
had a reasonable expectation of privacy.
In view of the sound, logical approach of the court in Romano, this Court is likewise
persuaded that the argument of Zimmerman that his privacy interests outweigh the
discovery requests is unavailing.
It is well recognized that the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, like New York, provide
for liberal discovery: “Generally, discovery is liberally allowed with respect to any matter,
not privileged, which is relevant to the cause being tried.” Zimmerman placed his physical
condition in issue, and Weis Markets is entitled to discovery thereon. Based on a review of
the publicly accessible portions of his Facebook and MySpace accounts, there is a
reasonable likelihood of additional relevant and material information on the non-public
portions of these sites. Zimmerman voluntarily posted all of the pictures and information
on his Facebook and MySpace sites to share with other users of these social network sites,
and he cannot now claim he possesses any reasonable expectation of privacy to prevent
Weis Markets from access to such information. By definition, a social networking site is the
interactive sharing of your personal life with others; the recipients are not limited in what
they do with such knowledge. With the initiation of litigation to seek a monetary award
based upon limitations or harm to one’s person, any relevant, non-privileged information
about one’s life that is shared with others and can be gleaned by defendants from the
internet is fair game in today’s society. Accordingly, Weis Markets’ Motion to Compel is
granted.
Based on the foregoing, the following Order is entered:
AND NOW, this 19th day of May, 2011, it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff shall provide
all passwords, user names and log-in names for any and all MySpace and Facebook
accounts to Defendant within twenty (20) days from the date hereof. It is FURTHER
ORDERED that Plaintiff shall not take steps to delete or alter existing information and
posts of his MySpace or Facebook accounts.
It is well publicized that Facebook’s privacy policy and its revisions have been the subject of criticism and
controversy that may be never ending. One need only “Google” search the terms “Facebook privacy” for an
exhaustive list of access to articles on the topic.
6
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NOTES AND QUESTIONS
Does this court (and the Romano court) say that posting any public content to a social
networking site eliminates any expectation of privacy in all private content in that account?
Once defense counsel gets access to the account, can they post messages in the plaintiff’s
name? If someone sends the plaintiff/user an instant message/chat while the defense
counsel is reviewing the account, what should defense counsel do?
Assume that a social networking site’s user agreement says that a user cannot share
his/her password with any third party. Could the social networking site object to this
court’s order? Would it strike you as odd if the social networking site had better grounds to
object to the court’s order than the plaintiff/user?
Multiple Identities Are Increasingly Untenable. The caselaw is filled with examples where
litigants say one thing in court and something contrary online. See, e.g., People v. Franco,
2009 WL 3165840 (Cal. App. Ct. 2009):
At about 10:30 a.m. on June 6, 2006, Franco and Henry Chavez were seen
racing each other in their Mustang vehicles on the Ventura Freeway, each
reaching speeds of approximately 100 miles per hour. Franco applied her
brakes while Chavez was directly behind her, causing him to lose control of
his vehicle. The vehicle travelled to the other side of the freeway, flipped,
and landed in a strawberry field. Chavez was killed. Franco did not stop.
Franco testified that she was driving approximately 75 miles an hour on the
freeway when Chavez began tailgating her. When she changed lanes, he
followed her. Noticing that her speed had increased, she tapped on her
brakes to slow down. Chavez veered to avoid hitting her, then lost control of
his vehicle. She saw a plume of dust but kept driving as her boyfriend
advised when she called him on her cell phone. The day before the accident,
however, Franco had written on her MySpace page, “If you find me on the
freeway and you can keep up I have a really bad habit of racing random
people.”
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In re Rolando S., 197 Cal. App. 4th 936 (Cal. App. Ct. 2011)
Franson, Judge.
…FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant was one of several recipients of an unsolicited text message providing the
password to the victim’s email account. Appellant used the victim’s email password and
account to gain access to her Facebook account, where he posted, in her name, prurient
messages on two of her male friends’ pages (walls) and altered her profile description in a
vulgar manner.2 The victim found out about the messages and informed her father, who
removed the messages from her account and later called the police.
Appellant admitted to the police that he posted the messages from the victim’s Facebook
account and altered her profile. A juvenile petition was filed alleging one count of violating
section 530.5, subdivision (a) (willfully obtaining personal identifying information and
using it for an unlawful purpose). After a contested jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court
found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant had committed the crime charged and
sustained the petition.
At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court denied appellant’s motion to reduce the crime
from a felony to a misdemeanor, without prejudice. The court noted its concern with the
short time span between this offense and the disposition of a prior offense—assault with a
deadly weapon (a car), where appellant had driven his car at three girls with the intent of
scaring them. The court found the maximum confinement time for the offense to be three
years, and found the aggregated maximum confinement time to be three years and three
months. The court ordered appellant committed to the Kings County Juvenile Academy
Alpha Program for 90 days to a year, and put him on probation.
DISCUSSION
Section 530.5(a) states in pertinent part:
“Every person who willfully obtains personal identifying information, as
defined in subdivision (b) of Section 530.55, of another person, and uses that
information for any unlawful purpose, including to obtain, or attempt to
obtain, credit, goods, services, real property, or medical information without
the consent of that person, is guilty of a public offense....”
The offense is a “wobbler,” punishable either as a misdemeanor or a felony. Section 530.55,
subdivision (b) includes “unique electronic data” as “personal identifying information.”
“[T]o be guilty under section 530.5, subdivision (a), the defendant must (1) willfully obtain
personal identifying information of another person, and (2) use the identifying information
2 Appellant posted, as the victim, on a male classmate’s wall: “I want to stick your dick in my mouth and then in
my pussy and fuck me really hard and cum on my face.” On another male classmate’s wall he posted: “When we
were dating we should have had sex. I always thought you had a cute dick, maybe we can have sex sometime.”
On the victim’s profile description, appellant posted: “Hey, Face Bookers, [ sic ] I’m [S.], a junior in high school
and college, 17 years young, I want to be a pediatrician but I’m not sure where I want to go to college yet. I have
high standards for myself and plan to meet them all. I love to suck dick.”
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for an unlawful purpose without the person’s consent.” The facts here are not in dispute.
Appellant asserts the facts fail to satisfy the elements of section 530.5(a). We disagree.
A. Appellant Willfully Obtained the Victim’s Email Account Password
Appellant essentially argues that because he made no effort to obtain the password, instead
passively receiving the text message on his cell phone “without his prior knowledge or
consent,” he did not “willfully” obtain the victim’s email account password for purposes of
the statute. Respondent focuses its argument on asserting that appellant “obtained” the
password, and evidenced his willfulness by using the password, rather than deleting it
when he received it. We conclude appellant willfully obtained the victim’s password when
he chose to remember the password from the text message, and later affirmatively used the
password to gain access to the victim’s electronic accounts.
…Appellant freely accepted the password information provided in the text message. While
the text message itself was unsolicited, no evidence suggests appellant was forced to
remember the password or otherwise keep a record of it so that he could use it later, as he
admitted to doing. On the record before us, we conclude that appellant willfully obtained
the password information from the text message, knowing that he was continuing to
possess the password, intending to do so, and was a free agent when securing the password
for his future use.
Moreover, appellant used the email password he willfully obtained from the text message to
then willfully obtain the victim’s Facebook account password. Facebook accounts are linked
to a user’s email account. If the user forgets his or her Facebook password, he or she can
regain access to his or her Facebook account by having Facebook email a verification
procedure to the user’s email address. By completing the Facebook verification procedure,
the user is directed to a Facebook page where they can then reset his or her Facebook
password by entering a new one, which then logs him or her back into the Facebook account
with the new password.
The victim’s father testified the victim’s Facebook password was being changed dozens of
times over several weeks and it was only after they deleted her email account that they
were able to regain control over her Facebook account. Appellant admitted to Officer Lucio
that he used the email account password he received from the text message to gain access
to the victim’s Facebook account. By resetting the victim’s Facebook account password
himself using the above-described process, appellant would have been able to log in to her
account and pose as the victim as he posted on her friends’ walls and on her profile. The
record makes no indication appellant received the victim’s Facebook account password in
another manner. It is reasonable to infer he used this process of resetting the password
through the victim’s email account to gain access to the victim’s Facebook account. Not
only did appellant willfully obtain the email password from the text message, he also
willfully obtained the Facebook account password by purposely using the email account as a
vehicle to alter the Facebook account password.
B. Appellant Used the Victim’s Information for an Unlawful Purpose
Appellant next contends his conduct fails to satisfy the second element of section 530.5(a),
that he “use[d] [the victim’s] information for any unlawful purpose.” He argues that at
most he “possibly defamed” the victim, but asserts that civil torts do not constitute an
“unlawful purpose” for purposes of the statute. Respondent argues appellant’s conduct was
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unlawful under section 647.6, subdivision (a)(1) (annoying or molesting a child). In the
alternative, respondent contends that civil torts constitute an unlawful purpose, and
appellant’s conduct amounted to libel under Civil Code section 45. We disagree with
respondent that appellant’s conduct constituted unlawful behavior under section 647.6,
subdivision (a)(1). However, we hold that intentional civil torts, such as libel, constitute an
“unlawful purpose” for purposes of section 530.5(a), and affirm the judgment.
1. Appellant’s Conduct Was Not Unlawful Under Section 647.6
Section 647.6, subdivision (a)(1) makes it a misdemeanor when a person, “annoys or molests
any child under 18 years of age.” Our Supreme Court has held that the statute requires
“(1) conduct a ‘“normal person would unhesitatingly be irritated by”‘ [citations], and (2)
conduct ‘“motivated by an unnatural or abnormal sexual interest”‘ in the victim [citations].”
We agree with appellant that the facts fail to demonstrate the prosecution satisfied the
second element….
Here, appellant posted three sexually explicit comments from the victim’s account. The
record makes no indication he attempted to contact the victim previously, or that he had
prior encounters with her that would indicate he was motivated by his sexual interest,
abnormal or otherwise. The juvenile court noted he had a girlfriend, and the probation
officer’s report indicates appellant intended his comments to be taken as a joke. We
conclude there is insufficient evidence to support the prosecution’s assertion that
appellant’s conduct was motivated by an unnatural or abnormal sexual interest in the
victim and therefore unlawful under section 647.6.
2. “Any Unlawful Purpose” Includes Causes of Action Under Civil Tort Law
Appellant contends the Legislature intended to limit “any unlawful purpose” to strictly
criminal conduct. We disagree….
Prior to the amendment, identity theft was a misdemeanor crime and had to specifically
involve the perpetrator’s use of the victim’s information “to obtain, or attempt to obtain,
credit, goods, or services” in the name of the victim without his or her consent. In adding
“for any unlawful purpose, including” before the clause beginning “to obtain,” the
amendment expanded the range of unlawful purposes for which a perpetrator could be
found guilty of committing identity theft and specifically denoted the non-exclusive nature
of the list of unlawful purposes set forth in the statute. The Legislature clearly intended to
greatly expand the scope of unlawful conduct underlying the identity theft offense.6…

6 In his reply brief, appellant raised for the first time the argument that section 528.5, which makes it a
misdemeanor to impersonate another person through an internet website for the purposes of harming,
intimidating, threatening, or defrauding another person, makes appellant’s conduct criminal. He argues that
his conduct was not criminal before section 528.5’s effective date, that is, before January 1, 2011.
We note, however, that section 530.5 has different elements from section 528.5. Section 530.5 requires
that a person willfully obtain personal identifying information and use it for an unlawful purpose. Section 528.5
does not include a requirement that a perpetrator obtain personal identifying information. As a result, a person
could violate section 528.5 by merely posting comments on a blog impersonating another person. There is no
requirement, under these circumstances, that the person obtain a password—a key distinction.
Further, section 528.5 does not require the perpetrator act with an unlawful purpose—merely that he
or she acted with the purpose of harming, intimidating, threatening, or defrauding a person. At least the terms
“harming” and “intimidating” do not necessarily have to be done for an unlawful purpose.
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Libel is an intentional tort. Civil Code section 45 defines the civil tort of libel: “Libel is a
false and unprivileged publication by writing, printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed
representation to the eye, which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or
obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure
him in his occupation.” Appellant practically concedes the point, arguing the “prosecution
proved only that [appellant] humiliated, embarrassed, and defamed [the victim].” Here,
appellant wrote sexually explicit and vulgar comments on the victims’ friends’ walls,
accessible by the victims’ friends and acquaintances, and purportedly as her. Appellant
clearly exposed the victim to hatred, contempt, ridicule and obloquy with his actions.9
3. Appellant’s Actions Establish an Unlawful Purpose Under Section 653m
Even assuming that a civil intentional tort failed to constitute an “unlawful purpose” for
purposes of section 530.5, appellant’s conduct was sufficient to satisfy section 530.5 based
on his conduct constituting a criminal offense under section 653m, subdivision (a)
(hereafter section 653m(a)).
Section 653m(a) states in pertinent part: “Every person who, with intent to annoy ... makes
contact by means of an electronic communication device with another and addresses to or
about the other person any obscene language ... is guilty of a misdemeanor.”
Section 653m, subdivision (c) (hereafter section 653m(c)) states in pertinent part: “Any
offense committed by use of an electronic communication device or medium, including the
Internet, may be deemed to have been committed when and where the electronic
communication or communications were originally sent or first viewed by the recipient.”
Appellant’s fraudulent posts as the victim would have shown up on her personal Facebook
page. He also altered her profile on her personal Facebook page. Section 653m(c) makes
clear the offense is committed as of sending the communication. Therefore, appellant
willfully obtained the victim’s Facebook password and then used that information for the
unlawful purpose of violating section 653m(a).
NOTES AND QUESTIONS
Unquestionably, the defendant engaged in bad behavior. Combined with the driving
incident, it also appears the defendant was out-of-control for a period of time. However,
don’t lose sight of the conclusion. This court says that the defendant feloniously stole the
victim’s identity by misusing a password to log into someone else’s Facebook account and
post fake messages in her name. Do you know anyone who has ever done something like
The act of willfully obtaining someone else’s password, and then using it for an unlawful purpose,
justifies more harsh treatment under section 530.5. We believe if appellant had committed these same acts
after January 1, 2011, he could have been charged under both sections 528.5 and 530.5.
9 At the disposition hearing, the victim’s mother read a statement from the victim, which stated: “[l]ast year,
when this started, I had people at school call me a slut and a whore. I had no idea what was going on or what I
had done to be called those names. [¶] After [appellant] was found guilty, some of his friends at school started
wearing “Team [Appellant]” shirts, saying I had made this up to get [appellant] in trouble.” She further related
that, “[appellant’s friends] have ruined half of my junior year and, now, my senior year of school. I used to love
going to school. Now, I dread dealing with this every day.”
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that? Have you? What percentage of teenagers would do something similar to Rolando’s
prank if they obtained a high school peer’s Facebook password?
Do you think there are, or should be, any constitutional limits on a prosecution like this?

335.

Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc., 172 Cal. App. 4th 1125 (Cal. App. Ct. 2009).
Levy, Judge.
The issue presented by this appeal is whether an author who posts an article on
myspace.com can state a cause of action for invasion of privacy and/or intentional infliction
of emotional distress against a person who submits that article to a newspaper for
republication. The trial court concluded not and sustained the demurrer to appellants’
complaint without leave to amend.
Appellants contend the republication constituted a public disclosure of private facts that
were not of legitimate public concern and thus was an invasion of privacy. Appellants note
that the republication included the author’s last name whereas the myspace.com posting
did not. Appellants further argue that the person who submitted the article to the
newspaper did so with the intent of punishing appellants and thus they have a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
As discussed in the published portion of this opinion, the trial court properly sustained the
demurrer without leave to amend to appellants’ invasion of privacy cause of action. The
facts contained in the article were not private. Rather, once posted on myspace.com, this
article was available to anyone with internet access. As discussed in the nonpublished
portion, the trial court should have overruled the demurrer to the intentional infliction of
emotional distress cause of action. Under the circumstances here, a jury should determine
whether the alleged conduct was outrageous. Accordingly, the judgment will be affirmed in
part and reversed in part.
BACKGROUND…
Following a visit to her hometown of Coalinga, appellant, Cynthia Moreno, wrote “An ode to
Coalinga” (Ode) and posted it in her online journal on myspace.com. The Ode opens with
“the older I get, the more I realize how much I despise Coalinga” and then proceeds to make
a number of extremely negative comments about Coalinga and its inhabitants. Six days
later, Cynthia removed the Ode from her journal. At the time, Cynthia was attending the
University of California at Berkeley. However, Cynthia’s parents, appellants David and
Maria Moreno, and Cynthia’s sister, appellant Araceli Moreno, were living in Coalinga.
Araceli was a student at Coalinga High School.
Respondent, Roger Campbell, was the principal of Coalinga High School and an employee of
respondent, Coalinga-Huron Unified School District. The day after Cynthia removed the
Ode from her online journal, appellants learned that Campbell had submitted the Ode to
the local newspaper, the Coalinga Record, by giving the Ode to his friend, Pamela Pond.
Pond was the editor of the Coalinga Record.
The Ode was published in the Letters to the Editor section of the Coalinga Record. The Ode
was attributed to Cynthia, using her full name. Cynthia had not stated her last name in her
online journal.
The community reacted violently to the publication of the Ode. Appellants received death
threats and a shot was fired at the family home, forcing the family to move out of Coalinga.
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Due to severe losses, David closed the 20-year-old family business.
Based on the publication of the Ode, appellants filed the underlying complaint alleging
causes of action for invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress. In
addition to respondents, appellants named Lee Enterprises, Inc., Lee Enterprises
Newspapers, Inc., and Hanford Sentinel, Inc., the publishers of the Coalinga Record, as
defendants. However, these publisher defendants were dismissed following their motion to
strike the complaint as a SLAPP suit (strategic lawsuits against public participation)
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. Appellants abandoned their appeal
from this judgment.
DISCUSSION
1. Appellants did not state a cause of action for invasion of privacy.
The right to privacy tort was recognized in 1890 based on the trend in tort law to extend
protection to “‘the right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent [a person’s] thoughts,
sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others.’” In other words, the tort
protects “a ‘right “to be let alone.”‘“ In 1972, the right to privacy was added to the California
Constitution by initiative.
To state a claim for violation of the constitutional right of privacy, a party must establish
(1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy under the
circumstances; and (3) a serious invasion of the privacy interest. Four distinct kinds of
activities have been found to violate this privacy protection and give rise to tort liability.
These activities are: (1) intrusion into private matters; (2) public disclosure of private facts;
(3) publicity placing a person in a false light; and (4) misappropriation of a person’s name or
likeness. Each of these four categories identifies a distinct interest associated with an
individual’s control of the process or products of his or her personal life. However, to prevail
on an invasion of privacy claim, the plaintiff must have conducted himself or herself in a
manner consistent with an actual expectation of privacy.
Here, the allegations involve a public disclosure of private facts. The elements of this tort
are: “‘(1) public disclosure (2) of a private fact (3) which would be offensive and objectionable
to the reasonable person and (4) which is not of legitimate public concern.’” The absence of
any one of these elements is a complete bar to liability.
a. Having been published on myspace.com, the Ode was not private.
As noted above, a crucial ingredient of the applicable invasion of privacy cause of action is a
public disclosure of private facts. A matter that is already public or that has previously
become part of the public domain is not private.
Here, Cynthia publicized her opinions about Coalinga by posting the Ode on myspace.com,
a hugely popular internet site. Cynthia’s affirmative act made her article available to any
person with a computer and thus opened it to the public eye. Under these circumstances, no
reasonable person would have had an expectation of privacy regarding the published
material.
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As pointed out by appellants, to be a private fact, the expectation of privacy need not be
absolute. Private is not equivalent to secret. “[T]he claim of a right of privacy is not ‘“so
much one of total secrecy as it is of the right to define one’s circle of intimacy—to choose
who shall see beneath the quotidian mask.”‘ Information disclosed to a few people may
remain private.” Nevertheless, the fact that Cynthia expected a limited audience does not
change the above analysis. By posting the article on myspace.com, Cynthia opened the
article to the public at large. Her potential audience was vast.
That Cynthia removed the Ode from her online journal after six days is also of no
consequence. The publication was not so obscure or transient that it was not accessed by
others. The only place that Campbell could have obtained a copy of the Ode was from the
internet, either directly or indirectly.
Finally, Cynthia’s last name was not a private fact. Although her online journal only used
the name “Cynthia,” it is clear that her identity was readily ascertainable from her
MySpace page. Campbell was able to attribute the article to her from the internet source.
There is no allegation that Campbell obtained Cynthia’s identification from a private
source. In fact, Cynthia’s MySpace page included her picture. Thus, Cynthia’s identity as
the author of the Ode was public. In disclosing Cynthia’s last name, Campbell was merely
giving further publicity to already public information. Such disclosure does not provide a
basis for the tort.
b. The other members of Cynthia’s family do not have an independent cause of action for
invasion of privacy.
Based on the direct damages they allegedly incurred due to publication of the Ode,
Cynthia’s parents, David and Maria, and Cynthia’s sister, Araceli, argue that they have
standing to sue for invasion of privacy. However, because the publication of the Ode was
not an invasion of Cynthia’s privacy, these appellants cannot state a claim based on the
same alleged invasion.
Moreover, the right of privacy is purely personal. It cannot be asserted by anyone other
than the person whose privacy has been invaded. Thus, even if Cynthia did have an
invasion of privacy claim, David, Maria and Araceli would not have standing. The Coalinga
Record did not identify David, Maria and Araceli when it published the Ode. Their invasion
of privacy claim is primarily based on their relationship to Cynthia and the community
reaction to Cynthia’s opinions, not on respondents’ conduct directed toward them.
In sum, because the Ode was not private, appellants’ claim is precluded under California
privacy tort law.4 Accordingly, the trial court properly sustained the demurrer to the
invasion of privacy cause of action.

4 Whether the publication of the Ode infringed on any federal copyright protection the Ode may have had is not
before this court and we express no opinion on that issue.
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2. A jury must determine whether respondents’ conduct was sufficiently extreme and
outrageous to result in liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress.*
“The elements of a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress are (1)
outrageous conduct by the defendant, (2) intention to cause or reckless disregard of the
probability of causing emotional distress, (3) severe emotional suffering, and (4) actual and
proximate causation of the emotional distress.”
To be outrageous, conduct must be so extreme that it exceeds all bounds of that usually
tolerated in a civilized community. However, conduct that might not otherwise be
considered extreme and outrageous may be found to be so if a (1) defendant abuses a
relation or position that gives him power to damage the plaintiff’s interest; (2) knows the
plaintiff is susceptible to injuries through mental distress; or (3) acts intentionally or
unreasonably with the recognition that the acts are likely to result in illness through
mental distress.
It is for the court to determine in the first instance whether the defendant’s conduct may
reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery. In making this
determination, the court employs an objective standard applied to the actual conduct, i.e.,
how reasonable people might view it, excluding from that category those who are either
overly sensitive or callous. But, “‘[w]here reasonable men may differ, it is for the jury,
subject to the control of the court, to determine whether, in the particular case, the conduct
has been sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in liability.’” Here, the trial court
concluded that Campbell’s conduct did not meet the standard of outrageousness necessary
to constitute a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress as a matter of
law.
In stating their claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, appellants alleged that
Campbell submitted the Ode to the Coalinga Record, knowing he did not have permission to
do so. Appellants further alleged that Campbell engaged in this act to punish appellants for
the contents of the Ode and intended to cause them emotional distress. Appellants contend
that this conduct was extreme and outrageous, especially in light of Campbell’s position as
Araceli’s principal.
Since this appeal is from the sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend, this court
must assume the truth of appellants’ allegations against Campbell. Based on these
allegations, we conclude that reasonable people may differ on whether Campbell’s actions
were extreme and outrageous. Accordingly, it is for a jury to make this determination.
Thus, the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the intentional infliction of
emotional distress cause of action….

*

[Editor’s note: this portion of the opinion was not certified for publication.]

339.

NOTES AND QUESTIONS
The Full Text of Moreno’s Post as Published in the Coalinga Record:
An ode to Coalinga
So, after three years, I decided to go to Coalinga for the football homecoming.
I didn’t go to see who I would run into, because running into friends from the
past is inevitable. I have to say, that the older I get, the more I realize how
much I despise Coalinga.
Every time I look at where I am at, where I am going and what I have
become, I can’t help but look at everyone else as if they haven’t matured nor
broken out of the Coalinga norms; I don’t blame them. Its actually a little
pathetic and sad! These people have a lot, and I mean, a lot to learn, alot to
experience, and more to overcome. They are merely beginning new phases in
their lives that will prove more difficult as time goes by. I don’t give them my
sympathy for I was always two steps ahead of the game; always had the
advantage of being far and secluded from everyone in Coalinga because I had
ambitions and aspirations that kept me focused. I never diverted from what
was more important in my life; and with that note, I still haven’t.
I’m on my way to becoming a lawyer. One bad *** corporate latina lawyer
who is not going to take *** from anyone, or anything. Ill be up there soon
enough to help out mi rata in every way possible. Looking back at the people
I saw in Coalinga this weekend...I pity them. They say that the friendships
you make in college are the ones that are true and the ones that last a
lifetime. I’m a firm believer in that.
When I look back to my friends from Coalinga, I don’t miss a single moment
with them because the moments were never real. Instead, I find that here in
college, I am immersed in an intellectual environment where individuals here
value hard work and commitment in all aspects of their lives, and who have
worked their asses off to come to a school as prestigious as UCB...those are
the friends I admire; the people who can hold conversations of substance and
value…people whom are going to be doctors, and lawyers, politicians,
psychologists, etc...in a society where we will all stand aside one another
because we have all been through the educational struggles similarly.
I don’t care much for Coalinga. or the people that reside there or the friends I
used to have while being there. In comparison to my college friends, they are
nothing, were nothing, and remain nothing. In a nutshell, their histories and
reputations are so denigrating and their focuses are set on such superficial
and unimportant things that breaking out of it for an instant scares
them....it’s no wonder they always come back to Coalinga...they can never be
strong enough to befriend any one else in other places, unless its through
others, or stand alone or for themselves to become accomplished. They can’t
do it without their “cliques” their “gossip” and especially their ‘jealousy.” The
sight of success is unbeknownst to them, just as much as their fervor for
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being involved with others businesses abhors me. Why don’t they focus on
themselves and see their status in society? Its nothing...so get over
yourselves. How terribly sad. It must be a small town thing...or maybe a
close-minded group of individuals who are afraid of change. I think inside
these individuals (and you all know who you are) know they can’t make it in
life. Their only way of success is by criticizing those around them, as if doing
so will make them feel better about themselves. You all have alot to learn...I
pray to God that you see the light one day. Because when you do, (even if you
never do), we are all going to be on top. You think you got us fooled? Im a
smarter cookie than you think.
So for an ode to Coalinga; I have none. I only value the few that have
contributed to my success, those teachers, mentors and family who have kept
the positive path looking brighter and brighter. Who the hell wouldn’t want
to get out of Coalinga to come to a school like CAL...and experience
everything that I have thus far? That’s right ******...envy me because thats
all you can do....literally, that is all you can do...and I mean that on more
than one symbolic level and interpret and talk about this like you never have
before, because that is all that you really can do...talk nonsense **** because
you are nothing....
So glad to be out of that damn town!
Gracias a dios,
Cynthia Moreno
Editor’s Note
It saddens us to know that a product of this community, a community that
takes such pride in its youth, would have such negative thoughts of what was
once their home. This article was found on the Internet and submitted for
publication.
Questions. In addition to the claims discussed above, did Moreno have any other claims she
could have brought? Did MySpace have any legal claims?
Denouement. In September 2010, a jury ruled that Campbell acted outrageously but did
not owe any damages. Both Moreno and Principal Campbell have found greener pastures
outside the courtroom. Principal Campbell was promoted to superintendent of the
Coalinga-Huron Joint Unified School District. Moreno temporarily flunked out of UC
Berkeley due to the stress, but she regained admittance after some time at a local
community college. As of 2010, she was a reporter for the Fresno Spanish-language
newspaper Vida en el Valle, but she has not (yet) become a bad-ass corporate Latina lawyer.
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